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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY STUDENT HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

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PREFACE

In the spring of 1966 the Loyola University Student Historical Association had its inception. This journal is a direct outgrowth and natural function of the Association. Our purpose--the communication of the past into the practical realities of the present--has meaning and validity only in the context of history as the science of man in time. The very root of the word history implies research. No student becomes a scholar, no scholar a master, until he has experienced history: history in terms of its roots: research.

The papers of which this journal is comprised are examples of the works of students of our University who have sought the distinction of scholar. These papers are by no means exhaustive of the works submitted, but they represent a cross-section of the interests of the department. Our initial venture is necessarily small, but it is our hope and dream to expand in size and in respect among the scholars not only of our own academic community, but of all who share our love of history.

H.M.M.
A.E.H.

ESSAYS

THE DEPUTY: THE PAPACY AND JUDAISM IN WORLD WAR II

Submitted by:

Maryann McClain

The Deputy, in portraying as accurately as possible an historical event, namely the great silence of Pius XII during the execution of six million Jews by Hitler's machine in World War II, represents a truly profound piece of drama, a call to conscience to the entire Christian world which, when faced with this hideous crime, turned its back and committed that greatest of all crimes: the refusal to speak out against it.

Dante, in his catalogue of human failings, sets up a special place for those who, in the difficult moments of a great crisis, choose to maintain their neutrality. In his play, The Deputy, Rolf Hochhuth assigns just that role to Pius XII, as symbolic of all of Christian Europe, who in his refusal to speak out officially against the slaughter of the Jews in World War II, clearly failed in his duty as a moral and religious leader.[1]

In treating The Dputy as a piece of drama, it is well to remember that it is the role of the playwright to take the existing facts, to unravel the confusion, and to impose upon it some kind of order; theatre is, after all, a vehicle for exposing relevant truth. Because the play in consideration is also historical drama, the author has attempted to stick as closely as possible to actual historical fact.[2] This does not always make for good art; but in spite of the fact that Hochhuth's play is a bit botchy and perhaps crude in spots, it is nevertheless a most soul gripping piece of drama. In drawing for material from memories, biographies, diaries, letters, and more specifically from documents taken from Wehrmacht and Nuremberg Court Archives, Hochhuth merely voices the opinions that the late Pope, like so many other conservative Europeans, was reported to have held by neutral ambassadors to Rome. Such a stand came to view the Reich as the only bulwark against Communist aggression and considering Hitler's military tactics excusable as means to an end, offered for his many victims only prayers and silence.[3]

In maintaining silence during the deportation and execution of the Jews of Europe, Pius XII entered a position of official neutrality; moreover, during the war years, high papal officials let it be known that the Pope did not want to jeopardize that neutrality by a condemnation, or to risk later charges that the Vatican may have contributed to German defeat.[4] In counter-attacking the wave of anti-papal sentiment in recent discussions of the controversial play, some Catholic officials have denounced the playwright's characterization of the late Pope as a cold and calculating skeptic, claiming it to be unfair and slanderous. Asserting that the Pope's inaction was providential, spokesmen such as Father Robert Leiber, Pius's secretary during the war years, claim that in pursuing this course of action-- or rather inaction-- the

Vatican sought to avert greater harm, that the Pope could best aid the Jews by not speaking, but by quietly aiding them.[5]

Such an explanation, however, falls short of being very convincing; for what harm could possibly have been greater than the already existing crime of Hitler's machine, a crime so hideous that the imagination cannot totally conceive the impact of a segment of history so grossly unbelievable![6] Such an explanation surely does not justify the awful silence of the world's highest spiritual authority in the face of this most staggering crime. Perhaps an answer will never be found to the haunting question, "why?" posed within the play; nevertheless, it is necessary to go more deeply into the reasons that may have motivated the Vatican's firm stand of neutrality, to examine this portion of historical fact for what it is.

In the early 1930's, at the time of the framing of the famous Concordat on the part of Hitler and the Vatican, it was Pius XII, then Eugenio Pacelli and secretary of state to Pius XI, who did all in his power to bring about a speedy conclusion to the arrangements.[7] Speaking of the Concordat, Chancellor Brüning in 1935 said, "Behind the agreement with Hitler stood not the Pope, but the Vatican bureaucracy and its leader, Pacelli. They visualized an authoritarian state and an authoritarian Church directed by the Vatican bureaucracy, the two to conclude an eternal league with one another."[8] Although Pacelli later contributed nobler motives to the dictatorially minded agreement, insisting in 1946 that if Hitler so persecuted the Church in spite of the agreement, he would have done much worse without it. That clever politician Hitler, however, saw other motives also, for he let it be known in inner circles that he intended to use just that agreement to create an "area of confidence" useful in the Nazi struggle to demolish International Judaism.[9]

That the Papacy considered German National Socialism a defense against the rise of Russian Bolshevism is fairly evident. Pius believed Hitler to be the defender of the West against Communism.[10] Oxford historian Hugh Trevor-Roper even charges that the Pope had a definite preference for Fascism-- not for the brutal Nazism into which it developed during the war, but for the type of authoritarian monarchy which it represented.[11]

Whether ot not this view can be relied upon is of course debatable. But the fact remains that the Pope did have a sincere and genuine love for the German people[12]. When the United States warned Pius that his silence concerning the barbarity of the Hitler campaign was damaging faith both in the Holy Father and in the Church itself, the Papacy replied that it was doing all in its power to alleviate the sufferings of all of the afflicted peoples of the world. And in 1942, when Myron Taylor, wartime U.S. representative to the Vatican sent confirmed intelligence reports of mass murders of Jews, asking if the Papacy had any practical suggestions as to "any practical manner in which the forces of civilized opinion could be utilized to prevent a continuation of these barbarities," the reply merely came that the Vatican had no way of verifying such reports.[13]

The Pope certainly could not claim ignorance, however, when in 1943, "right under the windows of the Vatican" as Hochhuth so adeptly phrases it, Hitler's soldiers rounded up the Jews of Rome and carted them off to Auschwitz from the very shadow of St. Peter's.[14]

In his two most memorable wartime messages, Christmas, 1942 and Spring, 1943, the Pope expressed sympathy for all persecuted peoples and concern for the horrors of war, but nowhere does he ever specifically mention the Jews. The very rhetoric of the messages, in the style of typical vagueness and empty generalities, could just as easily have referred to a Serbian peasant as to the Jews.[15] "Although under pressure from all sides," says Herr von Weizsäcker, Hitler's ambassador to the Vatican, "The Pope has not let himself be drawn into any demonstrative censure of the deportation of the Jews from Rome... he has done everything he could in this delicate matter not to strain relations with the German government and the German circles in Rome."[16]

What remains most puzzling, perhaps, is the fact that, even in the face of certain German defeat, the Pope could not find his voice to condemn Hitler. In June, 1944, when the Vatican and all of Rome resided under the protection of American troops, the fires of Auschwitz operated at full capacity, reaching the highest quota of daily killings. And these events concurred with reports from escaped prisoners who related detailed accounts and drawings of the Auschwitz camp to papal authorities, with articles and photographs in journals such as London Illustrated of the horrors of this human death factory-- human bones-- clothes of gassed women and children-- the hideous ovens of the crematoria.[17] Certainly at such a point Pius XII, the world's leading religious and moral spokesman could have troubled himself to speak a word concerning these barbarities-- if only acting in a humanitarian vein.[18] But the Pope remained silent, perhaps not realizing the extent of his power, perhaps realizing but for some mysterious reason unwilling to act. And perhaps also it might be said, in retrospect, that history contains no other incident in which so many people paid the price of their lives because of the passivity of a single statesman.[19] "Hundreds of thousands of European families," says Hochhuth, describing a scene in Act IV of the play, "including a number of nuns and monks-- on their way to the gas chambers, abandoned by everyone, abandoned even by the Deputy of Christ. So it was in Europe from 1941 to 1944."[20]

The hero of the play is a young Jesuit priest, Riccardo Fontana, a character clearly drawn from the acts and aims of Provost Bernhard Lichtenberg who was sentenced to death after coming forth publicly to pray for the Jews and asking to share their fate.[21] Taking the Star of David from his pocket in Act IV, after petitioning the Pope to no avail to speak out openly, he pins the emblem upon his cassock declaring before Pius that he will wear the star until the Pope "proclaims before the world a curse upon the man who slaughters Europe's Jews like cattle." Continuing his monologue he says firmly and quietly that, "God shall not destroy His Church only because a Pope shrinks from his summons."[22] Pius, the Deputy of Christ, is thus superseded by Riccardo, the Deputy of Pius.

The play, therefore raises an existential question; for in Act V the question of silence is carried to God Himself as is suggested by the title, "Auschwitz, or where are You God?" For why should Riccardo give up his life for the Jews and cling to a belief in God when, in the reality of actual experiences, he finds nothing to support such a belief?[23] No stage could realistically envision Auschwitz; the imagination could not totally grasp its grotesqueness. Today sightseers visit the place, tending to push its history into the subconscious of their minds, treating it more as legend, hardly conceiving that a mere twenty years ago, the horrors of a human death factory actually existed there.[24]

In a series of monologues in Act V, the setting is thus represented by a bare stage, and the prisoners are seen in almost complete darkness:

OLD MAN: I can no longer contend with you terrible
God, no longer pray, only beseech you:
Do not let me die in the car,
Not where my grandchildren can see.[25]

GIRL: Cold, God is cold as the pomp of San
Giovanni's. It's nothing to Him that this
Woman next to me will never bear her child,
That I will never be yours.
Cold, God is cold; my hands grow numb
When I try to fold them to pray with.
And the gods of the ancients are dead as
Their legends, dead as the antique rubble
in the Vatican museum, the morgue of art.[26]

Riccardo himself expresses these sentiments in a speech towards the end of the play when he finds himself too at Auschwitz, forced by the sadistic Doctor, master of the death factory, to assist in the burning of bodies:

For the past week
I have been burning the dead ten hours a day.
And with every human body that I burn
a portion of my faith burns also.
God burns.
Corpses-- a conveyor belt of corpses.
History is a highway paved with carrion...
If I knew that He looks on--
(With revulsion.) I would have to-- hate Him.[27]

In defending the Pope's stand of passivity, certain Catholic spokesmen have cited examples of the Vatican treasury supplying food, money and refuge in monasteries to the victims.[28] Indeed, Pius's heart was with the victims-- "But his voice... where is his voice?" Riccardo asks in Act II.[29]

Moreover, all claims that this passivity was the best policy do not hold ground in view of the fact that, in every instance that

papal intervention was threatened or even mentioned by Nuncios acting individually, deportations were halted at least temporarily. In fact, after the entry of the United States into the war, papal legations and German bishops representing the Vatican seemed to be the only authorities that Hitler did take into consideration as as not to offend too seriously a power which he know could sway much opinion against him.[30]

Even had an official denunciation by the Pope not in some way halted the extermination program (a hardly tenable idea), certainly it would have drawn support to the allied cause. When an Italian newsman asked Pius, however, why he did not condemn the Nazi atrocities for what they were, he is quoted as having said, "Dear friend, do not forget that millions of Catholics serve in the German armies. Shall I bring them into conflicts of conscience?"[31] But were there not Catholics fighting on all sides? Such a statement tends to underestimate the intelligence faculties, reducing the power of an individual to think and judge for himself. "Can the Vicar of Christ on earth," says political commentator Sebastian Haffner, "like a world statesman, act only if he has expectations of success? Aren't there some cases when he must speak, even when nothing is improved, and some things may even be made worse?"[32]

It is thus that Hochhuth uses Pius as a symbol of the deteriorated state into which all of German Christendom had fallen. For it was not only Pius who had fostered silence. Yet there are those who have protested against the play, claiming that it could have damaging effects upon interfaith relations between Judaism and Christianity. But if such a movement involves hiding the truth, of what value is it?[33]

What happened to Hitler's six million victims can never be re-created through any medium, even through that most effective medium of theatre. Says Max Ascoli, editor and publisher of <u>The Reporter</u>, "There is no way to relegate that horror to the past; the past cannot hold it. It cannot be disposed of."[34]

That is why again and again someone is singled out on whom the guilt can be centered. Says Ascoli, "The attempt failed when it was thought that the protagonist could be found in that wretched little breaucrat called Eichmann, as it has failed now that so eminent a man as a late head of the Catholic Church has been indicted for inaction."[35] The fact remains, however, that Christianity should be reminded; although truth often comes psychologically at the wrong moment, it nevertheless must be revealed. And this is the playwright's stock-in-trade.

FOOTNOTES

1 Newsweek, LXIII (March 2, 1964), 78

2 Rolf Hochhuth, The Deputy, trans. R . & C. Winston (New York: Grove Press, 1964), p. 287

3 New Yorker, XXXIX (Dec. 28, 1963), 54.

4 Newsweek, LXIII (March 2, 1964), 79.

5 "The Papacy: Pius XII and the Jews," Time, LXXX (Nov. 1, 1963), 85-6.

6 Ibid., p. 85.

7 New Republic, CL (March 14, 1964), 23.

8 Hochhuth, The Deputy, p. 296.

9 Ibid., p. 298.

10 "The Papacy," Time, p. 86.

11 Newsweek, LXIII (March 2, 1964), 79.

12 Reporter, XXX (Jan. 30, 1964), 49

13 Newsweek, LXIII (March 2, 1964), p. 79.

14 Ibid., p. 79.

15 Hochhuth, The Deputy, p. 349.

16 Newsweek, LXIII (March 2, 1964), p. 79.

17 Hochhuth, The Deputy, p. 298-299.

18 Ibid., p. 304.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., p. 312

21 Reporter, XXX (Jan. 30, 1964), 46.

22 Hochhuth, The Deputy, pps. 217, 220.

23 Nation, CXCVIII (March 16, 1964), p. 277.

24 Hochhuth, The Deputy, p. 223.

25 Ibid., p. 224

[26] Ibid., p. 225-226.

[27] Ibid., p. 270

[28] Newsweek, LXIII (March 2, 1964), p. 78.

[29] Hochhuth, The Deputy, p. 100.

[30] Ibid., p. 328.

[31] Newsweek, LXIII (March 2, 1964), p.78.

[32] Reporter, XXX (Jan. 30, 1964), p. 46.

[33] New Republic, CL (March 14, 1964), p. 25.

[34] Reporter, XXX (Jan. 30, 1964), 43.

[35] Ibid.

THE ODER-NEISSE LINE

Submitted by:

Walter D. Sagrera

The question of the Oder-Neisse frontier which today divides Germany from Poland must be analyzed from both its ideological and its power aspects. Until some agreement is found on this boundary question, there can be no permanent peace in Europe.

On the ideological level, Poland attempts to justify her claims to these territories on the basis of the maximum extension of the Piast dynasty, whose lands were partitioned in 1138. The modern Poles claim racial affinity to the original inhabitants of these areas. Poland lost 71,000 square miles of territory to the Soviet Union when the Curzon Line was made the eastern boundary of Poland after World War II. Stalin led the fight to compensate Poland with the former German territories east of the Oder and Western Neisse rivers. These include Pomerania, Silesia and part of Prussia.

The German claims are based on German evangalization of the area beginning in 1252, on the conquests of the Teutonic Knights, and on centuries of settlement and possession by Germany. Most Germans insist that the frontiers of 1937 are the true frontiers of Germany and emphasize the maltreatment and suffering of the 7½ million Germans forced to leave these territories after the institution of the Polish administration. Refugee newspapers in Germany constantly report the failures of the Polish "colonization," propogate the myth of the million Germans still living in Poland, sponsor "treffens" where refugees from the same area of the East can fraternize and reminisce, and describe the Polish feeling of "Vorlanefigkeit"--anxiety at the impermanence of their tenure. Germans have accepted the "right to one's homeland" as a basic freedom and it was political suicide in the past to acquiese on the question in the face of the political power of the refugees.

The proximate cause of the dispute is the Potsdam Protocol which stated that, pending the peace conference to settle the German question, "...the three heads of government agree that ...the former German territories east of a line...shall be under the administration of the Polish State and for such purpose should not be considered a part of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany." Polish administration, intended as a temporary affair, has become the new status quo.

These territories are the central heart of Europe, an area where conflicts have brought war to all Europe and the world twice in this century. To the German mind the status quo is a monstrous usurpation, and even Winston Churchill has written that "For the future peace of Europe here was a wrong beside which Alsace-Lorraine

and the Danzig Corridor were but trifles." Konrad Adenauer refused to discuss the "legal" claims of Germany until negotiation of an all-German Peace Treaty. He eventually hoped for a re-unification of East and West Germany and a Polish-German condominion over the East.

Several factors have emerged in the last ten years which might temper German opposition to a settlement. Continued Polish administration and the scarce likelihood of a German settlement soon have given Poland a more substantial claim through continuing its twenty-one year occupation. West Germany desires closer friendship and commercial ties with the Eastern European countries. The economic boom and prosperity of former refugees have whittled support of the refugee associations and from the All-German People's Party.

Poland is also held in a precarious position with the failure to find a solution. While Polish settlement is established, only the Soviet Union among the great powers has recognized the validity of her claims.

The position of the Western powers on this question is indeed critical. A new expulsion of the 5 million Poles hardly seems moral to justify the exodus of the 7½ million Germans. These territories, and particularly Silesia are essential to Poland economy and of less consequence to Germany.

Would Western acceptance of the Oder-Neisse frontier be a realistic acceptance of the existing power balance? Could Poland be wooed from the Soviet camp by an assurance of secure boundaries? Would German "Drang nach Osten" be stimulated by Western acquiescence? These answers must be determined. The present situation is provisional and will remain provisional until Germany and the West agree to a realistic policy, even though acceptance of this line would be affording some recognition to the Soviet puppet-state, the German Democratic Republic. No real peace is possible until this issue is resolved.

THEMES

THE MAKING OF THE COMPROMISE: 1850

Submitted by:

Jeanie Conner

By the end of 1850 Clay's Compromise had allegedly settled the question of expansion of slavery into the territories. In actuality, the compromise merely caused a slight setback to continuing verbal warfare between North and South. Within a decade the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, Bleeding Kansas, Harper's Ferry, and Fort Sumter would become indelible instances of conflict ending a civil war. The success or failure of the compromise may be argued for years, for it was successful----in that war was averted for ten years. Its failure can be seen only in the light of hindsight and is not to be attributed to the shortcomings of a blundering generation. The men of 1850 were not blunderers and to understand the real necessity of their Compromise, one must understand the age.

Since the Compromise of 1820, the union had moved steadily toward disruption. It was not Nicholas Biddle and the Second Bank of the United States, nor Fanny Wright and social reform, nor even the question of slavery in the South which pushed the nation to the brink of conflagration, but rather the issue of expansion of slavery into the territories. Senator Butler of South Carolina, realizing the certainty of the crises during the Mexican War, announced in the Senate in 1847:

> Mr. President, we are certainly in a difficult position. If we quit the (Mexican) War, it will be apparently with dishonor. If we go on, it must end in mischief. The truth is, we are like a shepherd who has got the wolf by the ears. It is hazardous to let go--it is worse to hold on.[1]

The "firebell in the night" did not awaken the nation and as Jefferson wrote to John Holmes, the 1820 agreement was "a reprieve only, and not a final sentence."[2] In thirty years only eight states had been admitted to the union, and in 1850, fifteen free states faced fifteen slave states and each sought the winning of the West.

Sectionalism had been a power struggle between Northeast and Southeast from Colonial times as each sought Western domination and as the frontier moved ever westward. By the 1840's the West had come into its own. John C. Fremont explored the Rocky Mountains, reached the Pacific Ocean, and played a leading role in the conquest of California; Texas and Iowa were admitted to the union; the Mormons established the State of Deseret; the war with Mexico was entered and ended; the Oregon Treaty was approved; gold was discovered near Sacramento; and many went West to grow up with the Country. And David Wilmot of Pennsylvania offered a proviso in

the House of Representatives whereby slavery would be excluded from newly acquired Mexican territories.

There was economic as well as political rivalry between North and South, and the strife could be defined in terms of industry versus agriculture. That rivalry grew in the growing West, and railroads pushed toward the Pacific at Mid-Century. A Southern writer aired his views in 1847 in DeBow's Commercial Review:

> A contest has been going on between the North and South not limited to slavery or no slavery-- to abolition or no abolition, not to politics of either Whigs or Democrats as such, but a contest for the wealth and commerce of the great valley of the Mississippi--a contest tendered by our Northern brethren, whether the growing commerce be thrown upon New Orleans or given to the cities.[3]

In the election of 1848, Zachary Taylor defeated Democrat Lewis Cass and Free Soiler Martin Van Buren. Taylor had described himself as a Whig, but not an ultra-Whig. No one really knew what an ultra-Whig was, and no one really cared. Taylor was a hero and the Democratic split ensured his election. It was this Louisiana plantation-owner President who would seek to deal with the problems of territorial expansion, and the major battleground would be the Senate Chamber of the United States.

As they filed into their seats in the Senate Chamber and the House of Representatives, on December 3, 1849, the men of The Thirty-First Congress knew the session ahead would be a grueling one. Free Soilers were demanding the adoption of Wilmot's Proviso; Texas and New Mexico were embroiled in a boundary dispute; Northern abolitionists cried for abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia as well as of slave trade in the district; and the South insisted upon a stronger enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act.

Clay of Kentucky was returning after an eight-year, self-imposed exile and a final unsuccessful bid for the Presidency. Champion of the American System, Clay had sponsored the two great Compromises of the century in 1820 and in 1833. At seventy-two years of age, the Senator from Kentucky would again be called upon to assume the role of the Great Compromiser. Webster of Massachusetts, the "god-like Daniel," was present. To him the preservation of the union was paramount; and when he spoke in 1850, he spoke "not as a Massachusetts man,. . . but as an American." And the South's shining knight John C. Calhoun struggled down the aisle to take his place among the others. Stark and gaunt, he was no longer Harriet Martineau's "cast iron man who looks as if he had never been born, and never could be extinguished."[4] This was the final hour for the great Triumvirate, and they put forth their last best efforts to attain an easing of the country's tensions. Within two years they would all be dead after almost forty years of public service.

From Missouri came Thomas Hart Benton, and Texas sent Sam Houston. Both men met political disaster in the 1850's. After his stand on the

burning issues of this Thirty-First Congress, Benton would no longer speak as the Senator from Missouri. After thirty years' view from Capitol Hill, he was replaced by a Whig. Houston, whose vote on the eventual compromise was termed "the damnedest outrage yet committed upon Texas,"[5] was as new to the Senate as Texas was to the nation. A firm Union Democrat, he, like Benton, would be condemned as a traitor to the South.

Younger men with newer faces were worried in December of 1849, and they, too, sought to deal with the problems created by the Oregon Treaty, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, James Marshall's discovery in California, and the election of Zachary Taylor. The former governor of New York, Whig Free Soiler Senator William H. Seward, invoked his appeal to a "higher law" than the Constitution, and Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois called for popular sovereignty.

On January 21, 1850, the President's plan was stated in an executive message to his Congress. He asked that California be admitted into the Union at once with its anti-slavery constitution and that the New Mexico Territory be allowed to form hers before the sectional problems were introduced.

> His cardinal idea was to keep the admission of California distinctly in the front as the present and pressing object of legislation and (to) remit all other issues involving angry recrimination between freedom and slavery in the background.[6]

Remaining firmly against any compromise, he told Senator Hannibal Hamlin of Maine, the future Vice President of Lincoln's war government, to "stand firm; don't yield; it means disunion, and I am pained to learn that we have disunion men to deal with; disunion is treason."[7]

There were other men primarily concerned with keeping the union intact. On January 29, 1850, Henry Clay rose to submit a list of items for consideration. For a generation, he had been one of the best loved and most admired men in public life. Not even John C. Calhoun, who had fought this colleague for years, could ignore his charm. "I don't like Henry Clay. He is a bad man, an imposter, a creator of wicked schemes. I wouldn't speak to him, but, by God, I love him."[8]

The Senate Chamber and the galleries were packed, and all listened as Clay intoned that simply to admit California would disturb the balance between free and slave states and give the North the real benefit of Mexican war. He proposed instead 1) that California be admitted with her free-state constitution; 2) that territorial governments in New Mexico and Utah be established with no express restriction upon slavery; 3) that the boundary of Texas be extended "from the Sabine to the mouth of the Rio Grande--and thence up the Rio Grande to the Southern limits of New Mexico, and thence, with that limit, to the boundary between the United States and Spain, as marked out under the Treaty of 1819"; 4) that Texas be given a sum "not less

than about $3,000,000" to pay debts; 5) that slavery not be abolished in the District of Columbia without the assent of Maryland; 6) that slave trade, as a compensation to the North, be prohibited in the district; 7) that the fugitive slave law be strictly enforced; 8) that slave trade between states be left alone. Ending with a prayer, he asked that "if the. . . dissolution of the union should happen, I may not survive to behold the . . . heart-rending spectacle."

As Clay concluded his first address of the year, there was less than satisfaction from radical segments of both North and South. Recently re-elected Mississippi Fire-eater Jeff Davis said that there was but one compromise acceptable to the South--to extend the 36°30' line to the Pacific Ocean. (James Buchanan had suggested this same measure in a personal letter as early as 1847 in lieu of the much disputed Proviso.[9]) Senators Foote of Mississippi and Mason of Virginia insinuated that Clay had turned his back on the people he represented, but the most important of the Southern dissenters was John C. Calhoun.

At sixty-seven years of age and in the last stages of tuberculosis, Calhoun was too ill to address the Senate. A firmer defender of the South than of the Union, Calhoun would lament her plight on his deathbed: "The South! The poor South! God knows what will become of her."[10] Webster had called him "much the ablest man in the Senate. . . He could have demolished Newton, Calvin, or even John Locke as a logician."[11] His brilliant logic was conveyed to his colleagues by Senator Mason, who, on March 4, stood to read Calhoun's carefully prepared text while Calhoun himself listened intently:

> I have, Senators, believed from the first that the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in disunion...How can the union be preserved? . . .What is it that has endangered the union?. . . The immediate cause is the almost universal discontent which pervades all the states composing the Southern section of the union. . . What is the cause of this discontent? It is the belief that the Southern States cannot remain as they are, in the union with honor and safety. . . What has caused this belief? 1) Northern agitation of the slave question. 2) Destruction of the equilibrium in government. 2) Destruction of the equilibrium in government in that one section of the government has no "adequate means of protecting itself against encroachments and oppression."

Mason continued to cite Calhoun's assault on the record of the North by citing three types of unjust legislation enacted by the North: First, the exclusion of slavery in territories in 1787 and 1820 and thus deprivation of Southern opportunities for economic expansion; Second, the protective tariffs which aided Northern industry only; Third, the consolidation of power in the Federal government which allowed a regional majority to rule the country.

In answer to his initial question, how can the union be preserved, Calhoun called for the North to restore the South to an

equal position, to uphold the Fugitive Slave Law, to cease agitation, and to grant her equal territorial rights. He called for a concurrent majority and a dual Presidency. In Calhoun's eyes, the South could either "part in peace" from the union or secure her protection through a constitutional amendment. Looking to the future, he realized that soon the railroads would link Northeast to Northwest through commerce and in total aversion to slavery. For him, Clay's compromise met none of the grievances of the South, and 1850 was the last chance for satisfaction.

Daniel Webster, at sixty-eight, had defied age better than Clay and Calhoun, and on March 7, still magnificent, he rose in the Senate to defend Clay's compromise and earn the condemnation of the North. Horace Mann vehemently declared "Webster is a Fallen Star! Lucifer descending from heaven."[12] But Webster was the only man whose influence could aid in effecting a compromise, and in the only Senate speech remembered by the date on which it was given, he sought to accomplish that end. Like Clay, he drew a large crowd and there was silence as he began:

"Mr. President, I wish to speak today, not as a Massachusetts man, nor as a Northern Man, but as an American, and a member of the Senate of the United States. . ." Claiming that the Government must uphold the Compromise of 1820 and allow the part of Texas south of 36°30' to hold slaves, he further maintained that California and New Mexico would be free from slavery "by a law which admits and sanctions in Texas--I mean the law of nature." Therefore the Proviso is unnecessary and would merely serve to "wound the Pride" of the South.

Having often expressed the view that slavery was a moral wrong, Webster believed the South had once felt the same. It was the cotton interest which gave rise to a new promotion of slavery. And however evil slavery may be, there were far worse evils in this world--not the least of which was war. With this in mind, Webster looked to the complaints of the South: "Especially one complaint of the South. . . has in my opinion just foundation; and that is that there has been found at the North. . . a disinclination to perform, freely their constitutional duties in regard to the return of persons bound to service, who have escaped into the free states."

Looking to Calhoun's plan to "separate and part in peace," Webster cried: "There can be no such thing as peaceable secession. . . I can see it as plainly as I see the sun in heaven---I see that disruption will produce a war such as I will not describe..."[13] There was little applause as he concluded, only confused murmurings.

It had been expected of Clay to submit a compromise, and it had been expected of Calhoun to defend all Southern claims. It was equally expected of Daniel Webster to uphold the cause of the North. His motives for doing otherwise were aptly explained to his constituents: "Necessity compels me to speak true rather than pleasing things. . . I should like to please you; but I prefer to save you, whatever your attitude toward me."[14]

With the conclusion of Webster's address, the best remembered speeches were over, but less-known men would attain greatness in the Thirty-First Congress. Only four days after the Seventh of March speech, a young fellow-Whig from New York challenged Webster, Calhoun, and Clay in his maiden speech in the Senate. Though he would speak for the Barnburners of his state and also uphold the Presidential plan, his address had not been calculated to be one of tremendous significance or extraordinary quality. The Senate Chamber was not full, but when William H. Seward began to speak, it was clear he addressed a national audience: "California is a state . . . She can never again be less than that. . . But it is insisted that California shall be attended by compromise of questions which have arisen out of slavery. I am opposed to any such compromise. . ."

Seward attacked Calhoun's demand for the restoration of equilibrium, explaining that equilibrium had been lost in 1787, "two years before the Constitution was adopted--that is, it began to be lost two years before it began to exist." Refuting Clay and Webster, he argued that if slavery were really excluded from the territories by nature, why should anyone object to recognizing the Proviso! Calling for a "higher law than the Constitution" through which we act as caretaker's of God's universe, he emphasized the necessity of preserving freedom for all and concluded piously: "I shall vote for the admission of California directly, without conditions, without qualifications, and without compromise."

Throughout this session, alone among Southerners, Missouri's Thomas Hart Benton had also upheld the President's plan. Seeing no need for a compromise, he told the Senate that California had no slaves to run away and was too far away to fear runaway slaves. Therefore, logically, though the fugitive slave re-enforcement was necessary and good, it should be an independent bill. The same is true of the question of slave trade in Washington, D. C. On the issues of slavery in the District of Columbia, slavery within states, and the suppression of slave trade between states, Benton maintained, "They all belong to a class of subjects not to be touched, which Congress never has touched and has no disposition now to touch. . . The Constitution is the compromise."15

Ready to support governments in New Mexico and Utah territories with no provision for slavery because he believed slavery extinct in both areas, he fumed at the very question of the Texas boundary dispute - exclaiming that it should have been settled six years ago when he had brought it up. (In 1844, Benton had actually broken with his state and party and engineered the defeat of a bill to annex Texas because he thought it to be a mere trick on the part of Secretary of State Calhoun in order to extend slave territory.)

The South was angry with Benton. He had attacked Calhoun continuously until the South Carolinian's death. When, in April, Benton again denounced the extremism of Calhoun, Mississippi's Henry S. Foote jumped to his rescue. The result was a threatened murder on the floor of the Senate as Foote drew a pistol on Benton,

and Benton, unarmed, advanced down the aisle to meet him. The theatrical display heightened as Benton screamed, "Let the assassin fire. I have no pistol." With great dignity, a Senate committee of seven was charged to investigate the disorder. Yet nothing could humble Benton nor cause him to change his mind. His scholarly wit, intellect, and arrogance prevailed. It is said that when Foote threatened to write a small book in which the Benton business would play a large part, Benton, undismayed retorted: "Tell Foote that I shall write a very large book in which he will not figure at all."[16] It was a threat he made good, but for all his confidence in himself, Benton had finally lost the confidence of Missouri slave-owners.

On the following day, the Senate appointed the Committee of Thirteen, with Clay as spokesman, to make recommendations on all the issues and proposed compromises made thus far. On May 8, Clay presented the majority report approving measures similar to his earlier proposals.

Five days later, he pleaded his case in the first of two speeches:

> Sir, it is with great pleasure that we do cooperate with the President of the United States to the extent which he recommends. He recommends the admission of California. The Committee propose this. There the President's recommendation stops and there we take up the subject and proceed to act upon the other parts of the territory acquired from Mexico.

Proceeding further, he announced the urgency of settling the Texas border question to avert bloodshed and defended the amendment prohibiting territorial legislation of slavery in Utah and New Mexico: "If territorial legislature can pass no law with respect to African slavery, the state of the law will . . . continue . . . until the people form a constitution."

Returning Seward's fire, Senator Clay lambasted the "higher law" and disclosed with the proper degree of piety:

> Why, sir, we are told that the other day, at a meeting of some of those people at New York, Moses and all of the prophets were rejected, and that the name even of our blessed Saviour was treated with blasphemy and contempt by these propagators of a divine law . . . above all human laws and constitutions.

Senator Douglas of Illinois, Chairman of the Territorial Committee, had declined to be a member of the Committee of Thirteen but had actually written most of the Committee's California plank. One clause was not his own, however, the clause denying the territorial governments the right to legislate on slavery. This clause he successfully sought to remove, and proposed instead that governments be "founded on popular sovereignty and the right of the

people to enact their own laws."[17] This principle of squatter's rights, originating with Lewis Cass several years earlier, would be Douglas's theme for the rest of his public career.

The following week, on May 21, Henry Clay delivered what was largely an affront to the President concluding as follows:

> Thus of the five subjects of disturbance and agitation--to-wit: California, territorial governments, the boundary question with Texas, the fugitive bill and the subject of slavery in the District -- His plan settles but one, leaving the other four. . . to enflame. . . the public mind.

He also destroyed the late Calhoun's case for the restoration of Southern equilibrium, declaring that "unless the majority shall be governed by the minority, the equilibrium is unattainable."

Summer threatened to drag on endlessly as the Senate debates persisted in sweltering Washington. There was general peace and prosperity that summer, and the nation would have accepted compromise; but the one obstacle was Zachary Taylor and his faithful Northern Whigs.

On June 3, a group of uncompromising southerners, representing nine slave states, led by Robert Barnwell Rhett met at Nashville. But the Nashville Convention was unexpectedly controlled by relative moderates who agreed to accept extension of the line of the Missouri Compromise if necessary. Without John C. Calhoun, the flame of the Southern fire had begun to flicker.

As June lapsed into July, there was still a deadlock on the issues. President Taylor sat in the broiling sun for several hours listening to Independence Day speeches. Tired and thirsty, he later enjoyed cherries and iced milk at home in the White House. On July 9th, the nation learned that her President was dead--fatally ill from cholera morbus. Mourned as a great soldier and not so great Chief Executive, Taylor, by his death ensured the passage of Clay's Compromise. For Millard Fillmore was a Free Soiler who had already made known his willingness to compromise, and his appointment of Daniel Webster as Secretary of State removed all doubts. Northern Whigs were no longer so opposed to a "deal" with the South.

Because of illness, Henry Clay, too, was no longer in the Senate. Without him and Webster, the task of securing the passage of the Omnibus Bill fell to Stephen A. Douglas. Without Calhoun since March, the Southern fight in the Senate had been left to the Davises, the Footes, and the Masons.

But moderation prevailed over extremism, and in September provisions similar to Clay's original proposals and to the report of the Committee of Thirteen became law. Millard Fillmore happily signed the following five pieces of Congressional legislation: 1) California is admitted as a free state by her own choice. 2) The territory acquired from Mexico is divided into New Mexico and Utah with the principle of popular sovereignty. 3) The boundary of Texas is fixed to exclude

New Mexico, and as a concession, the debts of that state are assumed. 4) Slave trade is prohibited in the District of Columbia. 5) The fugitive slave law is re-enforced.

The issue was temporarily settled. The South had her fugitive slave action, and the North, her chance for economic expansion. There was hope, in 1850, that a war could be averted. Clay would get his wish and not live to see the disruption of the union, but those "few miserable men who live upon agitation" to whom he had referred, overworked themselves in the 1850's. Yet it was not only agitation, but also economic developments, population growth, trade, transportation, and the coming-to-be of the new West which worked to the detriment of an already defensive South. Thus the Compromise of 1850, which caused such tremendous prosperity in the decade following its passage, would not be able to effect a lasting peace.

FOOTNOTES

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5 John F. Kennedy, Profiles in Courage (New York, 1955), p. 87.

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8 Kennedy, Profiles, p. 49.

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10 Herbert Agar, "Calhoun and the Meaning of 1850," in The Compromise of 1850, p. 67.

11 Kennedy, Profiles, p. 50.

12 Ibid., p. 64.

13 "Daniel Webster's Seventh of March Speech," in The Compromise of 1850, p. 39.

14 Kennedy, Profiles, p. 63.

15 "An Exchange Between Senator Thomas Hart Benton and Henry Clay," in The Compromise of 1850, p. 21.

16 Kennedy, Profiles, p. 82.

17 George Fort Milton, "Stephen A. Douglas Takes Charge," in The Compromise of 1850, p. 73.

(NOTE: All quotes from Senate Speeches not cited otherwise are from Major Crises in American History, Vol I, "Slavery And Expansion," pp. 414-458.)

THE SOVIET - YUGOSLAV CONFLICT: 1948

Submitted By:

Melo Nix

Before considering any of the events leading up to the conflict between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in 1948, one must first consider Tito's rise to power and the unique relationship existing betwen the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

During World War II the Partisans in Yugoslavia had liberated most of the country themselves. This was accomplished by more help from the Western powers than from the Soviet Union. At the end of the war an overwhelming majority of Partisans remained loyal to Tito. He also drew support from those not engaged in the Partisan movement. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia[1] was well organized and ready to step in. Tito and his lieutenants had never neglected Party affairs, even at the height of the war, and "the Party's domination was always certain."[2] Tito and his associates were proud of the achievements of the CPY. Yugoslavia was the only country in which Communists had successfully applied the Marxist doctrine of "transformation of a foreign war into a revolutionary war."[3] Yugoslav Communists had seized power even before the war was over, while, in the other countries of the Soviet Bloc, Communist regimes were installed exclusively with the help of the Red Army. "Tito definitely felt himself the strongest Communist leader outside of the Soviet Union."[4] Yugoslav Communists had come to power and were kept in power largely through their own efforts. This was to be the root of the later conflict. This distinguished Yugoslavia from other Soviet satellites. Because of this, Yugoslav leaders felt very confident in sponsoring independent ideas and attitudes. Thomas T. Hammond refers to Tito as "the first successful Communist heretic in history."[5] During the war the CPY had proved correct in its strategy and tactics in spite of Stalin's objections.[6]

If observers in the West saw any difference at all between Yugoslavia and the other Communist-dominated countries of Eastern Europe during this time it was that the Yugoslav regime seemed to be "the most pro-Soviet, the most completely communized and the most hard-boiled of the lot."[7] The Yugoslav government had all of the important characteristics of the USSR--"extreme centralism, fake federalism, rubber stamp parliaments, police terror, arbitrary justice, thought control, and one-party rule."[8]

H.E. Milovan Djilas, one-time member of the Politburo of the CPY and head of the Agitprop Commission said in an interview:

> "Moscow had almost no say in the course taken by our revolution or in the development of our State after the war whether during the various phases of that development we were in accord with the Soviet government, whether we agreed with them on specific

> matters, to what extent and why, is one question. But whether we did so of our own free will, on the basis of a given internal or international situation, is quite another question. It is precisely because of the failure to grasp these facts that the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union--came as such a great surprise to so many people."[9]

Many people have pinpointed many different issues as the leading ones causing the split. More generally, a combination of issues, not in equal proportion, caused the rift. Two basic conditions necessary to Russia's total control over its central and East European satellites--the presence of the Red Army and factionalism in the top leadership--were missing in Yugoslavia.[10]

The military aspect of the conflict was certainly among the more important issues. At the time Belgrade was liberated, there had been a minor crisis in Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Soviet troops were stationed in Belgrade. The Red Army raped and unnecessarily killed Yugoslav citizens. The Army was withdrawn and replaced by Soviet military advisers. Initially they came at Yugoslav request. Tito wanted his own army to be completely independent of the Red Army: the Soviet generals were against this. These generals refused to recommend Soviet aid for the building of armaments, instead they proposed that the Yugoslav army be supplied by the Soviet Union. "But it was to be arms and equipment considered necessary in Moscow, not in Belgrade. What the Russians wanted, in effect, was that the Yugoslav army be remodeled so as to become a subsidiary to the Red Army."[11]

Wages of the Soviet advisers were higher than that paid to Yugoslav officers of comparable rank. They demanded orderlies which do not exist in the Yugoslav army. They were highhanded and arrogant in their relations with the Yugoslavs. The Kremlin also tried to recruit Yugoslav citizens to be Soviet agents. These efforts were aimed at penetrating the army, economic administration, the interior and transport ministries, and the Party apparatus. An attempt was made by the Russians to "organize a net of informers"[12] in the Party. In a letter to Stalin and Malotov, Tito complained about this problem in the following words: "We regard it as improper for the agents of the Soviet Intelligence Service to recruit in our country, which is going toward socialism, our citizens for their intelligence service...this recruiting is destroying our internal unity."[13] The Soviet Union answered that "Tito had set his own secret police shadowing Russian agents in Yugoslavia."[14]

Viadimir Dedijer, one of Tito's oldest comrades and followers, insists that "the fundamental matter on which the conflict began was that the Soviet Union intended to subjugate Yugoslavia economically to prevent Yugoslavia's industrialization and to delay the further socialist development in our country."[15] Exploitation was apparent in several ways. The most obvious was the Soviet proposal for a joint stock company. Two were formed, Justa for air transportation, and Juspad, for shipping on the Danube. In Justa, both Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union put up capital. But Yugoslav assets were calculated at

1938 prices, which were comparatively low, while Soviet assets were calculated at 1946-1947 prices, which were comparatively high.[16] The same happened with Juspad.

In 1947 an agreement was made between the two countries under which the Soviet Union promised to grant Yugoslavia $135 million of capital goods credits. A year later, the USSR had sent capital goods worth only $800,000. Dedijer claims that Stalin promised capital goods to Yugoslavia only "to throw us off our guard," that "the agreement was a mere ruse" and that "the Soviet Union had no intention of honoring it."[17]

The first Five Year Plan was instituted by Tito in early 1947. It was patterned closely after that in operation in Russia at the time. Rapid industrialization was an integral part of this Plan. When the Soviet Union stepped into Yugoslav economic life, their proposals were in direct conflict with the Five Year Plan and they advised the Yugoslavs of the impossibility of the Plan.

Hand in hand with the economic problems came that of agriculture. Collectivization of farms created the greatest clash of opinion. Doreen Warriner, the British socialist economic writer, holds that "sometime between 1946 and 1948 the Kremlin decided the time had come to prepare a collectivization drive in Eastern Europe and change the nature of the people's democracies into out-and-out dictatorships."[18] Yugoslavia had collectivized but in this they included general cooperatives composed of private peasants who pooled their efforts for buying and selling. Tito did not collectivize on the Russian model because the landless peasant isn't a Yugoslav problem as it was a Russian one.[19] He was comparatively easy on the peasants because of their large size and their support. The 1948 regulation obliging the peasants to sell a part of their produce to the government at the prices determined by the government was criticized by the Soviet Union as displaying capitalist features. According to this regulation, issued June 3, 1948, the peasants are obliged to sell to the government purchasing agencies or to cooperatives from 10-85% of their produce, depending on the size of the holding.[20] Tito wanted economic ties with the West because "an economic life confined to the Iron Curtain did not promise to raise the standard of living of his country."[21]

What made Tito's position so serious from the Russian point of view was his connection with the idea of a Balkan federation. The Soviets had given signs of wanting to incorporate the Balkan states separately into the USSR as Soviet Republics. Each would then have had only nominal independence. But a Balkan Federation, although allied with the USSR, could take an independent line. Its possible defection in time of war would constitute a strategic threat to the Soviets. It was evident to Moscow that Tito's ambitions lay in the direction of the Balkans. They were opposed to Tito's independence in foreign policy. He took the lead in establishing close relations with the other people's democracies. He urged them to maintain an active inter-bloc diplomacy. Tito visited all the Eastern European satellite countries and was everywhere welcomed by large crowds and acclaimed even more than Stalin. "It appears that a number of Communist leaders in

in these countries--who by 1946 had already felt the whole weight of Russian control--hoped to get a respite from Russia's pressures by getting politically and economically closer to Yugoslavia. They were psychologically ready to form, under Tito's leadership, a common front to withstand Russia's economic pressures and other exigencies."[22]

At the international conferences held after the war, Soviet diplomats behaved toward the Yugoslavs in a "haughty manner that was absolutely incomprehensible to the latter. There was open display of superiority and contemptuous disdain toward some Yugoslav diplomats who were intellectualy and educated in the western tradition."[23]

The culmination of these differences and the beginning of the open conflict began in the early 1948 with the removal of Tito's portraits from the public places of Rumania on orders from Moscow. Immediately following this, Soviet military advisers and instructors were withdrawn from Yugoslavia, "because they were surrounded by unfriendliness and treated with hostility."[24] Tito deposed Andrija Hebrang, his chief opponent and the Kremlin's chief supporter in Yugoslavia, as president of the State Planning Commission and put him in the lesser position of minister of light industry. The Soviet government abruptly postponed for a year negotiation on the renewal of its trade agreement with Yugoslavia.

March 20, 1948 began the famous exchange of correspondence between Tito and Stalin when Tito wrote Stalin expressing his hurt and amazement at the Soviet action in withdrawing advisers.[25] Yugoslavia desired that the USSR inform Belgrade openly what the trouble was, "that it point out everything which it feels is inconsistent with good relations between our two countries."[26]

Stalin's reply of March 27th listed three causes other than military. First, leading Communists in Yugoslavia were circulating anti-Soviet rumors. Second, the CPY was not really a Marxist-Leninist, Bolshevik organization because it hid behind the People's Front and lacked internal democracy. Furthermore they weren't engaging in the class struggle. Thirdly, the Soviet Union accused Yugoslavia of employing an English spy as deputy foreign minister. The Soviet government could not carry on correspondence with the Yugoslav foreign office "under the censorship of an English spy."[27]

In spite of this letter, Tito received the strong backing of the Central Committee of CPY.[28] The Central Committee decided a reply must be sent to Russia. The Yugoslav reply was a combination of both humility and firmness. It denied all the Soviet charges, blaming them on "innacurate and slanderous information."[29] The Yugoslavs' "only desire was to eliminate every doubt and disbelief"[30] of their loyalty to the USSR. Hoffman says the essence of the reply is contained in one sentence which read: "No matter how much each of us loves the land of Socialism, the USSR, he can, in no case, love his country less."

Stalin's reply of May 4th said that the matter should be taken up at the next meeting of the Cominform. The Yugoslav leaders decided

almost at once not to attend the Cominform meeting because, Dedijer says, "it was realized that there was no guarantee that Tito would return alive from such a meeting."[31] A letter was sent to the Central Committee of CPSU stating that they did not "flee from criticism, but in this matter we feel so unequal that it is impossible for us to agree to have this matter decided now by the Cominform."[32] A final Soviet communication stated simply that Yugoslavia's refusal to attend the Cominform meeting violated the equality of Communist parties and indicated that the Yugoslavs had nothing to say in their own defense. Whether the Yugoslavs attended or not, the next meeting of the Cominform was going to consider the matter.

Accordingly, the Cominform met at Bucharest in late June. The Resolution declared that the CPY had placed themselves "outside the family of fraternal Communist Parties, outside the united Communist front, and consequently outside the ranks of the Information Bureau."[33] It listed again the charges made in preceeding letters. The most significant aspect of it was its open invitation to the CPY to get rid of Tito and his followers. "The interests of the very existence and development of the CPY demand that an end be put to this Regime."[34]

With the passing of this Resolution on June 28, 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform.

FOOTNOTES

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22 Tomasic, National Communism, p. 117.

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24 Dedijer, Tito, p. 329.

25 Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 9.

26 Ibid., p. 10

27 Ibid., p. 17

28 Hoffman, New Communism, p. 131.

29 Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 18.

30 Ibid., p. 30.

31 Dedijer, Tito, p. 357.

32 Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 53.

33 Ibid., p. 67.

34 Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 70.

THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Submitted By:

Raymond S. Wilson

The major premise of Article 126 of the Soviet Constitution is the proclamation of the inviolability of the right of every citizen to belong to public organizations, and a reemphasis of the proposition that the most active and politically conscious of this citizenry constitute the membership of the Communist Party, a membership whose role has likened them to be a collective primus inter pares.

But the reality of the situation fails to correspond in many respects to the constitutional myth, a myth which has been magnificently constructed to be the embodiment of innocence and justice, a myth which, as Reinhold Niehbuhr observes, "...proposes to invest this allegedly virtuous class (the proletariat) with precisely that total monopoly of power which is bound to be destructive of every virtue."[1] It is also this same Communist Party, deigned by its founders to be the architect of the New Order, that has failed to comprehend that it has become the passive element, no longer the sine qua non in the contemporary universal proletarian revolution.

Yet this qualification is not restricted to Russia and Italy alone--in the United States also the Party has been stagnant for years, unable to present itself to the populace as a dynamic force of change. Scope for presentation of either a "great man" or "great principle" image has been precluded by the disciplined organization of the established political machines and the large reservoir of funds needed to maintain a party. Communist Party social principles have also been absorbed into other party platforms. The Party's sheer inability to keep pace with fluctuating issues due to subservience to a dogma which threatens to swing down upon those who deviate from it like the Damoclean sword, has similiarly caused the Party to espouse policies which do not respond to the exigencies of the situation.

As the core of political power in the Soviet Union, the Party is unchallenged -- this goes without question -- but in the society at large the Party seems to have lost its creative and driving force. The motivating power has passed elsewhere: to the professional organizations, to the special interest groups, and to individuals knit together through their geographic, economic, and social positions.

In Italy, however, one finds the Communist Party in a unique situation -- caught between the external forces that are vying for control of the Italian state and, simultaneously, between the Internal Party factions that are competing for Party leadership. The Sino-Soviet ideological hiatus, the interplay of Church and State, and sweeping economic changes characterize the aggiornamento of the PCI. The ideological realignment within the PCI has caused it to now relegate the doctrine of overt revolution to a less pronounced position in the Party creed in favor of temporary co-existence. Other old beliefs have

similarly fallen:

> Europe has always conceived of wealth as necessitating the expropriation of some and the corresponding aggrandizement of others...Hence Europe cannot think of altering the relationship between the various levels of society without assuming a class struggle.[2]

This formerly valid proposition has been discarded as the PCI has come to realize that an advocacy of some capitalistic principles might be the impetus the Party needs to blow it out of the doldrums. If the Party can promise the electorate abundance without the disenfranchisement of certain classes and, at the same time, achieve the actualization of basis ideology, then the cause of Italian Communism will indeed be furthered. It does no appreciable good to stake political philosophy upon pure theory -- the people must be given a working model to illustrate to them that abundance can be effected in socialism without the Western capitalistic defects of imperfect competition, the economic evils of industrialization, and unregulated market operation.

The PCI can be considered to be the exemplar of the dilemma that is beginning to haunt its Russian counterpart. It is a political force in a state whose government has been unsuccessful in controlling an economy which has been, at best, highly unpredictable and irregular. In Italy this conflict has laid the groundwork for an inner contradiction: should the Party temper its opposition to the government so the latter may implement its quasi-Socialist reforms (introduced to combat the recent recession), thereby contributing to the immediate amelioration of the workers' lot? Such a course of action would, on the other hand, cause the PCI to risk the strengthening of capitalism and a diminishing of the revolutionary spirit (that is, the spirit of radical reform rather than one directed toward the overt ouster of the government). The other alternative, favored by the Old Guard, is a continuance of the fight for the collapse of the government and a renewal in the efforts directed toward the establishment of a Communist state. However, this plan's execution would endanger the poor and unemployed who are in need of immediate relief.

Thus changing times have begun to take their effect upon the Party apparatus in Italy; no longer can the PCI raise the Manifesto as the ultimate criterion, the doctrines of which must be crystalized. The economic problems confronting Italy today, around which political issues revolve, can be solved only pragmatically. It is this pragmatic character which has contributed to the ideological division and complicated solution of difficulties. To combat the ineffectiveness of the Center-Left coalition government will require the PCI to present meaningful alternatives if it hopes to fire the imagination of the people.

To attribute the popularity of Communism in Italy to any factor must entail mention of the attitude of respectability the PCI holds as a result of its new dialogues with the Catholic Church and its social-democratic image. Some recent statements suggest that the PCI may be ready to make the final jump to democracy in the Western sense

and accept the idea of free competition among political parties even under a Communist regime.[3] They loathe the idea of violent revolution and would not like to risk the secure position they have achieved as a domesticated opposition within Italian society. And since the PCI has been content to freeze a large bloc of votes into sterile protests against real issues it has chosen to dominate the opposition rather than advance policies geared to a resolution of these issues.

The aggiornamento of the PCI has revealed weaknesses indicative of its "hit-and-miss" attempt to discover the new role it hopes to play. In the 1965 French presidential elections, for example, while the great majority of other Italian left-wing publications were lauding Mitterand, the PCI press organ, L'Unita, treated him with a certain reservation, shifting most of its support to De Gaulle. Only when it became obvious that Mitterand was the clear Communist choice did the newspaper succinctly modify its stand and begin to doubt, editorially, the competence of the General for the presidency. One of the causes of the PCI's embarrassment was its feeling of an increasing necessity to explain and justify its decision to Italian public opinion, or to modify it in order to please public opinion, both inside and outside the party.[4] The Party has felt that Marxian theory plays its strict role in the eschatological Communist state and that it can be compromised with in contemporary society, given the nature and importance of public opinion.

Unfortunately for the PCI their future does not depend solely upon their own efforts; the Party is not big enough or capable enough to wield sufficient power to take hold of the reins of government. It must acquire and keep allies, the most feasible method of accomplishing this being the adapting of programs to the needs of particular groups.

To influence the bulk of the Italian electorate to cross political, economic, and religious lines remains the goal of the PCI. If it can assume the appearance of a political entity whose national image appeals less to dogma and more to conscience, it will not be relegated to the position of being a party of mere class discontent (as with the British Liberal Party). To do this requires effective leadership, leadership that was aptly represented by the late Palmiro Togliatti. He realized the Sino-Soviet split could only endanger the Party everywhere and that a reconciliation with the Church was a political necessity. His successor, Luigi Longo, has been charged with effecting his predecessor's testament but he, like so many of the party echelon, are bureaucrats and administrators, experts at machine-style politics, rather than innovators or agitators.

Italy is experiencing a vibrant economic Reformation at present and the PCI is an integral part in it. This is significant, not only because it might determine the future balance of political power in Italy, but also because Italy is a Western-oriented, democratically-endowed state for whose spoils the Communists have

had to devise new strategy to make possible a shift of popular opinion away from old institutions to new Party ones, which contain both the promise of individual initiative and Communist-directed state control.

Palmiro Togliatti phrased the Italian conception of Communism in this manner:

> The Italian Communists are faced with the task of finding an Italian road to socialism. This must take into account the historical development of the country, its social structure, the mentality and aims of the broad masses of the workers, and must make it possible to find the forms which are suitable for Italy so that the majority of the people can be won over to a socialist re-organization of society.[5]

Whereas in Italy the Communist Party has come to recognize the necessity of collaboration with non-party institutions and a reshaping of the Party program to correspond to the immediate needs of the nation, in the Soviet Union the movement for reform has been slow to materialize. The coup which ousted Khrushchev revealed the division of opinion within the Party <u>apparat</u>.

On the one hand, under the Khrushchev regime, the Party, confronted by the strains of a changing society evolving out of its revolutionary past, was broadened and expanded from an ideological vanguard into an operating organization involved in day-to-day management of all aspects of society. Brezhnev and Kosygin have reversed this trend and withdrawn the party organization from the detailed operation of government and society, and have reverted to Lenin's idea of the Party as a supervisory body to oversee government functions but not to manage them. This is the present leadership's understanding of the role the Communist Party should play in a progressive and mature Communist society: Instead of allowing its energies and stature to be dissipated in details, the Party must return to its historical function as an inspirational and ideological force of creation and motivation. The allocation of roles and duties by political bosses was the characteristic of the Khrushchev regime that was erased with the ascendancy of the new government. Bringing the all-powerful chain of authority directly to the workers was to stifle initiative by presenting the Party in a bad light. A reaction to this determined provincialism is reflected in Evgeni Evtushenko's poem "Back to Life":

> The frontiers oppress me...
> I want to wander
> As much as I like
> In London,
> To talk, however brokenly,
> With everybody...
> I want to ride on a bus
> Through morning Paris...

Here Evtushenko reveals his desire to break away from the confines

imposed upon him by Soviet society. To give expression to his passions and to experience reality are two aspects of this yearning for intellectural freedom which Evtushenko attempts to represent. He is typical of so many others in the U.S.S.R. who have been given an incentive to strive for an ideal that transcends ideology and allows the individual to give free play to his innermost ambitions. These same ambitions are the children of the parent called prosperity. It will be interesting to note the ramifications of this prosperity as it influences the ideologically-imposed constraints of Soviet society and attempts to break them down.

On the other hand (and to end the above digression), this shift in Party policy has espoused the view that Khrushchev's removal signified a victory of the central Party apparat over the provincial apparatchiki and non-Party groups. This victory is likely to have a two-fold effect: it will result in a more bureaucratic management, emphasizing in a conservative spirit regularity of procedures rather than personal implementation of them. Secondly, it means the new leadership may be somewhat divorced from the rhythm of Soviet life. Provincial Party representatives were closer to the people and had a better sense of their needs and aspirations. Now the central apparatchiki are more dogmatic and more concerned with their vested interest in the supremacy of the Party machinery.

> Power has been taken over by specialists in paper shuffling and in bureaucratic procedures. None of them participated in the Civil War nor at a high level of responsibility in the traumatic changes that Russia experienced during the years of the collectivization and industrialization. Bureaucratic convervatism is now dominant.[6]

In Russia, as in Italy, economics appears to be the focal point of all political disharmony. It was Khrushchev's failure in agricultural and industrial plans, in addition to foreign policy miscalculations, that were instrumental in effecting his demise. The new leadership has now laid the groundwork for the introduction of an economic program which lays stress upon individual prosperity as the key to the attainment of Communist goals more so than upon any strong reemphasis upon pure ideology. The Communist Party in the 23rd Party Congress has, in effect, called for the economic re-education of Soviet society and a revision in dogma to compensate for the new-found abundance. If the Party can put forth this program successfully and present an alternative to the formerly-held Protestant Ethic of hard work the people have been conditioned to, then it will have captured the soul of the state.

Soviet society, with the improvements in its standard of living, its culture and technology, not only is becoming more rational, but must in the long run lose its ideological fervor.[7]

As it makes further progress and becomes more stable, as its technical level draws closer to that of industrialized societies, so too will both its fervent disciples and the people at large begin to admit certain incontestible facts. So one may safely predict the rise of the advocacy of the plurality of industrialization methods so as to escape, even if only momentarily, from the absurd logic of Communist ideology.

And with every improvement in the Soviet Union in the standard of living, technical achievement, and education the pressure for independence must grow. The Party is fully aware of this. It has employed various methods to counter this pressure and keep it under control. The built-in apparatus, the vested interest of the officials, and the lack of any traditions of self-government under Soviet rule -- all represent enormous advantages on the side of the Party. This seems to lend weight to Adam Ulam's contention:

> ...Tvardovsky's editorial tolerance and Yevtushenko's occasional jarring poetical note are gestures of no great political significance; indeed, they may be considered a safety valve for the tensions released by de-Stalinization.[8]

As Ulam cautions, one must avoid confusing discontent with revolutionary sentiment.

Communist politicians in both Italy and Russia exhibit to their own people and to those who lie outside their frontier a much-publicized espousal of democratic political forms (the Russian Constitution being a prime example). They utilize the same political vocabulary and construct the same basic political institutions, yet they have been adapted to obtain results, not in conformance with these forms, but in agreement with the ideological character of Soviet dogma. The Soviet apparatus of government functions to meet the desires of a small group of self-appointed leaders rather than to provide a mechanism through which the general public can select its own leaders and influence the formation of policy.[9]

One must not construe the assumption of a democratic facade in Italy and capitalistic economic programs in Russia to mean the Party is changing its character completely. The means to the end have been modified but not changed. However, one may make the observation that the Italian path to the classless society has exhibited democratic tones to the detriment of Marxian ideology and Party discipline. Due to the prevailing overtones of socialism in all Italian party platforms it is doubtful whether the PCI will ever succeed in converting the electorate to communism. Even the PCI has become enamored with the benefits they have accrued as a result of their advocacy of a watered-down Marxism. It is thus conceivable to postulate that, given the social and economic disagreements in Italy, no one major political force will emerge on the Italian political scene and that there will be a profusion of

parties all advocating something different, yet nothing new.

In Russia, the absence of political parties makes it difficult to treat her on the same level as Italy. Nevertheless, her economic problems are quite similar with the Italian ones. For just as the PCI has seen it necessary to adapt its policy to changing times so too has the Soviet Union allowed some private eneterprise and individual freedom. In both nations the Party is confronted with the question of survival: in Italy as an effective opposition element, and in Russia whether she is to retain her hold over the proletariat and still be able to promise them all the fruits of Communism.

If, in neither nation, the Party cannot beat the capitalists at their own game by exploiting abundance and democracy as the main issues, then one may say that the philosophy of Communism will remain merely a philosophy without any vital guiding force.

FOOTNOTES

1 Reinhold Niehbuhr, The Irony of American History (New York: 1962), p. 114.

2 David M. Potter, People of Plenty (Chicago: 1954), p. 118.

3 H. Stuart Hughes, The United States and Italy (Cambridge: 1965), p. 264.

4 Luigi Barzini, "Communism, Italian Style, Has Nowhere to Go", New York Times Magazine, -- (Feb. 13, 1966), 40.

5 Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New York: 1959), p. 161.

6 Zbegniew Brzezinski, "Victory of the Clerks: What Khrushchev's Ouster Means", National Review, CVI (November 14, 1964), 15.

7 Raymond Aron, "Soviet Society in Transition", The Soviet Crucible, ed. Samual Hendel (Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc.: 1963), p. 633.

8 Adam B. Ulam, The New Face of Soviet Totalitarianism (Cambridge: 1963), p. 212.

9 John N. Hazard, The Soviet System of Government (Chicago: 1957), p. 1.

BOOK REVIEWS

Shannon, David A., BETWEEN THE WARS: AMERICA, 1919-1941, (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965)

By: Paul Waddle

To live meaningfully in the present one must realistically interpret past events. In Between the Wars: America, 1919-1941, the author negates myths, the product of oversimplified and distorted history, and emphasizes the truths of the historical past.

Shannon first shatters the image of President Woodrow Wilson as an internationalist overcome by powerful conservative Republican isolationists. This fantasy, he says, while "comforting the ardent Democrats" reduces history to a "clear cut struggle between good and evil." To illustrate the complexity of the post-World War I era, Shannon Develops Wilson's Fourteen Points in the light of their success at the signing of the Treaty of Versailles; A success determined in great part by French and British desires. While a revised treaty would probably have met with Senate approval, Wilson's unwillingness to compromise led to its ultimate defeat. By treating such complications, Shannon attempts to illustrate the oversimplification of the pat analysis of good versus evil. Cautiously avoiding partisanship, the author attacks the glorified legends of the New Deal president, Franklin Roosevelt, as both the nation's sole rescuer from economic disaster (Liberal myth) and as the destroyer of individual initiative (conservative viewpoint), Shannon calls Roosevelt a "gifted political broker" who was "Instrumental in molding the New Deal, but the clay from which it was molded was the pressures exerted upon him." Shannon's assertion that prohibition did not bring organized crime into being-as some claim it did- places that fantasy on dubious grounds. According to the author, prohibition offered only a profitable, and spectacular, outlet for gangsters' energies. When discussing American society of 1920's, the author rejects a giddy view of the "jazz age" and states:

> The grimness, despair, and darkness of America in the 1930's probably prompted writers to look back to the previous decade with a kind of nostalgia for more carefree existence and led them to long too fondly at what were actually superficialities.

Shannon is not satisfied solely with myth-shattering. The bulk of his work is devoted to the more delicate task of analysis of the domestic and foreign policies of the five presidents who served between the two world wars. Lengthy repetitions of the provisions of Congressional laws and Supreme Court rulings are not included. The author concentrates, rather, on the relation and purposes of the actions. He analyzes the increased demand for stocks in treating the Crash of 1929. An explanation is also offered for the Depression which followed the crash. Inadequate distribution of income was chiefly responsible, but unhealthy speculation by the nation's banks and "administered prices" in industry also contributed.

Inadequacy of economic planning played its part. Shannon states:

> Although there were conditions all over the economy in 1928 and 1929 that would signal danger to today's economists, the eminent economists and business leaders of the New Era saw nothing to disturb their optimism.

Embracing the past fully, Shannon describes the social and cultural atmosphere of the interim-war period. Immigration, mass culture and education are discussed in this extended search into the era.

The compelling force of this book lies for this reader in its refutation of widely-held, and nearly believable, myths. But Shannon does succeed in his larger goal. With scholarship and critical detachment, he presents history in perspective. The book's compact style and solid substance establishes the author as a historian who better understands the present through his clear understanding of the past.

Hartmann, Frederick H. GERMANY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965.)

A Book Review

By: Eva Gallagher

The work Germany Between East and West by Frederick H. Hartmann, presents a detailed overview of the problem of German reunification. Chronologically arranged, the book first relates the manner of and reasons behind German division after World War II. Reparations demanded by Soviet Russia, as well as the problem of making and choosing a distinction among "partition," "fragmentation," "dismemberment," and "dissolution," of the German state were among the chief considerations at the conference tables of Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam. These difficulties having been resolved in the occupational set-up among the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, and the United States, new ones arose as Germany edged toward economic prosperity and the United States and Soviet Union involved themselves in a "cold war."

The author sees world political alignment as having shifted from a two-bloc power structure following the war to the present polycentral alignment demonstrated among the so-called neutral nations, the newly-emerging African countries, and those designated either pro-East or pro-West. In consequence of this shift, Germany has been placed in the position of tempering and balancing her attitude with regard to American support of and possible Soviet concessions to national reunification. Now nationally prosperous and, as ever, desirous of a reunified Germany, the German Federal Republic is faced with the task of establishing her position in the world power structure, and of seeking cooperation with her aims from both the United States and the Soviet Union.

Progressing from the Potsdam agreements through the first Berlin crisis and allied airlift,the book details the second crisis and the building of the Berlin Wall. It then relates the present-day political structure of the West German government and the independent, nationalistic tendencies evidenced by the Erhard administration. Finally, the book concludes its discussion of the problem of German reunification with the statement: "Germany's division, now two decades old, will not continue indefinitely without grave danger of war."

The book is generally concise in its discussion of the history of German division, but it omits a detailed analysis of the final "temporary" agreements following World War II, and subsequently the background to the German dilemma of the nineteen sixties. The analysis of the consequences of the Berlin Wall to the question of reunification is lacking in the fact that it does not expand sufficiently on a statement earlier in the book, that the wall became a defensive rather than offensive package in the hands of the East German government. Significant to note in the book, however, is the

tone relating the German reunification question to the overall historical progression from two-bloc to polycentral alignment which is evident throughout and lends necessary continuity to the work.

Germany Between East and West is a complete and well-structured presentation of the reunification problem. It is undoubtedly a timely work and one which poses a question which only time will answer: will Germany become a unified state once again, and if so, when and how? With the deep involvement of the United States in Southeast Asia at this moment, it is perhaps necessary to be reminded that our position in Europe cannot and will not remain static when questions such as that of German reunification persist.

Green, Constance McLaughlin, THE RISE OF URBAN AMERICA, (New York: Harper & Row, 1965).

A Book Review

By: James Reteneller

The fact of urbanization in the twentieth-century United States is of the utmost importance in any serious study of contemporary American character. As the author herself deftly observes, "Only one fact was clear by 1960: all American social history had become in essence urban history."

Mrs. Green is well qualified to sketch the interaction of urban growth and other forces of history in this country. The author of several volumes on the background of American cities, she was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for History in 1963 for Washington: Village and Capital, 1800-1878. Starting with the five "major" Atlantic port cities of the seventeenth century, Mrs. Green sets out to demonstrate not only the comparatively dizzy growth of the early American urban centers, but also the manner in which these first cities contributed to the ever-increasing centralization of our population.

The author is careful to concentrate on the importance of roles played by the cities in such turning points as the Revolutionary War, the opening of the frontier, the Civil War, both World Wars and the great depression; and the reciprocal roles played by these events or periods in the growth of population centers. This presentation of an "urban thesis" in American history is unquestionably the backbone of her work in this volume, and yet the author's talent is put to perhaps its best use in other aspects of the book. A fine example of this is the chapter-by-chapter attention Mrs. Green devotes to the position of artists in the urban community, and the importance of their contributions to struggle of city life to "recapture its lost dignity" in the face of increasing pressures brought on by overpopulation and the ugliness surrounding most concentrations of industry. Needless to say, this is a vital point in any serious treatment of the urban phenomenon, and Mrs. Green adds luster to her book by allowing the problem of urban beauty "room to breathe."

As it sweeps from the colonial period to the early years of this decade, The Rise of Urban America reflects the fast pace of events in all areas of urban life in the United States. Ironically, this same acceleration of city growth and importance has refuted a significant portion of Mrs. Green's argument. For the swift recognition of the crucial role that cities play in our national life by the Johnson Administration has invalidated the author's contention that the American people in the 1960's were not yet seeing the city "as a national concern."