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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY NEW ORLEANS

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Despite the longevity and intensity with which Anglo-Saxon studies of history and literature are pursued, there are certainly no few corners of that study left dark and untidy. One such corner that has only recently begun to receive much attention is that inhabited by Archbishop Wulfstan II of Worcester and York. Identified as a homilist, a statesman, and a reformer, it is becoming more difficult to overlook the influence Wulfstan exercised on Anglo-Saxon England around the turn of the first millennium. Coming to his plural episcopacy of Worcester and York in 1002, after serving as Bishop of London since 996, he was already established as a skilled orator and had been active in political affairs during a period of Danish aggression.¹ Throughout his career, he accomplished long lists of civil and ecclesiastical contributions, especially with regards to state and canon law.² Perhaps his most well-known achievements are his codification of laws for both King Aethelred and King Cnut, his *Institutes of Polity*—a political treatise on the ordering of society and the duties imparted to each member by his or her role—, and obviously his sermons, chiefly his *Sermo Lupi ad Anglos*.

Simply that these are the most remarkable of the many works of Wulfstan might provoke a reader to wonder how they relate to one another. Is there a common theme or set of ideas that permeates these laws, political arguments, and sermons? Wulfstan's works, though not strictly uniform or singular in purpose, certainly seem to be distinctly oriented towards encouraging a return to God's Law as it has existed in previous times. Whether emphasizing this through actual law codes promulgated in the name of earthly monarchs, through a theoretical treatise, or through the rhetoric of impassioned sermons, the concept of God's Law and the English people's distance from it is seemingly ever-present. At least one case has been made that the times to which Wulfstan wishes to return are those of Edgar.³ However, I would point to Wulfstan's own texts and contexts and ask: is Wulfstan in fact, even as he looks forward to the Last Times, harkening back to the Israelites and their prophets? Might he have actually found himself acting as a new Isaiah or John the Baptist, anticipating the Antichrist and calling, from his own Anglo-Saxon wilderness, for the repentance of his people?

Perhaps the first step in such an inquiry would be to look at Wulfstan's work within the context of his own contemporaries. The most obvious basis of comparison is Ælfric, the Abbot of Eynsham and one of the most prolific homilists of English history. As representing the Æthelwoldian tradition, a dominant current of contemporary monastic reform, Ælfric will certainly fit our purposes.⁴ The fact that Wulfstan and Ælfric actually worked together only furthers the comparison.⁵

We will limit our comparison to the two figures' homilies, as those are the most appropriate points by which to do so; indeed, Wulfstan's homilies often seem to act as bases for or representatives of the legal and political works that characterized the other major parts of his corpus.

Both Wulfstan and Ælfric were products of the same ecclesiastical reforms coming mainly out of Fleury, an abbey itself undergoing the Cluniac reforms. Both Fleury and St. Peter's at Ghent had attracted future Anglo-Saxon archbishops and abbots; these men would go on to send their own disciples to these continental centers of reform for education. Ælfric's own master, Æthelwold, was one of these clergymen.⁶ Furthermore, Abbo of Fleury, an influential abbot and reformer, spent time in exile in Ramsey in the 980's—a time before Wulfstan headed

to his northern episcopacies. As Abbo was an "exceptionally able canonist and ideologue," there is little doubt that he influenced Wulfstan's reforms.⁷ This means that Wulfstan's influences, like Ælfric's, are continental in origin; however, just as each of our two homilists received their reforming influences in a variety of ways, they went on to manifest them in a similarly varied spectrum. For the present discourse, an eye to style and intent is most appropriate.

The first thing to note about the two homilists' works is that, while Ælfric set out to produce and compile large collections of homilies that were encyclopedic and exegetical, Wulfstan seems to have been much more focused on topical and hortatory sermons. The former's homilies were divided amongst a wide range of topics while Wulfstan dealt with a few main themes throughout the majority of his sermonizing.⁸ The main themes Milton Gatch identifies are eschatological urgency, the necessity of living by God's law, and the teaching of the divine law to the people.⁹ It seems that while Ælfric was concerned with giving the Anglo-Saxon clergy a standard set of sermons from which to preach to the laity, Wulfstan's reforms were more multi-pronged in approach, though narrower in focus. Though he was not as comprehensive, he spoke to all three pillars of society as he identified them in his *Institutes of Polity*.

Wulfstan's style was also unlike that of Ælfric or the tradition of Anglo-Saxon vernacular homilies as we know them. The use of two-stress phrases leaves Wulfstan's style as more like poetry than his contemporaries' homilies; further use of alliteration, rhyme, and other rhetorical devices gives Wulfstan's prose an urgency unlike that of other Anglo-Saxon homiletic writings.¹⁰ Even in those situations where Wulfstan seems to have drawn from the works of Ælfric or works common to them, Wulfstan adapts the homilies in very significant ways; typically, he shortens them and fits them into the afore-mentioned rhetorical prose style. However, he also tends to remove or simplify the theological subtlety found in other homilists' works, especially Ælfric's.¹¹ This is characteristic of his sermons as a whole. Though he certainly had instances of theological explication in his works, his own homilies were often much more straight-forward and simple. He was much more likely to use legal terms¹² or to reuse certain phrases or passages common throughout his corpus of works.¹³

This contrast can be seen clearly in each writer's approach to eschatological writings. Ælfric and Wulfstan were drawing on the same traditions—Anglo-Saxon and continental—for their own understandings of the Last Times and the Antichrist.¹⁴ Yet the way Wulfstan presents this tradition to his own audiences is unlike the methods of Ælfric and those on whom they drew. The very first distinction to make is summed up nicely by Milton Gatch: "There is no sustained treatment in the *Catholic Homilies* or the *Lives of the Saints* of the Last Times."¹⁵ As these two works represent the most comprehensive of Ælfric's homiletic collections, the fact that Wulfstan chose to devote much of his homiletic corpus to a topic only marginally dealt with by Ælfric immediately demonstrates the differences we have been noting. However, when one can cross-reference treatments of eschatological themes between the writers—a task more easily done with regards to the theme of Antichrist—it is clear that Ælfric is more interested in the theological, while Wulfstan is much more focused on the ethical imperative. The former spends a whole paragraph explaining what the Antichrist is and how he is to act. Wulfstan, in his *De Anticristo*, gives us simply this:

Antichrist is in Latin "contrary to Christ," that is in English, God's adversary. He is God's adversary who abandons God's laws and teaching and through the devil's teaching makes ill use of that which belongs to his Christianity, and then, being himself in sin, too severely befouls or leads other people to sin.¹⁶

The rest of the short homily is focused primarily on the events surrounding the Antichrist's arrival and the people's danger and responsibility in the Last Times.

These comparisons have established that Wulfstan, though contextualized by Ælfric and their common traditions, was doing something unique and unusual. This novelty can be further contextualized by another tradition: that of the Old Testament prophets. Even a brief foray into Isaiah and Ezekiel is enough for a reader to note similarities and parallels between the indictments and imperatives of Wulfstan and these, his ancient predecessors. In Isaiah 29, we see the Lord speaking of the Israelites' drawing away from Him in all but words and His plan to reduce them by drawing away from them in turn. In Amos 4, we see God proclaiming the depravity of the Israelites and their failure to make returns to the Lord of the gifts He has given them. In Ezekiel 18, we see the reprimands of the Lord and the call to turn away before the threatened destruction. In light of these passages, Wulfstan's own sermon on tithing would seem to work in the same vein:

Listen then, impious mortal. You know that everything you receive belongs to the Lord, and yet you will not accommodate the creator of all things by returning to him what belongs to him? ... He asks for first-fruits and tithes, and yet you refuse. Avaricious man, what would you do if he were to take nine-tenths for himself and leave you the tenth? ... Ungrateful cheat and scoundrel, with the divine voice I summon you! Redeem yourself, O man, while you are alive. Redeem yourself while you still can.¹⁷

His sermon on corrupt judges and false witnesses fits as well:

Tell me, I ask, how many powerful men have there been who thundered like storm-clouds and believed themselves eternally immutable? Where are they? They are nowhere to be seen now but suffer torment in hell without end ... And what of the possessions of the poor which the lordly took away from them? ... O man, if you are guilty of such crimes, hurry while you can so you return to the Lord¹⁸

Certainly there is more of the righteous indignation of the Hebrew prophets in these exhortations than of Ælfric or the Anglo-Saxon tradition.

On this, Malcolm Godden remarks:

The Anglo-Saxon writer who responded to the prophets most was Wulfstan, who perhaps found himself more in tune with them than most Anglo-Saxons ... Isaiah, Jeremiah and Ezekiel are clearly the model for his own writing.¹⁹

In this same article, Godden includes an excerpt from a piece of Wulfstan's works, commonly included in his homiletic corpus: a collection of passages from Isaiah and Jeremiah along with a brief introduction obviously drawing parallels between the Anglo-Saxons current problems—vices and Vikings—and the appropriate words of those prophets on such matters. Godden also points to another work that lists excerpts from Ezekiel on the clergy.²⁰ One such passage from Ezekiel seems to have been a favorite of Wulfstan's and is used in several sermons as well as in his *Admonitio episcoporum utilis* and *Institutes of Polity*.²¹ The verses in question are ones of admonition to the prophet himself that, as he has been placed as a watchman over God's people,

he will be held responsible for speaking God's law to them. When he fails to do so, their blood will be required of him. The frequency with which Wulfstan used these verses seems to demonstrate a belief by Wulfstan in the prophetic nature of priesthood. Moreover, though, it would seem to show a tendency by Wulfstan to place himself within the prophetic tradition. Surely the eagerness with which the Archbishop pursued his sermonizing on God's law and judgment, as well as his work towards legislating those same imperatives, gives the impression of his own seriousness with regards to Ezekiel's warning.

The Anglo-Saxons, moreover, viewed the prophets as men ordained by God to proclaim the coming of the messiah to God's chosen people.²² In this capacity, it is interesting that Wulfstan spends so much of his time and energy exhorting his people to repentance in preparation for the coming of Antichrist. His three sermons on the synoptic Gospels Antichrist passages, his *De Anticristo*, and his *De Temporibus Anticristo*, the last a reworking of a work of Ælfric, all focus on this repentance and preparation. As Joyce Tally Lionarons points out, Wulfstan, though writing and sermonizing within a period steeped in millennialism, does not seem to dwell on the coming millennium.²³ Instead, he uses these five homilies to proclaim the coming of the Antichrist. Even in his later and most famous sermon, *Sermo Lupi ad Anglos*, he continues with themes of the end times first dealt with in these works. Perhaps, then, he might even see himself in the tradition of John the Baptist, the last of the prophets. Against those Anglo-Saxons who had turned from God's law, was he crying out from the wilderness of York? When he gave the *Sermo Lupi ad Anglos* at the *witan* meeting in 1014, was he speaking to the brood of vipers of his own day, reminding them of rewards and punishment that would come at Christ's next appearance?

It would seem that this is the case when we read the sermon:

Understand properly also that for many years now the Devil has led this nation too far astray, and that there has been little loyalty among men although they spoke fair, and too many wrongs have prevailed in the land ... And the necessity is great for every man henceforth to observe God's law diligently and pay God's dues properly.²⁴

The whole sermon is in such a tone and constantly emphasizes the break between the Anglo-Saxons, identified as a people chosen by God, and their Lord; treachery, greed, violence, oppression, mistreatment of widows and children, deceit, disobedience, and paganism are all accusations leveled by Wulfstan—a list by no means unlike those of Isaiah, Ezekiel, Jeremiah, or John the Baptist—and the only answer is to turn away from these vices and back towards God's law. This disobedience and internal strife, according to Wulfstan's implications, has led to the external strife of the Viking aggression—a topic in the mind of every member of the *witan* as Swein Forkbeard's body was still warm and the future of Dane-English rule was undecided. A return to God's law will please God; whether or not he blesses the Anglo-Saxon with a respite is irrelevant. As we saw in Wulfstan's earlier eschatological homilies, the Archbishop is not advocating obedience as a means to prevent the Last Times; he is predicting the coming of the judgment regardless of his people's actions. Their choice to return to God's law is not one of material salvation, but one of spiritual salvation.

Yet, while Wulfstan's eye was seemingly ever on the eternal, he certainly did much for his material realm of Anglo-Saxon England—perhaps more than any other insular reformer. Due to his relatively recent rediscovery, the extent of Wulfstan's legal influence and achievements are still being assessed and debated. However, it is quite clear that he had no small part in the later

laws of Æthelred and much of the legislation of Cnut.²⁵ Wulfstan's legislation, though, is, like his sermons, quite unique; in fact, it is actually what many historians consider a homiletic element in his legislation that makes it unique.²⁶

Though Wulfstan's use of the *witan* to sermonize and prophecy coming plagues was unusual, it was not unprecedented. Even in Æthelstan's reign, churchmen were using the *witan* meetings to call for a more Christian society and to recall the king to his duties as a Christian ruler.²⁷ Furthermore, just as Wulfstan was quick to use real examples of his people's transgression of God's law, he was also not slow to make his admonitions to the king relevant as well, if a bit more subtle. As M.K. Lawson points out, Wulfstan's *Institutes of Polity* reinforce the very idea of a Christian king's duties and seem to emphasize at least two aspects—light taxes and fair judgments—in which Æthelred was considered by his people to be failing. Moreover, Wulfstan seems to break with his sources in his insistence on the extent of bishops' administration of both ecclesial and lay affairs, to the detriment of the king's own power and supremacy of office.²⁸

With regards to Wulfstan's legislative attitudes, the *witan* of Enham—likely in 1008—may provide a moment as interesting as that of the 1014 meeting. Here we get a brief window into the overlapping fields of Wulfstan's sermonizing and his legislating. As Lawson explains, the meeting would have begun with a separate meeting of the bishops. They would then have exhorted the crowd—one “of every age, order, and sex”—to uphold one king and the true Christian faith and to live virtuously.²⁹ Further admonitions would have targeted the clergy specifically. The complementarity of Wulfstan's sermons to this structure is hard to miss. Next, the archbishops would counsel the king on a variety of matters. After this, they would have preached again—this time against paganism and on a return to the one God. However, there is reason to believe that they would have incorporated in their preaching much of the secular matters that they had spent time addressing in the councils.³⁰

Perhaps the most important moment came when, after the sermonizing, the matters were pronounced to be of the king's accord and the nobles were made to promise to uphold them. With this formal ritual, Wulfstan had his validation in using the matters on which sermons were likely given at Enham and in issuing them in the form of legal documents. From Enham, we get, at the very least, Wulfstan's VI Æthelred.³¹ This process was not itself unprecedented either: similar instances are thought to have occurred as early as 786 under Offa's reign. It may have more in common, though, with the continental occurrence of a similar process at Dortmund just three years earlier in 1005. The possible influence of this synod of Henry II on Wulfstan would only further resonate with Wulfstan's seeming usage of Henry's law against the sale of Christians to heathens in his own legislation.³²

The same process may have been used again by Wulfstan at Cnut's Christmas court at Winchester; here, the archbishop may have read out the codes now known as I and II Cnut. They would have then received royal approval and an oath like that at Enham would have been sworn by the nobility.³³ If such a ritual was not unusual in Anglo-Saxon law-making, this would likely have been a very astute move by Cnut, who was eager to set himself up as an English king and a Christian one. The continuity that would be displayed by Wulfstan's participation would likely have been invaluable in a foreign king's first lawgiving. Whereas some may wonder the extent to which such ecclesiastical monopoly on legislation would have undermined the king's actual authority, Lawson seems to see the interplay as being to the king's benefit.³⁴ Likely, the king's people would have left Enham or Winchester with a reinforced notion of Christian faith and its

reliance on a Christian kingship—a kingship instituted by God and one which He expected to be obeyed.

These examples demonstrate an important attitude of Wulfstan towards his roles as preacher and legislator. Lawson remarks that Enham “explains why Wulfstan’s texts have such a homiletic tone: they are homiletic because they are grounded in preaching.”³⁵ Patrick Wormald, in examining Wulfstan’s works on Æthelred’s later codes, phrases this same idea differently, noting that a central point in such examinations is that “[l]aws and homilies are treated in essentially the same way.”³⁶ Wulfstan did not make a hard distinction in his oral performance or his codification. Just as homilies and laws were transcribed side-by-side in his manuscripts, so they seem to have commingled in his mind.

This, it would seem, only strengthens a possible assessment of him as working prophetically. If he truly saw himself as working in a prophetic vein, then his words were originating from God—the divine king and true lawmaker. As such, there was no real distinction between the sins against which Wulfstan preached and the crimes against which he wrote laws.³⁷ Those laws that were more oriented towards a greater Christianization of Anglo-Saxon society—regulations that called for certain fasts or feast days—would further emphasize the true religion and one God who Wulfstan was so insistent that his people never forget.

This brief examination of the charismatic figure that is Archbishop Wulfstan II of Worcester and York is by no means complete, exhaustive, or even sufficient to deal with this single topic. As his full titles suggest, this man was a multi-talented and multi-faceted one worth more attention than he has received thus far throughout the course of academia. Nevertheless, even this glance has demonstrated that Wulfstan is doing something unlike his contemporaries and immediate predecessors—actually, something more like his ancient predecessors. The degree to which Wulfstan intended this appearance of prophecy is one that will hopefully be investigated further and debated. The effect this would have had on his lawmaking likewise deserves more attention. The initial evidence presented here seems promising, though, and there is surely much more to be said when Wulfstan’s works are further analyzed, especially, taking Wormald and Lawson’s examples, in a more holistic and mutually-informed way. For now, it seems at least worth admitting that there is an element of Hebraic howling coming from this fierce Anglo-Saxon *lupus*—and one with important legal and historical implications.

NOTES

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3. Joyce Hill, “Archbishop Wulfstan: Reformer?” in *Wulfstan, Archbishop of York: The Proceedings of the Second Alcuin Conference*, ed. Matthew Townend (Abingdon: Marston Distributors, 2004), 313.
4. Gatch, 12.
5. Gatch, 22.
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7. Campbell, 202.
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18. Hall, 122-3.
19. Malcolm Godden, “Biblical Literature. The Old Testament,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Old English Literature*, eds. Malcolm Godden and Michael Lapidge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 222.
20. Godden, 223.
21. Hall, 101-3.
22. Godden, 223.
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24. Michael Swanton, *Anglo-Saxon Prose* (London: Dent, 1975), 179.
25. Campbell, 207.
26. Patrick Wormald, *The Making of English Law: King Alfred to the Twelfth Century, Vol. 1 Legislation and Its Limits* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2001), 332; M.K. Lawson, “Archbishop Wulfstan and the Homiletic Element in the Laws of Æthelred II and Cnut,” *The English Historical Review* 424 (1992): 565.
27. Lawson, 569.
28. Lawson, 572.
29. Lawson, 574.
30. Lawson, 574.
31. Lawson, 574.
32. Lawson, 575.
33. Lawson, 583.
34. Lawson, 579.
35. Lawson, 576-7.
36. Wormald, 341.
37. Wormald, 342.

Mary Kate Delaney

A POPE OF GREAT WORDS: INNOCENT III AND HIS WRITINGS

An advocate of ultimate papal authority, Pope Innocent III was successful in uniting the temporal and spiritual worlds under his influence. His ability to dominate the decisions of monarchs, call two crusades to the Holy Land, summon one of Christianity's greatest councils, and order the attack of Christian heretics was unprecedented. Innocent's particular ideology and succinct rhetoric were fundamental to his success. Throughout his eighteen years as pope, Innocent had taken the personas of father, mother, mediator, peace-maker, reformer, and most notably, Vicar of Christ. As a determined man and brilliant rhetorician, he made the best use of the only sort of correspondence of the time, writing. Commissioned by a small army of clerical writers with additions of Innocent's own clever rhetoric, the letters whether threatening or flattering were works of authority. Often, his writing was triumphant in forcing his influence over others, questioning the true position of the papacy in medieval society.

A man of small stature and pleasing countenance, Innocent did not appear to be the ruthless individual he was.¹ Although his uncle had been Pope Clement III, Innocent was elected by merit.² Distinguished by his education, piety, capability, and concern, Innocent proved to be the perfect candidate for pope, despite his young age.³ Upon consecration, Innocent hoped to create for himself a Christendom where the papacy sat center-stage, uniting the secular and spiritual worlds through determination and avid writing. Despite his poor health, Innocent wrote over seven hundred manuscripts. His *Misery of the Human Condition* became a novelty, and his *Mystery of the Mass* emerged as the basis of liturgical handbooks.⁴ From his ascension in 1198 to his death in 1216, Innocent had brought the power of the papacy to its pinnacle.⁵

The *Gesta Innocentii PP III* is one of the greatest tools used to assess Innocent although the document only covers the first ten years of his pontificate.⁶ The *Gesta*'s anonymous author, most likely living and working at the Papal Curia, would have had access to papal correspondence. The *Gesta* describes Innocent not only as medieval Europe's spiritual guide, but as an important person in political matters. Detailing the cases of Ingeborg of Denmark, King John of England, King Philip of France, and Stephen Langton, the Archbishop of Canterbury, the *Gesta* defines Innocent's role as peace-maker and mediator in the ecclesiastical and temporal worlds.⁷ The significance of Innocent's place in the world, as the anonymous author claims; reflects the evolution of papal ideology, as well as, Innocent's own revolutionary agenda.

Innocent's intention from the start was to continue in the path that his predecessors had paved, but the authority he had amassed by the end of his reign suggests that he was not content with the position of the papacy upon his arrival; Innocent craved more. In order to increase papal influence, Innocent had to unite the secular with the holy. His vision of the secular realm in compliance with the ecclesiastical can be drawn back to his youth. Upon visiting the shrine of Thomas Becket, Innocent apparently declared that never again would a man of God be made victim by a secular ruler.⁸ The first step Innocent took to bring papal authority to a new height was the refining of the title of the pope. According to Innocent, the pope was no longer St. Peter's vicar, but Christ's. Upon consecration Innocent declared as summarized,

The servant, who has been put in charge of the whole house, is the representative of Christ, the successor of Peter, the anointed of the Lord, the God of the Pharaohs; he is the mediator placed between God and men, lesser than God but greater than man.⁹

Innocent's claim was the most notable change to papal ideology. In declaring to be the Vicar of Christ, Innocent was the first pope in centuries to have attributed this much to the papacy.¹⁰ In his eyes, the pontificate was only God's agent.¹¹

Another one of Innocent's assertions significantly shaped papal authority. Innocent used the phrase *mater et magistra* (mother and teacher) to describe the authority of the church. He insisted that the authority of the church mirrored the sacrament of matrimony, whereas Christ was the paternal figure and the pope was the maternal. As the earthly mother, the position of the pope was necessary for the guidance of Christians.¹² The phrase *mater et magistra* can be found in twelve letters, which are dated to the first two years of his pontificate. In a letter to the bishop, magistrates, and citizens of Parma who had recently been placed under interdict due to the seizure of papal revenues, Innocent made use of his matrimonial ideology:

[T]he Roman church, which is the mother and teacher of the other churches [must] open mercifully the womb of charity to those who, repenting of their error, humbly submit to her obedience.¹³

The astute pope knew the image his rhetoric created would be most effective in proclaiming his conception of the papacy to Christendom and justifying his authority.¹⁴

Like the Vicar of Christ, *mater et magistra* was merely a twist of words. Innocent's use of a gendered image to justify higher church authority was unoriginal and stereotypical.¹⁵ By Innocent's period, "Christians had for eight centuries conceptualized church authority in feminine images, both maternal and spousal."¹⁶ The church was commonly called the universal mother. During the reform movements of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, even bishops and abbots were described as mothers.¹⁷ For Innocent, however, marriage was the ultimate paradigm of Christian teaching.¹⁸ His determination to assert himself as the ultimate mother, the one closest to God, differentiated him from others portraying the same image. Innocent took an old ideology and made it new, and his success in receiving compliance with secular rulers reflects the effectiveness of his carefully-composed rhetoric.

Innocent's revolutionary ideology resounded most importantly in his writings. Although his hand did not necessarily partake in the writing, Innocent had a strong relationship with his chancery, and must have dictated a good number of documents.¹⁹ For Innocent, having an active chancery was key to his political success in the secular realm. The 6,000 letters produced under his command and sent to every part of Europe reflected his persistent engagement in secular affairs.²⁰ The letters seemingly urgent character and wordly language made them effective trumpets of power.²¹

The marriage conflict between Ingeborg of Denmark and Philip Augustus of France was one in which Innocent felt he needed to intervene. In 1193 King Philip had married Ingeborg, but soon after received an annulment from the French bishops. Three

years later he married Agnes of Meran.²² According to the *Gesta*, Innocent immediately sent a letter to Philip demanding his separation from Agnes and the reinstatement of Ingeborg, but Philip did not comply. Writing to archbishops and abbots of France, Innocent placed the land under ecclesiastical interdict.²³ In April of 1204 Innocent wrote to the prelates of France in hopes that they would persuade Philip to comply with the pope's terms. In strategically writing to Philip and the prelates of France, Innocent covered the secular and ecclesiastical realms concerning the marriage conflict. Although the final negotiations concerning the marriage of Philip and Ingeborg did not end until 1213 when Philip finally complied; Innocent had his victory.²⁴

A similar struggle occurred in England. After the death of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Innocent appointed a friend, Stephen Langton, to the position in 1207.²⁵ When King John refused to admit Langton, Innocent placed an interdict on England, and later excommunicated John in 1209.²⁶ The only rites the people of England could receive were the baptism of infants and the absolution of the dying, making John one of the most loathed kings in English history. One of Innocent's letters written to John in April of 1213 depicts the tension between the two:

Would that at the first you had agreed to our counsels and believed our warnings! For certainly the business now pending between the crown and the prelacy would not have been so aggravated.²⁷

Perhaps the affair with John proved even more trivial than that of Philip. Overwhelmed with furious subjects under strict interdict and the discovery of a baronial plot to overthrow his kingship, John gave in to Innocent's requests. He finally met with Innocent in 1213.²⁸ His disobedience to the papacy was not only broken, it was dissolved. In addition to accepting Langton as archbishop, John had to pledge devotion to Innocent.

Innocent's influence over the spiritual realm was also quite remarkable. During his eighteen-year reign as pope, he summoned and presided over one of the most influential councils, promoted two crusades to the Levant, called the first crusade against heretics, and sanctioned the Franciscan and Dominican orders.²⁹ Innocent governed Christendom and the secular world in the same manner, through eager and persistent writing.

The Fourth Lateran Council's contributions to Christianity were extraordinary. Innocent's primary focus had been the misconduct of the clergy and the defining and redefining of sacraments.³⁰ Innocent's basic success, however, lay in his ability to gather one of the best attended councils of the Middle Ages. A letter of summons, addressed to the archbishop, bishops, abbots, and priors of Vienne, opens with the imminent need to recover the Holy Land and reform the church, plucking the bad fruit from the Christian vine. Declaring attendance mandatory no matter the obstacles of the journey, Innocent proclaims,

No one ever sailed through calm waters who always waited for the sea to stop throwing up waves.³¹

The implementation of such a convincing image portrays the significance of the council for Innocent. Furthermore, he arranged spies to investigate the extent of clerical

corruption and sent agents to organize a crusade years before the council. Innocent was fully prepared for the business to be addressed during the council.³²

When the council was finally held on November 11, 1215, the attendance was the greatest held up to that time; there were over four hundred bishops and eight hundred abbots and priors.³³ Once there, the attendants heard much more of Innocent's compelling rhetoric in an opening sermon. Using the words of Christ and his apostles at the Last Supper at the convening of the council, Innocent states, "I have desired with longing to eat this Pasch with you before I suffer, that is, before I die."³⁴ Possibly anticipating his own death, which occurred in the next year, Innocent's imagery was clearly effective at obtaining the attention and concern of church leaders. Once again, Innocent's determination and planning through cleverly-devised rhetoric succeeded.

Like summoning general councils, the papacy had a long history concerning its involvement in crusading. Although horrified at the crusaders' sack of Constantinople in 1202 and disheartened at their halt in Byzantium, Innocent was delighted at the crusaders' capture of the empire. In a letter written to the people of Constantinople in May of 1205, Innocent pronounced, "the Lord had deigned to open a way for the recovery of his land by the miraculous transfer of the empire from the Greeks to the Latins."³⁵ In gaining control of Constantinople, the crusaders were closer to their target, but as they lingered in the empire year after year, Innocent grew impatient and declared a new expedition to the East. He began preaching liturgical propaganda for the crusade during the great council. General letters were soon sent to every Christian country in an attempt to maximize efforts.³⁶ Innocent was set to rally before the troops in June of 1217, but perished before; perhaps, the crusade would have gone smoother with the industrious pope.

One of Innocent's most notorious ecclesiastical affairs was the Albigensian Crusade. Although heretics had been condemned as early as 1022, no pope had ever declared a crusade on them. By Innocent's time, Southern France and Northern Italy proved to be the problem areas for the Church. In 1198 Innocent sent a monk named Rainer to confiscate property and exile the Cathars, but greater and deadly measures were taken in later years.³⁷ The *Gesta* refers to a case in which Innocent encountered the Patarenes, a group of heretics in Italy, and established the following statute:

[The filthy heretics] should first be captured...all their goods should be seized...the house in which the heretic was received should be destroyed, and no one dare to rebuild it ...[no one] should employ [them]...whoever dares to give ecclesiastical burial to such persons...should be punished by the sword...³⁸

Using severe language, Innocent wanted to make it impossible for heretics to exist in society, however, heretical existence continued. Innocent soon used crusading to root out his enemies. The massacre of the people of Beziers in July of 1209 was one of the deadliest instances.³⁹

Innocent's crusading approach proved to be effective in obliterating the enemy, however, the best aid came from the new order of St. Francis. Choosing an apostolic lifestyle like the Cathars, but having a strong devotion to church authority, St. Francis was the perfect match for heresy.⁴⁰ Upon meeting Francis, Innocent told him to play with the pigs because of his uncouth appearance. When Francis returned caked in pig feces,

Innocent was convinced Francis would be loyal to the papacy.⁴¹ Interestingly, Innocent did not think much of Francis, but after Innocent's death, Francis, as well as, St. Dominic proved to be the greatest forces against heresy. Heresy was the one department of which Innocent's rhetoric faltered, for such heretics could not be won over by flattery or scared by threats. Compliance with heretics was not obtained through writing, but his rhetoric was successful in rallying crusaders against heretics. Innocent's actions provided an example for which future dealings with heretical groups were treacherously modeled.

Having a great deal of influence in both the temporal and spiritual spheres, Innocent proved to be one of the finest popes of the Middle Ages. Innocent's compelling language and determination were his greatest assets. Using the Vicar of Christ and gendered images, Innocent reinvigorated papal ideology, and in actively writing church and secular authorities he became the ultimate Christian overseer. Although writing to secular rulers, summoning a council, and calling crusades had been traditional roles of the papacy, they were all notable actions, which produced significant reform and served as precedent for future ecclesiastical affairs. The Albigensian Crusade proved to be the only affair, which did not have a previous model, however, the master of rhetoric won support over the enemy. Pope Innocent III, the man of great words and determination, exceeded preceding pontificates because he twisted and transformed existing papal ideology through passionate writing, and since later popes lacked such rhetorical talent, they ultimately reigned in his shadow.

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Garrett Fontenot

INDIGENOUS COLONISTS: THE FORMATION OF AN ACADIAN CULTURAL IDENTITY

Acadian history consists of a tangle of New World and Old World; of French, English, and distinctly Acadian people and cultures. It is an intricate web of interconnecting viewpoints and understandings concerning both the land of Acadia and the peoples who inhabited that land, both native and colonist. Many of the descriptions of the Acadian peoples before the conquest come from not the Acadians, but rather from officials who were geographically far removed from the Acadians that their accounts consist primarily of overly idealistic banter based more on speculation than hard evidence or from soldiers sent to the colony who showed little sympathy towards the Acadian people.¹ It is not unusual in Acadian history to see both the English and French (and in some cases, factions of competing Frenchmen) competing over claims to the colony.² While debates over Acadia raged outside the colony, the Acadians themselves grew on their own terms, developing a distinct cultural identity. The complicated and confusing nature of the colony fostered a colonial disposition distinct from that of their Canadian neighbors and French and English masters. The Acadian settlers saw themselves not as French settlers or English subjects, but rather, primarily, as Acadians.³ In his book on the growth of Acadia, John Bartlet Brebner goes so far as to define this disconnected understanding of the regions by saying "There were, in effect, two Acadies, each important in its own way. The one was the Acadie of the international conflict, the other the land settled and developed by the Acadians."⁴ The idea of "two Acadias" implies the distinction between how the Acadians viewed their identity and how others viewed the inhabitants. A unique, pragmatic, and accommodating Acadian political culture developed through the demographics and settlement patterns of the early colony in conjunction with the complicated and disputed political situation and differing understandings of the colony and its people on the part of the English and French.

Major permanent settlement of the colony of Acadia began during the governorship of Frenchman Isaac de Razilly, who on May 10, 1632, who received a commission as governor of from the French crown. Under his leadership and promotion, around one hundred to two hundred settlers arrived in Acadia. These initial settlers would form the basis of the later population of Acadia.⁵ The bulk of Acadian settlers arrived in the 1630s and 1640s under the sponsorship of Governors Razilly and Charles de Menou d'Aulnay.⁶ By 1683, only about six hundred settlers had established themselves in Acadia, however, the population continued to grow steadily.⁷ During this period, the vast majority (about seventy percent) of Acadian settlers were concentrated around Port Royal, with the remaining thirty percent spread out along the coasts.⁸ By 1714, the population had grown to around one thousand, seven hundred and seventy-three, as compared to the four hundred and forty-one settlers forty three years earlier in 1671. What is most remarkable about this quadrupling of the population is that rather than representing an increase in immigrants to Acadia, these figures reflect natural growth through reproduction. This "eloquent testimony to the fecundity of the Acadian stock" would profoundly impact the demographic growth of the colony and ensure the cultural cohesiveness of the Acadians through natural growth, rather than interrupt the process of cultural development with the introduction of new settlers.⁹ New settlements also developed with the rapid increase in population, especially on the Minas Basin (fifty settlers in 1690) and at Beaubassin (one hundred and fifty settlers in 1690)¹⁰, however, the primary settlement and largest concentration of Acadians remained at Port Royal (with around six hundred inhabitants).¹¹

The natural growth of the population enabled the people to develop a strong and distinct identity separate from any sort of European identity.¹² Within a few generations, it is likely the Acadians viewed themselves not as a European colonial people, but rather as an indigenous people distinct to the land.¹³ An attitude of semi-neglect of the region by French authorities reinforced this idea of a distinct Acadian identity. Acadia remained relatively isolated for the most part of its colonial existence. Though the Acadians participated in trade with New England and Europe, in the largest scheme, Acadia was widely considered a colonial backwater, but a backwater with important strategic value.¹⁴ It was located in a very strategically difficult location: travel to the St. Lawrence River Valley and New England required the undertaking of an often arduous and lengthy journey by sea and over rough terrain. Communication within Acadia was likewise difficult, as the lack of settlements, tedious geography, and treacherous coastlines of Acadia made travel across the land difficult.¹⁵ The French naturally faced difficulties in administering the colony, further exacerbated by the population growth and subsequent geographical expansion during the second half of the seventeenth century. This lack of colonial administration "taught the colonists to think and act in their own best interests."¹⁶ The settlement of new lands also allowed for increased opportunities for Acadians to assert their independence. As small Acadian farmers constructed dykes to clear the marshland along the coast, their settlements grew increasingly distant from the main population center at Port Royal, making communication and travel with the new, outlying settlements increasingly difficult. New settlements were not immediately garrisoned, as few French troops were present to provide for their defense. The already limited colonial administration failed to expand its jurisdiction to cover them, and as a result, rural Acadians were forced to grow to be quite independent of both colonial authorities as well as European authorities.¹⁷ The policies enacted in 1670 by the governor of New France, Louis de Buade de Frontenac, to consolidate New France into a more cohesive entity reflect the French misunderstanding and neglect of Acadia. What constituted the French colonial presence in Acadia was either ignored during this Frontenac's unification process, or was otherwise presented demands that were either irrelevant or otherwise unsuited for the reality in the colony. Acadia thus remained a separate and radically different region from the rest of Canada, simultaneously maintaining only tenuous links to France. Most ties to New France were largely forgotten by the Acadians until the British invasion of 1710 forced the colonists at Port Royal to request assistance from the Marquis de Vaudreuil in relocating out from under British rule to the St. Lawrence Valley.¹⁸ This particular isolation pushed Acadia into New England's sphere of influence in such a way that Acadia maintained much closer ties to New England than it did with Canada or New France.¹⁹

The idea that Acadia fell within New England's sphere of influence rather than that of France or Canada is supported by the very tangled political situation of the colony in the second half of the seventeenth century. Acadia was subject to numerous invasions, raids, conflicts, and disputes in the period from its founding to the British conquest of 1710, many of which were directed from New England. Acadia's geographical location served as one of the primary reasons for continuous pressure from New England: positioned in a strategic location between New England and New France and possessing rich fisheries, Acadia was destined to serve as a point of conflict between the two colonial powers as well as the inhabitants of each region.²⁰ In the late seventeenth century, complaints and conflict over the coastal trade in the region began to arise. One documented example is that of Henri Brunet, an official of the French *Compagnie du Nord*, who was involved with trade in the region during this period. Brunet's correspondence from the winter of 1674-75 is notable in the complaints he raises against unauthorized traders

from New England exploiting the resources of Acadia, going so far as to request a commission to stop the illicit traders.²¹ In the late seventeenth century, the Faneuil family of Boston acted in conjunction with one David Basset to facilitate the exchange of English cloth and hardware for Acadian coal and wheat through prominent Acadian merchants.²² Merchants based in France saw little incentive to trade with the small, remote colony, whereas merchants in New England were both located near Acadia and could easily profit from trade with the colony. Acadians accepted the trade with New England because of the large presence of New England traders as well as the profitability of such an arrangement.²³ New England's dominance of the Acadian trade and the French neglect of the colony forced some governors of Acadia to casually overlook, if not tacitly participate in, the illegal trade with New England in order to support both themselves and the colony.²⁴ Acadian merchants were quick to realize the potential profits to be made through trade with the English after the 1710 conquest, as well. Some Acadian merchants were quick to pledge allegiance to the British in order to capitalize on and, in some ways, secure the already existing trade between New England and Nova Scotia. By November 1710, two months after the capture of Port Royal, fifty-seven Acadian families had sworn allegiance to the British and had already begun to trade with the British forces in Port Royal.²⁵

Conflict is one of the main themes in Acadian history, as an incredible number of raids, attacks, and conquests mark the history of the region. The most notable of these is, undoubtedly the final conquest of Nova Scotia by the British in 1710 which led to the establishment of permanent British colonial government in Nova Scotia and eventually the expulsion of the Acadians from their homeland. Even before 1710, however, forces from New England made numerous forays into Acadia, eliciting an interesting response from the Acadian settlers. Acadia's location on the periphery of the Atlantic colonial world contributed to the nature of warfare which dominated the period between 1650 and 1710. Many of the military operations in Acadia were conducted in an irregular manner, without official sanction from colonial authorities.²⁶ One of the more interesting examples is that of Dutch captain Jurriaen Aernouts, who laid claim to the colony after capturing its governor in 1674 with only one frigate under his command. Several English raids between 1696 and 1704 destroyed the Acadian settlements in the Fundy region and two attacks were attempted on Port Royal in 1707, but failed to capture the fort protecting the city.²⁷ New Englanders envisioned that an increase in the already burgeoning commercial activity with Acadia would occur once the French administrative presence, albeit limited, was eliminated.²⁸ The English also sought to remove the threat that French presence in Acadia represented.²⁹ Rather than posing a strictly military threat to the English, the French position in Canada threatened English colonial trade (exemplified by the illicit trade conducted between New England and France). The conquest of Acadia would have been an attractive option for the English colonial government to prevent wealth from leaving English hands and to secure the fur and fish produced in the region. The absence of effective French colonial authority led the settlers to act in their own self-interest in response to English aggression, as the administration was concerned more with other areas of New France than it was with Acadia.³⁰

In light of the physical and political conflict over Acadia, it becomes very easy to forget that real control of the colony resided with the Acadian people. Throughout the period from 1600 to 1710, the Acadians developed a culture based around adaptability. Because of the competing influences of trade with New England as well as violence directed from New England, the Acadians were forced to develop a political mindset that allowed them to adapt to either while maintaining the most favorable balance of power. This mindset was something not recognized by either the French or English, who viewed the Acadians as little more than pawns in the broader

Atlantic colonial game. Numerous treaties and agreements between the colonial powers took no account of the Acadians or their view of themselves as something like an indigenous people to the region, which is how they viewed themselves.³¹ Neither France nor Britain had recognized the independence of the Acadians, and had, for the most part, ignored their presence in the colony, taking the Acadians into consideration only whenever matters of trade involved merchants and traders of Acadia. The Acadians saw themselves not as Frenchmen or Englishmen, but simply as Acadians; an attitude reflected in some of the policy decisions and attitudes they adopted in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The French complained in the early eighteenth century that the Acadians "lived like true republicans, not acknowledging royal or judicial authority."³² The British interpreted this independent-minded behavior as apolitical, accepting the fact that the Acadians did not consider themselves British, even after the British came to rule the region in 1710.³³

The Acadians, on the other hand, interpreted their behavior as that which was meant to guarantee the maintenance of their quasi-independent status. When the British captured and held Port Royal in 1690 for a short period of time, many of the Acadian elites of the town signed an oath of allegiance to William and Mary, and some even took the additional step of serving on the council set up to rule Acadia on behalf of Massachusetts.³⁴ Since the Port Royal elite were the ones who were most intimately connected with New England trade, it would seem logical to demonstrate support for English officials in order to safeguard their trade interests with merchants in New England. The Acadian elites' attitude does not suggest passive support of the British, but rather support of their own interest. A similar pragmatic behavior was demonstrated in response to a raid on a settlement in the Beaubassin region in 1696. Germain Bourgeois, a prominent settler familiar with the New England trade, served as the militia captain for the settlement during a raid from New England under the command of Benjamin Church. Bourgeois attempted to convince Church that the settlers had signed the oath of allegiance to King William after the 1690 attack on Port Royal, and their compliance with the English in 1690 made them subject to the protection of the English. Since the Beaubassin settlers did not enjoy the actual protection of the French despite the fact that they were under nominal French control, Bourgeois's actions represent an attempt to protect the best interest of the village by siding with the British, since to resist or declare neutrality would have led to the destruction or pillaging of the village.³⁵ This sort of attitude reflects the mindset of peoples commonly faced with hardship and conflict. European communities subject to civil and religious strife often adopted an attitude of accommodation when faced by an invading army, only to withdraw their support whenever it became disadvantageous or was no longer necessary for their protection.³⁶ The Acadian pragmatic attitude became a great inconvenience for both the British and French, since the Acadians refused to work with only one power, making mercantilism a nearly impossible theory to put into practice because of the large amount of smuggling undertaken by English merchants with the complicity of the Acadians. The Acadians were not, however, unified by any single policy or form of pragmatism; rather, it was practiced on a case by case basis, molding to whatever the local situation called for.³⁷ Henri Brunet's pleas to his French superiors for a coast guard commission attest to this pragmatism, as he sought to restrict the illegal trade conducted on the part of New Englanders, as it was, in his eyes, detrimental to his own trade in the region. The Acadians recognized the need for pragmatic action on a case-by-case basis, without which the people would have been easily overwhelmed by outside powers.

Though the Acadians conducted large amounts of trade with New England, it was more favorable to remain under French control because the French neglect of the colony allowed the

Acadians to control their own affairs, whereas British control of the colony meant increased control over its people. The presence of a large, developed British colony near Acadia was incredibly important in the colony's development, but it did not mean that the Acadians were subject to the whim of New England. The Acadians used the proximity of New England to their advantage, suffering occasional raids as the price for their refusal to identify themselves as New Englanders. Their refusal to identify with New England does not automatically mean that they were considered French, but rather formed a distinctly Acadian culture. After being conquered by the British in 1710, the Acadians refused to swear an oath of allegiance to the British unless allegiance was qualified by an exemption from military service to the British and a right to emigrate freely out of British territory.³⁸ The Acadian identity was heavily politically self-centered and pragmatic. The Acadians sought to maintain a power dynamic in which they could trade with New England (even if the trade was illegal) and also maintain the benevolent neglect of the French government. Unlike many other colonists, who were identified with their mother country, the Acadians represented a somewhat indigenous people, who saw Acadia as their native land and modeled much of their political behavior on the principle of maintaining their independence and identity.

The Acadian identity can ultimately be understood in terms of the regions unique geography and population growth as well as the impact that these factors had on the Acadian sense of pragmatism. It is likely that this sort of attitude would not have developed had the population of Acadia not grown in a manner that mirrored indigenous patterns of population growth. The Acadian mindset evolved because of the strong community ties fostered by the natural population increase which led the Acadians to see themselves as their own people, not as a colonial people. Whereas other colonists viewed themselves as English, French, or Spanish because of the collective memory and constant presence of new colonists from Europe, the Acadians were not reminded of their ties to European colonial powers, both because new colonists did not regularly arrive and the colonial administration of the colony was either not present or otherwise ineffective or irrelevant. This confluence of factors forced the Acadians to act in their own interests, to do what they saw fit for their own well-being, a mindset that manifested itself in the varied responses to the presence of New England merchants in Acadia as well as the varied levels of cooperation rendered to the British after the conquest of Acadia in 1710. To some extent, this attitude was eventually recognized by the British and French, but for the most part, the Acadian's pragmatic responses remained an enigma for outsiders. The Marquis de Vaudreuil, the colonial governor of New France, wrote to the French Minister of Marine in November 1711 that the Acadians, rather than simply acquiescing to the British presence in Port Royal (or Annapolis Royal, as the British now referred to it) were rather acting deliberately "because they wanted to harvest their crops peacefully and because they were out of munitions."³⁹ Vaudreuil's opinion represents a tacit recognition of the attitude and independence of the Acadians. The pragmatic attitude of the Acadians served them quite well until the British began to strongly enforce their presence in the colony in the mid-eighteenth century, clashing with the predominant Acadian attitudes, and ultimately leading to *Le Grand Dérangement* of the Acadian people between 1755 and 1763.

NOTES

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Emily Gelpi

JEANNE D'ARC: THE EVOLUTION OF A MYSTICAL SYMBOL

On January 6, 1412, a peasant girl was born who would defy the medieval social construct by the age of nineteen.¹ Born into a beleaguered and war-torn France, Jeanne d'Arc became a mystical symbol of hope at the onset of her visions of Christ.² Armed with the intercession of her mission from angels, Jeanne's religious devotion resulted in an unconventional campaign for the restoration of France.³ Her unwavering faith in her visions transformed her life into that of a mystic, ultimately propelling her into a life of female dynamism.⁴ Her life defied the female social restraint of the period by embodying a radical call to action. Marina Warner exclaims, "Joan of Arc is a preeminent heroine because she belongs to the sphere of action, while so many female figures or models are assigned and confined to the sphere of contemplation. She is anomalous in our culture, a woman renowned for doing something on her own, not by birthright."⁵ Fueled by the mysticism of her mission, Jeanne became a powerful symbol of virginity as the Maid of Orleans, but she ultimately fell from grace. Throughout her life, Joan's mysticism was the catalyst for the evolution of her identity from virginal maid to condemned heretic.

At the start of her campaign, Jeanne identified herself as "La Pucelle" and solidified her virginity as the identity of her mission. La Pucelle literally means "virgin", but it also denotes youth and innocence in a temporary state of time.⁶ Jeanne clarified her commitment to her virginity during her trial when she stated, "The first time I heard the voice, I promised to keep my virginity for as long as it pleased God."⁷ Through Jeanne's exclamation, it is clear that her virginity was synonymous with her mission, but her mission was quite uncommon for the time. Donald Spoto states that Jeanne "was dedicating herself neither as a nun nor as a laywoman associated with the religious community. She saw her virginity as a corollary of the imminent task to which she freely responded. The terms of her promise ('as long as...') implied that, should God lead her along other paths in the future, she would be open to his plan for her to marry and bear children."⁸ Through her vow of chastity outside of a nunnery, Jeanne took an uncommon approach that resulted in her complete reliance on God. Specifically, "her chaste condition was her identity, and this derived from the sense of self provided from her revelations."⁹ Therefore, Jeanne's commitment to chastity was inextricably linked to her mission from Christ and became the ultimate source of her identity.

Jeanne's amenorrhea assimilated mysticism into her virginal identity, which intensified the believability of her mission. Jeanne's squire, Jean d'Aulon, stated, "I've heard it said by many women, who saw the Maid undressed many times and knew her secrets, that she never suffered from the secret illness of women and that no one could ever notice or learn anything of it from her clothes or in any other way."¹⁰ During the time, amenorrhea represented uniqueness and power, and a border into womanhood that Jeanne would not cross.¹¹ The *Almanache de Gotha* of 1822 describes Jeanne's amenorrhea as an exemption from the weakness of her sex and a "remarkable peculiarity, which makes manifest the plans God entertained for her."¹² Jeanne's amenorrhea promoted the sanctity of her mission and, as one medieval medical commentary argues, "such a failing of the menses happens on account of the power and quality of strength."¹³ Thus, Jeanne's amenorrhea bolstered the innocence and integrity of her mission, and ultimately alluded to her strength.

As Jeanne branded the sanctity of her mission with her own virginity, she instinctively associated herself with an inherently religious image of female power.¹⁴ Specifically, virginity was the only route to female autonomy that defied conventional roles such as wife, mistress, and mother, which were ultimately identified in relation to men.¹⁵ Mary Gordon states, "At least potent virginity was the minimum condition for a woman entering a traditionally male sphere; at its most powerful, it invested its possessor with an aura that traveled between the sacred, the mystical, and the magical."¹⁶ As Jeanne identified herself according to her virginity, she reached the maxim of female autonomy and achieved spiritual power. During the medieval period, women's bodies were viewed as more powerful than men through their unique potential for chastity, and the female virgin "was magic because of the long Christian tradition that held since the second century that the inviolate body of a woman was one of the holiest things possible in creation, holier than the chastity of a man, who cannot anatomically achieve the same physical image of spiritual integrity as a woman."¹⁷ Therefore, Jeanne secured power through the central beliefs associated with the innocent state of her virginity.

As Jeanne reached the maxim of her female autonomy, she crossed gender lines to protect her virginal identity on which her mission was built. From her first trip to Chinon to meet Charles VII, Jeanne was intent on protecting her chastity by deemphasizing her gender through male costume.¹⁸ Edward Lucie-Smith argues, "Joan's clothes were also a means of taking on a new social, as well as a new sexual identity. She did not remain in the plain dress she assumed in Valcours. We soon hear of her dressed in the manner of a young nobleman."¹⁹ Accounts of Jeanne's attire suggest that she not only transcended female dress, but blatantly flaunted the distinction of her position among men as she wore, "magnificent and sumptuous habits of precious cloth, gold, and also furs. And not only did she wear short tunics, but also tabards, and robes open at every side."²⁰ Jeanne's masquerade in the height of male fashion is a radical assertion of power and status for a female peasant during the Middle Ages. Specifically, the richness and masculinity of her clothes "were a silent but conspicuous claim to be someone whom no common rules applied."²¹ Jeanne challenged gender lines in the medieval period with audacity, fueled by an unwavering belief in her mission. As someone chosen by God, Jeanne believed in the sanctity of her mission and boldly defied the confines of her gender for the protection and distinction of her status.

Jeanne's voices were the source of her mission and characterized her mystical reputation. A mystical experience involves a spontaneous and transient gift of knowledge where the mystic "has received a pure, direct vision of truth."²² Mystical experiences are significant to social order and intrinsically anti-authoritarian. Ultimately, they force the mystic to believe in the truth of the vision and seek a conflict they would refrain from otherwise.²³ Anne Barstow declares Jeanne's mystical experiences as, "highly relevant to historical research about autonomous women [...]" She represents the kind of mystic who receives instructions about the unraveling of a problem.²⁴ Specifically, St. Michael, St. Catherine, and St. Margaret gave Jeanne instructions to crown the dauphin King of France.²⁵ However, before Charles VII's coronation could take place, "fidelity to God's summons came to mean a commitment to alleviate human suffering by lifting the siege of Orleans."²⁶ In battle, Jeanne's mystical reputation transformed the morale of the French soldiers. They rallied around her as she encouraged them to trust in God completely, reassuring them of a final reward in heaven.²⁷ Ultimately, the soldier's faith in the legitimacy of Jeanne's mysticism changed the course of the war as they lifted the siege of Orleans.

Jeanne's mysticism resulted in the evolution of her identity from innocent virgin to the glorified Maid of Orleans. France's new commitment to lifting the siege was inextricably linked

to Jeanne's mysticism, as people regarded her as "the daughter of God, a girl blessed with the mystical gift of insight and faith."²⁸ Specifically, Jeanne was credited for the success of the siege, which is evident in an Orleans citizen's exclamation, "all the people of the city believed that if the Maid had not come from God to help them, all the inhabitants and the city itself would have quickly succumbed to the power of the enemy besieging them."²⁹ The people of Orleans venerated Jeanne because of the mysticism that embodied her identity and mission. During the 15th century, devotion to women saints thrived and people revered some women as *mulieres sanctae*, or living holy women.³⁰ Daniel Spoto argues, "To understand her value to the military expeditions, it is essential to appreciate the strength of religious belief at the time and the veneration in which people held an evidently prayerful woman vowed to virginity."³¹ People's reactions to Jeanne's presence in Orleans suggest that she was promoted to a lofty spiritual status as "all regarded her with much affection—men and women, as well as small children. There was an extraordinary rush to touch her, or even to touch the horse on which she sat."³² Jeanne's reputation was formed out of the mysticism of her mission, but also the strength of her action. She transformed those around her, due to her ability to achieve the unthinkable in changing the course of the war. Ultimately, people's faith in mysticism of Jeanne's mission transformed her identity from virgin to the legitimate Maid of Orleans.

As a symbol of triumph and power, the Maid of Orleans fell from favor as she began to lose military battles. Jeanne's reputation was bolstered by the success of her military operations, and she "understood herself as a symbolic figure, and she understood the symbolic nature of her enterprise."³³ But as she lost her military might, Jeanne's symbolic nature became ambiguous and contradictory, leaving her unable to inspire the French troops in battle.³⁴ Jeanne's fall from favor is especially evident in the transformation of her relationship with King Charles VII. Jeanne, once regarded as the primary force behind Charles VII's coronation, was indirectly disowned by the king upon her capture in Compiègne. As Charles VII abandoned Jeanne, it is clear that his loyalty was carefully tied to the usefulness of her representation.³⁵ Mary Gordon suggests that Jeanne's fall from favor is a direct consequence of her desire to move from the female sphere of inaction to the male sphere of action, which ultimately conflicts with the male notion that, "a girl can be an ornament, but if she wants to act, rather than be looked at, if she wants scope and autonomy rather than the static fate of a well-regarded object, she becomes dangerous."³⁶ As a venerated mystical symbol, Jeanne was useful to the king; however, as a contradictory figure, Jeanne represented the radical. As her symbolic mission no longer personified success, Jeanne fell from favor and her motives were questioned.

Throughout Jeanne's life, her individualistic, mystical, and female identity radically opposed the Church. Jeanne's powerful religious campaign for France challenged the Church's conception of female religious devotion because "she was rigorously unique—not a queen, a mother, an aristocrat, a nun, or an intellectual, but a woman of action and profound religious faith, convinced that God willed the integrity of her country."³⁷ In 1429, at the height of Jeanne's popularity in France, the Church was intent on reestablishing its authority by strictly enforcing orthodoxy.³⁸ The authors of *Heresies in the High Middle Ages* define heresy as, "the pursuit of what to the individual seemed right", and, in an age where the Church was competing for dominance, it was considered treason.³⁹ After the schism divided and discredited the Church's authority, it emerged as a weaker institution that could no longer afford its independence from the influence of powerful monarchs.⁴⁰ As Jeanne waged a powerful military campaign against the English, her victories made her an enemy of King Henry V, and the mysticism of her mission

had implications of heresy. The Church's intent to acquire Jeanne after her capture is clear in a letter from Bishop Cauchon to John of Luxembourg and the Duke of Burgundy:

In the name and on behalf of the King our sire [...] that the woman who is commonly called Joan the Maid, prisoner, be sent to the King to be delivered over to the Church to hold her trial because she is suspected and defamed to have committed many crimes, sortileges, idolatry, invocations of enemies (devils) and other several cases touching our faith against that faith.⁴¹

Clearly influenced by the power of the King of England, the bishop asserted the political and religious implications of Jeanne's capture, over which he wanted complete control. Ultimately, Jeanne was handed over to the very institution which the mysticism of her mission defied, the Catholic Church.

As Jeanne faced the inquisition of an ecclesiastical court, she questioned the motives and authority of the Church. Jeanne did not trust the nature of the trial; instead, "she believed the Church neither represented the church triumphant (in heaven) nor the church militant (church on earth) to her they were just the enemy, the English, the Burgundians."⁴² The biased nature of the investigation supports Jeanne's beliefs. Specifically, Bishop Cauchon gathered one cardinal, six bishops, thirty-two doctors of theology, sixteen bachelors of theology, seven doctors of medicine, and one hundred clerical associations to argue the case against Jeanne, and ultimately left the nineteen year old, illiterate peasant to defend herself.⁴³ The grueling nature of the trial was recalled by the notary, Guillaume Manchon, who stated, "During the trial Joan was harassed by numerous and diverse interrogations which lasted about three or four hours."⁴⁴ In spite of the harsh inquisitions, Jeanne remained consistently fearless, without any concern for her adamant defiance of the Church's authority.⁴⁵ Guillaume Manchon also recalled the means Bishop Cauchon took to ensure Jeanne's confusion and condemnation during interrogation: "At the beginning of the trial, during five or six days, while I set down in writing the Maid's answers and excuses, sometimes the judges tried to constrain me, by translating into Latin, to put into other terms, changing the meaning of words or, in some other manner, my understanding (of what had been said)."⁴⁶ In spite of the manipulation of theological rhetoric, Jeanne challenged her inquisitors with the simple nature of her answers.⁴⁷ Therefore, through the judges' biased and manipulative approach, Jeanne's fate was clearly sealed from the start of the trial.

The ecclesiastical court rigorously scrutinized the dual-gender of Jeanne's identity during her inquisition. Article XII of the trial outlines that, "Joan wore a shirt, breeches, a doublet with leggings joined to the doublet by twenty laces, high slippers laced on the outside, a short robe to the knee or thereabouts, a scalloped hat, tight boots, long spurs, a sword, a dagger, a male tunic, a lance, and other arms with which she armed herself after the manner of the men-at-arms."⁴⁸ The nature of Jeanne's male dress was acceptable to the court only in the form of temporary disguise; however, "a woman was not permitted to live every day of her life cross-dressed as a man and intending to be taken for a man, for that would be able to imitate what was presumed to be the loftier status of a man."⁴⁹ Therefore, the court charged Jeanne for idolatry, specifically, for making herself an idol through the masquerade of a dual-gender. This charge was one of the few that remained against Jeanne throughout the trial because, in taking on male costume, she did not fully conceal her female identity to protect her virginity. Instead, "everything Joan did was colored by the accent of her femaleness, like a foreign accent that inflects every syllable and determines the interpretation of every word."⁵⁰ Jeanne radically tried to represent the pinnacle of

both sexes in the medieval period of strict gender categorization. In doing so, "her cross-dressing made her femaleness a contradiction rather than an erasure; in taking on the power and authority of men, she refused to give up the identity of a woman."⁵¹ In spite of the charge of false idolization, Jeanne continued to defy the medieval gender construct throughout her trial. Jeanne refused to forgo her male costume to hear mass and receive the Eucharist during her captivity.⁵² Like her unwavering faith in her visions, Jeanne remained steadfast in her direct defiance of gender norms through her male costume.

As Jeanne's male costume implicated her as a heretic, her allegiance to the power of her visions directly defied the authority of the Church. The court first accused Jeanne of creating false idols of her visions because her descriptions implied their bodily existence.⁵³ Specifically, "she believed unwaveringly in her counselors, and to her they were very real. She even asserted that she had embraced St. Margaret and St. Catherine, who had a beautiful perfume about them."⁵⁴ When asked about her escape attempt, that nearly took her life, Jeanne admitted it was against the will of her voices, but that they had absolved her of her sin. Such an assertion "that she was forgiven by them directly, without her having needed to receive absolution by sacramental means, through the authority of a priest, was an example of the kind of heretical presumption that maddened Joan's judges, that they rightly saw an assault on the primacy of ecclesiastical authority."⁵⁵ Jeanne's claim legitimized the Church's suspicions of heresy because it transformed the innocent guidance her visions initially represented.⁵⁶ The once innocent visions on which Jeanne's mission was built, now directly defied Church authority. Jeanne's assertion of her vision's power instantly made her an enemy of the Church militant because "like other mystics and visionaries, [Joan] posed a threat to the hierarchy of the Church. If men were able to communicate so directly with God—through visions or 'voices'—what need was there for the clergy?"⁵⁷ Due to the revolutionary implications of Jeanne's voices, "the ultimate accusation was that Joan had taken on the authority of God and raised herself above the power of the Church by neither confessing her visions to a priest nor by asking any cleric for guidance in or approval of her supernatural experiences."⁵⁸ Therefore, Jeanne's unwavering faith in the power of her visions over Church authority inevitably resulted in her conviction as a heretic.

As the ecclesiastical court convicted Jeanne of heresy, she clearly represented a religious and political prisoner. From a letter written in the name of King Henry V, England's undeniable influence in Jeanne's fate is clear: "It is our intention to recover and take back to ourselves that Joan if so be that she be not convicted or attained of the case (of heresy) or other touching or regarding of our faith."⁵⁹ This letter exemplifies England's stake in Jeanne's trial by ultimately identifying Jeanne as a political and religious prisoner. The trial's dual nature defied its ecclesiastical visage on several points. Technically, as a religious prisoner, Jeanne should not have been held in a secular prison during her captivity, and the costs of her confinement should not have been paid by the English. Instead, she should have been housed in an ecclesiastical prison with same sex guards.⁶⁰ This convergence of the religious and secular authority over Jeanne's captivity clearly depicts the dual-nature of her trial. The inherent biases in Jeanne's trial are also apparent in her lack of representation, which was required by Church law for all persons under twenty-five accused of heresy.⁶¹ In contrast, Jeanne was denied defense at the age of nineteen. The trial's discrepancies must be understood within the context of the political state and social power of England during the period. Jeanne was the instrument for Charles VII's coronation, and she was the Maid that ultimately weakened England's power in France. Therefore, Jeanne's trial must be seen as a political one, in which the English were determined to discredit France's source of power and triumph.⁶² Therefore, upon her conviction, the English

authorities sought the cruelest form of punishment for Jeanne's crimes that would boldly destroy her pure identity. As Jeanne was sentenced to be burned at the stake she cried, "Alas! Am I so horribly and cruelly used, that my clean body, never yet defiled, must this day be burnt and turn to ashes! Ha! Ha! I would rather be beheaded seven times than suffer burning."⁶³ Therefore, as England was determined to discredit France's military success, the Church was the instrument for its revenge against Jeanne.

After England secured Jeanne's conviction as a heretic, their aim to dishonor France's beloved Maid came to fruition at Jeanne's execution. The authorities allowed the result of Jeanne's inquisition to spread quickly because, "they wanted Joan's death to be witnessed by as many people as possible—the ignominious end of the supposed miracle-worker who had raised the siege of Orleans."⁶⁴ In the context of the period, public executions were a form of entertainment, and it was reported that Jeanne's execution was witnessed by "an innumerable throng of spectators."⁶⁵ Although the English succeeded in putting on a show, the response was not quite what they had intended. Upon her execution, the crowds were not impressed by the imposition of political and religious authority; instead, they felt pity for Jeanne's suffering. This is evident in one judges' exclamation, "Please God, let my soul be in the place where I believe this woman to be."⁶⁶ Likewise, the reaction of the executioner is one of guilt, as he confessed to monks, "I greatly feel that I am damned for I have burned a holy woman."⁶⁷ Therefore, although being burned as a heretic, Jeanne's execution did not serve its ultimate purpose to discredit her power. Instead, her holiness was witnessed by thousands and eventually restored eighteen years later when her name was exonerated of the heretical charge.⁶⁸

Throughout her life, Jeanne's identity evolved, due to her unwavering faith in her visions. At their onset, her visions prescribed Jeanne to remain a virgin, which ultimately became the identity of her mission.⁶⁹ By assuming a state of chastity, Jeanne's virginal identity allowed her to achieve the pinnacle of female power.⁷⁰ The mysticism of her amenorrhea bolstered the strength of her character and mission.⁷¹ Armed with the sanctity of her mission and the power of her virginity, Jeanne crossed gender spheres to secure her place in France's restoration. Jeanne boldly straddled gender lines, empowered by the authority of her visions.⁷² Just as Jeanne's mysticism encouraged her virginity, it also transformed Jeanne into a symbol of veneration as the Maid of Orleans. As a woman, willing and able to rally the French troops to victory, Jeanne's success was viewed as ordained by God and the citizens of France glorified her.⁷³ But as Jeanne's mysticism induced her rise to power, its innocent nature was ultimately questioned as she failed to live up to expectations. As she fell into the hands of the enemy, the source of her power became the instrument of her downfall, and Jeanne was condemned as a heretic for worshipping her visions.⁷⁴ However, in spite of a cruel and dishonest end, Jeanne's legend and sainthood are living proof of her undeniable impact on the historical period. She was a pious and devout peasant who rose to become the leader of the French resistance, remaining under the banner and authority of Christ. Overwhelmed by religious fervor and political instability, France ultimately embraced Jeanne, in spite of her inadequate social status and gender, due to her innate and awe-inspiring faith in Christ.

NOTES

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46. Pernoud, 171.
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- 58. Barstow, 94.
- 59. Pernoud, 161.
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- 63. Gordon, 136
- 64. Lucie-Smith, 1.
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- 66. Lucie-Smith, 2.
- 67. Lucie-Smith, 3.
- 68. Gordon, 133.
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Emily Heiser

REVIVING RWANDA: REFORM IN A POST-GENOCIDAL STATE

In 1994 the world witnessed one of the most horrific mass killings in history. Rwanda lost more than ten percent of its population in just one hundred days. At a rate of eight thousand people per day, the number of Rwandan deaths accumulated at nearly three times the rate of Jewish deaths during the Holocaust. This was the most efficient mass killing since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.¹ During the years and months following the genocide, the west tried to rationalize what happened. But we failed to recognize that this genocide was not a tribal meltdown rooted in hatred nor was it a spontaneous outburst of fury set off by earlier events.² The Rwandan genocide was a planned annihilation caused by years of racialization and political oppression. More than fifteen years later, as a post-conflict nation, Rwanda remains a hot bed of political corruption and potential instability. The starting point for reform is radically different than in any other region because the genocide has intensified the tensions between Hutu and Tutsi, tensions already volatile in nature. To contain the deep animosity, there must be a "cooling off" period before addressing reform in Rwanda. This not only requires cooperation from the government but also a commitment from the international community. There is a particular urgency to the question of Rwanda's stability as a nation. Rwanda is a major political and military force in the region. Consequently, its stability – or lack thereof – has considerable implications for the stability of surrounding regions, including eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, and Burundi.

Belgium seized Rwanda from Germany in 1916; two years later it was formally given to Belgium as a League of Nations trust territory. The most devastating institution the Belgians brought with them was race. Mahmood Mamdani points out that the racialization of the Hutu and Tutsi was not just an intellectual construct but that it was an institutional construct. More simply, racial ideology was embedded in institutions, which in turn strengthened racial privilege and reproduced racial ideology.³ The colonial state called for a reflection to implement "racial policies." Race policy became such a preoccupation with the colonial power that from 1925 on, annual colonial administration reports included detailed descriptions of the "races."⁴ One report from the Belgian Department of Colonies wrote:

The Mututsi of good race has nothing of the negro, apart from his colour. He is very tall, 1.80 m. at least, often 1.90 or more. He is very thin, a characteristic which tends to be even more noticeable as he gets older. His features are very fine: a high brow, thin nose and fine lips framing beautiful shining teeth. Batutsi women are usually lighter-skinned than their husbands, very slender and pretty in their youth... Gifted with a vivacious intelligence, the Tutsi displays a refinement of feelings which is rare among primitive people. He is a natural born leader, capable of extreme self-control and of calculated will.⁵

The Hutu were depicted as inexplicably submissive, cowardly, and lacking dignity. A colonial report described them as displaying, "very typical Bantu features ... They are generally set with a big head, a jovial expression, a wide nose and enormous lips."⁶ The Hamitic Hypothesis played a central role in the creation of ethnic categories

in Rwanda since the colonial period. The Europeans capitalized on the Hamitic myth, which placed the origin of the Tutsi outside of Africa implying that, no group as 'good' as the Tutsi could have come from this 'dark continent,' once again justifying Tutsi rule. Mahmood Mamdani discusses the comprehensive reforms of the Belgian colonial administration. He acknowledges that the Belgian power turned the Hamitic racial supremacy from an ideology into an institutional fact by making it the basis of changes in political, social, and cultural relations.⁷ The institutions that supported racial ideology were created in the decade from 1927 to 1936. The reform classified the entire population as Tutsi, Hutu, or Twa, and issued each person with a card declaring his or her "official" identity. In order to promote these racial institutions, the Belgian administrators would have to start with education and then move to state administration. If the theory was that the Tutsi were a "civilizing race," then there would have to be institutions that would discriminate in favor of the Tutsi and make the theory a reality. This theory would lead to a revolution and eventually the attempted elimination of an entire people.

The decolonization of Africa happened quickly after World War II, due to the financial devastation of the Imperial powers. Upon leaving Rwanda, the Belgians switched their support from the Tutsis to the Hutus, leading to the 1959 "Social Revolution." To many Hutu, the revolution marked the end of Tutsi domination and the appointment of power to the Hutus.⁸ For Tutsi, it marked the beginning of a bloody future. The year 1959 began with a sharp split between Hutu and Tutsi political leaders. Grégoire Kayibanda, leader of the revolution, called for Hutu power and for the exclusion of the Tutsi from political life. Faced with loss of political power, some of the Tutsi political elite moved into exile and began preparations for an armed return to power. In 1962 UN intervention led to the New York Accord and the formal announcement of state independence that same year. The New York accord split the Union Nationale Rwandaise, or UNAR, into two rival factions: accommodationists and restorationists.⁹

Rwanda had been in a deadly civil war, which began in 1990. Negotiations to end the war were shaped significantly by internal pressures from opposition parties as well as external pressures from Tanzania, the Organization of African Unity, and outsiders such as the U.S. and Belgium.¹⁰ In the end the Arusha Accords were signed on August 4, 1993 marking the end of the war between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and the Rwandan army. The peace agreement set up a power-sharing arrangement between the RPF and the Rwandan government. However, the Arusha Accord ended up accomplishing the opposite of what it set out to do. In reality, Arusha confirmed the Hutu power claim that the opposition had betrayed the nation. In doing so, it sealed the fate of genocide. The Arusha Agreement failed because it did not take into account the extremist Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) either by including it or by containing it. Instead, the agreement ignored them entirely.¹¹ This power sharing agreement was proving to be unsuccessful. With the assassination of President Melchior Ndadaye of Burundi on October 21, 1993, genocide came to be seen by the Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement et la Démocratie (MRND) politicians as the only rational option, and compromise as synonymous with political suicide.¹² The message conveyed by Ndadaye's assassination: "Never trust the Tutsi!"

April 6, 1994: President Habyarimana's plane is shot down. Even though there is no circumstantial evidence to support it was done by Tutsi extremists, it was just the event Hutu radicals were waiting for. Moments after the crash, killings of Tutsi and

moderate Hutus began in Kigali. Several days later the systematic mass killings began, ushering in three brutal months of murder. Apart from the International Committee of the Red Cross and an under-equipped United Nations peacekeeping mission, Rwandans were largely abandoned. There is evidence to suggest that the UN forces in Rwanda were warned that militias were being armed and that there was a plan to re-start the war.¹³ Western governments sent in troops to save whites, and then they withdrew. Nothing was done to protect those at risk; many were killed right in front of UN soldiers who stood aside and let it happen. The UN pulled out leaving behind a ridiculous four hundred and fifty soldiers, down from twenty five hundred.¹⁴ The Clinton Administration was well aware of the genocide that engulfed Rwanda in 1994 but buried the information to justify any inaction. A National Security Archive report points out five ways in which the decisions made by the United States government contributed to the slow U.S. and worldwide response and to the continuation of genocide. Contrary to later public statements, the U.S. lobbied for a total withdrawal of U.N. forces in Rwanda in April 1994. Senior officials privately used the word genocide within sixteen days of the start of the killings, but had decided not to use it publicly because the president had already chose not to intervene.¹⁵ Secretary of State, Warren Christopher did not authorize officials to use the term "genocide" until May 21 but told the public that the events in Rwanda were simply "acts of genocide." Most disturbing of all is that the government officials knew exactly who was leading the genocide, and actually spoke with those leaders urging them to stop the violence but never followed up with concrete action.¹⁶ Intelligence reports show that the president was most certainly made aware of a planned final solution of all Tutsi and Hutu moderates.

Months after the genocide, surrounding nations including Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Tanzania and Burundi became engulfed in the aftermath of genocide. The RPF victory in the first "democratic elections" set off a massive exodus of Hutu from Rwanda. Over two million people crossed Rwanda's borders into Congo and Tanzania. These refugees literally brought with them the trauma of post genocidal Rwanda to the region of Kivu in eastern DRC. The impact was volcanic and its effects have yet to disappear. The growing crisis in Rwanda introduced a greater tension in Kivu. The tension grew in intensity as the Kinyarwanda-speaking refugee and exile population in Kivu grew in size, increasing the weight of refugees and exiles while blurring the distinction between them and earlier immigrants.¹⁷ The Banyarwanda of Congo were in the political spotlight by the early 1990s. Historically, the Congolese Banyarwanda were divided between those in North Kivu and the rest in South Kivu, the former mainly Hutu and the latter mainly Tutsi.¹⁸ North Kivu had been dealing with a longstanding citizenship crisis but South Kivu did not experience this until the early 1990s. When they organized to defend their citizenship rights, the Banyarwanda of Congo tended to join together on a linguistic and regional basis, rarely as Hutu and Tutsi. The shift in political identity from Hutu and Tutsi was a distinct product of the 1990s. The depth of the crisis in the eastern Congo cannot be understood unless it is seen as the result of a convergence between two distinct processes: the social crisis of post genocide Rwanda and the citizenship crisis in the entire region. The second is the belief that power is the condition of Tutsi survival. The war in Congo has put the "indigenous" majority against a divided "nonindigenous" minority, with the Congolese Tutsi linking themselves to the post genocide state of Rwanda and the Congolese Hutu opposing the state just as firmly. The

war in Congo has created two volatile regional diasporas: one Hutu, the other Tutsi, each determined to set the region on fire if their demands are not met.

Anyone addressing the question of political reform after the genocide will need to keep in mind three things: first, the genocide; second, the consequences of genocide; and third, that these consequences have overflowed the boundaries of Rwanda. Whatever the nature and length of this transition period, its direction will be shaped by its end goal. Will Rwanda follow the example of Israel and create a separate political community of Tutsi, alongside another of Hutu? Will it follow the example of Zanzibar and merge in a larger union with the tendency to dissolve bipolar political identities? Or will it charter a third course by trying to forge a political identity that transcends Hutu and Tutsi? Whatever the course of action Rwanda chooses, its people will have to begin by making one basic choice between political union and political divorce.¹⁹ Rwanda's key dilemma is how to build a democracy that can incorporate a "guilty majority" alongside a "fearful minority."²⁰ The assumption is that every living Hutu either participated or acted as a passive onlooker in the genocide. Morally, if not legally, both are culpable. The problem is that to be a Hutu is to be presumed a perpetrator. It is impossible to think of reconciliation between Hutu and Tutsi without first reconciling with history. Mamdani talks about a visit to Kigali in 1996 where he spoke with a history teacher. She informed him that history was no longer being taught in schools. When he inquired as to why this was so she responded, "Because there is no agreement on what should be taught as history." In order to break the monopoly of Hutu power and Tutsi power on Rwanda's politics, one has to break the monopoly on Rwanda's history writing and thus history making. The government must put the truth of genocide in a historical context.

Ethnicity has been deemed illegal under current president Paul Kagame who refuses to acknowledge Hutu and Tutsi as separate identities. While eliminating race and ethnicity sounds good in theory, putting it into practice is nearly impossible. By refusing to recognize the racial differences, Kagame has failed to acknowledge not only the genocide but also Rwanda's history. In order for Rwanda to begin its path to stability, the government must allow race and recognize that it is real. Once that has happened, a power sharing agreement must be met. The best place for Rwandans and the international community to look is Burundi. Like Rwanda, Burundi houses a majority Hutu population with a minority Tutsi population living alongside them. Burundi has managed to be a self-sustaining nation because it accepts that ethnicity is real and there is no way to get around it so it must be incorporated into everyday life. The country has set up a power sharing government whereby a certain amount of Tutsi and Hutu must be governing the country at the same time. This is what Rwanda needs if they are to move forward and avoid another outburst of killings. Rwanda may be unable to achieve this on their own. Therefore what responsibility does the West have? For Kagame, Belgium, France, the United States, and the United Nations have no business assisting Rwanda in reform because they failed to help during the genocide. By refusing to recognize race and making it illegal to speak of the genocide, Kagame has made it nearly impossible for NGOs, the UN, and any of the Western powers to help restore the nation. What makes the instability of Rwanda even more dangerous is the close relationship it has with its bordering nations. The borders are so blurred that the issues in Rwanda are bound to have a severe impact on the African Great Lakes region.

The problem of Rwanda is political power. Hutus and Tutsis must be recognized as separate political identities and a reorganization of power is critical. The dilemma of post genocide Rwanda lies between the gap that divides Hutus as a political majority and Tutsis as a political minority. The minority demands justice, the majority calls for democracy. For the minority, democracy is an agenda for completing genocide but the majority sees justice as a cover up for restoring minority power. Whether for the Hutu majority or for the entire population, democracy has to create an institutional reform that unravels this "armed fist" and separates the executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative branches. On the other hand, the Tutsi will have to accept that the prerequisite to cohabitation, reconciliation, and a common political future is to give up the monopoly of power. An immediate challenge for Rwanda will be to see Hutu and Tutsi as both political identities and historical identities. However, this dynamic will need to be the result of regional initiative backed by international support, which must aim to calm a simmering volcano before it erupts and engulfs a wider region.

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THE PLAGUE OF ATHENS AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

The Plague of Athens was not simply deleterious to the Athenian war effort, instead it was the crucial element that served to seal Athens' fate in the war against Sparta. Athens enjoyed a number of advantages that allowed it to engage the Spartans on an equal, if not superior footing. It was only through the traumatic and harrowing experience of this plague, however that Athens and her allies were unable to crush the Spartans, but instead were themselves overwhelmed. The Plague of Athens crippled more than Athens' manpower and its capacity to wage war. The massive loss of both civilians and military personnel served to destroy Athens as an effective political and military factor during a life or death struggle with regional rival, Sparta. Moreover, the plague demoralized the populace who could not understand the causes of a plague that made no distinction based on age or class and did not relent with the changing of the seasons.

The reasons for the war, the advantages enjoyed by the contenders, and their vulnerabilities were intimately linked together with why the Plague of Athens was the critical factor in Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians built their rising power upon their maritime strength and consequent commercial wealth instead of landed wealth. Athens was a democracy, which vested executive power into the hands of the tyrant Pericles. The Athenian military based its manpower upon a system of mandatory service of all citizens (meaning free men of means, illustrating the link between citizenship and military service in Ancient Greece) from the ages of 18 to 60 that was common to all of the city-states of Greece.¹ As this was the case, the Athenians were able to muster a citizen-army of 19,000 men. In addition to this, the Athenians had 16,000 soldiers who were deemed to be unfit for field duty due to age and were assigned to guard Athens and its various forts.² As Athens's allies were, at this point, ambivalent to the idea of Athenian defeat, their land army's numbers were not bolstered significantly.³

Arrayed against Athens were the forces of the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta.⁴ The surrounding Greek city-states had become increasingly suspicious of the growing power of the Athenian Empire, particularly due to the fact that the Athenian Empire was born of Athens seizing control of the Delian League.⁵ To counter this perceived threat, many city-states formed the Peloponnesian League. The result of this defensive alliance was that they were able to muster over 100,000 soldiers against the Athenians' 19,000.⁶ Plutarch reports that the Spartan army, which invaded Athens' home province of Attica, numbered 60,000 strong (a gross overestimation, but telling of the odds against the Athenians nonetheless.)⁷ In addition, the fact that the Spartans contributed their army to the league made it much more formidable. The league also had the distinction that it was, up to that point, undefeated in a fair battle.⁸

In terms of land-based strength, the Peloponnesian League vastly outmatched the Athenians. The situation, as it stood, seemed to foretell a clear defeat of the Athenians at the hands of Sparta and her allies. The Athenians had no hope of defeating the Peloponnesian League in open battle and were thus forced to remain behind their fortifications. Normally, this would have meant that the Athenians would have been starved into submission in short order. However, the Athenians enjoyed a distinct advantage over their land-based adversaries: the Athenian Navy. Indeed, while it was certainly true that the Peloponnesian League could muster more soldiers than the other city-states of Greece combined,⁹ the Athenian Navy and that of her allies, Chios and Corcyra, were more than a match for the navies of the rest of Greece.¹⁰ The

Athenians alone were able to muster a fleet of 300 triremes¹¹ (the premier warship of the day) all of which were manned by Athenian sailors.¹² Furthermore, the Athenians were as famed and skilled as sailors as the Spartans were lauded for their hoplites. By contrast, the Peloponnesian fleet was unable to come close to matching the Athenian fleet in either numbers¹³ or skill, the Athenians having adopted newer tactics that emphasized maneuverability.¹⁴ Much as the Athenians had gained control of the Delian League through their superior navy,¹⁵ so too did they seek to crush the Peloponnesian League in the same manner.¹⁶ In terms of military technology and strategy, the ship is superior to infantry due to the increase in mobility that it represents and its ability to participate in economic warfare on a much wider scale, such as initiating blockades.

At the dawn of the Peloponnesian War, the Athenian Empire was at the height of its power. Athenian naval and commercial power aided Athens greatly in the increase of its power throughout Greece, allowing it to subjugate numerous city-states. Sparta would claim that it violated the treaty it had with Athens in order "to liberate Greece" from Athenian hegemony.¹⁷ However, in his perhaps biased opinion, Thucydides would claim that the Spartans struck out of fear of Athens' growing power.¹⁸ In any case, Athens was acknowledged as a force to be reckoned with. It had been growing in power ever since it became the president of the powerful confederation of Greek city-states called the Delian League,¹⁹ later the Athenian Empire.²⁰ In addition to gaining wealth through commerce, the Athenian Empire received tribute from its dependencies, usually in the form of money.²¹ Athens' naval superiority and the location of Athenian cities and those of its allies upon the coast and islands allowed them to remain resupplied despite being under a near constant stage of siege by Peloponnesian forces. Their navy also allowed them to conduct offensive operations against both the Peloponnesian League and its own dependencies, which had risen in revolt. The influx of wealth enabled the Athenians to buy supplies for the inhabitants of their cities, refit their soldiers and ships, and pay their military well as was expected by military personnel in Athens.²² By contrast, the Peloponnesian troops went unpaid.²³ The Athenians were therefore able to maintain a professional military; specifically, it meant that they had a fulltime navy that did not retire seasonally to tend to farming as the Peloponnesians did. Thus, they could, and did conduct military operations at all times of the year.

In addition to this, Athens maintained a substantial treasury reserve of 6,000 talents.²⁴ The Athenian treasury surplus was nearly five times greater than that of any city-state in Greece.²⁵ Pericles' plan was to avoid meeting the Peloponnesians in the field entirely.²⁶ It was his idea that the Athenians could win the war by remaining behind their walls and sustaining themselves with supplies brought in from the sea. Again, the crux of the Athenian plan was their naval superiority. This was a sound strategy and even King Archidamus, for whom this phase of the wars between Athens and Sparta was named, realized that Athens could not be taken by force under expected conditions.²⁷ It was with this navy and vast wealth that Athens could easily outlast the poorer Sparta in a conflict without either engaging in a land battle or surrendering, as was Pericles' plan.²⁸ The Peloponnesians, due to their lack of a reserve of wealth, could not engage in a prolonged conflict, and thus could not maintain a continuous siege. The Spartans would be unable to force Athens into capitulation through a siege because unless they could seize maritime control, Athens could remain supplied from the sea.²⁹

The Athenians' entire strategy was based on the reasonable expectation that they would not die and instead be able to man both their land defenses and their fleet in order to keep them supplied. If nothing catastrophic had occurred, it would be reasonable to assume that Athens would have been able to outlast Sparta's capacity to wage a prolonged war. Unfortunately for

Pericles' well-laid plans, a strange and most deadly malady struck the Athenians. The disease is now believed to be typhoid, a disease caused by water and food contaminated by human waste. This situation was likely brought about as a result of the city of Athens being inundated with refugees from the surrounding countryside, fleeing from the ravages of the massive Spartan army.³⁰ A side effect of the yearly invasions of Attica and the province of Plataea³¹ was that the city of Athens became swelled with refugees from the surrounding countryside and other parts of the Empire, which had suffered the ravages of Peloponnesian incursions.³² The city's population is estimated to have doubled or tripled in size as the entirety of Attica took refuge within its walls. This was a society whose understanding of sanitation, while perhaps advanced compared to the rest of the world, would have nevertheless failed under such a sudden stress. It is likely that the sewage systems that did exist were entirely unable to handle the vast influx of refugees.³³ The result was the Great Plague of Athens.

Furthermore, this new, larger population comprised chiefly of outsiders meant that there was a more massive exposure to harmful diseases, such as the aforementioned typhoid, due to a compromised sewage system. The disease struck nearly everyone in the city, the common denominator being food and water, and killed without distinction to social class or societal role.³⁴ In fact, the entire population was susceptible to contracting the Plague. In his account of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides tells how no one, regardless of his or her strength, was exempt from the disease.³⁵ People were dying in spite of whether or not they were being cared for as well.³⁶ The certainty of people who had contracted the Plague dying led them to become hopeless of their situation.³⁷ The hopelessness experienced by the people in the face of this disease aided in sapping the morale from the people of the city when it was at war and under siege. The fear of the disease and the perceived contagious nature of the affliction led many to cease caring for the sick entirely.³⁸ This selfishness brought about by fear served to aid in the disintegration of the social bonds, which were needed to hold the city together at the crucial point when a strong community was needed most. The suddenness of the Plague's appearance along with the fact that it would not abate with the seasons, as normal illnesses had done, was an unexpected and ultimately insurmountable challenge to Athenian society.

The comprehensive nature of whom the plague struck and the random nature of those who succumbed, from the lowest pauper to Pericles himself, brought about a questioning of society and of authority at the worst possible time, in the middle of a siege. An example of this is the comedy *Lysistrata*, written in 411 B.C. by Aristophanes, which created outrage in many circles for not only suggesting that Athens sue for peace, but that women would push men to do so by withholding sex from them.³⁹

Cultural expression aside, the speed by which the Plague killed also caused many religious traditions to be abandoned in favor of simple expediency, namely, funeral rites. Plague victims were dying so quickly that family members were forced to forgo funerals in favor of stealing other grieving families' funeral pyres, or simply piling their loved ones onto already lit pyres along side their deceased neighbors.⁴⁰ The result of Athenians being so suddenly inundated with death was a sense of fatalism in Athenian society manifesting itself in the people losing respect for the laws of the gods and society. The people abandoned their fear of the gods entirely.⁴¹ It is important to note that in the aftermath of Athens' defeat in the Peloponnesian War, one of the charges leveled against Socrates was that he was an atheist. The belief of Athens' downfall coming from a societal breakdown had the result that any who later sought to challenge the societal order with atheism and "corrupting Athens' youth" were charged with a crime punishable by death.

The sense of fatalism in Athens also led to a general lawlessness within the city.⁴² Athenian society did not have a standing police force to keep order and in the absence of such a secular legal tradition as is enjoyed in the Post-Modern West, laws and faith were inextricably linked. However, when the Athenians came to the belief that their deaths were inevitable, they lost the fear that their individual actions would offend the gods with their lives forfeit. Furthermore, the comprehensive nature of the plague also led many Athenians to believe that waging the current war had offended the gods as their ancestors had done in the *Iliad*.⁴³ The Athenians were of the opinion that if the war of their government had damned them to a horrible death they owed no obedience to the law and that no personal piety could save them from the coming death.

The Plague also did not affect any other belligerent in the war. The Athenians were utterly alone in their experience of this disease.⁴⁴ It was not simply that the Athenians were the only ones to experience the disease; the Plague of Athens also affected the animal population of the city.⁴⁵ Athenians who noticed this (and an agrarian society such as Classical Greece would notice this) would have come to the conclusion that the gods were so filled with ire at the hubris of Athens that even the animals must suffer. Those animals that did survive would visibly and uncharacteristically avoid the bodies of the dead.⁴⁶ The significance of this is twofold. One factor is that when animals depart from their expected behavior, such as carrion birds avoiding carrion, this adds to the supernatural nature of the Plague and the belief that the gods must be the cause. Another factor to consider is that dead bodies were lying out in the open. Athenians were dying too quickly to receive proper funeral rites. The effect of the dead lying in the streets and bodies having to be interred in mass graves is paralleled in the Black Death of medieval Europe. Both of these instances of mass death led to a great degree of fatalism and a questioning of the social order.

The stresses that the Plague of Athens placed upon the *polis* were such that the fabric of society itself began to tear. Thucydides noted that in an effort to alleviate the fury of the gods, fathers would sacrifice their sons.⁴⁷ Even the ties of family were disintegrating in the wake of the Great Plague of Athens. Furthermore, given the climate of hysteria of divine retribution, the people ceased to trust the government, specifically the laws of the government.⁴⁸ Finally, with the belief in the unavoidable wrath of the gods permeating society, the moral fabric bound in religion was rent asunder leading to "lying oaths and breaches of the right of asylum, to say nothing of the carnage in the holy places."⁴⁹ Arnold J. Toynbee wrote in his examination of the course of civilizations that a characteristic of the decline of a society is when the majority ceases to follow the dictates of the ruling minority.⁵⁰ This was the situation in Athens during the Plague. As power in Athenian society was based in equal parts upon religion and family ties as it was with actual law, a challenge to this society as severe as the Plague of Athens, led to the people challenging the beliefs and the foundations of their society.

The exclusivity of their woe served to cement further the belief amongst the Athenians that the gods stood against the endeavors of Athens. The belief that the gods stood against them had a crippling effect upon those who were still fit to resist the Spartans and resupply the city, those whose numbers continued to dwindle. The nature of the disease served only to add to the horror of the situation and steal away men's ardor to continue the war. While many of the stouthearted men in Athens' service may have been able to bear some of these symptoms, the affliction that struck was beyond that which any could imagine.

The symptoms according to Thucydides were these:...Heat in the head, inflammation of the eyes, suffusion with blood of tongue and throat, foetid breath, hoarseness with violent coughing, vomiting of bile, retching and convulsions, pustular and ulcinating skin eruption, total body hyperaesthesia and restlessness, irresistible desire for water to assuage thirst and immersion therein to alleviate body heat, terminal exhaustion apparently produced by diarrhoea, loss of toes, fingers and private parts, destruction of eyes, and if recovery supervenes, amnesia.⁵¹

Even if uninfected, a soldier could not be unaffected by this, witnessing what can only be attributed to an act by a vengeful pantheon, will finish what manpower shortages began and crush the Athenian war effort. Though, the manpower shortages due to the Plague would have alone been enough to defeat the Athenians.

The comprehensive nature of the Plague of Athens meant that this disease affected everyone. Specifically, this disease affected the members of the military, both hoplites and sailors. While the loss of hoplites, though unfortunate, was not a critical loss, as the Athenians never needed to engage in an offensive ground action to win the war. Furthermore, their duties, primarily to serve as garrison soldiers, could be taught to the surviving inhabitants of the cities without great difficulty. The point is that the loss of hoplites was not the worst loss that the Athenian war effort suffered. The critical loss experienced by the Athenian Empire was that of their sailors. Athens' strength was its navy, which prevented it from being starved out in a siege, allowed them to retain their grip upon their overseas empire, and allowed for a continued supply of tribute money from their dependants. However, the Plague of Athens killed off many sailors, which caused manpower shortages in the one area that Athens could ill afford. The Athenian sailors were the most skilled in the Aegean Sea, if not the entire Ancient World. Their experience made them an invaluable asset to the Athenian Empire as it was upon their backs that the Athenian Empire was built. However, the Great Plague of Athens struck everyone, regardless of age, strength, or experience. The Athenians could not make up for the loss of its experienced seamen. The loss of sailors coincided with the Peloponnesians gaining naval strength due in large part to the efforts of Corinth, which had been working diligently to close the gap in ship numbers. Facing the combination of an increased number of hostile ships, a severe loss of experienced sailors, and a reckless fleet deployment to Syracuse, the Athenian Navy lost its superiority in the Aegean.

An effect of the decline of the Athenian Navy was the gradual loss of tribute due to hostile fleets cutting off supply and communication to Athens' dependencies. The loss of income, combined with the already strained treasury led to servicemen going without pay, an unprecedented occurrence, which further crippled morale. Once the tribute states came to the belief that they were outside of the reach of the Athenian Navy, they began to revolt. The most notable of these revolts was that of Lesbos.⁵² While the revolt was put down, it was nonetheless an indication of Athens' slipping power and the crumbling of its empire. Finally, the once proud Athenian Navy was ultimately crushed at the Battle of Aegospotami, thus ending all hope by the Athenians of withstanding a Spartan siege.⁵³ They would be forced to capitulate soon afterwards.

Carl von Clausewitz wrote in *On War* of the "Remarkable Trinity," which described the three factors required to work in cohesion for a prolonged conflict to be carried out, these are: the government, the army, and the people.⁵⁴ The Plague of Athens stole away the people's confidence in the government along with the life of Pericles. It crushed the manpower of the military to the point where it could not man the defenses and resupply the city from the sea. The

people were distracted from their support of the war effort by their preoccupation with a perceived apocalypse. It was in this fashion that the Plague of Athens sealed the empire's fate, snatching defeat from the jaws of victory.

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Matthew Leake

THE DOMINO EFFECT: THE IMPORTANCE OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND HARRY S TRUMAN ON SETTING THE TONE FOR PARTY REALIGNMENT IN THE SOUTH

The destruction of the Solid Democratic South in the twentieth century remains one of the most fascinating topics in American History. Historians have attempted to ascertain many different causes for such a politically charged region. V.O. Key wrote, "In its grand outlines the politics of the South revolves around the position of the Negro."¹ Key was indeed correct in his analysis. Political loyalty lost its strength as soon as issues that favored African Americans arose. There always seemed to be a dispute over the jurisdiction of state and federal governments. Yet, such disputes remained a "cover up" for the true intentions of powerful Whites in the South: the maintaining of White supremacy. These dilemmas had existed since before the Civil War; however, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Harry S Truman sealed the transformation of the Democratic Party in the United States of America through their "Deals" of the twentieth century. There was no turning back after that point in American History. Truman, in particular, made Civil Rights a top priority during his presidency. The foundation of the Solid Democratic South began to crumble as the power of the Democrats shifted toward the progressive wing. Roosevelt helped the United States emerge from the Great Depression with his New Deal, and Truman continued the legacy of his predecessor with the Fair Deal. Although they possessed different qualities, both programs exhibited significant progressive doctrines that crippled the supporters of the Old South beyond repair.

The Democratic Party of the South attracted white supremacists due to its position on segregation and Jim Crow. Such strict conservatives could not have imagined voting for any other party at the time.² African Americans, on the other hand, bonded together under the Grand Old Party, the political party of Abraham Lincoln. Lee Guidon, a former slave who was interviewed during the 1930s, stated, "I votes Republican. That's the party of my color, and I stick to them as long as they do right."³ Both parties were divided by race in the South, and the white Democrats held the advantage. Through intimidation and the poll tax, Southern Democrats ensured that they would remain in power, thus allowing them to prevent desegregation and equal rights.⁴

The Populist movement of the 1890s laid a strong foundation for President Roosevelt and President Truman to seal the political realignment of the South. Some African Americans supported the Populist movement with upcountry white Republicans and Democrats. Non sanctioned means of preventing African Americans from voting lost their dominance during the plight of the farmers. Black vote became a wanted factor of the Democratic and Populist Parties. In addition, Democrats feared losing their sovereignty to Populists and Republicans.⁵ After the Populist Party crumbled and was assimilated by the Democrats, the residents of the plantation areas attempted to disfranchise African Americans and upcountry whites.⁶ The plantation elite helped align the South with the Democratic Party in the midst of their skirmish with the Populists.⁷ Such a "Solid South," the plantation elite believed, would prevent interference from Washington in matters of racial equality. There was and continues to be a fear of African American dominance over whites in the Southern United States.

All remained well for Southern whites in regard to race for the time being; however, the South had suffered tremendous poverty and hardships in the days following the Civil War, and the Great Depression only made matters worse.⁸ Franklin Roosevelt ensured the Southern

support of the Democratic Party due to the positive effects of the New Deal on the suffering economy. By using the media to his advantage and evading the issue of Civil Rights, Roosevelt maintained a grip on Southern whites.⁹ African Americans, who were also benefiting from the New Deal, began to jump on the Democrat bandwagon.¹⁰

Roosevelt's smooth ride in the Southern states did not last indefinitely. The publication of *Report on Economic Conditions of the South* by the office of the sitting President did not sit well with many Southerners. The report attacked the agrarian way of life, and therefore, the remnants of the Old South. In addition, Roosevelt's New Deal program empowered African Americans in the work force and threatened agricultural estates.¹¹ While not always known for placing civil rights at the top of his "to do list," Roosevelt did reveal some positive feelings on equal treatment for all Americans during a campaign address on November 1, 1940 in New York: "We are a nation of many nationalities, many races, many religions-bound together by a single unity, the unity of freedom and equality. Whoever seeks to set one nationality against another, seeks to degrade all nationalities. Whoever seeks to set one race against another seeks to enslave all races. Whoever seeks to set one religion against another, seeks to destroy all religion..."¹² In addition, the migration of many African Americans to the Northern United States split the Democratic vote.

Franklin Roosevelt's conflict with the conservative South was minor compared to the actions taken by Harry Truman. Truman spat in the face of his political base in the South when he requested the indefinite operation of the Fair Employment Practices Commission. Roosevelt had originally initiated the FEPC as an urgent program during the Second World War.¹³ Although the FEPC did not assist African Americans on a high scale, Southerners worried that it could lead to opportunities for the Negro in the near future. Southern lawmakers had been combating such a proposal for quite some time. Eventually, Southern politicians killed the proposal; however, Truman's attempt at such an "unthinkable" act left citizens of Dixie with bitter tastes in their mouths.¹⁴

Truman's rocky relation with the South did not improve. He became the first President of the United States to make a speech to the National Association for the Advancement of Colored people on the 29 of June in 1947.¹⁵ During his speech, President Truman stated his zeal for pursuing equal rights and his belief that the federal government had a large role to play in assisting African Americans to reach their potential: "We can no longer afford the luxury of a leisurely attack upon prejudice and discrimination. There is much that state and local governments can do in providing positive safeguards for civil rights. But we cannot any longer await the growth of a will to action in the slowest state or the most backward community. Our national government must show the way."¹⁶ Truman also requested an account from his Civil Rights Committee, and their response suggested a number of progressive actions and laws designed to increase the country's dedication to equality. Southern lawmakers and voters were appalled at such a list of recommendations, and problems escalated when President Truman called for Congress to put the plans into action.¹⁷

Since the time before the Civil War, Southerners remained leery of the industrialists in the North interfering in "state affairs." In the minds of Southern states, President Truman seemed to constantly cross the line between federal and state jurisdiction. The incumbent administration initiated "Operation Dixie," an attempt by Truman to gain the political support of labor unions and similar groups. "Operation Dixie" combated the agrarian tradition in the South because it tried to reorganize workers under an alternate industrial means of production.¹⁸

Conservative Southern Democrats began to formulate a strategy to combat the actions taken in Washington. Nothing as grandiose as a full realignment would occur yet, however, a group of angry Southern Democrats revolted and formed the State's Rights Political Party or the Dixiecrat Party. Truman's zealous attitude toward Civil Rights caused many quarrels in the Capital, encouraging thirteen Alabama legislators to angrily leave the National Democratic Convention and eventually lead the Dixiecrats to organize their own political ticket in the election of 1948.¹⁹

The new Southern political party nominated Governor Strom Thurmond as their contender for the presidency. Thurmond spoke to an energetic crowd at the nomination and stated that if Truman was to be reelected, the South would be no more than a colony to the United States.²⁰ V.O. Key's notion that African Americans heavily influenced the politics of the South indeed remained true in the case of the Dixiecrats. Strom Thurmond and Fielding Wright, the two running mates for President and Vice President of the United States in 1948, held the positions of governor in the states with the highest African American population. Though outnumbered, whites wished to maintain supremacy in their districts.²¹ Thurmond argued that his party's platform did not revolve around race and white dominance, but rather the same issue that erupted in Civil War nearly a century earlier: state's rights. On the other hand, "...his (Thurmond) own behavior belied that claim."²²

There are many similarities between the arguments and political stances of Governor Strom Thurmond and John C. Calhoun. Calhoun represented the state of South Carolina during the nineteenth century. Calhoun fervently believed in state's rights and their existence as independent entities.²³ He also accepted the notion that African Americans were a lesser race unable to embrace freedom.²⁴ Although slavery was not an issue for Governor Strom Thurmond in the twentieth century, there are strong parallels between Thurmond and Calhoun in regard to treatment of African Americans and intervention by the national government.

President Truman made a point to put the Dixiecrats "in their place" after Thurmond lost the presidential election in 1948. During his inauguration ceremony, the first national event allowing whites and blacks to attend together, President Truman failed to acknowledge Strom Thurmond. Truman also stared at Vice President Barkley, a Dixiecrat, after attempting to shake his hand.²⁵ Sanctions were given to several Dixiecrats after Truman's victory, including the removal of five "rebels" from the Democratic National Committee.²⁶ The most devastating punishment of all placed on the defenders of the Old South was Truman's full charge of civil rights.²⁷

Though the newly formed Dixiecrats lost the presidential election in 1948, they remained determined to continue their quest for power. The Republican Party fought amongst itself as to who would be their presidential candidate in 1952. It came down to Robert Taft and Dwight Eisenhower, and Eisenhower eventually clinched the nomination. Because Truman decided to step down, the Democrats chose the Governor of Illinois, Adlai Stevenson. Stevenson was no match for the popular war hero, and Eisenhower claimed the title of President of the United States in the 1952 election.²⁸ The Republicans had now gained power in the White House.

The old Dixiecrats were somewhat appeased with the election of Eisenhower. President Eisenhower did not make civil rights his top priority during his first term in office.²⁹ Southern realignment to the Republican Party had not reached its peak yet; however, the Republican Eisenhower gained many votes in the South during the 1956 presidential election. Democrats still controlled the Houses of Congress from the South.³⁰ President Eisenhower did lose support

in the South when he used the powers of his office to support *Brown V. Board of Education* through the military.³¹

Roosevelt and Truman set the stage for a party realignment in the Southern United States. It was not until the Kennedy years; however, that Republicans gained a true foothold in Dixie. John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, Presidents under the Democratic Party banner, made civil rights a top priority.³² Kennedy and Johnson's political stances show strong similarities to President Harry Truman's administration. "Though this polarization was certainly not complete, particularly in the South, the parties became distinguishable on racial issues."³³

The Republican Party's similarities to the Southern way of life played a major role in realignment during the post Kennedy and Johnson years, it is important to note the Republican Party's similarities to the Southern way of life. The Republican Party "appealed to their (hard core conservative Southerners) conservative political beliefs."³⁴ When the Democratic Party became more liberal on Civil Rights, and the Republicans became more conservative on such a core issue, Southerners were able to realign themselves with the Grand Old Party. The Democrats had also been accumulating many African Americans into their ranks.³⁵

John F. Kennedy, while an advocate for civil rights, wanted to take his time with proposing such legislation. Pressure fell on his shoulders, however, when African Americans in the South continued their open protests.³⁶ The Republican Party at the time was split over how civil rights should be attained. Conservatives such as Barry Goldwater agreed with the state's rights principle in that states should determine how issues on race are treated.³⁷ Such a split in the Republican Party where one faction supported a state's rights stance such as Governor Strom Thurmond of the Dixiecrats encouraged a realignment.

President Johnson's zeal for Civil Rights gave the Republicans the Solid South since he did not receive one state in the election of 1964 in the Deep South.³⁸ Richard Nixon, Johnson's successor, "received solid support from whites in the cities and the suburbs." Supporters of Strom Thurmond during the Dixiecrat Revolution now gave their vote to Richard Nixon, a Republican.³⁹ Interestingly enough, though, Jimmy Carter, a Democrat and two Presidents after Nixon won the majority of the Southern vote. This strong support from the South could have been because of Carter's great personality and "Old South" family history.⁴⁰ Though he was a Democrat, "liberals distrusted him."⁴¹ Still, Carter was revered for keeping the liberal and conservative wings of the Democratic Party from splitting.⁴²

One of the most renowned Republican Presidents, Ronald Reagan, gave rise to Modern Conservatism. During the election of 1932, Reagan was actually a voter and supporter of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the father of the New Deal and a Democrat. During the 1968 presidential campaign, Strom Thurmond accepted Reagan's beliefs; however, he campaigned against him by supporting Richard Nixon.⁴³

Historians have called Reagan a "New Deal Republican."⁴⁴ Such a label would suggest that the political realignment of the South was complete. A New Deal Republican would have been a contradiction in terms during the mid twentieth century. During the election of 1980, Ronald Reagan won the majority of votes in the South.⁴⁵

"Since then (election of 1968), with the exception of 1976, Republicans have overwhelmingly dominated the presidential contest. (In the Southern United States)"⁴⁶ Party realignment and the growth of the Republican Party in the South took some time; however, it has made significant strides up to present day America.⁴⁷ For the most part, the presidential election of 2008 remained true to the Republican Party's dominance of the South. Barack Obama, however, won North Carolina and Virginia, former Confederate States.⁴⁸ Such a deviation from

the norm only proves that predictions in politics are an imprecise science. However, the impact of Roosevelt and Truman on the domino effect in the realignment of the South is indeed certain. The future of both political parties remains uncertain today; however, the Republican Party and its conservative values seem to be losing the battle with the progressive Democrats.

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Don Shaw

THE ORANGE REVOLUTION: THE STORY OF AN AMERICAN NGO INTERVENTION

Introduction

The impact of American Non-Governmental Organizations in the Orange Revolution gives significant insight into the complexities of US foreign policy and its formative process. By its very nature, foreign policy within US history is a subject of circumstance, depending upon a multitude of variables and political actors. The trends which developed within Ukrainian society are directly associated with both the history of the region and the nature in which external forces affected society.

An Oligarchic State

Shortly after the collapse of the USSR, it became apparent that Ukraine's political arena emerged as an oligarchic extension of elite Ukrainian business interests. Upon the opening of the market economy, extensive market exploitation through commodity trades and rent seeking left business throughout the country dominated by a select few.¹ This process involved buying gas for state-controlled prices while reselling them at market prices. It was common for the state to award regional monopolies to the small elite, creating an oligarchic scheme exhibiting a regional character. Hundreds of millions of dollars were siphoned out through this process, thus creating the network base consisting of wealthy business tycoons and political elites. Out of this chaotic environment, Leonid Kuchma of the Dnipropetrovsk region emerged as a leading political actor, serving as the Prime Minister from 1992-1993. By July of 1994, Kuchma was elected president of Ukraine. Unsurprisingly, at least six of Ukraine's biggest enterprise groups originated in the east of the country, similar to Kuchma.²

During his first year, Kuchma attempted to disrupt the old system of oligarchic networks by pursuing aggressive market reforms. This trend did not last long as Kuchma eventually gave way under pressure from the old oligarchic forces. The appointment of Pavlo Lazarenko to the office of prime minister in 1996 proved to be a significant event during the Kuchma Presidency. During his tenure as prime minister, Lazarenko grossly manipulated the gas markets of Ukraine for personal profit and established the oligarchic political party Hromada.³ Although Lazarenko was ousted one year later, it is important to note that his business partner, Yulia Tymoshenko, entered into mainstream politics as a member of Hromada and a voice of opposition. The years of rent seeking within the market produced a steady decline in the state's GDP during these years, yielding to a low approval rating for Kuchma as a parallel. In response to the country's increasingly dire economic situation, a coalition under the leadership of Viktor Medvechuk placed Viktor Yushchenko, an economic czar, as the prime minister. Yushchenko successfully raised state revenues and turned the state's budget deficit into a surplus by 2000.⁴ As a result, a more level economic environment was created in which the state's dependence on elite businessmen eroded. From the time Yushchenko took office in 2000, the GDP of Ukraine steadily rose from 5.4% annually to an impressive 12.4% in 2004.⁵ Because many associated Yushchenko with the economic growth, two significant elements of public opinion emerged. The first was that the growing prosperity in Ukraine heightened the everyday citizen's awareness of political corruption and injustice that plagued the Kuchma regime. The second and

complimentary element was that Yushchenko, as well as Yulia Tymoshchenko, gained significant political capital as a result of the success in market reform. These elements would later compound to create a future legitimate opposition to Kuchma and his chosen successor, Viktor Yanukovich.

The Opposition Crystallizes

The economic stabilization produced by Yushchenko created a market environment where rent seeking became an insufficient means of creating capital. As a consequence, extensive privatization developed as the dependence on the state diminished. As fractionalization and competition within the market began to increase, so did the elements of pluralism within the government. The old established oligarchy within the state increasingly fought over each others assets as a means of consolidating economic power, and in the process created a new power group consisting of small to mid-level tycoons. An environment characterized by competitive distrust and regional rivalries left the political scene open to opposition forces. The constitution of 1996 would then serve as a buffer against asymmetric power domination, ensuring that the 'rules of the game' would be upheld.⁶ The national fractionation effectively guaranteed the preservation of competitive elections, allowing pluralism, albeit regional pluralism, to take root within Ukrainian society. This principle of economic pluralism would eventually contribute to the development of political pluralism. This principle, coupled with developments within the incumbent regime, would produce positive trends for the opposition in the coming years.

The office of president changed a great deal following the passage of the Ukrainian Constitution in 1996. The formal powers of the president were quite limited under the constitution; however Kuchma proved quite adept at using Machiavellian maneuvers. He masterfully played oligarchs, government agencies, and elements of the law enforcement against each other in order to gain extraordinary political leverage. Throughout his administration these trends continued with time, but these actions did not go unnoticed by the public. In consequence, his popularity progressively declined and forced Kuchma to rely upon more authoritarian measures to exert his power. The acknowledgement of Kuchma's corruption left the president as the undisputed focal point for blame and opposition within the government.⁷ As an example of these authoritarian measures, most accessible media outlets became controlled by the influence of the state, keeping blacklists of politicians and events that the government deemed undesirable. Increasing abusive execution of authority by Kuchma led to the abduction and murder of one of the most outspoken political critics, journalist Heorhiy Gongadze. The discovery of Gongadze's body in November, 2000 drew stark criticism from domestic and international communities alike. After a cassette tape emerged that linked Kuchma to the murder, his reputation took considerable damage.⁸ Tired of the censorship and oppression, strong opposition soon emerged from the ranks of journalists and civic activists. Protests erupted on the streets of Kiev as a result, bringing the "Kuchmagate" scandal onto the national and international stage. These protests, spearheaded by the "Ukraine without Kuchma" and "For Truth" movements gained quite a bit of credibility through the participation of political personalities, including future supporters of the Orange Revolution such as Yuriy Lutsenk (current minister of interior) and Taras Stetskiy (coordinator of Maidan protests).⁹ The main source of support for these opposition movements came from Yushchenko, consequently contributing to his sacking as prime minister after the movements' failure became apparent in April, 2001. However, this development would have a profound effect upon the direction of Ukrainian politics. His dismissal would create the

opportunity for Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshchenko to establish a more credible opposition through the creation of a broad political alliance.

The March 2002 parliamentary elections would serve as an indicator of the direction in which public opinion was turning within Ukraine. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine party received nearly 33 percent of the vote in the election. In addition, the Tymoshenko bloc and the socialist party each received about 10 percent of the proportional voting.¹⁰ These developments signaled good gains by the opposition, despite the formation of a Pro-Kuchma majority in the same year. The elections confirmed that Yushchenko had the ability to form a legitimate coalition opposition to the incumbent regime. It is in this context that Yushchenko and Tymoshenko began seeking Western help to overthrow Kuchma, effectively clearing the way for the 2004 elections.

The East, the West, and the NGO

Although often set aside as a footnote of history, the impact that foreign actors had in determining the outcome of the Orange Revolution cannot be overstated. The primary sources of foreign influence originated from Western forces lead by the United States and those of Russia. The contest over influence in Ukraine from these two political forces exists as a natural attribute of its geopolitical positioning and social history. Russia has historically seen Ukraine as cornerstone region for its strategic aims, particularly due to its access to warm water ports and its linguistic commonalities in the eastern regions. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has played an important role as a buffer against Western-oriented nations and NATO members. As for the United States and its allies, the expansion and diffusion of democratic civic virtue formed the substance of its national security and foreign policy initiatives. Unlike other post-Soviet states, Ukraine contained a fairly stable, growing economy and a substantially well-developed civil society during the Post-Soviet era, placing it as a prime candidate for democratic reform. Influence by the United States would not come in the form of direct intervention, but use of American Non-Governmental Organizations in Ukrainian politics would dominate US policy. The emergence of Vladimir Putin as the Russian head of state placed a new strain on US-Russian relations, naturally transforming Ukraine as a battleground for influence. Putin's decision to re-establish state control over the energy mega-corporation Gazprom significantly increased Russia's influence within not only Ukraine, but all of Eastern Europe. Due to Ukraine's dependence on Russian energy, Putin gained the leverage to reassert Russian policy within the nation.

Despite being from the Dnipropetrovsk region of Ukraine, Leonid Kuchma cannot be categorized as being 'Moscow oriented' from the beginning. In the early years of his presidency, Kuchma often walked a fine line in between favoring Washington or Moscow. By most accounts, Kuchma's primary objective as president seems to have been to maintain his own grip of power in Ukraine, using ambiguous diplomatic maneuvering to maximize support from both the East and the West. In a sense, it was his efforts to appease both the White House and the Kremlin that contributed to the semi-authoritarian nature of the Ukrainian government. There existed incentive to maintain just enough political freedom to ensure that the avenues of Western financial sources were left open, while continuing to rely upon Russian economic policies. His efforts to stay neutral were largely successful until the Kuchmagate scandal. As Western public opinion decisively shifted against Kuchma, Moscow was left as his only natural pillar of support. Putin presented support quickly, eventually leading to an agreement between Ukraine and Russia that ended Ukrainian cooperation with NATO in January of 2001. More significantly, a second

agreement came into effect a year and a half later that gave Gazprom a 51% share in Ukraine's pipeline network.¹¹ The flow of the Odessa-Brody pipeline was reversed in this agreement. This was significant in that instead of carrying American and British oil from the Caspian Sea to Europe, Russian oil would be redirected for the use of Russian oil firms, thus helping to consolidate Russia's growing monopoly on regional and global oil markets. At the heart of the matter, these events were seen as a threat to the national security of the United States. Washington perceived that the assurance of Western access to the oil and natural gas of the Central Asia was in danger, thus a regime change in Ukraine was in its interests.

The use of NGOs as a legitimate instrument of regime change became evident in their crucial influence within the revolutions of Serbia in 2000 and Georgia in 2003. American NGOs helped to create an organizational base for popular opposition movements through financial and logistical support. These efforts provided training and support for election monitoring, exit polls, and civic-education work. Although these efforts were non-partisan, the establishment of transparency within the electoral system decisively gave the opposition an advantage. The most significant of these NGOs were the Renaissance Foundation, Freedom House, the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute, and the International Republican Institute. The Renaissance Foundation is an affiliate of the George Soros's Open Society Foundation which played a particularly key role in the initiation of NGO involvement. The billionaire Soros has played a significant role in influencing US foreign policy. Strobe Talbott, the deputy secretary under Madeleine Albright, qualified his role in stating that

Soros's policy is not identical to the foreign policy of the US government – but it is compatible with it. It's like working with a friendly, allied, independent entity, if not a government. We try to synchronize our approach to the former communist countries with Germany, France, Great Britain – and with George Soros.¹²

In order to give greater detail to Soros's impact on democratic reform in the region, his contribution to supporting the B-92 radio station in Serbia should be mentioned. This radio station served as a significant outlet for opposition opinion, airing news reports openly critical of the Milosevic and his Serbian government. Soros took an interest in the B-92 radio station during the 1990s and helped fund it through his Open Society Foundation. By 1996, the station had grown into a primary media force. It was only after Soros began to fund the opposition radio station that other NGOs began to follow suit. Additionally, Soros funded the Serbian opposition movement, Optor, in its infant days, giving it the financial and logistical backing that it needed to carry out its operations. Similarly, the IRI and the NDI would use Gen. Gene Sharp's essay on non-violent opposition as the primary doctrine for the training and organization of Optor, helping to firmly establish the group as a cornerstone actor of the 2000 ousting of Milosevic.¹³ In reference to Ukraine, these efforts would become important for the Orange Revolution opposition due to the resources in information, training, and logistics that these foreign organizations would later contribute. The examples set by the successful revolutions of Serbia and Georgia proved that NGO funding of electoral monitors and get out the vote initiatives worked very effectively against semi-authoritarian regimes. Although Soros acted more as an independent entity, other American NGOs exerted influence as a more direct extension of US foreign policy. The fact that many US foreign policy elites have direct influence over many of these NGOs is evidence of this. The National Endowment for Democracy was headed for an extensive period of time by Carl Gershman, a neo-conservative who held a working relationship with Donald Rumsfeld.¹⁴ Current Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice continues to hold a

position on the editorial board for *Journal of Democracy*, an NED publication (listed as on leave).¹⁵ Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright holds the chairmanship for the NDI, contributing assistance to fledgling democracies around the globe.¹⁶ The chairman of the IRI is held by Sen. John McCain, the unsuccessful 2008 Republican presidential nominee. The relationship between the mentioned political actors and the NGOs that influenced the Orange Revolution is not a matter of coincidence, but implicates the existence of serious foreign policy calculations in favor of indirect American intervention.

The Yushchenko Campaign

Yushchenko began his presidential campaign in the summer of 2004 with the aid of his ally, Yulia Tymoshenko. The focus of the campaign essentially relied upon a consistent attack on Kuchma's reputation for corruption. Evident of this strategy to emphasis change, was the decision to employ orange as the movement's color. Orange was a neutral tone for Ukrainians in both the East and the West, neither expressing nationalism nor links with past administrations. In contrast, Kuchma's chosen successor, Yanukovych, relied upon his current position as prime minister and de-facto incumbent. Additionally, he was heavily influenced by Russian advisors to place emphasis on state status for the Russian language and a policy of integration with Russia. Despite strong pro-Russian sentiment throughout western districts of the country, Russian involvement within Yanukovych's campaign would eventually create a backlash. Numerous public appearances with President Putin over-emphasized his relationship with the Kremlin, effectively portraying him as a continuation of the Kuchma regime. Nonetheless, the Yanukovych Campaign held a well established advantage over Yushchenko in terms of televised media access. Of the six major national channels in Ukraine, the state controlled all but one.¹⁷ Despite this, the opposition found others ways to diffuse their electoral messages. Coming into the presidential campaign, Yushchenko had successfully established its own national network for distributing its own information. Grassroots activists and organizations engaged the public through rallies, posters, campaign literature, and public forums. The efforts of his grassroots movement complemented and strengthened the already growing civil society in Ukraine. The role of civil society in the Orange Revolution was the central variable that would determine its outcome. The organizational input that helped develop these efforts initially came from the help of American NGOs. Immediately following the Rose Revolution, David Detterman, director of the National Democratic Institute's Kiev office, flew to Tbilisi in an effort to analyze if a similar grassroots movement to the Rose Revolution's would be possible in Ukraine.¹⁸ Here, contacts were made with the Georgian civic groups, such as the notorious Kmara. Through the aid of the NDI, Kmara and Optor veterans began to regularly visit Ukraine to help train various Ukrainian organizations, namely Pora.¹⁹ Established in 2004, Pora spearheaded the democratic movement and played a central role in Yushchenko's successful campaign. Pora successfully coordinated and cooperated with a diverse assortment of NGOs throughout Ukraine to establish a broad-based movement. This embodied the lessons learned from the democratic breakthroughs in both Georgia and Serbia, evidence of their influence. Only a mere \$130,000 was contributed to Pora directly from Western sources, specifically the Canadian International Development Agency, Freedom House, and the German Marshall Fund of the United States, however Western governments and NGOs heavily funded affiliates of Pora, such as the Freedom of Choice coalition and the Committee of Ukrainian voters.²⁰ Additionally, priceless contributions in training and liaison sources were integral to its success. Juhani Grossman of Freedom House

stated, "We never financially supported Pora, but we did in fact support the training of activists who later became members of Pora".²¹ One example of this type of assistance took the form of a five day training session for Pora activists in May of 2004, which was held in the Serbian city of Novi Sad. During these training sessions, veterans of Optor and Freedom House consultants educated the activists in logistical and organizational techniques.²² Without these sources of logistical assistance, it seems doubtful that such widespread support for Viktor Yushchenko would have matured.

The Russian Response

Russian influence on the Yanukovych Campaign took a more direct approach, both financially and politically. Russia's current president, Dmitri Medvedev, was in charge of the official Russian strategy for the Ukrainian election.²³ Placing an elite figure such as Medvedev as the chief strategist implicates the degree of importance President Putin placed on the election. In terms of financial support, Russian financial contributions are estimated to have been in the range of \$50 to \$600 million in direct donations. The sheer amount of financial support reflects that many industrial-financial groups were interested in supporting the incumbent regime, perceiving the old structure of power was more secure for assets that were held in Ukraine. Alfa-Bank, Basic Element, Gazprom, LUKOIL, the National Reserve Bank, Sistema, Tatneft, and Vneshtorgbank are just a few of the major enterprises that sought to support Yanukovych's candidacy.²⁴ For many constituents in the eastern regions of Ukraine, serious concern over the status of Russian citizenship and the Russian language also tended to place them in the Pro-Yanukovych camp. The Russian government supported these policies and hoped to promote them as a base of support. As a result, the Yanukovych strategy, under Russian pressure, increasingly made the election a referendum on Russian relations. In essence, this produced a split between the East and the West of Ukraine and made Central Ukraine the decisive key to electoral victory. As the first round elections approached however, this strategy seemed to be losing traction. Series of pro-Yushchenko rallies and protests began to draw crowds in the tens of thousands within Central Ukraine, largely under the organization of Pora. The pro-Yanukovych authorities grew nervous and decided to take more direct measures to counter Yushchenko's grassroots movement. Police began raiding Pora offices in Kiev, claiming that they were under investigation for terrorist activities. These allegations never took root as public opinion identified the accusations as a political ploy. In a final attempt to undermine the opposition, Viktor Yushchenko was poisoned on the night of September 5, 2004. As a result, Yushchenko survived, however his face was scarred permanently. Although no evidence of pro-Yanukovych or Russian involvement ever surfaced, the majority of public opinion implicated Yanukovych as the perpetrator. In consequence, Yushchenko became not only the leader of the opposition, but also the symbol of the ruling regime's authoritarian nature.

The Results

In the first round of the presidential election, Yushchenko received 39.9 percent of the votes. To the surprise of many, this made Yushchenko the front-runner, beating out Yanukovych by .7 percent.²⁵ This first round success helped Yushchenko to consolidate support from other opposition candidates, considerably strengthening the force of his opposition coalition. In preparation for the second-round vote, NGOs across the country prepared to increase their

presence in voter monitoring efforts. On November 21, the results given by the Central Election Commission indicated that Yanukovych had won by a margin of nearly 3 percent. However, exit polls provided by Pora backed election monitors claimed that Yushchenko had won by 10 percent. As news of election fraud circulated the streets of Kiev via the 5th Channel television station, massive protests broke out as public anger became intolerable. As a part of their commitment to democratic values, Pora and other Western backed NGOs used non-violent tactics, primarily by establishing a tent city in Maidan Square. Once it was clear that the second round results had been falsified by pro-Yanukovych authorities, the United States provided significant support for Yushchenko by pressuring the Kuchma government to hold a re-run of the election. In a letter to President Kuchma, President Bush stated that "a tarnished election will lead us to review our relations with Ukraine".²⁶ On November 24, Secretary of State Colin Powell followed up with a statement expressing that the United States "cannot accept the Ukraine election as legitimate". The Yushchenko campaign soon filed for a re-run of the election to the Ukrainian Supreme Court. As a result, the decision to hold a re-run of the second round elections was made, which was held on December 26, 2004. The results of the Dec. 26th re-run concluded that Yushchenko had won, 52 to 44 percent.²⁷

A Qualification of Influence

Official figures of US agency expenditures are placed at \$280.48 million in aid to Ukraine in the fiscal year 2002, including \$156.92 million under the 1992 Freedom Support Act. For 2004, this figure was placed at \$143.47 million, including \$34.11 million for democracy assistance. George Soros's Renaissance Foundation spent \$1.65 million between autumn 2003 and December 2004, supporting 'New Choice 2004' and 'Freedom of Choice' NGO coalitions, each of whom are affiliates of Pora.²⁸ American domestic constituencies also made their mark on democratic reform in Ukraine. Chicago is home to one of the largest Ukrainian communities in North America, home to Ukraine's current first lady, Katherine Chumachenko. More than \$363,000 was raised in this community alone.²⁹ A key contributor to the Yushchenko campaign was the legal seminars provided by the International Republican Institute, which would greatly aid in preparing Yushchenko's legal team for filing for the Dec. 26 re-run.³⁰ Once again, the support for the Pora youth movement cannot be ignored. The efforts of the Open Society Initiative, Freedom House, the NDI, the German Marshall Fund, and the IRI all contributed essential financial and logistical support to its effort. As presented, the role of American NGOs in the Orange Revolution is clear and consistent. Although the true extent of their impact may never be known, the degree and frequency in which their resources were directed to the Ukraine civil society leads to the conclusion that their involvement was deliberate and significant.

Conclusion

The Orange Revolution developed as a product of trends within the greater economic and political environment in which Ukraine resides. The fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economic crash of the Russian federation led to the development of a vacuum of influence within the nation, creating an opportunity which Western civil organizations and Western influence could exploit. The adoption of a Western-style free market was both a product and a reinforcement of this principle.

Russian influence, however, still existed substantially within Ukraine's borders due to its geo-political positioning. As the free market was opened in Ukraine, those who already controlled the assets first benefited from the economic developments. As a natural product of past Soviet hegemony, these asset holders originated from the Russophone regions of the country. This monopoly of financial power then correlated to an equal hold on political power. Rampant corruption spread throughout the government as these oligarchs abused their power in order to maintain control. This proved highly inefficient, necessitating the market reforms of 2000 under the leadership of Yushchenko. The establishment of a more level economic zone by these reforms forced many oligarchs to begin selling their assets, increasingly privatizing the country. In consequence, an entire portion of Ukrainian civil society that was pro-West developed as a precipitant because Western-style market and political reform were in their interests. American and Western NGOs saw this as an opportunity to assert their influence within this civil society, establishing both financial and organization links within Ukraine.

Thus, the establishment of American economic interests within Ukraine naturally orientated the behavior of its foreign policy to support political opposition. The efforts of American NGOs in providing essential training and resources to the domestic civil society in Ukraine decisively produced a more organized and motivated political opposition. As a result, an environment of transparency and accountability was planted into the arena of Ukrainian politics. Furthermore, this transparency increased the capacity of the United States to act more directly once evidence that democracy had been violated emerged. It should be clear that the actions of American NGOs leading up to the Orange Revolution provide a firm example of how U.S. economic and foreign policy interests are influenced by the wider context of historical development.

NOTES

1. Anders Aslund, "The Ancient Regime," in *Revolution in Orange*, eds. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul. (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 10.
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4. Aslund, 15.
5. Taras Kuzio, "Everyday Ukrainians and the Orange Revolution," in Aslund and McFaul, *Revolution in Orange*, 51.
6. Aslund, 25.
7. Adrian Karatnycky, "From Kuchmagate to the Orange Revolution," in Aslund and McFaul, *Revolution in Orange*, 33.
8. Mark MacKinnon, *The New Cold War* (New York: Carrol & Graff Publishers, 2007), 81.
9. Karatnycky, 33.
10. Karatnycky, 35.
11. MacKinnon, 82.
12. MacKinnon, 26.
13. MacKinnon, 42.
14. MacKinnon, 27.
15. "Editorial Board and Staff," *Journal of Democracy*, <http://www.journalofdemocracy.org/about/editorsStaff.html>.
16. "NDI Board of Directors," National Democratic Institute, <http://www.ndi.org/node/10>.
17. Olena Prytula, "The Ukrainian Media Rebellion," in Aslund and McFaul, *Revolution in Orange*, 111.
18. MacKinnon, 154.
19. MacKinnon, 155.
20. Pavol Demes and Joerg Forbig, "Pora-'It's Time' for Democracy in Ukraine," in Aslund and McFaul, *Revolution in Orange*, 97.

21. MacKinnon, 171.
22. MacKinnon, 167.
23. Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, "Russia's Role in the Orange Revolution," in Aslund and McFaul, *Revolution in Orange*, 151.
24. Petrov and Ryabov, 152.
25. Karatnycky, 38.
26. Olena Prystayko and Oleksandr Sushko, "Western Influence," in Aslund and McFaul, *Revolution in Orange*, 133.
27. Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 153.
28. Wilson, 184.
29. Wilson, 184.
30. MacKinnon, 205.

Jason Straight

FROM CONSERVATIVE REBELLION TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE EVOLUTION OF PEASANT RESISTANCE IN LATE MEDIEVAL GERMANY¹

As Wilhelm Abel remarked in his seminal book on Medieval agricultural history, "peasants are sparing of words and make few appearances on the stage of history until they resort to arms."² This being the case, the *dramatis personae* which acted on the stage of late Medieval Germany was crowded with peasant actors, who, unlike many of their peers, often had speaking roles. The actions of emperors, archbishops, and lords were subject to the frequent scrutiny of a chorus of peasant voices—and peasant arms. From the end of the thirteenth century through the Peasants' War of 1525, there were over sixty documented peasant uprisings in the territories of the Holy Roman Empire.³ The majority of these uprisings occurred during the end of the fifteenth and the beginning of the sixteenth centuries. While each rebellion had its own unique causes, several influences were at the heart of most popular uprisings. The most common impetuses for popular revolt in late medieval Germany⁴ were attempts by seignorial authorities to institute new or modified legal obligations on their peasants.⁵ Peasant uprisings were, therefore, often conservative in nature and peasants consistently clamored for a return to "old custom" [*alt(e)s Herkommen*] in their published complaints. The interpretation of 'custom' was, however, fluid.

While peasant rebellion had been relatively common throughout the the history of Holy Roman Empire, leading up to the Peasant's War of 1525, popular uprisings increased in size, level of organization, and in geographic area covered. Changes in the physical nature of rebellion were coupled with changes in peasant ideologies. In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, peasant rebellion in Germany underwent an ideological shift from simple resistance to new forms of taxation and servitude to a genuine revolt against existing social and political structures. This new ideology culminated in several radical revolts which were inspired by what Peter Blickle has termed a "vision of a political organization based on rural and urban communes without a feudal hierarchy."⁶ While it may be an overstate to understand this change as a revolution of the common man, the changing nature of rebellion reveals a change in peasant attitudes toward their lords to from a desire to preserve existing lord-vassal relationships as long as their lords upheld their duties, to a questioning of the fundamental nature of these relationships.

It is no coincidence that both the frequency and intensity of peasant rebellions increased during the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Late Medieval Germany was a region wracked by environmental, economic, and political crises that weakened the power of the central imperial authority and lead to a shift toward semi-autonomous control of territories by the lower nobility. The growing power of the lower nobility, however, was counteracted by the increased social and political power of the peasant class.⁷ This transition of power had its roots in fundamental economic and demographic developments of the late Middle Ages. From the twelfth century until the devastation of the Black Death in the mid fourteenth century, the population of Europe grow at an explosive rate. Coupled with this population boom was a general increase in the standard of living due to increased agriculture production.⁸ These trends were brought to a sudden end by the onset of the Black Death in the middle of the fourteenth century. The oft cited death rates of the plague need not be recounted here, needless to say, the population of Germany was decimated. The effects of the plague were to be felt throughout the century to come, as year

after year Europe was hit with continuing epidemics and crop failures.⁹ These continuing catastrophes effected different classes of society in different ways. In one sense, depopulation was an economic advantage to those who survived, as marginal land could be abandoned with an abundance of unpopulated quality land to be occupied.¹⁰ Depopulation also meant manpower shortages, and led to the increasing importance of the individual peasant in agricultural production.¹¹ In Germany, it was central authority that suffered the greatest from the crises of the fourteenth century. The power vacuum created by a succession of weak emperors led local elites to attempt to centralize power under their control. In order to achieve personal power, lords often attempted to squeeze every last bit of tax revenue from their peasants in order to ensure that they profited from often shaky economic and political conditions.

With the growing importance and diverging interests of the peasantry and the lower nobility, the situation was ripe for rebellion. While the territories of Germany were nominally under the rule of the Holy Roman Empire, in reality the empire was a patchwork of lordships ruled by petty nobles who were continuously embroiled in private wars. The heaviest blows of this continuous violence fell on the peasants. In a lord peasant relationship that was based off of a contractual exchange of labor for protection, the effect of localized wars on peasants was an important factor in changing peasant lord relationships. Perhaps the greatest single cause of peasant rebellion was a feeling among the peasantry that their immediate lords were failing to uphold their contractual obligations or making unjust demands contrary to accepted custom. For the peasantry, just law and old custom were synonymous. As Günther Franz has surmised, "for the Medieval man it was necessary for the law to be old; and if it was old, it was also good."¹² Petty nobles used all of the weapons in their legal arsenal to extract resources from their diminutive domains. Chief among these were the adoption of tenants of Roman Law, which many peasant viewed as an external invasion on accept custom, by which they could institute new forms of direct taxation contrary to traditional practices of peasant-lord relationships.¹³

With this basic framework of the causes and conditions of peasant rebellion in place, it will be expedient to examine how these factors played out in a succession of peasant uprisings leading up to the Peasants' War of 1525. Between 1458 and 1463, there were three individual peasant uprisings in the Archbishopric of Salzburg which serve as an excellent test case for examining the transition from simple to radical resistance. Salzburg, like many other German territories, had been distressed by incessant warfare throughout the fifteenth century; in the mid 1400s, a large portion of two wars, one in which the emperor Friedrich III was engaged, were fought primarily in Salzburg.¹⁴ The problems facing the peasants of Salzburg were compounded by a monetary policy and economic crisis that laid mounting tax demands on them. From 1458-1460, Salzburg and Southern Germany entered into a monetary crisis brought on when Emperor Frederick III began minting debased coinage in order to finance his wars.¹⁵ The result of this financial mismanagement was the onset of inflation which left the nobles of Salzburg in a financial crisis. To compound the problem, the years between 1456 and 1459 were poor harvests. In 1458, the archbishop of Salzburg, Sigmund von Volkersdorf instituted a livestock tax [*viehsteuer*] to make up for lost income due to receiving rents in debased coinage. In response to this new tax, there was a peasant uprising. Little is known about this particular revolt except for a brief mention in the *Salzburgische Chronica* of Dückher von Hasslaw which merely states that there was an uprising which was abated when the tax was rescinded.¹⁶ In many ways, Dückher's silence is telling. A rebellion sparked by a new, and particularly distressing form of taxation was abated when the tax was lowered. Lord and peasant clashed, but without any effects on their fundamental relationship.

In 1462, the new archbishop of Salzburg, Burckhard von Weispriach, instituted another new tax: a tax on consecrations [*weihsteuer*].¹⁷ The peasants of Salzburg did not react kindly to the institution of this new tax, especially at double the rate of the previous time a similar tax had been levied, and an uprising broke out.¹⁸ Unlike the previous peasant uprising, the archbishop was steadfast in maintaining the tax. Also unlike with the first uprising the entire archbishopric took part and several thousand peasants took up arms. While the revolt did not turn into a violent conflict, the threat of violence was clear. This rebellion did not put forward a fully realized call for social reform but rather focused on a return to legal custom in the collection of taxes. What was different about this rebellion from other anti-tax rebellions was that the peasants sought to attain legal confirmation of existing relations and achieve some level of rural representation in the collection of taxes.¹⁹ While this was a step towards social reformation, the conservatism of the rebellious peasants is apparent. A survey of the various complaints of the peasants of Salzburg about the tax reveal a consistent appeal based on "old custom" for why the peasant's were just in their refusal to pay the new tax.²⁰ The peasants, however, demanded representation in the local courts and oversight of the implementation of new taxation, an act unknown in 'custom'. The overall aim was to entrench what were seen as existing and just political relations in law and to ensure that law was followed by allowing oversight from the lower classes.

Despite the sizable number of peasants involved in the uprising of 1462 and the archbishop's inability, or unwillingness, to put down the rebellion with force, the Salzburg peasants did not achieve their political aims. The complaints of the peasants in 1462 were decided by an agent of the imperial court who arbitrated between the peasants and the archbishop. In the settlement that was reached, the peasantry was granted some concessions but was not let free of the tax. In 1463, a second rebellion broke out with a similar agenda as the previous rebellion. Like the first rebellion, the 1463 uprising ground to a standstill and the archbishop was still unwilling to attempt to repress it by force. The rebellion of 1463 faded out after more disputes between the rebels and the archbishop. After both of these rebellions, the Salzburg peasants achieved part of their social agenda: representation in the locals Estates.²¹ In the end, however, the peasants still had to pay the tax and the right of the archbishop to impose taxation was not undermined. The Salzburg peasant rebellions, while in many aspects simple anti-tax rebellions, showed a tendency of the peasants to question the power structures of their immediate lords and an attempt to reform the perceived abuse of the system by reforming the system itself.

Around the turn of the sixteenth century, peasant rebellions became better organized and peasant demands, more radical. This new style of rebellion is best displayed in the *Bundschuh* movement which raged across Germany from 1493 up to the Peasant's war in 1525. The laced boot or [*Bundschuh*] had been used as a symbol of the hardships of peasant life for some time before 1500 throughout Europe, mostly in France.²² In 1502 in the bishopric of Speyer a *Bundschuh* insurrection broke out lead by the peasant leader Joss Fritz who rallied approximately 10,000 followers to his cause. While Fritz' *Bundschuh* insurrection broke out in response to new forms of financial exertion by the bishop, the rebellion was not aimed at a mere reduction of taxation. Enraged by the bishop's actions, Fritz planned to lead his band of peasants, and some petty knights, in an attack on the city of Bruchsal and on Margraviate of Baden. Beyond merely demanding decreased of taxation, Fritz' band demanded liberation from the laws and rules of the bishop and from the rule of lords in general. The ideology of the *Bundschuh* movement was displayed clearly on the banner under which they marched, which carried the inscription "God's Justice Alone."²³ Before Fritz could implement his plan he was betrayed to

the authorities and while he escaped, many of his followers did not and punishment was swift. Over 100 of the conspirators were tortured into confession and a general list of charges of the insubordinate behavior of the Speyer *Bundschuh* was compiled by the authorities of bishopric. While these coerced confessions are hardly trustworthy accounts of the ideology of the movement, the sense of the confessions fits with the general trends in the evolution of peasant rebellion and serves to explain the meaning behind the banner "God's justice alone." As the charges read; it, was the intention of the peasants to

Take by force of arms all the freedoms they desired and would henceforth refuse to tolerate any man's dominion over them. They would no longer pay interest, remit tithes or taxes, nor pay tolls or dues of any kind. They wished to be completely quit of all duties and tributes.²⁴

This was a far cry from the mere cessation of an unpopular tax but a radical call for a fundamental shift in the relation between lords and the peasants. The growing threat of the *Bundschuh* movement to traditional structures of power is also clearly illustrated in the reaction to the movement by the Emperor. In 1502, Emperor Maximilian I issued a decree which outlawed the *Bundschuh* and mandated that the leaders and recruiters for the movement should be drawn and quartered, their property forfeit, and their children exiled, however, members of the movement who turned themselves in would not be subject to capital punishment.²⁵ In Maximilian's decree there is a clear sense of fear that the *Bundschuh* movement was a genuine threat to traditional power structures: as the decree read, the *Bundschuh* rebels were conspiring "against all authority, including the highest authorities, with the intention to free themselves from their subordinate position, which would lead to the destruction of all divine, human, spiritual and temporal law, [of] all authority government, of the prince, nobles, and city councils."²⁶

While sporadic uprisings continued to plague the countryside after the ban of the *Bundschuh*, the greatest show of peasant discontent was still on the horizon, the so-called Peasants' War²⁷ which engulfed the entire Rhineland from 1524-1526. The Peasants' War grew out of a series of complaints and petitions from various localities in the Southern Black Forest region. These petitions were not highly radical at first and called for redress of excessive taxation and an end to violations of old custom.²⁸ An example list of grievances from the county of Stühlingen near the beginning of the Peasants' War shows a moderate program. The Stühlingen peasants were primarily concerned with the institution of a new legal system and attempts at centralizing power and reducing the autonomy of local establishments. It was thus that they complained about abuses of lawyers, payments for legal services, and the trial and detention of the accused contrary to local custom. Throughout their list of grievances the peasants repeatedly appealed to the familiar grounds of "old custom" and "ancient law."²⁹ Quickly, however, the movement turned radical. Early in the year 1525, the ideology of the rebels began to blend religious and political phrasing and rejected the nature of feudal obligations entirely. Throughout the year 1525, a group of peasants led by Han Müller, a serf from the abbey of St. Blasien, which styled themselves the Christian Union raised a considerable rebellion throughout Upper Swabia. It was this group that created the well-known Twelve Articles which came to be the defining set of grievances of the Peasant's War. The Twelve Articles echoed *Bundschuh* radicalism, in that they rejected the basis of feudal lordship as ungrounded and unjust. The fundamental claim of the Twelve Articles was that there could be no

authority but that based in Holy Scripture and that serfdom was repugnant to Christian Freedom.³⁰ Without delving too deeply into the religious context of these articles in relation to the Protestant Reformation, it is clear to see that the political outlook of most of those involved in the Peasants' War was for a radical abolition of feudal servitude.

As the largest popular uprising before the French Revolution, the German Peasant's War of 1525, has drawn the attention of many historians and political theorists. To Friedrich Engels, the rebels were a type of proto-communists. To Martin Luther, they were the "Murderous, Thieving Hordes of Peasants." More recently, Peter Blickle has seen this revolt as primarily humanistic and a part of the "Revolution of the Common Man."³¹ While the rebels of 1525 may not have been humanists, proto-socialists, anarchists, or members of any other category which their actions have earned them retroactive entrance into, they, unlike many of their predecessors, were willing to question the existing authority systems under which they lived. When these systems failed to uphold what they saw as their rights, they took up arms and demanded a change to the system or a voice in its smooth operation. This was not a change that took place over night. When the events of 1525 are viewed as part of a dynamic evolution of social and political relations within the Holy Roman Empire, connected to broader environmental, technological, and demographic changes in Germany society, the process and development of peasant radicalism can be ascertained. The physical and mental trauma of the Black Death, coupled with a weak central government unable of stamping out resistance lead to peasant grievances simmering over time and developing into more radical forms. The increasing importance of the individual peasant in post-plague society along with the increasing demands placed on the peasantry by their immediate lords manifested itself in increased peasant violence and an increasingly large role for the peasantry in the political sphere. Even the struggle to legislate against peasant rebellion inherently gave the peasants influence in imperial legislation. Over time these developments lead to a large scale radical uprising that shook the foundations of German society. Due to the ultimate failure of the revolt of 1525, how, and if, the political ideologies of the *Bundschuh* or the Twelve Articles could manifest itself in society remains unknown. What is apparent, however, in the peasant rebellions of the late Medieval period is a growing self awareness among the peasantry and a willingness to question traditional social and political relationships, which had often been seen as part of a God-ordained ordering of the world epitomized by the breakdown into the three estates.

NOTES

1. I would like to extend thanks to professors Robert Dewell and Dittmar Dittich for assistance with particularly difficult passages in the German texts
2. Wilhelm Abel, *Agricultural Fluctuations in Europe from the Thirteenth to the Twentieth Centuries*, trans. Olive Ordish (New York: Saint Martin's Press, 1980), 64.
3. Günther Franz, *Die Deutschen Bauernkrieg* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1956), map 1, Peter Blickle, *Unruhen in der Ständischen Gesellschaft, 1300-1800* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988), 13.
4. I use German and Germany throughout for convenience to refer to the lands nominally under the control of the Holy Roman Empire.
5. Werner Rosener, *Peasants in the Middle Ages*, trans. Alexander Stützer (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 237-40.
6. Peter Blickle, *From the Communal Reformation to the Revolution of the Common Man*, trans. Beat Kumin, (Boston: Brill, 1998), 12.
7. Rosener, *Peasantry of Europe*, 76-7.
8. Abel, 21-30.

9. Abel, 48.
10. Rösener, *Peasantry of Europe*, 73-74, uses the abandonment of unfavorable land as one of the keys to explaining the desertion of cities and the reversion to wasteland of previously cultivated land.
11. Michael Toch, "Lords and Peasants: A Reappraisal of Medieval Economic Relationships," *The Journal of European Economic History* 15 (1986): 163-82, pp. 163-5 summarizes this view which was espoused by, among others, the French agricultural historian Georges Duby.
12. Franz, *Bauernkrieg*, 1 (translation mine).
13. Gerald Strauss, ed., *Manifestations of Discontent in Germany on the Eve of the Reformation* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1971), 196-7.
14. Franz, *Bauernkrieg*, 30-1.
15. Günther Franz, "Der Salzburger Bauernaufstand 1462," *Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landeskunde* 68 (1928): 97-112, 98-9; Rösener, *Peasantry of Europe*, 75-6. Rösener notes that the debasement of currency had a negative effect on lords who usually received rents as a fixed cash flow. Inflation and currency debasement forced them to find new ways to achieve income.
16. Reprinted in Franz, "Der Salzburger Bauernaufstand 1462," 99.
17. Herbert Klein, "Neue Quellen zum Salzburger Bauernaufstand 1462/63," *Mitteilungen der Gesellschaft für Salzburger Landeskunde* 77 (1937): 49-80, 68; Franz, "Der Salzburger Bauernaufstand 1462," 100-1.
18. Tom Scott, *Society and Economy in Germany, 1300-1600* (New York: Palgrave, 2002), 226-7.
19. Blickle, *Communal Reformation*, 11.
20. Klein, Documents II, III, and XIII in particular.
21. Scott, 227.
22. Strauss, 144.
23. Strauss, 144-5.
24. Reprinted in Strauss, 146.
25. Blickle, *Criminalization*, 90.
26. Reprinted in Blickle, *Criminalization*, 91.
27. The name "Peasants' War" is a slight misnomer as most orders of society become involved and radical action was not relegated to just the peasantry. It is accurate, however, in that a large number of peasants took an active roll in the War and many were vocal in expounding the radical agenda of the rebels.
28. Scott, 236-7.
29. Reprinted in Strauss, 153-66.
30. Scott, 237-8.
31. Scott, 234. This is explored at depth in Peter Blickle, *The Revolution of 1525: The German Peasants War from a New Perspective*, trans. Thomas A. Brady Jr. and H. C. Midelfort (New York: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985) and appears in the title of Blickle's later work, *From the Communal Reformation to the Revolution of the Common Man*.

Peter D. Winfrey

"REST ASSURED THAT WE WILL NOT YIELD": THE RISE OF POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE FIRST MODERN CONTESTED PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

Abstract

Although America was idealized as the new republic that would be free of fractious government, political parties began to develop soon after the signing of the treaty of Paris in 1783. Two major factions emerged, slowly developing their platforms and ideas. With the advent of national newspapers, the media became an important and crucial tool for electoral success. Both parties, well led and organized, finally clashed in the Election of 1800, which remains one of the most important contests in American Political History. In this election, the first cohesive opposition faced off against the ruling party of the day, creating the first election crisis in American history. Only quick thinking and a bit of compromise was able to end the crisis and bring the nation back from the brink of chaos. Furthermore, the Election of 1800 utilized many innovative techniques that soon became standard additions to the American political fabric, revolutionizing the experience of the political system for the everyday citizen. While some contend that the earlier presidential election four years previous was the first modern election, I contend that the election of the new century also provided for a new age in American politics, the age of the engaged citizen. New election practices pioneered during the campaign, such as canvassing, laid the groundwork for mass popular participation in the government.

Introduction

Eschewing a carriage, Thomas Jefferson strode out briskly into the cool Washington, D.C. air. He set out from the boarding house where he was staying for the Capitol, still under construction. Today, the Third President of the United States would be inaugurated. It was only less than a month before that the nation was locked in the throes of an election crisis that threatened the existence of the Union, but the President-elect, the lanky Virginian currently striding towards the Capitol, could only think of his speech he had to deliver to the joint session of Congress. A change had occurred in the government; his opposition party had ousted the incumbents. Some called it the "Revolution of 1800." Whether it was truly a revolution did not matter, however, it was time for a new era in politics, and he would be a new kind of president, a man of the common people. He was not dressed ornately, with a dress sword as Washington was, but in a plain suit. He would not see his predecessor at the ceremony; John Adams had departed for his home in New England before dawn. Approaching the Senate chambers, Jefferson readied his speech. Both parties had thoroughly demonized the other during the campaign that it was dubious that the rift between the two parties could be mended. Nonetheless, the man with the dark piercing eyes looked out into the crowd of Congressmen and tried to unify them: "every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists." Hoping that the words did not upon deaf ears, Jefferson departed the Senate Chamber optimistic. A new era had commenced in the American political system, the age of the ordinary citizen.

The Rise of Political Parties and the First Modern Contested Presidential Election

In 1796, George Washington faced a dilemma. He had encountered many problems during his lifetime, not the least fighting the British Army with a rag-tag group of militiamen. He had overcome that challenge, giving America its freedom in the process. Yet, now, fifteen years later, he stared down at a problem that seemed insurmountable, even for the great father of the nation. America was evolving, changing even too fast for the Virginian. The shape of the young republic was shifting, beginning to incorporate political factions and new kinds of propaganda; some had even penetrated the normally unassailable persona of Washington, drawing his ire. From the old general's perspective, the nation that was once united in revolution now seemed to be devolving into partisan chaos. Finally after much deliberation, President Washington reached a decision. He had done all he could do. He decided to retire, to his home at Mount Vernon astride the Potomac. The great general had completed his duty and now would return to his plow.

From the time of the founding, America's establishments had grown at a breakneck pace. The most profound developments changed the American political structure to its foundations. A nascent news media flourished, and by the close of the century, had already a major influence on popular opinion. Despite Washington's objections, two clearly delineated parties had arisen by the time of his retirement, and each looked to the election of 1800 as an opportunity to put their ideas into practice. The start of a new century produced an election that was revolutionary in its use of political techniques and media, changing the scope of the American political landscape forever.

The strength of these parties lay in their leadership, which provided a clear ideology and direction for both the Democratic-Republicans (commonly known as the Republicans during this period) and the Federalists. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison led the Republicans, while Alexander Hamilton guided the Federalists during the first ten years of the republic. All were extraordinary statesmen in their own right, yet they only thought of themselves as ordinary men doing their duty for their country. All four men had worked together to create the United States, and now sought to implement their vision of the republic through the election of 1800. Each man came from a different background, and brought his distinct brand of values into play. For John Adams, personal values constituted one's primary internal compass.

Some men have all the characteristics of a natural leader: poise, charisma, and tact. John Adams was not one of those men. Although intensely ambitious, John Adams Jr., never considered himself to be a great man. In fact, he took considerable pride in being a "man of no particular distinction."¹ He certainly did not look the part of a dashing revolutionary: he measured less than six feet in height and was quite portly. Awkward in social settings, he took comfort in his library, especially the classics, and fancied himself an intellectual. Although many founders took pride in their native region, Adams defined himself as the quintessential New Englander. He took pride in his Puritan heritage and the independence his ancestors achieved. Adams admired the Puritan ideal of the self-made farmer, beholden to no one, his achievements

his own. This man, descended from "virtuous, independent New England farmers," was born October 30, 1735 at the family homestead in Braintree, Massachusetts.² His father, John Sr., "played the part of a solid citizen", acting at various times as constable, lieutenant of the local militia, member of the town's board of selectmen, and deacon of the community's Congregationalist Church.³ His mother, Susanna Boylston Adams, eighteen years younger than her husband, came from a respectable family, above the elder John's social class. From an early age, John's parents instilled in him a great love of hard work and reverence for God. By most accounts, young John had an ordinary New England childhood by the standards of his day.

When he was of age, Adams attended Harvard College, where his father wanted him to enter the clergy. Adams, however, did not have any aspirations for a minister's life, and instead, prepared himself for a legal career. Setting a pattern that he would follow for the rest of his life, Adams struck out on his own, blazing a new trail. Independence subsequently formed the guiding principle in Adams' life, profoundly affecting his political thought. Soon, he discovered a kindred spirit who would be his constant companion in the quest for self-determination: a remarkable young woman named Abigail Smith. Abigail had received a rare education for a woman in Early America. Her mother, Elizabeth Smith, took advantage of her husband William's extensive library, and ensured that her daughter learned to read and write. By the time she had come of age, Abigail had read many important English authors—Milton, Pope, Richardson, and Shakespeare—in addition to the classics of Greece and Rome.⁴ Her liberal upbringing endowed Abigail with an empowering resilience. In 1764, Adams married Abigail after a five-year courtship, a decision which was the most important of his life, as she would prove to be his most faithful confidant and advisor.⁵ In the years preceding the Revolution, Adams lived and practiced law in Boston, becoming one of the most prominent attorneys in the area.

Like most of his contemporaries, Adams read widely, and many ideas of British political philosophy would influence his thought. Foremost influences included the British Whigs, especially philosopher John Locke and Henry St. John Viscount Bolingbroke. Bolingbroke's ideas on the benefits of mixed government and the power of self-interest became core Adams beliefs, marking the Bostonian as a staunch Whig.⁶ Beginning with the Stamp Act in 1765, Adams became convinced that the British Parliament sought to destroy liberty. "Liberty was threatened throughout the empire; the oppressive measures that the ministry had sought to implement in America" were only the most obvious assaults.⁷ As Boston became the center of unrest in these years, Adams supported the revolutionary efforts, although he disapproved of the violent methods advocated by the Sons of Liberty, a group led by his older cousin, Samuel Adams. True to his independent nature, he spurned the radical majority, defending the British soldiers accused in the Boston Massacre. Risking his legal reputation and family's safety, he successfully proved that the soldiers were not culpable for the incident. Adams' rational defense of law and order guided his actions during this period. Adams became an ardent supporter of colonial independence only when it appeared that the British were not interested in logically resolving the problem. Hence, after the British closed the Port of Boston in 1774, Adams became a firm supporter of independence.

When the colonies called together the First Continental Congress, Massachusetts chose Adams, its most vocal advocate, as a delegate. Adams' popularity within his home colony

enabled his continued appointment through the Second Continental Congress when that body assembled in May of 1775. From the beginning of the Second Continental Congress, he tenaciously insisted on independence. What Adams lacked in charisma, he made up for it with his voice. He was well regarded for his oratory, once described by a Congressman as akin to "an angel...let down from heaven" illuminating Congress.⁸ Calling for the colonies' independence, he endorsed a cause close to his heart and mind. His friend Dr. Benjamin Rush reported that during Congress, many delegates quickly acknowledged Adams "to be the first man in the House."⁹ His advocacy led to his appointment to the committee assigned to draft a declaration of independence. During the revolution, he served as the United States representative in France starting in 1778, eventually helping to negotiate the Treaty of Paris and peace with England. While in Europe, he learned of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia of 1787, and approved of its idea of a strong central government, publishing a pamphlet entitled *A Defence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States of America*. Though initially hopeful for the opportunity to see Europe, the excesses and debauchery of Europe, especially France, offended his Puritan virtues, and he soon tired of the constant social soirees of the ruling class. By 1788, he longed to return home to his simple farm in Braintree, and away from the extravagant palaces and estates of Europe. Resigning his diplomatic posts, he returned to Massachusetts just in time for the first presidential election in 1789. Though the presidency was guaranteed to General Washington, the position of Vice-President was still open. Friends encouraged Adams to stand for the office and he agreed to continue his service to the nation. Looking forward to his role in the first presidential administration, he was elected the first Vice President of the United States.

While young Adams learned his letters, Peter and Jane Randolph Jefferson welcomed a third addition to their family in rural Albemarle County, Virginia. They named the newborn Thomas, after his grandfather, an early pioneer of the Virginia backcountry. Born in the early spring of April 1743, at Shadwell, a small wooden house on the banks of the Rivanna River, Thomas Jefferson inherited the life of the landed gentry of tidewater Virginia. After Jefferson's second birthday, his family moved to Tuckahoe, a place fifteen miles downriver from Shadwell. The Jeffersons lived there for six years with the Randolphs, his mother's family. Although he spent the majority of his early childhood at Tuckahoe, Jefferson considered Shadwell his true home. Upon his return to a greatly expanded Shadwell, Jefferson began to attend school, first with William Douglas, and later with James Maury, a "correct classical scholar" who had a great influence on young Jefferson, introducing him to the classics and works of the Enlightenment. Maury's influence imbued Jefferson with a love of knowledge that would remain with him as long as he lived. In 1757, tragedy struck when Peter Jefferson died, leaving Thomas the master of the Shadwell estate at the age of fourteen. His father left his son 5,500 acres of his land including dozens of slaves, which later became the basis for Monticello.¹⁰

By 1760, Jefferson had finished his primary schooling and enrolled at the College of William and Mary in Williamsburg, Virginia's colonial capital. The Jefferson that arrived in Williamsburg struck an imposing figure: over six tall, with a shock of red hair. The young Virginian was eager to learn, and he soon found an able and willing teacher. Many years later, an elder Jefferson observed that it was his "great good fortune...that Dr. William Small of Scotland, was then Professor of Mathematics, a man profound in most branches of science, with...an enlarged and liberal mind. He...became soon attached to me, and made me his daily companion when not engaged in the school."¹¹ Small became Jefferson's tutor, building young

Jefferson's growing love of knowledge into a lifelong passion. The young student responded in earnest, completing the typically three-year undergraduate course in two years. He then studied law with George Wythe, a prominent legal scholar of the day, before his admission to the bar five years later. Following his time in Williamsburg, Jefferson returned home to practice law, and by 1769, he had been elected to the Virginia House of Burgesses.

His fondness for the law soon waned in favor of true love. The target of his affection was Martha Wayles Skelton, a recently widowed young woman. Jefferson adored his wife, though she was often frail and sickly. Writing to an acquaintance, he declared: "In every scheme of happiness she is placed in the foreground of the picture, as the principal figure. Take that away, and it is no picture for me."¹² Although he wished to remain with his adoring wife, duty called when he was selected him for the First and Second Continental Congresses in Philadelphia. Lacking the powerful voice of his contemporaries, including the irascible John Adams, he remained silent during the proceedings. Adams later claimed that "the whole time I sat with him, I never heard him utter three sentences together."¹³ Although he did doubt his public speaking ability, Jefferson's silence can partly be attributed to his concern for his wife, pregnant with the couple's third child. To many of the delegates, he was better known for his written work, especially *A Summary View of the Rights of British America*, rather than any of his few oratories. When the motion for independence sounded, his reputation as a writer made him a natural choice for the committee, and its members asked him to draft the declaration. Some changes notwithstanding, the Declaration of Independence remained largely the work of his pen when it was read in the Congress and approved on July 2, 1776. During the revolution, he served briefly as governor of Virginia from 1779 to 1781, once narrowly escaping capture from British soldiers at Monticello, and soon, public disapproval of his job as executive ended his term as governor. After this disastrous term as governor, he would never again hold Virginia public office. During the some of country's most difficult times, Jefferson suffered immense personal tragedy. After giving birth to their sixth child, Martha became deathly ill. Jefferson returned to Monticello immediately, swearing off his Congressional duties to be with his dying wife. When she died in the early autumn of 1782, Jefferson entered one of the most somber periods of his life. He entered a deep depression and locked himself in his room for three weeks straight. His daughter Martha called his grief "indescribable", a sense shared by all who were with him during that period.¹⁴

When at last he re-emerged, he threw himself back into public service, accepting as envoy to France only a few years later. Disliking Paris at first, Jefferson soon fell in love with the City of Lights, enthralled with its culture and arts, especially its position as a center of learning and science. The intellectually engaging atmosphere rekindled his old passion for literature and science and soothed the heartache of his lost wife. Most of all, he relished the enlightening discussions that occurred in the salons and cafes of the city. He reasoned that America was the spiritual successor to Europe, and that his new country should improve upon Europe's institutions. By "discovering Europe, Jefferson discovered America as well."¹⁵ The intellectual discussions helped Jefferson to expatiate his political beliefs, on his concept of liberty, an ideal both the French and the Virginian held dear. Jefferson heard of the Constitutional Convention from abroad, his good friend James Madison sending regular missives on the meeting's progress. Although he initially had misgivings about several parts of the document, especially the dubious absence of presidential term limits, ultimately he approved of it, telling Madison "he liked

whatever strengthened the Union."¹⁶ In 1789, Jefferson returned home to America exhausted, deservedly receiving a leave of absence from his ministerial duties. He had been away from his home country for over four years, and wanted nothing less than to unwind at his beloved Monticello and catch up with his agricultural and scientific interests. Nevertheless, his country called him back into public service. President Washington nominated him to be his first Secretary of State, seeing none more qualified for the position. Jefferson hesitated, torn between his personal desires and the needs of his new country. After consulting with friends, he finally consented, nodding to "the will of my country."¹⁷ In Washington's cabinet he joined another well-known statesman, one who had worked closely with Washington during the war and now began his term as Secretary of the Treasury: Alexander Hamilton.

One of the younger founding fathers, Alexander Hamilton was a foreign emigrant, a rarity among the leaders of the new nation. Born on January 11, 1755 in Nevis, British West Indies to James Hamilton, a Scotsman, and his unwed companion, Rachel Faucett Lavien, Hamilton was labeled a bastard. Throughout his life, Hamilton constantly sought to attain some degree of status to hide his ignominious birth. For this reason, he became obsessed with his personal honor for as long as he lived. At the beginning of his life, his illegitimate status had an immediate impact. Hamilton could not receive any formal schooling as the Anglican Church forbade formal schooling for bastards; luckily, he was able to receive some education under a private tutor.¹⁸ In 1765, his father abandoned Rachel and his sons for St. Croix, likely because he could not support his growing family. Although his mother tried to support them by keeping a small store, she passed away in 1768, leaving Alexander and his younger brother James orphaned. Now parentless, with only his brother to keep him company, Hamilton recognized that if he were to get anywhere in the world, he had to rely only on himself and his own abilities. Fortunately, Thomas Stevens, a well-to-do merchant on the island, adopted him and gave him a home. The determined Hamilton soon began to work for the mercantile outfit Beekman and Cruger, receiving a first taste of finance and economics, and igniting a passion in him that he carried throughout his life. Clerking at the outfit, he "had to mind money, chart courses for ships, keep track of freight, and compute prices in an exotic blend of currencies, including Portuguese coins, Spanish pieces of eight, British pounds, Danish ducats, and Dutch silvers."¹⁹ In 1772, Hamilton wrote a letter describing a recent hurricane that was subsequently published in the *Royal Danish American Gazette*. Impressed by young Hamilton's writing, the local town undertook a collection to send him to the mainland British colonies to complete his education. For the teenage Hamilton, already wise beyond his years, this came as a glorious opportunity. Not only could he receive a quality education, but he would also be given a fresh start in America, a place no one knew of his bastard status.

After arriving in America, Hamilton first attended a grammar school in New Jersey in 1772. When he completed his studies he first applied to the College of New Jersey (now Princeton), but later decided to attend King's College in New York City (later renamed Columbia). Although a Loyalist stronghold, Hamilton bucked the majority at King's College, establishing himself as a revolutionary, penning fiery newspaper pieces and gaining the captaincy of the first artillery company in New York.²⁰ Hamilton's men saw combat during the New and New Jersey campaigns in 1776-77, where Hamilton's leadership distinguished his unit. Impressed by his "brilliant courage and admirable skill," General Washington offered him a place on his staff as his personal aide-de-camp, where he remained for the rest of the war.²¹

Hamilton quickly gained Washington's trust; by the end of the war, the young soldier was handling all of the General's correspondence to Congress and other generals. Soon, Washington became the father figure that Hamilton never had. They formed a close friendship that would last the rest of their lives. By the end of the war, Hamilton had been promoted to major general, yet his personal ambition was still not satisfied. He decided he could cement his place among the social elite by marrying into one of the most prominent families of New York. Hamilton impressed Elizabeth Schuyler with his dashing military mien and handsome appearance; after her father's approval, they wed in 1780. Although he sincerely loved "Eliza", he valued his public honor more rather than his private intimacy. His priorities would cause a marital crisis later when Hamilton grew enamored of Maria Reynolds and her husband threatened to expose the New Yorker's infidelity; he thought it was far more honorable to admit publicly to adultery rather than to show any inkling of corruption on his part.

At last achieving respectability as a gentleman of the New York aristocracy, he focused his attention on politics. Elected to Congress in 1782, he soon saw that the government prescribed by the Articles of Confederation was weak and inefficient, and began to call for a convention to discuss measures that would strengthen the current government. Hamilton soon found an able ally in Robert Morris, the recently appointed the Superintendent of Finance. Morris ran an important Philadelphia shipping outfit that helped to pay for a substantial portion of the Continental Congress's debts during the revolution, and took pride in his financial acuity. During his tenure as superintendent, Morris established the Bank of North America, the first commercial bank in the country, and helped to stabilize the nation's credit.²² Morris championed the expansion of public debt to increase investment and revenue in the meager American coffers. In addition, it ensured the union of the new state, and "justified the demand for federal taxes" as way to finance the debt, giving the government some cash flow.²³ Morris' plan, as outlined in "On Public Debt," seemed to Hamilton a brilliant idea. A strong financial system would ensure a strong centralized government. Hamilton developed a strong rapport with Morris, and many of Morris' fiscal proposals made their way later into Hamilton's recommendations as Secretary of the Treasury. As a New York delegate to the convention in Philadelphia, Hamilton became an advocate for strong central government that had the authority to direct national affairs. Giving rise to the name of his future party, Hamilton, along with James Madison and John Jay, authored the series of essays that came to be known as the *Federalist Papers*, which proved instrumental to the ratification of the new Constitution. When Washington was elected president, he named Hamilton head of the Treasury department, tasking him with the creation of a financial system for the new nation. At the time, Hamilton did not realize that creating a financial system would cause a Congressional firestorm.

Political parties emerged slowly on the national stage, though they had been manifest since the ratification debate over the Constitution. In 1791, Federalism dominated the federal government, without opposition. Those who identified themselves as Federalist "were the nationalist-minded, conservative, well-to-do members who believed that the cure for the 'excess of democracy' was a strong national government."²⁴ Although Washington was nominally a Federalist, the real leader of the emerging group was Alexander Hamilton, who secured the federal government's power through his work as Secretary of the Treasury. Although Washington's administration lacked any serious opposition, some Americans objected to Washington's aristocratic manner and stately air, leading many to worry that the Federalists

wanted to substitute King George III of Britain with George I of Virginia. These people used the word "republican" to describe themselves, a direct jab at Washington, Hamilton, and the Federalists to protest their seemingly royal intentions.²⁵

The new party began to coalesce around a rising Congressman from Virginia, Jefferson's close friend, James Madison. Madison was hardly new to the political scene, serving as both Virginia state legislator and Constitutional Convention delegate, and at the latter, a leading advocate for the Constitution. Corroborating with Jay and Hamilton on the *Federalist Papers*, he produced a significant portion of the completed work; only Hamilton composed more letters for the project. Yet, despite his fervent Federalism, a few years later he reemerged as the preeminent Republican in Congress. Although at first glance, the two Madisons seem incompatible, the transition can be seen in the evolution of thought of this prominent statesman.

James Madison, Jr., was the son of a tobacco planter and his wife, born March 16, 1751, only 25 miles from Jefferson's boyhood home of Shadwell. Young James was raised, like Jefferson, in relative wealth. His father's plantation in Orange County sprawled over three thousand acres in the Virginia countryside, employing numerous slaves to manage the estate.²⁶ Although little documentation survives describing Madison's boyhood, life on the plantation was a prosperous and happy time. When Madison reached maturity, he began his education at the College of New Jersey. Madison enjoyed his college years in Princeton, immersing himself in the school's strong tradition of dissent, arising from its founding by a divergent Presbyterian sect and its association with liberal British academies. Princeton's association with these academies often allowed teachers more freedom to use creative methods and implement experimental curricular changes. Attending such a progressive college gave Madison a great deal of freedom and a wide exposure to divergent and dissenting ideas that were avoided at other colonial colleges. Although the subjects that Madison learned at Princeton were standard and esteemed throughout the western world (Greek, Latin, and divinity), Princeton gained its liberal reputation by determining the manner and order these subjects were taught. Furthermore, religious observance and ancient language study was deemphasized, enabling many teachers to concentrate on contemporary studies of politics, society, and science.²⁷ Madison enjoyed his time at Princeton, excelling in both academic and extracurricular pursuits. The young Virginian joined the American Whig Society, one of two competing student debating clubs in the college. Corresponding with its already liberal reputation, Princeton emerged as an early revolutionary hotspot, with both students and teachers participating in shows of radicalism. Madison reported that at one commencement, students foreswore British-produced clothes and processed only in "American cloth."²⁸ With this act of defiance, the students began to identify themselves as Americans rather than British subjects, solidifying their allegiance to the rebellion. In this politically charged atmosphere, it is easy to see how Madison developed a keen worldview. After graduating from the college in 1771, Madison remained in Princeton, contemplating his future plans. He did not particularly desire to be a minister or a lawyer, as he possessed a weak speaking voice and was often ill. Government and public affairs held the greatest interest for the young graduate, and he focused his studies accordingly, furthering his knowledge with the help of his former teacher and President of the College of New Jersey, John Witherspoon, in the year after his graduation. Madison soon became active with the revolutionary cause when Orange County elected him in late 1774 to the colonial-wide "Committee of Safety", which enforced the Continental Congress's embargo on British goods.²⁹

Only two years later, his county named him to the House of Burgesses, beginning his term when he was only twenty-five years old. In the legislature Madison met Jefferson, and as the elder Jefferson began his ill-fated term as governor in 1779, they developed a lifelong friendship. Later on in his life, Madison would mention that there had never been "an interruption or diminution of mutual confidence and cordial friendship" in the two Virginians' association.³⁰ They both possessed sharp intellects, yet their philosophies sprang from different ends of the spectrum. Jefferson embodied the mentality of a dreamer, and saw things in their perfected state; Madison saw things more realistically. As an example, both disliked representative legislatures having too much power; however, Jefferson feared that the elected representatives would abuse their power, while Madison feared that the elected would not govern rationally. As one historian describes it, "Jefferson worried about the rights of the majority; Madison worried about the rights of the minority."³¹

As Jefferson began his term as governor, Madison was called to Philadelphia as a delegate to the Continental Congress in 1779. This election would begin Madison's storied Congressional career, serving in the Continental Congress, the Confederation Congress, and later in the House of Representatives after the ratification of the Constitution. During his time in the various legislatures, he honed his craft and soon became a masterful politician. Unknown outside Williamsburg in 1779, only several years later he had become a national figure.³² Serving on the Confederation Congress after the Treaty of Paris, Madison sensed the Confederation's deficiencies, and decided that a strong central government would be far more effective. By the mid-1780s enough states had seen the failings of the Articles of Confederation to select delegates for a convention in Annapolis, Maryland. The Annapolis convention's ideas of a strong national government made their way to Philadelphia only a year later.

At the Constitutional Convention, Madison became a leading proponent for the ratification of a new, stronger centralized government. He drafted the Virginia Plan at the beginning of the meeting, which would serve as one of the primary components of the finalized Constitution. During the meeting, he became close partners with Hamilton, as both worked to secure the approval of the new government. From his close association with Hamilton, and his work on the *Federalist Papers*, he became connected with the Federalist cohort. In Philadelphia, a central tension between the power of the people and the government emerged. Hamilton and the Federalists contended that strong government maintained order in a chaotic society, while the opposition, led by Patrick Henry, insisted that too much power vested in the government would breed tyranny. This opposition consisted of a loose group of delegates, somewhat unimaginatively known to history as the "Anti-Federalists." Their name is derived from the preeminent issue they objected to—the ratification of the Constitution—for this was only issue on which they were unified. Their reasons for opposing the Constitution varied, and in some cases, were paradoxical.³³ They feared, perhaps correctly, that the government would consist only of the wealthiest and best bred of the nation's citizens, obstructing any chance of a common American to represent their new country. The Anti-Federalists believed that they needed to protect the people against usurpations of the government; the omission of a Bill of Rights constituted the primary protest. Believing that if the power did not lie with the people, the Anti-Federalists' feared that the "people's natural deference to the rich and the well-born would result in an elective aristocracy."³⁴ To counter the great majority of the Anti-Federalists' opposition, the Federalists promised to make a Bill of Rights a part of the Constitution if the states approved

the document. During ratification, the Anti-Federalists used extensive letter and pamphlet writing campaigns to voice their concerns. Although the opposition to ratification remained strong, there was no consensus and one state after another approved the Constitution, eventually gaining the requisite number of states needed for its enactment. Following the approval of the document, the Anti-Federalist opposition disappeared into a puff of smoke. With their cause defeated, the opposition leaders laid their objections aside, deciding that "the accepted task for friends of liberty was neither counterrevolution nor reform."³⁵ This mentality precludes the Anti-Federalists from acquiring the appellation of a true political party. The Federalists maintained cohesion by winning the ratification battle, and thus becoming the *de facto* power in the new government, while the Anti-Federalists disappeared, leaving a void that would only be filled several years later. The Anti-Federalist strongest legacy, however, is not the actions it took during the ratification battle, but in laying the seeds of opposition that would reemerge under the Democratic-Republicans several years later.

The formation of the Republican party started as a reaction to the policies of the new government, specifically to Hamilton's fiscal policies. Upon taking office as Secretary of the Treasury, Hamilton quickly set himself to the assignment of creating a financial structure for the new nation. The national government still owed considerable debt to foreign countries from the Revolution, making Hamilton's duties even more complex. Many states' finances, furthermore, were also in trouble. Under the Articles of Confederation, the power to produce currency had rested with the states, ultimately leading to thirteen different shapes and sizes of payment and instability in the market. Although Congress now had the sole power to mint currency, it needed a bank to establish credit and create a workable system. Hamilton first produced a report on the public debt. Delivered to Congress on January 14, 1790, the *Report on Public Credit* proposed a dynamic plan for the nation. Hamilton decided that the federal government should assume all debts, both federal and state for a total of \$79 million dollars.³⁶

The Republicans rose up in protest. At the forefront of the furor, Madison emerged as the opposition's most vocal leader. Although Jefferson would become the symbolic leader, his late arrival on the scene, in addition to his role as Secretary of State, removed him from leading the party's formation. Jefferson felt that he could not criticize the administration while still an officer of the government. The assumption plan proposed by Hamilton drew ire from Madison for placing the onus of the states' revolutionary debt onto the federal government, forcing states that had already paid off the majority of their debts (such as Virginia) back into the debtor column. Previously convinced of his old colleague's federalism, Hamilton was devastated when Madison spoke out in Congress in opposition his plan on February 11th, 1790.³⁷ With Madison carrying their banner, the Republicans rallied against the assumption plan. As the firestorm over assumption raged, the House of Representatives approved Hamilton's bill on June 2nd, with the exception of assumption. Hamilton considered assumption the most important aspect of his plan, as everything else hinged on its passing. In desperation, Hamilton began sending conciliatory messages to opposition leaders. A few weeks after the funding bill passed the House, Hamilton appealed to Jefferson for help. Jefferson later recalls meeting Hamilton on the street:

He walked me backwards and forwards before the President's door for half an hour. He painted pathetically the temper into which the legislature had been wrought; the danger of the *secession* of their members, and the separation of the States. He observed that the

members of the administration ought to act in concert; that though this question was not of my department, yet a common duty should make it a common concern...and that the question having been lost by a small majority only, it was probable that an appeal from me to the judgment and discretion of some of my friends, might effect a change in the vote, and the machine of government, now suspended, might be again set into motion.

Jefferson agreed to help facilitate some kind of change, and to this end, he suggested a dinner party: "I proposed to him, however, to dine with me the next day, and I would invite another friend or two, bring them into conference together, and I thought it impossible that reasonable men, consulting together coolly, could fail, by some mutual sacrifices of opinion, to form a compromise which was to save the Union."³⁸ The next day Jefferson invited both Hamilton and Madison to dinner, a tactic that he increasingly used to reach agreements on political matters. After much debate, Madison agreed to stop his opposition to the debt plan in favor of moving the proposed national capital to a Southern location. Although Hamilton would have loved to have his adopted city—New York—as the national capital, his success depended on the passage of his financial plans. Hamilton agreed to use his influence to move the capital southward, and his plan passed Congress a month later with no objections from Madison.³⁹

With a little dinner table conversation, one of the first political deals had been struck between a governing party and a strengthening opposition. During this period, the ideologies of both parties fully emerged, though most Americans already had some sense where each faction stood. Consequently, each defined itself by its opposition to the ideas of the other party. Although the Federalist party stood for a strong, central government, its comprehensive platform only began to develop through conflict with the Republicans. The same situation occurred with the Republicans, as their ideals were forged by their opposition against Hamilton's fiscal program and the location over the proposed national capital. Madison's conversion from a nominal Federalist to a devoted Republican defined the beginning of the Republican party. In the early years, Madison defined what it meant to be Republican in a Federalist dominated nation, developing a definite political ideology in his letters and speeches. By 1792, Madison had developed a definite ideology for the party in addition to the name of "Republicans." By this juncture, Madison conceded that even in the new American republic, "parties are unavoidable."⁴⁰ In an essay to the *National Gazette*, Madison wrote of "the Republican party", and gave a brief synopsis of its principles:

[The Republican party] consists of those who believing in the doctrine that mankind are capable of governing themselves, and hating hereditary power as an insult to the reason and an outrage to the rights of man, are naturally offended at every public measure that does not appeal to the understanding and to the general interest of the community, or that is not strictly conformable to the principles, and conducive to the preservation of republican government.⁴¹

Madison further highlighted the differences between his party and the Federalists by offering a simple comparison. Asking who the nation's true friend was, Madison shot back:

Not those who favor measures, which by pampering the spirit of speculation within and without the government, disgust the best friends of the Union. Not

those who promote unnecessary accumulations of the debt of the Union, instead of the best means of discharging it as fast as possible...Not those who espouse a system of measures more accommodated to the depraved examples of...hereditary forms...⁴²

The Federalists had never fully detailed their core beliefs until they found themselves compelled to do so by the emergence of the Republicans as a legitimate political party. Once the Republicans emerged, the Federalists withstood their attacks and solidified their position as the governing faction.

The next development for the Republicans concerned the gradual transfer of leadership from Madison to Jefferson. In his role as Secretary of State, Jefferson excelled, but he increasingly desired to retire from public life. Finally, he resigned from office in 1793, and returned to Monticello. The fifty-year-old Virginian had served in public affairs for his country for over eighteen years, and now had a chance to focus on his greatest interests: farming, science, and literature. At the very least, Jefferson needed time to relax. To James Monroe, he apologized for taking so long to write him, faulting the delay on "that sort of procrastination which so often takes place when no circumstance fixes a business to a particular time."⁴³ Most of all, Jefferson felt a need to disassociate himself from the increasing partisanship in Philadelphia; writing to Madison in 1794, he declared: "I have never seen a Philadelphia paper since I left it...and I feel myself so thoroughly weened from the interest I took in the proceedings there, while there, that I have never had a wish to see one, and believe that I never shall take another newspaper of any sort." As such, he told his friend, "I find my mind totally absorbed in my rural occupations."⁴⁴ Jefferson resolved to never enter politics again, satisfied with the slow pace of his life and his present tranquility, reiterating that "the length of my tether is now fixed for life from Monticello to Richmond." "My private business," he wrote to a friend, "can never call me elsewhere, and certainly politics will not, which have ever hated both in theory and practice."⁴⁵ The first year after retirement, he refused to discuss politics of any sort. As the next years passed, however, he became increasingly open to discussions of politics. During this span of three years, the mantle of Republican leadership passed from Madison to Jefferson, culminating in Jefferson's candidacy for President in 1796. Madison instigated this change himself, relaying to Jefferson news from Congress in Philadelphia, and pertinent news clippings and pamphlets. The Whiskey Rebellion in 1795 proved to be the key turning point in Jefferson's return to politics, arousing his republican sentiment and spurring him to write opinions to newspapers and acquaintances in protest of the overbearing reach of the federal government.⁴⁶ Over the next year, Jefferson slowly regained his political passion, fueled by the debate over Jay's Treaty. Jefferson evolution during these years highlights the dynamic relationship between Jefferson and Madison. During his Monticello years, Madison served as Jefferson's political informant. Each had a distinct role: "Jefferson was the psychological superior and senior member of the team. He orchestrated the strategy and Madison implemented the tactics" in Congress.⁴⁷ By the time Jefferson had reentered the political scene, the roles soon reversed; a year after Jefferson became Vice President, Madison retired from the House of Representatives to his home at Montpelier.

When Washington retired in 1796, most people assumed that Vice President John Adams would succeed him. Adams had a feeling that he would not run unopposed. Acting on his premonition, he wrote several letters to Jefferson, each assuming that the Virginian would be his

opponent in the upcoming election season.⁴⁸ Earlier in his respite at Monticello, Jefferson seemed firmly opposed to running, but his tone changed when Madison entreated him to run in 1796: "I by no means think of declining the work...On the contrary, I wish with ardor to begin it."⁴⁹ Despite his hints at running, as the election approached, Jefferson never actually declared his intentions to run for president, yet he allowed his name to be considered and did not dispel any rumors later that year to the contrary.⁵⁰ As December 1796 neared, when the electors from the states gathered to choose the next president, neither candidate publicly voiced his intention to run, let alone campaign for office. Curiously, both were following a precedent established by Washington. "Washington had acted that way in 1788 and 1792, and his would-be successors were careful to emulate him. Jefferson remained in Monticello; Adams went home to his farm near Boston."⁵¹ Adams and Jefferson, following established gentlemanly conduct of the era, thought it improper to even appear to be seeking public office. When the electors did gather in December, Adams emerged the winner, albeit narrowly, claiming 71 electors, one more than the majority needed, to Jefferson's 68 votes. As parties had only just begun to develop, party discipline was virtually non-existent, leading too many Federalists to vote for Adams while neglecting to support South Carolinian Thomas Pinckney, resulting in Jefferson securing second place in the totals, making him Vice President.⁵²

Adams took the oath of office on March 4th, 1797, and addressed Congress, giving a brief synopsis of his service to the country leading up to his present election. Acknowledging the beginning of a growing party system, he admonished them about the interference of politics into the electoral system, warning that "if an election is determined by a majority of a single vote...through artifice or corruption, the Government may be the choice of a party, for its own end, not of the nation for the national good."⁵³ Whether he knew about the growing divisions and solidifying parties in Congress or not, Adams faced an unenviable situation with an uncooperative Vice President. Adams and Jefferson had originally liked each other when they first met in Philadelphia during both Continental Congresses and gradually grew closer when they were both ministers to France during the revolutionary era. The friendship that blossomed between Adams and Jefferson evolved from "their common cause against English imperial rule and their different roots in the regional cultures of New England and Virginia."⁵⁴ Since the establishment of the new government, Adams and Jefferson's relationship had grown rocky as each staked out different sides of the political spectrum; Jefferson embracing the Republicans, while Adams identified with the strong-government Federalists. Their once frequent letters slowed to a trickle, and finally to a halt in early 1796. Letters between the two old friends would not resume until 1811 when they finally reconciled their differences.⁵⁵ Now post-election, practically sworn enemies, they were expected to work together in the halls of government. Adams attempted to smooth over the differences; he offered Madison a diplomatic position in France and Jefferson a place in this cabinet, but to no avail. Jefferson refused to work with Adams in determining policy or supporting any of the Federalist agenda. Writing to Madison soon after the election, he described his role as Vice President:

My Letters inform me that Mr. Adams speaks of me with great friendship, and with satisfaction in the prospect of administering the government in concurrence with me. As to my participating in the administration, if by that be meant the executive cabinet, both duty and inclination will shut the door to me...the constitution will only know me as the member of a legislative body.⁵⁶

It became quickly apparent during his tenure as Vice President that Jefferson was less than excited to serve as Adams' deputy. He never remained in Philadelphia longer than required to administer his duties as the President of the Senate, returning to Monticello as much as possible.

To his dismay, Adams soon discovered that Hamilton was working against him. Although Adams held the Presidency, Hamilton maintained the leadership of the Federalists. Adams made an effort to distance himself from Hamilton during his Vice Presidency, deriding him as the "sovereign pontiff of Federalism," and nursing a dislike that would only intensify during the next four years.⁵⁷ Divisions had already arisen in the party itself. The High Federalists, led by Hamilton, tended to support policies that strengthened ties with Great Britain and opposed any concessions to France. They consisted of the most fervently nationalist members. Adams, while maintaining his ideological independence from any party, still identified with the more moderate portions of the Federalists. Looking to establish continuity in the presidency and avoid any party dissent, Adams retained the majority of Washington's cabinet as his own. This decision proved disastrous, as the majority of his cabinet were High Federalists and thus loyal to Hamilton. Adams later recalled his decision to retain Washington's cabinet one of the major blunders of his presidency, nearly dooming his presidency from the beginning, an observation with which even Jefferson agreed.⁵⁸ Three of his cabinet members regularly informed Hamilton of cabinet happenings: Oliver Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury, James McHenry, Secretary of War, and Timothy Pickering, Secretary of State. All three men, especially Wolcott, communicated Adams' directives to Hamilton, who then dispensed his own marching orders.

Foreign affairs defined Adams' presidency. The crisis with France that had started near the tail end of Washington's administration became the key issue of Adams' presidency. This problem influenced all other issues that Adams dealt with during his four year term.⁵⁹ The French "Quasi-War" began with the French Revolution in 1792, when Louis XVI was guillotined by his subjects. Great Britain immediately declared war on revolutionary France, placing the United States in a difficult dilemma of choosing between France, its savior of the American Revolution, and Great Britain, still the world's unquestioned military power and still itching for retribution after losing the American Revolution. Many Republicans, including Jefferson, supported the French Revolution, pleased to see the principles of freedom and liberty blossoming in Europe. Federalists looked down upon the events in Paris with suspicion, especially during the Reign of Terror, wary of the rampant chaos and anarchy. Not willing to entangle the country in another war so soon after the Revolution, Washington proclaimed America neutral in the conflict in 1793, pleasing neither side. In retaliation, England repudiated the Treaty of Paris and began to reoccupy several forts among the Great Lakes and considered any American ships trading with the French to be carrying contraband. Washington had sent Chief Justice John Jay to negotiate a treaty in England, eventually agreeing to the terms of Jay's Treaty in 1795. The terms strongly favored the British, most importantly designating them the preferred trading partner of the United States. The new French government, called the Directory, considered the treaty an insult to the Franco-American friendship engendered in the American Revolution. Offended, the French went on the offensive, commandeering American merchant ships trading with England and pressing their crews into French service.

Adams resolved to end the attacks, and sent Charles Cotesworth Pinckney to Paris to resolve the matter. Upon arrival, Pinckney was denied access to the French Minister, forcing him

to move to Holland and wait for instructions from the President. Upon receiving Pinckney's report, Adams addressed Congress and urged the nation to prepare for war while he tried diplomacy one last time. He announced his intention to send Pinckney back to Paris, along with Federalist John Marshall and political independent Elbridge Gerry. In March 1798, Adams learned that the commission had been again refused admittance to see Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand, the French foreign minister. Talleyrand, a person only rivaled in his diplomacy by his greed, had recently returned from his post in Britain to assume his new duties. When he received notice that he been appointed Foreign Minister, Talleyrand crowed: "I'll hold the job; I have to make an immense fortune out of it, a really immense fortune."⁶⁰ Talleyrand had refused to admit the Americans, but sent secret agents on his behalf to establish conditions for the Americans' audience. His agents requested that the American diplomats pay him a bribe, a large loan to the French Republic, and obtain an apology from Adams for his bellicose speech a year earlier.⁶¹ The diplomats would then be granted permission to see Talleyrand. Shocked and repulsed by Talleyrand's conditions, Pinckney, Marshall, and Gerry jointly petitioned Adams for further instructions.

Initially, Adams had determined to ask for a declaration of war from Congress when received these notices; instead, he let his temper cool, and deliberated with his cabinet on the best course of action. Adams decided to inform Congress only to build up the navy and levy new taxes. The Republicans, suspicious of this directive, demanded that Adams release the diplomatic dispatches that described the events. Adams gladly complied, knowing the explosive content of the dispatches and released the documents, only changing the names of the French agents to X, Y, and Z, respectively.⁶² The revelations of the dispatches confounded the Republicans, equally appalled as Adams had been at the French and Talleyrand's lack of ethics. Abigail Adams described the reaction of the opposition party, saying "[they] were struck dumb, and opened not their mouths."⁶³ Adams himself felt vindicated. Federalist Fisher Ames declared that the dispatches "really electrified all classes," with word spreading like wildfire, generating fervent anti-French sentiment throughout the nation.⁶⁴ This pleased the High Federalists, especially Hamilton, reportedly "delighted" with the president's actions, and saw the war as an opportunity to boost the nation's economy.⁶⁵ War drums sounded throughout the country, and Adams began to take on a martial appearance, wearing a sword at his side in public, and using a bellicose tone in his speeches. Adams soon sensed that support was building for his cause in the face of the XYZ Affair and for himself, as his popularity reached new heights.⁶⁶ The Republicans in Congress, however, remained cautious. They approved defensive measures against attack, but still guarded against any measures that would precipitate war. As a defensive measure, Congress passed a law in July 1798 tripling the size of the standing army from 4,000 men to nearly 12,000 soldiers. Through his influence in Adams' cabinet, and with a stamp of approval from the elder Washington, Hamilton secured the field command of the new provisional army, much to the President's ire.⁶⁷

With war fervor raging, some of the Federalists took it upon themselves to work a dashing stroke on their Republican opponents. When Theodore Sedgwick, a Federalist party leader in the Senate, first heard of the XYZ Affair, he sent a brief memo to an associate: "It will afford a glorious opportunity to destroy faction. Improve it."⁶⁸ The anti-French zeal that arose from the XYZ Affair seemed to give the governing party *carte blanche* to either prevent or precipitate a war. The Federalists sensed this apparent mandate from the people and began to

pass many laws under the guise of national security. The most important acts constitutionally and politically were the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.

The Alien and Sedition Acts were the most politically motivated of all the laws passed during this volatile period. Republicans criticized Adams and the rest of Federalists in Congress, questioning the necessity of the military build up. Tired of dissent, the Federalist-controlled Congress quickly passed four acts during the summer of 1798 which they felt would silence any and all Republican opposition: the Naturalization Act, the Alien Friends Act, the Alien Enemies Act, and the Sedition Act, now collectively known as the Alien and Sedition Laws. The first three acts dealt with immigrants and aliens, extending the residency period of citizenship to fourteen years, and giving the president enormous authority to deport "dangerous" foreign aliens. Although the first three acts indirectly aimed at the Republican base of support-immigrants- the fourth, the Sedition Act, leveled the strong arm of the law directly at the opposition party, criminalizing any criticism of the standing government. The penalties imposed for violating the law were harsh:

The first section punished conspiracies and combinations to impede the operation of the federal laws and set the penalty at not more than five years imprisonment and a fine of not more than \$5,000. The second penalized any person, citizen as well as alien, for any 'false, scandalous and malicious' statements against the president, either house of Congress, or the government, made with intent to defame them, or bring them into contempt or disrepute, or to excite against them the hatred of the good people of the United States. The maximum penalty was two years' imprisonment and a \$2,000 fine.⁶⁹

With the support of Federalist judges, the Sedition Act could easily be extended to punish any criticism of the Adams administration, whether or not the opposition was "false, scandalous and malicious." Armed with their new law with dubious constitutionality at the very least, Secretary of State Timothy Pickering and the Federalists pounced upon the Republicans and their most effective propaganda tool- the Republican press. One of the first editors prosecuted under the new law was Benjamin Franklin Bache, the head of the openly Republican *Philadelphia Aurora*. Federalists gleefully arrested Bache and threw him in jail, happy to dispose of their harshest critic. Bache's saga lasted several months, tragically leading to his death from yellow fever before he could stand trial.

Bache's ordeal galvanized Jefferson and the Republicans. Many questioned the constitutionality of these laws, especially Jefferson and Madison, appalled by its blatant disregard for freedoms protected in the Bill of Rights. Jefferson lamented to Madison that the laws "are so palpably in the teeth of the constitution as to shew they mean to pay no respect to it."⁷⁰ Both Republicans set to work, first to help the editors of the Republican newspapers under watch of the Sedition Act, contributing funds to their newspapers and alleviating the legal fees imposed upon them. Second, they proposed a series of resolutions to denounce the acts. Jefferson and Madison decided that the best place to protest the violations of the federal government was to assert the rights of the states to refuse to comply with the laws' execution. Jefferson's friend and former neighbor John Breckinridge had moved to Kentucky five years previously and now was a member of that state's legislature. While Breckinridge visited relatives in his former

county, Jefferson proposed the idea of introducing a resolution of protest to Kentucky's legislature, and Breckinridge agreed. Jefferson composed the Kentucky Resolutions and sent them to Breckinridge, who succeeded in getting the resolutions passed in late 1798. Following Jefferson's lead, Madison wrote the Virginia Resolution, consulting with Jefferson, and passed them on to John Taylor to introduce in the Virginia General Assembly.⁷¹ In the Kentucky Resolutions, Jefferson proclaimed that the Alien and Sedition Acts "are all together void and of no force, and that the power to create, define, and punish such other crimes is reserved...to the respective states." In questioning the legality of the acts, Jefferson aims a larger criticism at the federal Constitution and government, doubting their ability to speak for the whole of the American people and govern a still tenuous union of states. Madison, in more careful language, protested the acts' infringement of civil rights in the Virginia Resolution, also passed in 1798. Madison protested against "the palpable and alarming infractions of the constitution, in the two late cases of the 'alien and sedition acts'...which by uniting legislative and judicial powers, to those of executive, subverts the general principles of free government, as well as the particular organization and positive provisions of the federal constitution."⁷² Pointing salvos of criticism at the core of the government, the Constitution, the two Virginians reawakened echoes of Anti-Federalist sentiment questioning the validity and legality of the document, with Jefferson decrying the subjugation of the individual states to the national union. Despite Federalist efforts, less than fifty people were arrested under the acts and only half of those were prosecuted.⁷³ Nonetheless, the laws were kept on the books until after the election of 1800, despite the popular outcry against their use. Until they expired, Federalists enthusiastically approved of their usage, lessening their chances of success in future elections each time they did so. When a new majority and president were seated in 1801, both were happy to let the laws expire and fade away into the Congressional Record.⁷⁴

Soon, President Adams began to turn his attention to his reelection campaign. Unlike previous elections, campaigning had begun in earnest nearly a year beforehand. In November 1799, Abigail Adams remarked that "Electioneering is already begun" in Philadelphia.⁷⁵ By this time, campaign propaganda disseminated throughout the country by major newspapers who acted as the organs of both parties. The *Gazette of the United States* served as the voice of the Federalists, while the Republicans followed the *Aurora*, published by Benjamin Franklin's grandson, Benjamin Franklin Bache. The rise of these newspapers as party organs, along with other local newspapers, which followed the *Aurora* and the *Gazette* and tended to reprint items that they had published, greatly influenced popular opinion during the election season of 1800. Pamphleteers and editors of newspapers took great care in what they published in their papers, often selecting items that fit their party affiliation, and in this way alone, can be seen the rise of the press as a major influence in politics. The large circulation area and reach of newspapers at this time period allowed ideas to be spread quickly as a population of 3.8 million engaged in "newspaper sharing or group readings in public places."⁷⁶ As subscriptions grew, so did the number of publications. In 1790, there were 92 news publications; by 1800, that number had increased to 234 publications.⁷⁷ Without a doubt, this new medium--the newspaper--would prove to be a powerful tool in the next presidential election. The political faction that would most effectively use this apparatus would most definitely emerge the winner.

Both parties used the press differently. Federalists favored a strong, central government, one in which "those with an investment in society played the most important roles."⁷⁸

Federalists' use of the press was used as rallying point for their supporters and inherently was not favorable for gathering new partisans. A prime example of the Federalist view toward the press can be seen in the passage of the Sedition Act, envisioned as a law intended to stop, and further, prevent any dissention, rather to consider any new voices. Republicans instead embraced new voices. Phillip Freneau, a Republican editor, described their view: "Public opinion sets the bounds to every government, and is the sovereign of every free one."⁷⁹ The Republicans considered every voice, and encouraged the freedom of the press. Not only did the Sedition Act fail to silence the Republicans, it seemed to energize them, using their persecution as a rallying point, inducing even more people to take up their cause. Rather than Republican newspapers shuttering and dwindling, to the Federalists' dismay, the number of papers skyrocketed; in fact, by 1800 there would be "two-thirds more" Republican newspapers than there was before the Sedition Act.⁸⁰ Their attack on the institution of the press itself hampered, the Federalists still used their newspapers to rally support and influence opinion. Both parties tried their hand at the press during the upcoming election, and two letters stand out as major examples of each party's use of propaganda and personal attacks on the major candidates.

During the election, each party looked for opportunities to discredit the other side, especially the candidates for president. For the Federalists, looking to expose Jefferson as a radical, godless, Francophile, found their ammunition in the Mazzei letter. Never intended to be a public missive, Jefferson had written his friend Philip Mazzei, living in Florence, early in 1796 to discuss his last remainders of personal business left in America. A small section at the end of the letter caused uproar during the election season and would plague Jefferson through his campaign. Writing about the political scene back while in his solitude at Monticello, Jefferson wrote that the current government, full of officers "who prefer the calm of despotism to the boisterous sea of liberty," had sacrificed their virtues to the whims of the British. He went on to accuse those who had been instrumental during the Revolution, including Washington, had been lured away from the true sense of liberty, having their "heads shorn by the harlot England".⁸¹ In early 1797, a Parisian newspaper, the *Moniteur*, published the letter, and when Federalists learned of its existence four months later in April, Noah Webster's *Minerva* quickly published it as proof of Jefferson's radicalism. Many were appalled by Jefferson's brazen attack of the late Washington, still beloved as the father of the country. With the publication of the letter, Jefferson was depicted as a bloody revolutionary who intended to hand over America to Napoleon and the throes of anarchy. Federalists dubbed him the "Solomon of Jacobinism" and the "greatest villain in existence."⁸² Neither side minced words when it came to vilifying the opposing side, especially the Federalists. The *Gazette of the United States* compared both Adams' and Jefferson's virtues and found the latter's lacking. The newspaper first declared "Jacobinism...an association all that is bad in human nature, leagued against all that is good." To prove its point, it enumerated the "virtues" of each man; under Jefferson it included "Cunning", "Vice", "Atheism", "Mobocracy", and "Selfishness." These were juxtaposed against those listed under Adams: "Honesty", "Genius", "Liberty", and "Religion."⁸³ Along with these charges of his French leanings, questions arose about his seeming lack of religion, and whispers of relations with one of his female slaves.⁸⁴

On the Federalist side, Alexander Hamilton had split with Adams and began to urge his associates to support the other leading Federalist candidate, South Carolinian Charles Cotesworth Pinckney. The High Federalists had already abandoned Adams as their candidate, while more

moderate Federalists still defended the sitting president, citing his track record of exemplary service to the nation. A year before the election, John Marshall, then a fresh Congressman from Virginia, noted to his brother that many Federalists had designs "to desert him & to push some other candidate" most likely "one of the Pinckneys".⁸⁵ Adams had long been suspicious of Hamilton's meddling in his administration, and weary of the incompetence of the talking heads of McHenry, Pickering, and Wolcott, who only acted as spies for Hamilton. Finally in May 1800, Adams sent missives both to Pickering and Wolcott, asking for their resignations. McHenry responded; resigning one month later, and after no response from Pickering, Adams fired him in a letter two days later.⁸⁶ It was a move three years too late, but Hamilton's incessant meddling finally pushed him over the edge. Adams described Hamilton as "an intriguing-the greatest intriguing in the World-a man devoid of every moral principle-a Bastard" and an "insolent coxcomb who rarely dined in good company, where there was good wine, without getting silly and vamping about his administration like a young girl about her brilliants and trinkets."⁸⁷ Apart from Hamilton's machinations in Adams' administration, much of the enmity stemmed from a "clash of personalities" between the two. "Adams was stubbornly independent, and Hamilton tried to steer him. Adams had a strict sense of virtue concerning women; Hamilton did not."⁸⁸ With such opposite personalities, Adams and Hamilton clashed constantly on every issue.

By mid-May 1800, Hamilton's mind was made up. He could not support any longer the man he called as having "a very unfit and incapable character" for a second term in office. Writing to Theodore Sedgwick, he concluded that he would rather see the opposition in office than Adams:

I will never be responsible for him by my direct support-even though the consequence should be the election of *Jefferson*. If we must have an *enemy* at the head of Government, let it be one whom we can oppose & for whom we are not responsible, who will not involve our party in the disgrace of his foolish and bad measures. Under *Adams* as under *Jefferson* the government will sink.⁸⁹

To his associates, Hamilton began circulating the idea of writing a public letter denouncing Adams' candidacy. In the summer of 1800, he wrote to Wolcott that had "serious thoughts of giving to my public my opinion respecting Mr. Adams with my reasons in a letter to a friend with my signature." His friends advised him to not go forward with the letter or at least omit his name from the work. George Cabot counseled that he "may do better than to put your name to it" for it would "be converted to a new proof that you are a *dangerous* man."⁹⁰ Against the good recommendations of his friends, however, Hamilton persisted in writing the letter. When he had finished, his letter ran fifty-four pages in a biting diatribe against Adams. Published in October 1800, the *Letter from Alexander Hamilton, Concerning the Public Conduct and Character of John Adams, Esq., President of the United States* criticized Adams' public service record, claiming that the president had followed "a pattern of bad judgment and inability to persevere in a systematic plan of conduct."⁹¹ Hamilton summarized Adams' tenure as president as one of a "heterogeneous compound of right and wrong, of wisdom and error," and vilified Adams for his "misconduct" in office, including abuse of cabinet members and bungling the peace mission to France. Perplexingly, he ended his letter with the suggestion that Federalist electors should still vote for Adams and Pinckney.⁹² For a man usually regarded by his contemporaries as a brilliant statesman, Hamilton's *Letter* was his fatal miscalculation. Unleashing such a malicious attack on

a sitting president of his party amounted to political suicide.

By June of 1800, the new federal city of Washington had been culled from the swamps of southern Maryland, and ready to become the new seat of government for the nation. As a result of the dinner table bargain between Hamilton and Madison in 1790, Congress enacted a law designating a 100 square mile portion of Maryland straddling the Potomac River as the site of the new national capital. In the intermediate years, the area was surveyed by a team led by Andrew Ellicott and Benjamin Banneker, an African-American surveyor, and laid out in a plan devised by the French-born architect, Pierre L'Enfant. The city had gradually been constructed, and by 1800 it was ready to house the federal government. As each governmental department moved to the new capital, President Adams took an unusually circuitous route to the new city. Analysis of the journey afterward showed that he had done something unheard of for a sitting President—campaigning. At each town, large crowds gathered to see him and he, in return, gave a brief speech that varied little, but offered several strong reasons why he should be re-elected president.⁹³ In doing so, he made an impact on prospective voters in the election that was only months away and quite possibly became the first president to travel the countryside and give “stump speeches.” As Adams campaigned his way to Washington, Hamilton departed on a trip of his own, passing through New England in what many suspected to be a tour to garner support for Pinckney’s candidacy. Word reached Adams, who reported the happening to his son, Thomas. “Gen[eral] Hamilton has been on a tour through New England to persuade the people to choose electors who will give a unanimous vote for Gen[eral] Pinckney.” Perhaps disregarding his own campaigning, he considered Hamilton’s attempts “impudent and brazen faced”. Even with Hamilton trying to undermine his support, Adams remained optimistic, insisting that he would have “an unanimous vote in Massachusetts” but ceded Connecticut and New Jersey to Pinckney.⁹⁴ While the Federalists fought for every state against the Republicans, the internal battle that raged within the party between Adams and Hamilton threatened its existence, giving the Republicans the discord they needed to secure the presidency.

New York remained the most crucial state in the election process; it had been for years a stronghold of Federalist support. In a surprising result, the Republicans scored a coup, largely the work of Aaron Burr, a New Jersey-raised, young New York state assemblyman.⁹⁵ Interestingly enough, the Democratic-Republican path to victory began with the founding of a bank in 1799. Originally incorporated to supply New York with fresh water from the Bronx River, the Manhattan Company’s founders “believed that a plentiful supply of fresh water would prevent yellow fever” from decimating the city every few years.⁹⁶ Before the New York legislature approved the charter, Burr quietly inserted a clause in the pending charter allowing the company to use “its ‘surplus capital’ for other unnamed enterprises” while also enlarging its board of directors, placing Republicans in the new board seats.⁹⁷ Burr planned for this new bank to provide services to “middling sorts” of citizens such as merchants and tradesmen who were not wealthy enough to invest in the Federalist-controlled branches of the Bank of the United States and the Bank of New York.⁹⁸ Many of the bank’s first customers were Republicans, and many more became partisans as a result of the bank’s services. Moreover, the members on the board of the Manhattan Company helped to unite a divided Republican party from three factions into one. The board was “weighted to create a Republican majority, deliberately distributed representational parity to the leaders of the three major Republican factions in New York: the backers of George Clinton, Robert R. Livingston, and [Aaron] Burr.”⁹⁹ By ensuring each faction

a financial interest in the company, they had to work with one another by necessity, and in effect, made the board the New York Republican’s *de facto* executive committee. Already by April 1800, a month away from the New York election, Edward Livingston reported to Jefferson “all know and understand the principles of their deliverers—Burr is...zealous and will be active in his Exertions—on the whole I think every thing promises a favorable issue to our labors.”¹⁰⁰

Although the Bank of the Manhattan Company provided Burr with a rapidly developing base of probable Republican voters, it was his electioneering efforts that won the day for the Republicans. In most states, the electors were chosen by their respective state legislatures. New York’s twelve electoral votes depended on the outcome of the state assembly election in May of 1800. Burr knew that securing New York City would be the key to a Republican majority in the state assembly. He began developing a plan based off of his experience in the Continental Army in the Revolution. Burr “dispatched his staff to collect data, and profiled the city’s voters in terms of partisan allegiance. He knew which Republicans would contribute money, who would volunteer their time at the polls, and who could only be counted on to vote.”¹⁰¹ A Federalist newspaper later lamented that their opposition had “discriminated throughout this city, between their partisans, and those opposed to them, and they soon knew to a man the name of every doubtful character.”¹⁰² Furthermore, Burr focused on the organization of the party in urban areas, making sure each city ward had a party representative in. In the selection of his candidates, he was circumspect: each man had either a national reputation or was a solid businessman that Burr knew well. As the election neared, Burr’s home became the Republicans campaign headquarters: “committees were in session day and night during the whole time at his house. Refreshments were always on the table, and mattresses were set up for temporary repose in the rooms.”¹⁰³ Burr’s innovative election methods paid off; in the end, all 13 assembly seats that were up for election were filled by Republicans, giving the party a majority in the assembly, and most importantly, the state’s electoral votes. As the state election season wore on, the count of electors revealed a dead heat for both parties. The last electoral contest of the season, South Carolina, would turn out to be the most decisive, as the results gave the Republicans a slight advantage going into December. On the eve of the election, Jefferson astutely commented that “the issue of the election hangs on S[outh] Carol[in]a.”¹⁰⁴

On December 3rd, the appointed electors from each state met in their respective capitals and submitted their votes for President of the United States. Although the exact results were not known for several weeks afterward, letters and rumors exchanged between associates, and soon the unofficial results became known amongst the candidates.¹⁰⁵ By December 21st, Jefferson had “tolerably well ascertained” that the vote put the Republicans into the presidency “probably of 73 to 65”, however, he had a feeling that the two Republican candidates—Burr and himself—were “even between themselves.”¹⁰⁶ Jefferson was correct, the total was indeed seventy-three votes, but it was also as he feared—both Burr and he each had received the seventy-three votes. As per the Constitution, each elector had two votes that they cast in the presidential decision. One vote would be cast for the president and the second would be cast for the other candidate of the party, understood to be the Vice President. On the Federalist side, Adams and Pinckney received nearly equal numbers of votes (Adams received 65 to Pinckney’s 64), but one elector from Rhode Island had thrown away his vote to John Jay to ensure a differential between Adams and Pinckney. The opposite occurred for the Republicans, as each delegate voted once for Jefferson and once for Burr, allowing a tie at seventy-three votes apiece for the two candidates. A

fundamental flaw in the Electoral College had been exposed, and the nation suddenly had an election crisis on its hands.

Although the vote had not been verified, rumors of the tie had been widely disseminated and confirmed among friends in private. According to the Constitution, a tie in the Electoral College meant that the matter was to be resolved by a vote of the House of Representatives on the determined date. Each state was allotted one vote, with a majority deciding the election. Both parties began to work separately to resolve the tie. On the Republicans' side, Jefferson corresponded with Aaron Burr and tried to persuade him to concede the presidency, possibly implying that he would offer him greater powers as Vice President. In reply, Burr responded positively, saying that he "will cheerfully abandon the office of V[ice] P[re]sident if it shall be thought that I can be more useful in any Active station."¹⁰⁷ The Federalists, much to the chagrin of Jefferson and the Republicans, also had plans to engineer the presidency to their favor. With the House of Representatives firmly in the hands of the Federalists, they began to plot on how they could play the role of spoiler or even legislate one of their own into the office. On the 19th of December, Gouverneur Morris, a Federalist senator from New York, wrote to Hamilton concerning a plan that would give the presidency to a member of the Federalist-controlled senate. Morris wrote that the plan had advanced in discussion that "it even went so far as to cast about for the person" to fill the role.¹⁰⁸ While nothing ever proceeded with the plans from either spectrum, in this intrigue the joint session of Congress was called to order on February 11th, 1801.

With the issue of the election given to the House of Representatives, Federalists, though they had not elected their candidate to the Presidency, they felt they still could affect the result of the election by barring Jefferson from office. Prominent Federalists began to extol Burr's virtues over Jefferson's vices, emphasizing Burr's military record and masculinity. The *Philadelphia Gazette* compared Jefferson and Burr, preferring the New Yorker:

He never *penned* a declaration of independence I admit—but he has, *engraved that declaration in capitals* with the point of his sword—it is yet legible on the walls of Quebec. He has *fought* for that independence, for which Mr. Jefferson only *wrote*. He has gallantly exposed his life in support of that declaration, and for the protection of its *penn-man*; He has been *liberal of his blood*, while Mr. Jefferson has only *hazarded his ink*.¹⁰⁹

While his fellow Federalists were planning to elevate Burr to the highest office in the land, Alexander Hamilton remained bitterly opposed to Burr as President. In the two months before the results were unsealed, he began a furious letter-writing campaign to dissuade his Federalist friends from supporting Burr. Consistently, he informed them of Burr's character: Burr loves nothing but himself...He is sanguine enough to hope every thing—daring enough attempt every thing—wicked enough to scruple nothing.¹¹⁰ It is not known how much Hamilton accomplished with his letter writing campaign, but nonetheless, the majority of the Federalists planned to stop Jefferson from becoming president by making Aaron Burr their man.

Thomas Jefferson, the President of the Senate, called both houses of Congress to order in the Senate chambers of the unfinished capitol and quickly commenced with the primary business

of the day—certifying the Presidential election results. Discounting Georgia's ballots due to a disqualifying technicality, Jefferson quickly and precisely counted the states' ballots, reading aloud each result after they had been tallied. A tie remained between Jefferson and Burr with seventy-three votes apiece. The events continued: "The two Houses then separated; and the House of Representatives, being returned to their chamber, proceeded, in the manner prescribed by the Constitution, to the choice of a President of the United States."¹¹¹ At the first ballot, members of both parties toed the party line, Republicans voting primarily for Jefferson, and the Federalists for Burr, ensuring that the tie held. A second ballot was taken and the gridlock still remained. On the first day of voting, a total of nineteen ballots were taken, and still the Federalists did not budge in their determination. The House of Representatives continued their balloting until the end of the week, whereupon a total of thirty-three votes had been taken, each of the same result.¹¹² The nation was wholly engrossed in the proceedings in the capital; daily reports of the proceedings were taken by correspondents for numerous newspapers across the country. Newspapers looked for any insight into the proceedings. One newspaper reprinted a letter a Federalist Congressman had sent to a friend who lived in his hometown. The unnamed Congressman reported to his acquaintance that

both sides at present appear inflexible. The issue of the election, on the federal side, is in the hands of Mr. Morris of Vermont, Mr. Bayard of Delaware, and Messrs. Craik, Baer, Thomas, and Lennis of Maryland; in all of whom we think we can place unlimited confidence; but the accidental absence of any therein, except Bayard, may be decisive against us, each of the others commanding or rather holding divided, a state. I don't know but the other side have equal ground of confidence in those, who can dispose of States now voting for Mr. Jefferson.

The Congressman assured his friend that the Federalists were determined to elect "Burr or [else] no President," and that any problems encountered in this plan should be blamed upon the Republicans.¹¹³ His letter presents a grim view of the outcome of the election, one of an unbreakable deadlock that could potentially threaten the future of the Union. The *New York Daily Advertiser* lamented that the deadlock commenced one of "the most solemn eras which have existed in the annals of our country" and that the "confidence" of the people "stands appalled at the dangers which threaten the peace of society, and the existence of the constitution."¹¹⁴ Neither party desired see the nation fail, but a divided Congress had reached an impasse with the reality of a leaderless nation waiting on the horizon.

On no one's mind did this possibility of a failed nation hang heavier than on the sole representative from Delaware, Federalist James Bayard, recently re-elected to his third term. As one of the smallest states in the union, Delaware's existence as a viable state depended on the continuation of the United States. Bayard decided that he could be the tiebreaker in this embittered stalemate. He decided that if he could meet with Jefferson, he could arrange a bargain, using his vote as leverage. He sought out John Nicholas, a Virginian Republican and a close friend of Jefferson, and proposed a deal: if Jefferson would agree to pursue several Federalist policies as president, he would withhold his vote, allowing Jefferson to win the majority. Nicholas agreed in principle to these terms and would "vouch for Jefferson's acceptance."¹¹⁵ Although it was not clear if Jefferson was informed of this plan, Bayard proceeded with the brokered deal nonetheless. When the thirty-sixth ballot was collected on

February 17th, the deadlock had been broken. The *Annals of Congress* describes the subsequent action:

The Speaker declared to the House that the votes of ten States had been given for Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia; the votes of four States for Aaron Burr, of New York; and that the votes of two States had been given in blank; and that, consequently, Thomas Jefferson, of Virginia, had been, agreeably to the Constitution, elected President of the United States.¹¹⁶

As the result travelled through the nation, Republicans celebrated their triumph. A newspaper in Wilmington, Delaware reported the Republicans' exuberance: "Joy beamed from the countenance of every real Republican, and friend of his country. In the evening a multitude assembled and paraded the streets with lighted candles, and firing cannons. Many houses were illuminated, and made a most brilliant appearance."¹¹⁷ The most divisive presidential contest to date had been decided to the benefit of Jefferson, now the Third President of the United States, and to the delight of the Republicans, but to the horror of the Federalists, who had self-destructed at the highest level of their party leadership.

In his inaugural speech, Jefferson proclaimed that "we are all Federalists; we are all Republicans;" however, with the close of the election, the time was past for reconciliation.¹¹⁸ America was no longer a one-party state, but had developed into a genuine two-party system. Republicans and Federalists had clashed over the future of America, each with its own vision of the future. The victorious Republicans strived to implement their idea of a Democratic republic, led by President Jefferson, while the Federalists now found themselves in the opposition, struggling to recapture the glory they achieved during the Quasi-War with France. They had lost the executive branch and struggled to maintain their hold on Congress, but they luckily found themselves firmly entrenched in the judicial branch. John Marshall, a staunch Federalist, had been appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in the last few months of Adams' presidency. Marshall, one of the most influential justices to serve on the Court, would prove to be a veritable thorn in the side of all Republicans until his death in 1835. Losing influence in the South and Middle States, the Federalists leaned on their strong New England base for support, but the tide began to change even in the most stalwart Federalist strongholds. Even Massachusetts, Adams' home state, had a Republican governor by 1810.

The Republicans achieved victory in 1800 by mobilizing everyday people and utilizing the press as useful propaganda. Newspapers served to inform the public and more specifically, a party's partisans, hoping to either rally their support or incite a reaction against their opposition. The Republican papers highlighted the Federalists' bumbling efforts of manipulating popular opinion and the schism of the party entering the election. The success of the Republicans rested on combining all of these novel practices in a way that adhered to the ideals of the party. The combination of these elements in a Republican political culture proved to be an unstoppable force for the Federalists.

Several years after the election, the Federalists realized they were losing ground, and tried to emulate the Republicans' success. One such appeal in 1801, given by Theodore Dwight, entreated the Federalists to admit their defeat and to embrace the Republicans' winning methods.

Dwight beseeched his fellow Federalists to "profit from the lessons which the Jacobins have taught us." The New Englander continued:

We have seen a vicious combination, composed of the most discordant materials, agreeing to bury their individual, and separate interests, and passions, and uniting, with one heart, and hand, to forward by every mean, and at all hazards, the general plans of the party. We have also seen them succeed. That government, which the collected wisdom, virtue and patriotism of the United States originally planned...is adrift, without helm or compass, in a turbid and boisterous ocean. To be prepared against the hour of its shipwreck, or bring it back in safety to its wonted haven, the Federalist party must also unite, be watchful, and active...They must move in a firm, compact, and formidable phalanx, which no common force can resist, & no ordinary danger intimidate.¹¹⁹

By this juncture, many Federalists had decided that it was time to radically change the party's methods, or face the specter of irrelevancy. Although attempts were made to stop the bleeding, the party slowly and increasingly lost influence, and eventually dying by the end of the 1810s.

The greatest impact of the election was its engagement of the ordinary citizen. Media proliferation had an immediate impact on the polls. In several states, the number of voters substantially increased from the two previous presidential elections, with the increase coming in favor of the Republicans.¹²⁰ The victory of the Republicans and the decline of the Federalists, ensuring a gradual trend towards the democratization of the political process, opened up opportunities for popular involvement where everyday citizens had previously been barred. Innovations that the Republicans developed and utilized during the election quickly became mainstays of the nation's maturing political system.

Although claimed by the Republicans as a second revolution, the immediate results of the Election of 1800 proved less than "revolutionary". Only a few changes were made with the Republicans in power; they did not radically change the Constitution nor make extraordinary reforms to the way the government was run. With the exception of the 12th Amendment, which specified that presidential electors had to designate one vote for President and one for Vice President, a necessity due to the deadlock of the latest election, the Republicans made no significant changes. The Federalists later joked that all the "revolutionary" Republicans had done was cut the budget and taxes.¹²¹ Jefferson's "revolution" was largely political rather than structural. Although the Republicans used slight hyperbole in defining their victory, a change had indeed occurred, but not in the halls of government, but with the American people.

The Election of 1800 had a lasting impact on American political and cultural structures. It institutionalized the two-party system, so feared by Washington, but in doing so, guaranteed that people could have differences of opinion and not fear reprisals. Two ideologically distinct parties dragged each other through the proverbial mud, and the nation did not fall asunder. Media matured, and eventually secured its position in the culture of the American political establishment. Most importantly, the election proved that the Federal Constitution could endure one of the most licentious contests of its day and halt secession from the Union. Ultimately, the "revolution of 1800" was not so much a revolution, but rather, a groundbreaking evolution in the

American political system.

NOTES

- ¹ John Ferling, *John Adams: A Life* (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1992), 170.
- ² When Adams was born, England was still using the Julian calendar. Thus Adams was born on October 19th, but his birth date was later changed to the 30th when England switched to the Gregorian calendar, due to the differences in the numbering of the two calendar styles. David McCullough, *John Adams* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2001.), 30-31. Ferling, *John Adams*, 10-11.
- ³ McCullough, 30. James Grant, *John Adams: Party of One* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005.), 20.
- ⁴ Grant, 44.
- ⁵ McCullough, 57.
- ⁶ Joseph J. Ellis, *Passionate Sage: The Character and Legacy of John Adams* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001.), 89.
- ⁷ Ferling, *John Adams*, 82.
- ⁸ Ferling, *John Adams*, 169.
- ⁹ Ferling, *John Adams*, 129.
- ¹⁰ Merrill D. Peterson, *Thomas Jefferson and the New Nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970.), 8-9.
- ¹¹ Peterson, 12.
- ¹² Jefferson to Robert Skipwith, 3 August 1771, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*. Julian P. Boyd, et al, eds (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950-), 1:78.
- ¹³ L.H. Butterfield, ed. *Diary and Autobiography of John Adams*, The Adams Papers. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961.), 3:335-36.
- ¹⁴ Jon Kukla, *Mr. Jefferson's Women*. (New York: Alfred E. Knopf, 2007.), 84.
- ¹⁵ Peterson, 331.
- ¹⁶ Peterson, 360.
- ¹⁷ Peterson, 392-393.
- ¹⁸ Ron Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton*. (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 17. Richard Brookhiser, *Alexander Hamilton: American*. (New York: The Free Press, 1999), 14-16. Jacob E. Cooke, *Alexander Hamilton*. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1982.), 2.
- ¹⁹ Chernow, 29.
- ²⁰ Chernow, 72-73.
- ²¹ Chernow, 83, 85. Broadus Mitchell, *Alexander Hamilton: Youth to Maturity 1755-1788* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957.), 92.
- ²² E. James Ferguson, *The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1961.), 136.
- ²³ Ferguson, 143.
- ²⁴ John C. Miller, *The Federalist Era, 1789-1801*. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960.), 100.
- ²⁵ Ferling, *The First of Men: A Life of George Washington*. (Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1988.), 420.
- ²⁶ Ralph Ketcham, *James Madison: A Biography*. (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1990.), 10.
- ²⁷ Ketcham, 29-30.
- ²⁸ Ketcham, 34, 37.
- ²⁹ Ketcham, 63.
- ³⁰ Madison, quoted in Drew R. McCoy, *The Last of the Fathers: James Madison and the Republican Legacy*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.), 45.
- ³¹ Gordon S. Wood, *Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different*. (New York: The Penguin Press, 2006.), 145.
- ³² Lance Banning, *The Sacred Fire of Liberty: James Madison and the Founding of the Federal Republic*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.), 13.
- ³³ Banning, *The Jeffersonian Republicans: Evolution of a Party Ideology*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978.), 105.
- ³⁴ Banning, *The Jeffersonian Republicans*, 109.

- ³⁵ Banning, *The Jeffersonian Republicans*, 113.
- ³⁶ Chernow, 297, 302.
- ³⁷ Madison's speech can be found in *Annals of Congress*, 1st Cong. 2nd Sess., 1233-1237.
- ³⁸ Jefferson, [Memorandum], 1792, *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 17:205-7.
- ³⁹ Ketcham, 309.
- ⁴⁰ "For the *National Gazette*. Parties" Published in the *National Gazette* 23 January 1792. *The Papers of James Madison*, J. C. A. Stagg, et al, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962-1977 and Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1977-1991), 14:197.
- ⁴¹ "For the *National Gazette*. A Candid State of Parties." Published in the *National Gazette* 22 September 1792. *Papers of James Madison*, 14:372, 371.
- ⁴² "For the *National Gazette*. The Union--Who Are Its Real Friends?" Published in the *National Gazette* 31 March 1792. *Papers of James Madison*, 14: 274.
- ⁴³ Jefferson to James Monroe, 26 May 1795. *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 28:359.
- ⁴⁴ Jefferson to James Madison, 3 April 1794. *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 28:50.
- ⁴⁵ Jefferson to Horatio Gates, 3 February 1794. *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 28:14.
- ⁴⁶ Ellis, *American Sphinx: The Character of Thomas Jefferson* (New York: Vintage Books, 1998.), 182.
- ⁴⁷ Ellis, *American Sphinx*, 145.
- ⁴⁸ Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson: The Tumultuous Election of 1800*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004.), 69-70.
- ⁴⁹ Jefferson to Madison, 6 March 1796. *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 29:7.
- ⁵⁰ Susan Dunn, *Jefferson's Second Revolution: The Election Crisis of 1800 and the Triumph of Republicanism*. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2004.), 78-79.
- ⁵¹ Edward J. Larson, *A Magnificent Catastrophe: The Tumultuous Election of 1800, America's First Presidential Campaign*. (New York: Free Press, 2007.), 31.
- ⁵² Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*, 87. Larson, 31.
- ⁵³ *Annals of Congress*, 5th Cong., Special Sess. No. 1, 1584.
- ⁵⁴ Ellis, *American Sphinx*, xv.
- ⁵⁵ The last letter between the two for sixteen years was a letter Adams wrote to Jefferson, dated 6 April 1796, *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 29:58. Benjamin Rush and Abigail Adams are credited as the catalysts who helped rekindle their friendship in 1812.
- ⁵⁶ Jefferson to Madison, 22 January 1797. *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 29:271.
- ⁵⁷ Chernow, 523.
- ⁵⁸ Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*, 96-97.
- ⁵⁹ Stanley Elkins and Eric McKittrick, *The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788-1800* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.), 529.
- ⁶⁰ Elkins and McKittrick, 562.
- ⁶¹ James Morton Smith, ed. *The Republic of Letters: The Correspondence between Thomas Jefferson and James Madison 1776-1826*. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995.), 2:1000.
- ⁶² The French agents were later revealed as: X-Jean Conrad Hottinguer, Y-Pierre Bellamy, Z-Lucien Hauteval.
- ⁶³ Abigail Adams to Cotton Tufts, 25 May 1798, in McCullough, 497.
- ⁶⁴ Fisher Ames to Christopher Gore, 28 July 1798. *Works of Fisher Ames*. William B. Allen and Seth Ames, eds. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1983), 2:1293.
- ⁶⁵ Alexander Hamilton to Timothy Pickering, 27 March 1798. *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, Harold C. Syrett, et al., eds. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-1987.), 21:81-84.
- ⁶⁶ Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*, 109.
- ⁶⁷ Dunn, 98. Larson, 34.
- ⁶⁸ Sedgwick to -----, 7 March 1798, quoted in James Morton Smith, *Freedom's Fetters: The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties*. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1966.), 21.
- ⁶⁹ Smith, *Freedom's Fetters*, 95.
- ⁷⁰ Jefferson to Madison, 7 June 1798. *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 29:393.
- ⁷¹ Smith, *The Republic of Letters*, 2:1068, 1070.
- ⁷² "The Kentucky Resolutions of 1798," *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 30:550. "Virginia Resolutions," *Papers of James Madison*, 17:189.
- ⁷³ Dunn, 112.

⁷⁴ The lone exception is the Alien Enemies Act, which remains on the books to this day.

⁷⁵ Abigail Adams to Mary Cranch, 26 November 1799 *New Letters of Abigail Adams, 1788-1801*, Stewart Mitchell, ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1947.), 217

⁷⁶ Joanne B. Freeman, *Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic*. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001.), 124.

⁷⁷ Carol Sue Humphreys, *The Press of the Young Republic: 1783-1833*. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996.), 42.

⁷⁸ Humphreys, 42

⁷⁹ Philadelphia *National Gazette*, 19 December, 1791, quoted in Humphreys, 42.

⁸⁰ Jeffrey L. Pasley, "The Tyranny of Printers": *Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2001.), 105, 126.

⁸¹ Jefferson to Philip Mazzei, 24 April 1796. *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 29-82.

⁸² Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*, 153.

⁸³ *Gazette of the United States* (Philadelphia, PA), 8 January, 1801.

⁸⁴ Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*, 153, 156. Jefferson's relations with one of his female slaves, Sally Hemings, and his paternity of at least one of her children, and likely all of them has been all but confirmed by DNA testing. At the time of the election, the relationship was limited to parlor room gossip and rumor, and was not until 1802 that James T. Callendar accused Jefferson of the act in the *Richmond Recorder*. For more information, see Annette Gordon-Reed, *Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings: An American Controversy* (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1997.) and Eugene A. Foster, et al., "Jefferson Fathered Slave's Last Child," *Nature* 396: 27-28.

⁸⁵ John Marshall to James Markham Marshall, 16 December 1799 *Papers of John Marshall*. Charles T. Cullen, et al, eds. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1974-2006), 4:44-45.

⁸⁶ John Adams to Timothy Pickering, 10 May 1800 and 12 May 1800. Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 120.

⁸⁷ James McHenry to John Adams, 31 May 1800, enclosed in McHenry to Alexander Hamilton, 2 June 1800. *Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, 24:557. John Adams to Benjamin Rush, 25 January 1806, in *The Spur of Fame: Dialogues of John Adams and Benjamin Rush, 1805-1813*, John A. Schutz and Douglass Adair, eds. (San Marino, CA: Huntington Library, 1966.), 48

⁸⁸ Freeman, 106.

⁸⁹ Hamilton to Theodore Sedgwick, 10 May 1800. *Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, 24:475. Emphasis is author's.

⁹⁰ Hamilton to Oliver Wolcott, 3 August 1800. George Cabot to Hamilton, 21 August 1800 *Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, 25:54, 75.

⁹¹ Larson, 216.

⁹² Hamilton, *Letter from Alexander Hamilton, Concerning the Public Conduct and Character of John Adams, Esq., President of the United States*, in *Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, 25:204.

⁹³ Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*, 137. Larson, 141-142.

⁹⁴ John Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, 14 July 1800. Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Reel 120.

⁹⁵ Larson, 87.

⁹⁶ Nancy Isenberg, *Fallen Founder: The Life of Aaron Burr*. (New York: Penguin Books, 2007.), 183-184. Brian Phillips Murphy, "A very convenient instrument": The Manhattan Company, Aaron Burr, and the Election of 1800 " *The William and Mary Quarterly* 65 (2008): 234

⁹⁷ Isenberg, 185. Murphy, *Ibid*.

⁹⁸ Isenberg, 183.

⁹⁹ Murphy, 235-236.

¹⁰⁰ Edward Livingston to Jefferson, 11 April, 1800. *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 31: 495

¹⁰¹ Isenberg, 197.

¹⁰² "Letter by Portius", *New York Commercial Advertiser*, 4 May, 1800.

¹⁰³ Isenberg, 199.

¹⁰⁴ Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph, 30 November 1800. *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 32:263

¹⁰⁵ The official results would only become known when the ballots were opened and counted on February 11th, the date appointed by the Constitution.

¹⁰⁶ Jefferson to Caesar A. Rodney, 21 December 1800 *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 32:336.

¹⁰⁷ Jefferson to Aaron Burr, 15 December 1800, *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, 32:307. Burr to Jefferson, 23 December 1800, *Political Correspondence and Public Papers of Aaron Burr*, ed. Mary-Jo Kline, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.), 1:474

¹⁰⁸ Gouverneur Morris to Hamilton, 19 December 1800. *Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, 25:267.

¹⁰⁹ "Of Burr and Jefferson." *Philadelphia Gazette* 12 February, 1801. Emphasis has been retained from the original article.

¹¹⁰ Hamilton to Gouverneur Morris, 24 December, 1800. *Papers of Alexander Hamilton*, 25:272. Wood, 241.

¹¹¹ *Annals of Congress*, 6th Cong., 2nd sess., 1024

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 2025-2028.

¹¹³ "Extract of a letter from a member of Congress to his friend in this town, dated February 12, 1801."

Newburyport Herald (Newburyport, MA), 24 February, 1801. Emphasis has been retained from the original article.

¹¹⁴ *New York Daily Advertiser* (New York, NY), 21 February, 1801.

¹¹⁵ Ferling, *Adams vs. Jefferson*, 190

¹¹⁶ *Annals of Congress*, 6th Cong., 2nd Sess., 2028.

¹¹⁷ *Mirror of the Times General Advertiser* [Wilmington, DE], 21 February, 1801

¹¹⁸ Thomas Jefferson, *First Inaugural Address*. <http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=JefAddr.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part=2&divison=div1>, 493.

¹¹⁹ Theodore Dwight, *An Oration Delivered at New-Haven on the 7th of July, A.D. 1801 before the Society of the Cincinnati for the State of Connecticut. Assembled to Celebrate the Anniversary of American Independence* (Hartford, CT, 1801.), 5.

¹²⁰ Pasley, "1800 as a Revolution in Political Culture: Newspapers, Celebrations, Voting, and Democratization in the Early Republic," James Horn, Jan Lewis, and Peter Onuf, eds. *The Revolution of 1800: Race, Democracy, and the New Republic*. (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2002.), 148. *A New Nation Votes: American Election Returns 1787-1825*. Based on Information Compiled by Phillip Lampi. http://elections.lib.tufts.edu/aas_portal/index.xq

¹²¹ Pasley, "1800 as a Revolution in Political Culture", 121

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