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Preface

Consisting entirely of student material the Loyola University Student Historical Journal serves a dual purpose: to encourage the pursuit of historical scholarship among student contributors and to share the results of student analyses and investigations with the readers.

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Judah Touro: His Contribution to New Orleans

Susan Ducote

When twenty-seven year old Judah Touro arrived from Boston in 1802, New Orleans was a town of about 8,000 people. It had just been transferred from Spain to France and was quite unlike the comfortable and cultured Boston to which Touro had been accustomed. In spite of its lack of luxury, New Orleans held great potential for Touro; and he decided to make the port city his home.¹

Touro, the son of a Rhode Island rabbi, had been orphaned at the age of twelve and was raised by an uncle in Boston. Judah fell in with his cousin Catherine, so the uncle had him sent away often on business trips. Judah decided he would raise a great fortune then return to marry Catherine someday (which he never did). He saw New Orleans as a good prospect for success?

Touro was known as a hard-working person of ability and integrity. During his first year in New Orleans, he opened a small store that sold Boston codfish, Maine potatoes, and New England rum. His success was phenomenal from the start. Business relations with New England increased, and the purchase of Louisiana by the United States in 1803 opened up endless commercial advantages?

The Louisiana Purchase resulted in a large immigration of American merchants to New Orleans, and it soon became the center of cotton and sugar trade as well as trade in grain and tobacco. The population of New Orleans had tripled in seven years since Touro's arrival and amounted to nearly 25,000 in 1810.²

Wealth had been pouring in fast on Touro, so that even before 1812 he had gained a comfortable fortune. As his business expanded, Touro became an extensive shipowner, as well as an investor in many banking enterprises. Touro invested in properties and buildings which he bought and developed. Confident in the future of New Orleans, he purchased lot after lot, virtually all in the commercial center of the city, paid cash, erected buildings, and collected rents.

Touro was soon considered one of the leading citizens of the town, known for his interest in civic and philanthropic movements. In 1804, he joined one hundred and forty of the leading citizens of New Orleans in congratulating Governor Claiborne and General

James Wilkinson on the discovery of the Aaron Burr plot. Later, Touro petitioned the governor to re-appoint a sheriff who had been removed from office during the Burr conspiracy. In 1812 and 1813, Touro was elected to the board of directors of the Bank of New Orleans. He also served on a special grand jury which submitted strong presentments on such important subjects as pirates, smuggling, and the neglect of patients in a local marine hospital.³

The Battle of New Orleans seems to have drawn a veil over Touro's willingness or ability to participate in political activities. During the Battle, Touro, who was very patriotic, served as an ammunition carrier for the Louisiana Militia. In the height of the conflict, a British cannonball smashed into his thigh, and Touro was left to die on the battlefield. But a friend, Rezin Shepherd, risking the charge of desertion, carried Touro off to New Orleans for medical help. This action strengthened the close friendship that continued without interruption throughout the lives of both.⁴ Touro was so grateful to Shepherd that in his will he appointed him "the universal legatee of the rest and residue of my estate," identifying Shepherd as "my dear, old and devoted friend...to whom under Divine Providence, I was greatly indebted for the preservation of my life when I was wounded on the First of January, 1815."⁵

After his accident, Touro lived an almost cloistered life. But he repeatedly showed his public spirit by assisting civic and patriotic movements whenever these were brought to his attention, both in New Orleans and elsewhere. He contributed the needed money to complete construction on the Bunker Hill Monument in Boston, and toward numerous other monuments and charities around the country.⁶

In 1824, a small group of prominent citizens of New Orleans formed a Free Library Society for the purpose of "extending knowledge among the inhabitants of the city." Judah Touro at once offered any help or money needed. The library became known as the Touro Free Library of New Orleans, and for several years it continued to be the only public library in the city.⁷

One of the leading citizens with whom Touro worked in organizing the free library was Reverend Theodore Clapp, pastor of the First Congregational Unitarian Church of New Orleans. When the church suddenly came in danger of being sold to pay off debts, Touro bought it and let the congregation use it without charge. He also gave Clapp thousands of dollars over the years to keep up the church.⁸ In his autobiography, Clapp wrote of Touro's help in that time of need: "...we were few, feeble, impoverished, bankrupt. A noble Israelite snatched us from the jaws of destruction.... Is there a Christian society in New Orleans that has ever offered to help us?"⁹

During one of the yellow fever epidemics in New Orleans Touro established a hospital and put in charge a young physician, Dr. Joseph

Bensadon of Charleston. The institution soon became known as Touro Infirmary. In 1852, Touro purchased a large estate and had its buildings remodeled for hospital purposes. He placed the buildings at the disposal of the Touro Infirmary, to exist as a "nonsectarian institution." In 1869, the Touro Infirmary moved to its present location with the aid of money willed to it by Touro.¹²

Though his gifts were many, Touro's personal wants were few. A characteristic story told is about a day when Touro had his clerk buy him a coat. On the same day, his friend Nathan came to visit with a similar coat. Touro asked how much Nathan had paid for it and found it was bought for \$2 cheaper at D. H. Holmes. Touro then had his clerk return the coat in exchange for the less expensive one from Holmes. On the same day he wrote out a check for \$5,000 to the victims of a fire in Mobile, without being called upon to do so.¹³

In the summer of 1846, the Congregation Dispersed of Judah, a group of Spanish and Portuguese Jews, was organizing in New Orleans. For aid, the group turned to Judah Touro, who gave them the Christ Church building at the corner of Canal and Bourbon Streets. The year before, Touro had traded some other property he owned on Canal Street to the Christ Church congregation. He paid thousands of dollars to have the church converted to a synagogue. Touro lived in the old rectory of Christ Church, so whenever the new congregation needed anything, Judah Touro was always on hand to freely give it. (In 1881, the Congregation Dispersed of Judah merged with Congregation Gates of Mercy, a group of French, German, and Spanish merchants, and in the early 1900's the union moved to its present location on St. Charles Avenue and adopted the name Touro Synagogue.)

At the same time, the Congregation Gates of Mercy was building a new synagogue on North Rampart Street, and Touro contributed much to it. Saint Louis Cathedral was also being rebuilt; Touro bought ten percent of its bonds. Seeing the need for improvement of New Orleans' principal thoroughfare, Touro contributed heavily toward the beautification of Canal Street. He also made donations to the University of Louisiana, which later became Tulane University.¹⁴

Another aspect of Touro's philanthropic way of life was his aversion to slavery. Even though living in the heart of the South, he is said to have frequently purchased Negro slaves for the sole purpose of liberating them. Slaves whom he had bought to work for him would receive their freedom; and, in several instances, Touro set up businesses for them.¹⁵

When he died, in 1854, Judah Touro left a most remarkable will. A large portion of his estate went to Christian and Jewish congregations in New Orleans. The will also contained bequests to practically every synagogue and Jewish charitable institution existing in the United States at the time. But more than half of his estate was

devoted to Jewish, Christian, and nonsectarian charities in New Orleans, such as the Hebrew Benevolent Association of New Orleans, the Hebrew Foreign Mission Society, Saint Anna's Home for Destitute Females, Saint Mary's Catholic Home for Boys, Milne Boy's Home, Fireman's Charitable Association of New Orleans, and the Seamen's Home of New Orleans, to name a few.¹⁶

But Judah Touro's contribution cannot be enumerated solely by his monetary gifts. Touro was a good, industrious citizen of New Orleans. To his friends he offered dogged loyalty, and in an activity-frenzied city of high fashion and speculation, he lived a quiet, sober, and moral life. Though he gave much, Judah Touro's fine personal qualities should not be overshadowed by the amount of his bequests.¹⁷

NOTES

¹Bertram W. Korn, *The Early Jews of New Orleans*, (Waltham, Massachusetts: The American Jewish Historical Society, 1969) pp. 76-77.

²Eleanor Early, *New Orleans Holiday*, (New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1947) pp. 177-178.

³Leon Huhner, *The Life of Judah Touro*, (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society of America, 1946) p. 38.

⁴Huhner, p. 43

⁵Korn, pp. 83-84

⁶Huhner, pp. 60-61

⁷From the will of Judah Touro, in Huhner, pp. 129-139

⁸Korn, pp. 87-88

⁹Henry Rightor, *The Standard History of New Orleans*, (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1900)

¹⁰Huhner, p. 69

¹¹Theodore Clapp, *Autobiographical Sketches and Recollections During a 35 Years' Residence in New Orleans*, (Boston: Phillips, Sampson, and Company, 1858) p. 69

¹²Huhner, pp. 71-72

¹³The New Orleans Press, *Historical Sketchbook of New Orleans*, publ. 1885, p. 305

¹⁴Huhner, pp. 75, 88-93

¹⁵Korn, pp. 88-89

¹⁶From the will of Judah Touro, in Huhner, pp. 129-139

¹⁷Korn, p. 90

Alfred Emmanuel Smith: Reformer to Reactionary?

Jeannine A. Eckholdt

The 1920's in American history marked a time of peace and prosperity which was to drift gradually into the greatest of economic disasters with all of its repercussions in the political and social spheres. One politician, Alfred Emmanuel Smith was to emerge in this "riches to rags" saga of the American people in quite a startling fashion. Smith was the living representation of the American Dream; a grandson of Catholic immigrants, born and raised in a shabby Irish neighborhood in Manhattan's decaying Lower East Side, he was able to transcend the limitations of a fish-market education to serve four successful terms as governor of New York and to obtain the Democratic presidential nomination of 1928! Also unique was his own personal record: progressive in the 20's while Republican prosperity preached a lethargic role for government and anti-New Deal in a decade where the populace clung desperately to its savior, Franklin Delano Roosevelt. In this seeming political regression, was Smith just demonstrating bitterness after defeat? This appears to be too simplistic for such a dramatic occurrence. Enigmatic as it may seem, Smith's conservative stance concerning the New Deal does have its origins in his tenure as governor. While Smith simultaneously implemented various reforms, he also enunciated an underlying conservatism. By examining Al Smith's conception of government through his reaction to the Red Scare, administrative and budget legislation, all in comparison to his attitudes in the 1930's, the reader realizes that the early Smith did not differ drastically from the later Smith. Not to be denied in the explanation for his anti-New Deal platform are the subsequent disappointments Smith suffered after the 1928 debacle which did contribute (to a much lesser degree) to his alienation.

Al Smith's reverence for the American system of law often attained a high level of intensity. In commenting on the ouster of five Socialist candidates from the New York assembly, he voiced his views on democracy and its obligations: "Although I am unalterably opposed to the fundamental principles of the Socialist party, it is inconceivable that a minority party, duly constituted and legally organized, should be deprived of its right to expression so long as it has honesty. . . . Our faith

in American democracy is confirmed not only by its results, but by its methods and organs of free power.² His beliefs were refreshing in a time of hysteria which had gripped both New York and the entire nation. Certain business groups and the Republican party seized the opportunity the Red Scare provided and promptly denounced Smith's proposals for an 8-hour day, a living wage and workers' compensation as Socialistic or Communistic. Smith's desire to see his program actualized and not buried beneath a wealth of demands for conformity and his desire to uphold the Constitution led him (feverishly) to veto anti-sedition laws and to protest the ouster of the 1920 Socialists. David Colburn states definitively the success of Smith's social relief program when he writes, "His (Smith's) program reduced public alarm over bolshevism in 1919 and 1920 without suppressing freedom of speech, freedom of thought or freedom of action."³

Yet, Smith regarded the Bolsheviks as a decided threat to the American system, thus illustrating his conservatism tinged with liberalism. While the Socialists were willing to work within the system, the Communists did not hesitate to resort to violent action to achieve their end. Smith himself ordered an inquiry by the District Attorney and the police department to determine if a law prohibiting seditious statements had been violated in a meeting of Bolsheviks with a Soviet Ambassador in April of 1919. During his pardon message directed toward Jim Larkin who was convicted of anarchism, Smith stated: "I condemn the dictatorship of the 'proletariat,' of the farmers, of the capitalists, of the merchants.... In a free democracy we know no dictatorships and we endure none.... I pardon Larkin, not because of agreement with his views, but despite my disagreement with them."⁴

What underlies this philosophy was Al Smith's profound belief that Americans were able to rise above social or class distinction; the significant element in society was not the group but the individual for whom government existed. Government should enter all areas of society, urban and rural so the whole would benefit. During the Roosevelt Era, distinction among classes was becoming all too prominent for the man who had forewarned the public of the perils of a society ruled by one class or the desires of one class. The Ideal of the Forgotten Man was Roosevelt's appeal to the American people to assure them of his understanding of their plight. It found little sympathy from Smith; it was only an oratorical skill to stir the poor against the rich. Furthermore, for Smith, the Roosevelt administration drifted too closely to the Bryanite cause of free silver, approved by such populists and fanatics as Huey Long and Father Coughlin. Is this the man who was acting so differently from his policies of the previous decade? Repeatedly, in his aforementioned attitudes of the 1920's, he had warned against the political indulgences of the past. Promoting class antagonism could culminate

in a State contrary to American ideals—a thought that occupied Smith for the entirety of his life.

Also significant for Al Smith during his terms as governor was the notion that the State as a functioning body was responsible for remedying the problems of the existing social order without reconstructing American society. The wondrous aspect of Smith's administration was that he enacted social welfare legislation without great fiscal expenditures. During his second term as governor (1924-26), Smith's ability to trim \$17,000,000 out of the state budget caused a shuddering among Republicans who prided themselves on fiscal responsibility.⁵ Paralleling this accomplishment were his intentions of tax reduction when he spoke in 1924 to the state legislature: "I believe that it is a very great mistake to take from the taxpayers in any one year more than is needed for the actual conduct of government, always leaving a safe reserve in the bank in case of trouble..."⁶ He achieved a 25-percent reduction in state income tax. According to Smith, the people of America desired an honest account of every dollar; they would not tolerate waste.

In the spirit of preventing waste, Smith confronted the problem of administrative inefficiency when he first ascended the governorship. Within the bureaucracy, there were 160 various agencies approved by 16 different procedures and removed 7 different ways. They shared the chaotic, overlapping administration of the state. By alleviating the problem through the creation of the Reconstruction Commission, Smith designed an organized-sixteen department government for the first time in the history of New York?

Always a proponent of sound money policies and efficient government, the Roosevelt administration seemed to function with acute inadequacy for Al Smith. He perceived the inflationary techniques which the New Deal propagated; and consequently, he proceeded to warn Roosevelt of the dangers of an uncontrolled inflation. Deficit spending was totally alien to Smith. In the same vein, Roosevelt's government was inefficient and thus, more costly and cumbersome. In the December issue (1933) of *Outlook*, he wrote of the various public works departments: "It looks as if one of the absent-minded professors had played anagrams with the alphabet soup. The soup got cold while he was unconsciously inventing a new game for the nation, a game which beats the crossword puzzle—the game of identifying new departments by their initials."⁸ The top-heavy structure of the social welfare government was choked with red tape and this was intolerable for the politician who slenderized the chaos of his own government.

To complete Al Smith's vision of government, Colburn provides a "startling" summary of his governorship:

Not only did such reforms as maternity and health care, minimum wages and maximum hours, broader educational opportunities, public

works, and conservatism benefit the people of New York; ultimately they also benefited the nation as a whole. By keeping alive the importance of reform amidst the furor of the Red Scare, and by experimenting with new reform programs during a decade of unparalleled materialism Governor Alfred E. Smith helped prepare the way for the coming of the *New Deal*⁸

The aforementioned quote and comparisons lead one to conclude that though Al Smith and FDR professed allegiance to the same party and to the same basic goals, Smith adhered to the conservative faction while Roosevelt adhered to the more liberal faction. The personal differences between the two men accentuated the fashion in which they approached politics. While Roosevelt was the improviser and the evangelist, Smith was the organizer, the logician who did not improvise.¹⁰ Smith was one of the few politicians who clung with certain rigidity to the rules. While Roosevelt did not hesitate to pack a court to prevent the defeat of his legislation, Smith had a profound sense of respect for the judiciary as an institution. He knew the constitutional limitations of the governorship and abided by them. The Smith approach had seen the State playing the dominant role in enacting welfare programs, while the Roosevelt approach saw the centralization of the national government to deal with the crisis. All these differences underlay Smith's criticism of Roosevelt and the New Deal.

Though Smith possessed a basic consistency in regard to his political outlook throughout the two decades, it can not be presented as the only fact which explains Smith's break with Roosevelt and the New Deal. Of lesser significance are Smith's political disappointments which came to the fore after the 1928 election. Handicapped by his Catholicism and his wet stance, Smith had little chance for victory over Republican Hoover whose party claimed credit for the prosperous times. Terribly disappointed with the results, Smith vowed never to run again. The American public was just not receptive to a campaign of the real issues, and Smith suffered from it. Smith then turned to the business world and became president of the Empire State Building. Because his life revolved around business affairs, his role in politics diminished; but his interest never waned. A sideline, Smith himself best stated his feelings of subsequent alienation when he commented during Roosevelt's term as governor: "Did you know, by God, that he [Roosevelt] has never consulted me about a damn thing since he has been governor?"¹¹ Roosevelt continued to ignore Smith throughout his presidential terms. The relationship between the two men resembled that of Gladstone observing Disraeli; it eventually crippled Smith as a politician, for as an outsider he could only criticize, failing to perceive that the expediences of the times required Roosevelt to renege on promises such as sound money!¹²

Perhaps the bitterness Smith felt after political defeat and isolation can best explain his prime inconsistency with the past—membership

in the Libery League, a "counter-revolution" of the New Deal, created for the purpose of denying Roosevelt reelection in 1936. He who had denounced the fanatics had joined the extremists. Whether Smith was right or wrong has no importance. What is important is that he considered himself engaged in a righteous cause, fighting an administration which led him to believe its motivation was striking down constitutional government through its leader's continued arrogation of power.

Thus, Smith's consistency throughout the two decades culminated in his tragic political fate. Bitterness did play a role in the stiffening process (most exemplified by his membership in the League) and it blinded Smith to the changing currents brought on by the Depression and to the intentions of Roosevelt. But, beneath it all, Al Smith did not undergo a radical transformation. By presenting Smith's record as governor in the ideological, economic and administrative spheres and his subsequent role in the 30's, the reader realizes the basis for this statement. Despite Smith's lapse into political alienation, one can not disregard the wealth of the legacy he left, namely the very program he opposed because of his principles.

FOOTNOTES

¹Time Magazine, "The Defeat of the Happy Warrior," vol. 75: 18-19, April 10, 1960, p. 18

²Pringle, Henry F.: *Alfred E. Smith, A Critical Study*, Macy-Masius Publishers, 1927, p. 239

³Colburn, David R.: "Governor Alfred E. Smith and the Red Scare," *Political Science Quarterly*, S'73, 88: p. 442

⁴Pringle, Henry F., p. 246

⁵O'Connor, Richard: *The First Hurrah, A Biography of Alfred E. Smith*, G. P. Putnam's Sons: New York, 1970, p. 1139

⁶Ibid, p. 131

⁷Pringle, Henry F., p. 284

⁸O'Connor, p. 274

⁹Colburn, David R., p. 444

¹⁰O'Connor, p. 274

¹¹Handlin, Oscar: *Al Smith and his America*, Little Brown and Company: Boston, 1958, p. 154

¹²O'Connor, p. 274

Becket and Henry II: Politics and Personalities

Raymond Fitzgerald, Jr.

It is the happy fate of some historical events to capture the imaginations and interests of those skilled in the literary arts. Such episodes thereby gain a special immortality, enduring not only in the studies of historians, but also in the minds and hearts of all the literate world. One of these fortunate subjects is the life and death of St. Thomas Becket; in such works as Eliot's magnificent *Murder in the Cathedral* and Jean Anouilh's *Becket* the struggle between the crown and mitre gained lasting fame. Perhaps this is so because one of the chief features of the conflict, the power of the personalities of those involved, has captured the interest of such acute and sensitive figures as dramatists. Certainly the character of the archbishop stands at the center of most works based on the incident of 1170, for he provides a perpetual challenge to all who seek to understand the heroic element in human nature.

Yet while the historian may also be attracted to the enigmatic figure of St. Thomas, his task is far more extensive than that of the playwright and the poet. The murder of the archbishop did not just happen; it was rather a high point in a long and complex struggle, one which had its roots in times long before those of Becket and one which was not resolved by the saint's martyrdom. Moreover, this conflict entailed a complicated and intricate web of feudal rights, local custom, ecclesiastical law, political philosophy, and power politics. Thus, even a brief investigation of the various elements which occasioned the memorable event in Canterbury Cathedral should prove to be not simply useful, but also essential to a true understanding of the figures who stood opposed in the conflict.

The genesis of the struggle between the English king and the primate of his realm began not on the shores of that island, but rather in the cloisters of Cluny and in the halls of the papal palace. The great moral and ecclesiastical reform movement of the eleventh century symbolized and, to a large extent, directed by Gregory VII, was but one facet of an increased vitality in the church; another aspect was the growth of clerical independence under a strong papacy's lead. The movement to extend the power of the pope over the church

is itself an aspect of medieval history which could easily hold one's interests and labors for a lifetime. However, for the purposes at hand, one can profitably focus on one issue which particularly concerned the English church: the rights of autonomy from secular control which accrued to a local church by virtue of its being part of the Church Universal. The question of the church's control of the state never really entered the contest between Becket and his king (that difficulty being reserved for later prelates and monarchs). However, such pronouncements as Gregory's *Dictatus Papae* did make certain claims which established church independence in matters of ecclesiastical structure, discipline, and appeals.¹ Such claims (which most kings of the time found novel, revolutionary, and destructive of established order) aroused the resentment of many a ruler. Moreover, the ecclesiastical situation in England by the time of Henry II worsened these tensions and exacerbated what would have been at best an uneasy period of transition.

Throughout the history of the church in England, there had been many close links of the religious community to the protective influences of the crown. Precedents for a presumably beneficial royal role in church affairs dated back at least as far as the Council of Whitby of 664 (at which time King Oswy called a general synod to unite Celtic and Roman Christians)² Such harmonious relations continued throughout the Anglo-Saxon period, the high point of church-crown cooperation being the reign of King Edgar; with the aid of the faithful and competent Archbishop Dunstan, this monarch effected a reform of the monastic system which was to hold strong until the Norman Conquest. Dunstan, who was both Archbishop of Canterbury and Chancellor of England, even advanced the theory of the king's possession of special characteristics from God, Whose instrument for the ordering of the church the king was.³

The Norman Conquest ended the Anglo-Saxon monarchy and with it the explicit notion of theocratic kingship. However, the church had always supported the efforts of Duke William (both in Normandy and in England); and the church in England became one of the foundations upon which the new king built his power. In this process, the ecclesiastical establishment became even more attached to the monarchy, albeit in a new and distinctly Norman manner. William I, aided by his chancellor and Archbishop of Canterbury Lanfranc, transformed the church in England from a primarily monastic structure to a strongly feudal, episcopally-dominated hierarchy, with the bishops of the land also being tenants of the king. Interestingly enough, this process took place at the same time as the Georgian Reform was beginning in earnest; moreover, William and Lanfranc (both of whom appreciated the benefits of an improved clergy) proved to be staunch supporters of many of the disciplinary and moral reforms espoused

by the pope.⁴ Indeed, much of the reform of the English church was carried out under the auspices of the king. However, there remained one facet of the reform movement which was unrealized during the reign of William I: that of papal centralization of control over bishops (with the resultant lessening of such royal control). William insisted that the episcopacy in England remain very much under his direct sway, receiving all symbols of office and means of power from the king.

However, this issue of lay investiture, which was the bane of Continental church-state relations, was not to be the question which Henry II and Becket were to inherit as their *casus belli*. The Compromise of Bec (1107) addressed this thorny question in a pact which typified the Norman ecclesiastical settlement.⁵ By this agreement, Archbishop Anselm, who had upheld the rights of the church, received from King Henry I a renunciation of royal claims to investiture. However, this document also contained a statement by the church on the propriety of the king's receiving homage from bishops before their consecration. Thus, the compromise, while granting one ecclesiastical demand, still reflected the English kings' desire to keep the church very much under the practical power of royal legal control. Hence, the question underlying the problem of lay investiture remained without a formal settlement; the precise limits of royal control over the church were still undefined.

Nor were the boundaries of state and church clarified after the death of Henry I. These years, characterized by baronial anarchy during the wars between Stephen and Matilda, saw a devolution of royal power (with the church being one of the major beneficiaries). Under the leadership of the redoubtable Archbishop Theobald of Canterbury, the church in England was more than prepared to prevent itself from slipping into the anarchy which King Stephen's mismanagement encouraged.⁶ For example, church courts, now founded on an ever more regularized code of canon law, combined with increased appeals to and contract with Rome to make the church more independent of royal control and influence.

Thus, when Henry II ascended the throne in 1154, he did not find himself in the position of many of the German emperors, who almost inherited a tradition of open conflict with the church. However, he did have to work under a system of church-crown relations which had developed two divergent strains: a history of royal control which was buttressed by new concerns by an increasingly centralized monarchy and the recent experience of clerical independence which relied on the then-flourishing body of legal and ecclesiastical theory from the Continent.

Henry II's basic position was quite natural for one in his situation; as an exceptionally vigorous governmental head who was presiding over a revolution of efficiency in law and administration, the king wished at least to regain those powers which his stronger ancestors

had exercised in England. To this end, he streamlined royal government, collected his feudal dues with greater return, and firmly established a common law system which insured the supremacy of the royal courts in both civil and criminal cases. Such a monarch was not prepared to allow the powers of the church to remain the sole vestige of Stephen's weakness of government. Drawing from the well-established customs and from the formal feudal rights accorded the crown by such documents as the Compromise of Bec, Henry sought to hinder clerical appeals to Rome, to re-establish royal rights to revenues from vacant sees, to exact feudal dues on church lands, and to try "criminous clerks" in royal courts?

However, in these projects, the king faced the opposition of Thomas Becket, an archbishop of sufficient caliber to fight the king's encroachments upon the church's newly found independence. Becket's principal tactic was quite simple: to deny the king's major premise. All the royal arguments rested on the absolute validity of local custom in dictating the relations between monarch and church. Against such claims, Becket had only to turn to the wealth of legal, philosophical, and theological thought then emanating from the schools of France and Italy. Such masters as Robert Pullen and Robert of Melun had introduced English pupils such as Herbert of Bosham, John of Salisbury, and Thomas Becket himself to the political and ecclesiological theories whereby the king's power was limited by a natural order. By these theories, the church should be independent of secular influence; and the prelates of the church should possess full rights to direct the affairs of their charges and to communicate with the Holy Father.⁸ Against such arguments, the king of England had not even such weapons of theory as those wielded by the Holy Roman Emperors (who could claim some divine quality of their office). Henry could but cite custom upon custom, to which Becket could (and did) reply that Christ "never said, 'I am custom,' but 'I am truth.'"⁹

However, Henry's lack of effective arguments to advance against his enemy in Canterbury did not mean that the king was powerless in the struggle. Such was far from the case; as one of the greatest political tacticians of his age, Henry knew only too well how to bring to bear every possible pressure (legal and extra-legal) against his opponents. Such an all-embracing program of attack was just the means he employed against the archbishop, for Henry used three strategems which encompassed the whole of his powers: the legalities of the Constitutions of Clarendon, the diplomacies of pressure on the pope, and the issue of the coronation of the young prince Henry.

The Constitutions of Clarendon, which resulted from the convocation at that place in 1164, represented the assertion of customary royal rights in several areas of disputation that had developed between king and primate. One of the major difficulties concerned

advowson, the right of presentation of a church to a cleric; since to the king's mind this practice was merely another form of infeudation, it was only natural that he included in the Constitutions an article insuring royal power over this practice:

If controversy arise between laymen, between layman and clergyman, or between clergymen, with regard to advowson and presentation of churches, it shall be treated or concluded in the court of the lord king.¹⁰

Adoption of such a proposal would have severely curtailed the activity of the ecclesiastical courts. Yet there was another area of spiritual jurisdiction which concerned the king. The particular issue had been occasioned by Becket's excommunication of William of Eynesford, a tenant-in-chief of the king, in response to that baron's encroachment upon a benefice of the archbishop.¹¹ However, such action against such a noble without the king's express prior approval was a thing unheard of in the history of England. Hence, another of the articles (VII) called the archbishop to task for this novel application of spiritual punishment.

A third, and to the king especially meaningful, point raised at Clarendon was the question of trial of clerics in royal courts. By Article III of the Constitutions, clerks accused of civil and criminal offenses would first be tried in church courts; if they were found guilty, they would be defrocked and tried in the royal court (where final punishment would be decided). This section of the Clarendon Constitutions was Henry's attempt to end a practice of legal procedure which had developed during the reign of Stephen and thus to establish more firmly the absolute nature of Henry's chief domestic reform (the royal courts).

Finally, the last series of articles offensive to Becket and to those of like mind concerned appeals of English clergymen to Rome. Article VIII sought to end this practice, stating that appeals

should proceed from the archdeacon to the bishop and from the bishop to the archbishop. And if the archbishop fails to provide justice, recourse should finally be had to the lord king.¹²

Article IV made any communication at all with Rome more difficult, for it decreed that "archbishops, bishops, and parsons of the kingdom are not permitted to go out of the kingdom without the licence of the lord king."¹³ Thus, this section of the Constitutions sought to give force of formal statement to the king's control of that part of the Church Universal contained within the borders of his realm.

However, the true importance of the Constitutions of Clarendon for an understanding of the conflict between Becket and Henry II lay not so much in the points of the individual articles, as in the interpretations which each of the protagonists placed on these propositions. Henry seems to have viewed them as a concise and unequivocal

summary of the rights which had been the king's since the advent of the Normans. He did not consider them an assertion of royal power over properly ecclesiastical affairs, but as the deliniation of royal from clerical powers, a distinction he hoped would dissuade the archbishop from denying ancient royal prerogatives. Becket, a product of the schools' careful training, considered these propositions in a more abstract and theoretical light. To him, they represented an unwarranted attack on the justice of canon law. The issue was not so much that of correct precedent for royal privileges, as that of divinely appointed right. For example, Becket's reply to the custom-rooted claims for dual-trial for clerics was taken straight from canon law: "God does not judge twice in the same matter."¹⁴

Thus, the Constitutions of Clarendon represented the first attempt of the king to quiet the archbishop who had reared his head in opposition to the king's policies of legal and administrative centralization. As accounts of the Convocation of Clarendon suggest, Henry hoped by these means to do with Becket what he had done with many a recalcitrant baron: to humble his opponent with the power, majesty, and authority of royal law. However, the archbishop proved to be a firmer foe than the king expected. Despite an initial (and fear-inspired) acceptance of the Constitutions, Becket rejected the offensive articles wholesale.

Legal and regal authority having failed, Henry II moved to a course of harrying his foe into submission. This process began with the Council of Northampton, on which occasion Henry used the case of John the Marshal (who had a grievance against Becket) to initiate a series of heavy fines against the cleric.¹⁵ Such acts precipitated Becket's flight to France, where he hoped to find safety and rest.

But the arm of the head of the Angevin Empire was long enough to reach into France. Henry's machinations against his clerical foe now left the realm of English law and entered that of international diplomacy, specifically, that of papal politics. At this time, Pope Alexander III was in a position which forced him to hold to a most uneasy *via media* throughout most of the Becket controversy. The pope was then in exile in France, for he had been driven from Italy by the schismatic Frederick Barbarossa; he was much in need of the support of Henry II in pressing his claims to the throne of St. Peter and thus could not afford to antagonize the English monarch. Yet the pope's background was such that, other things being equal, he would have preferred to support proponents of the Gregorian reform against secular rulers. The pope himself was a product of the legal and scholastic influences which gave foundation to Becket's arguments, while His Holiness was indebted to such scholars as enunciated the canonical position for their consistent support in his struggle for the papacy.¹⁶ Hence, the pope's actions were designed to conciliate the two

parties rather than to support either side strongly. Even toward the end of Becket's life, the pope's injunctions were directed toward both parties; in 1170; he ordered Henry II to restore Becket and the archbishop to submit to his king, "*salva ecclesiae libertate*."¹⁷ Thus, while the pope was unable to give Becket unreserved aid, he nevertheless refused to force a solution in Henry's favor (despite considerable royal pressure); quite the opposite, when issues finally came to threats of excommunication and their execution, the pontiff (especially as his European situation bettered) supported the archbishop rather than the king.

Having failed to humble Becket by the usual tactics, Henry late in the struggle embarked on a program designed to break the archbishop by any means, customary or otherwise. The culmination of this final attack was the coronation of Henry II's son, for in this incident, Henry indicated how far he was prepared to go in fighting his clerical opponent. He broke all precedent by involving himself in the old dispute for primacy between the sees of Canterbury and York, allowing Archbishop Roger of York to perform the coronation of the young king (in open defiance of the hallowed right of Canterbury to do so). That Henry suffered setbacks from this overestimation of his power (angering King Louis of France, Pope Alexander III, and, of course, Becket) serves as an excellent illustration of the extent to which Henry was willing to go in battling his episcopal foe.

The severity of Henry's antagonism and the determination in his pursuit of the archbishop (dispositions which, as seen above, led Henry to make some of his rare political blunders) point out an aspect of the contest between crown and mitre which no analysis of objective causes (both remote and proximate) can fully explain. There was no compelling reason why the tensions in England should have erupted in the eventually murderous violence of the Becket case. Indeed, with the exception of this incident, there were few English instances of such really brutal battles between royal and ecclesiastical power as plagued medieval Germany. The crucial element in this conflict lay in the personalities of the two protagonists, whose temperaments and attitudes turned the possibility of total struggle into a certainty.

Insofar as human behavior is understandable, Henry's seems to have fallen into fairly comprehensible patterns. The English king was nothing if not a powerfully willed man of enormous energy, a facet of his character which astounded and exhausted his contemporaries.¹⁸ Such a person, possessed of such great talents and placed in so exalted a position, naturally tended to a certain egotism. Henry, no exception to this rule, does seem to have identified his policies with himself and to have had a more-than-normal personal involvement with the affairs of the state he headed. Moreover, such a strong figure was not likely to tolerate betrayal (either personal or political). Becket's

actions, those of a man who had been a friend and ally of the king, who had served as royal chancellor, and who owed his religious office to the activity of the king, were sufficient to drive Henry, both as a king and as a person, into paroxysms of rage. His measures against the archbishop (e.g., his condemnation of Becket at Northampton, the exile of Becket's family, the persecution of his clerics, and the confiscation of his lands) were executed with such a ferociousness that one becomes aware of a hidden and ugly facet of the king's personality which this conflict brought to the fore.¹⁹ The deep-rooted animosity of Henry was that of a man who felt betrayed by a friend and opposed in matters of prime importance to himself.

Becket's own personality was far more difficult to comprehend. However, there was one incident in his life which seems to have colored all his actions as archbishop: his dramatic conversion on entering into his new episcopal office. Following the language of many medieval accounts, not a few modern authors have described this event as Becket's "putting on a new man."²⁰ However, close examination of Becket's pre-episcopal life serves to show that there was much in the man's background which made his extremely conscientious behavior as archbishop quite motivated.²¹ Much of Becket's youth and young manhood had been spent in the household of Archbishop Theobald (by all accounts, an exemplary bishop); and his education reflected the reforming influences of Continental schools. Hence, when he ascended into his office, Becket possessed a rather clear concept of the role expected of him. If anything, much of the difference between Becket the chancellor and Becket the archbishop was that caused by the "old" man replacing the "new" man. (Of course, this consideration of the background of Becket's conversion must in no way vitiate the dramatic nature of this event. When the "old" Becket returned, he did so with a new spirit such as would make the archbishop stand out from the mass of clergymen of similar backgrounds.)

However, Becket's background does not fully explain why he held such a firm and combative stand against the king. Determined and willful, Becket also became personally involved in his work; one finds no other-worldly spirit in a man who could answer all his noble detractors with heated words and heart-felt reminders of those times when he would have settled accounts with a sword.²² However, while both Henry II and Archbishop Becket were quite intimately involved in their roles, there remained one major difference between the two. Henry II viewed the conflict always in terms of himself, seeing all facets of the struggle as involving *his own* power and *his own* prestige. But Becket (perhaps because he was not a king) came to identify himself with a greater cause, i.e., God and His honor. (Anouilh's subtitle, *The Honour of God*, is one of the more valid points in his play.) Becket did not begin his struggle against Henry with such exalted

notions; however, under increased royal pressure, he moved from his initial position of defense of the church's legal rights²³ Clarendon forced him into the post of defender of the Church Universal against local encroachments, while the events after that convocation strengthened in him the vision of himself as upholder of the rights of God against the powers of this world. Thus, the basic difference between Henry's approach and that of Becket was that between a man whose most dramatic statement was "What miserable sluggards have I brought up in my kingdom that they should suffer *their lord* to be mocked by a low-born clerk" and one whose most compelling regret was his temporary betrayal of his God at Clarendon.²⁴

Such fervor on the part of Becket (in many ways reminiscent of the crusading zeal of St. Bernard) gave to the archbishop a militant spirit which set him apart from the usual cleric of his day. Even such a man as Alexander III, whose defense of papal and ecclesiastical rights had cost him exile, was not so eager for open combat as was his spiritual son in Canterbury. Moreover, the confusion and resentment of many of the prelates of England (e.g., Bishop Gelbert Foliot of London) was that of well-trained and reasonably holy men who could not understand the necessity for a debilitating battle with their king. Thus, while the experience of Becket at his conversion from royal service to that of the church did not instill in him any new ideas on his role, it does seem to have opened his perception to a new dimension, one which eventually led him to face the sword-wielding barons with courage, composure, and confidence.

Thus, in the end, the historian must return to that element of the struggle between king and prelate which has most intrigued playwrights: the enigma of personality. This area is most difficult to analyze. One can always examine ecclesiastical and royal documents, one can peruse chronicles and hagiographies; but one cannot enter into the mind of a human being. However, the historian can try to infer from recorded behavior the mental states which may have given rise to such deeds as the murder in the cathedral in 1170. This process is admittedly a challenging task, one whose conclusions are always open to further clarification; but it is one which is necessary if one hopes to understand something of the interaction among persons which gives rise to the events of the past.

FOOTNOTES

¹Brian Tierney, ed. *The Middle Ages*, Vol. 1 (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1973), pp. 121-122. Articles III, XX, and XXI of the *Dictatus Papae* are the most pertinent to this point.

²Francis G. James, ed. *The Pageant of Medieval England: Historical and Literary Sources to 1485* (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 5-10. This account of the Council of Whitby, taken from Bede's *Ecclesiastical History*, brings out very clearly the royal role.

³Christopher Brooke, *From Alfred to Henry III: 871-1272* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1961), p. 55.

⁴David Knowles, *Thomas Becket* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1971), pp. 15-16.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 68.

⁶Brooke, *op. cit.*, pp. 170-171.

⁷Knowles, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

⁸Beryl Smalley, *The Becket Conflict and the Schools: A Study of Intellectuals in Politics* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1973), pp. 42, 53.

⁹*Ibid.*, p. 128.

¹⁰Thomas Jones, ed. *The Becket Controversy* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1970), p. 14.

¹¹W. R. W. Stephens, *The English Church from the Norman Conquest to the Accession of Edward I* (New York: Ams Press, 1901), p. 164.

¹²Jones, *loc. cit.*

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹⁴Stephen, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

¹⁵Knowles, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95.

¹⁶Smalley, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143.

¹⁷Knowles, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 109.

²⁰Ibid., pp. 53-54.

²¹Ibid., pp. 55.

²²David Knowles, "Archbishop Thomas Becket: A Character Study," *Proceedings of the British Academy*: 1949 (London, Oxford University Press, 1949), p. 187.

²³Ibid., p. 193.

²⁴Stephen, op. cit., p. 180.

Moves and the Motive for the CIA and Chile

Dwan Singleton

"We are prepared to have the kind of relationship with the Chilean government that it is prepared to have with us," announced President Richard Nixon in his 1971 State of the World Message, issued February 25, 1971.¹

The statement belied the atmosphere of U.S.-Chilean relations that already had developed since the ascension of President Salvador Allende Gossens's Popular Unity government which was forged by the Socialist and Communist Parties in the fall of 1970. Rumors were rampant about Central Intelligence Agency action against Allende. These mushroomed following the death of Allende in 1973.²

Two important questions should be asked about the CIA in Chile: (1) in which of the alleged activities is there sufficient evidence to indicate direct CIA involvement and (2) what is the primary motivation that can be discerned behind such actions by the CIA. Consideration will be limited to those activities which allegedly occurred subsequent to the Presidential election on September 4, 1970 and before the installation of the new military government on September 13, 1973.

Concerning the source material available, it is important to note that almost all of the CIA testimony which was given to Congressional committees was delivered during executive sessions and remains classified and unpublished. However, some of this material has become public through indirect means. For instance, the *Washington Post* obtained a transcript from intelligence community sources of CIA director William Colby's October 11, 1973 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs.³ The July 18, 1974 letters of Representative Michael Harrington to the respective chairmen of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee concerning Colby's April 24, 1974 testimony about covert operations in Chile before the Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the House Armed Services Committee also was discovered by the *New York Times*.⁴

General acknowledgment that the CIA was active in Chile from 1970 to 1973 was given by Jack B. Kubisch, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, before the Subcommittee on

Inter-American Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on September 25, 1973. However, he refused to comment on the exact nature of these activities.⁵ The Harrington letter mentioned above refers to expenditures whose aim was to prevent the election of Allende and for "destabilization efforts" against the Allende government after it was established.⁶ The decisions were made by the Forty Committee which is a sub-Cabinet level committee charged with the responsibility of examining the proposals for major covert actions.⁷ Included as members are the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (the chairman), the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Director of the CIA.⁸

An examination will be conducted of the various major alleged activities of the CIA in the following events and areas: the October 24, 1970 Chilean Congressional vote for the President, the Chilean media, the political parties, the private organizations and the labor groups, the truckers' strikes in 1972 and 1973, and the military coup that toppled Allende.

The terms Track I and Track II refer to two plans involving the CIA and were aimed at preventing the Chilean Congress from selecting Allende as President even though he received 36.3 percent of the vote in the September 4 popular election. Runner-up Jorge Alessandri received 35.3 percent. According to the staff report of the Senate Select Committee to study covert operations in Chile, only Track I was authorized by the Forty Committee, while Track II was initiated by the White House and was revealed only to the CIA and the Forty Committee's chairman, Henry Kissinger.⁹

The hope of Track I was that on October 24 the Chilean Congress would vote for Alessandri who then was supposed to resign, thereby necessitating a second election in which former President Eduardo Frei could become a candidate. The report cites the authorization of \$250,000 for bribes of the Chilean Congress, although it was not spent since later the plan did not seem viable because the Chilean Congressman generally rejected the bribes.¹⁰ There is a reference to this plan in the Harrington letter where the authorized amount of money is cited as \$350,000.¹¹ Former Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry also acknowledged what he termed the "Alessandri formula" before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations.¹²

To improve the chances of Track I, the CIA was authorized to conduct a scare campaign on what would happen to the Chilean economy should Allende be declared the president. This included the funding of news articles, radio programs, political advertisements, and political rallies. Pressure also was placed on Frei, who refused to participate in the scheme.¹³

Based on the substantial agreement of the staff report, the

Harrington letter, and Korry, the existence of the Track I plan appears definite.

Track II called for the CIA to aid in planning a military coup in Chile to prevent an Allende government. The staff report of the Senate subcommittee claims 21 contacts with important military and Carabinero (police) officials were made by the CIA between October 5 and October 20, 1970.¹⁴ The CIA also was in touch with different groups plotting a coup and gave three weapons and tear gas to one group. However, these were returned, apparently unused.¹⁵ The plan for a military coup was abandoned following the assassination of the constitutionalist Chief of Staff of the Chilean Army, General Rene Schneider.¹⁶ This occurred during the attempted kidnapping of Schneider by one of the groups planning the coup on October 20. The CIA, upon learning of the details of the group's plan the week before the attempt, ceased supporting this group.¹⁷

Some plan for a military coup appears to have been formulated which included CIA participation, based on the staff report and Korry's acknowledgment.

According to the Harrington letter, CIA Chief Colby testified that "Funding was provided to individuals, political parties, and media outlets in Chile, through channels in other countries in both Latin America and Europe."¹⁸ The Harrington letter also explains that part of the \$5 million was for destabilization activities and that the \$1.5 million for the 1973 municipal elections went to "support an unnamed but influential anti-Allende newspaper."¹⁹ The Senate subcommittee staff report notes that \$1.5 million was spent by the CIA to support the Santiago opposition newspaper *El Mercurio*. It states that CIA documents claim "these efforts played a significant role in setting the stage for the military coup of September 11, 1973."²⁰

In addition to this aid, the CIA also generated articles for anti-Allende newspapers as well as material for opposition party radio stations and for several television shows.²¹

The intervention of the CIA with the Chilean media was admitted by President Gerald Ford at a news conference on September 16, 1974.²² With this concurrence, the allegation of CIA involvement in the Chilean media can be certified as true.

Measures also were authorized by the Forty Committee for CIA work in buttressing the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the National Party (PN), and several off-shoot parties. The goal was to form a united opposition to Allende's Popular Unity government. According to the Senate subcommittee staff report, over one-half of the funds authorized by the Forty Committee were delegated for this purpose. The money was used to support the party structures, their candidates in the municipal elections and the Congressional by-election of July, 1973, and for various expressions of opposition, such as the media,

political rallies, and demonstrations against the government and its policies.²³ Harrington also refers to the funding of political parties in his letter.²⁴

In secret testimony on October 11, 1973 before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, CIA director Colby acknowledged the CIA had infiltrated the political parties of Chile. Subcommittee chairman Rep. Dante B. Fascell asked Colby if it is "reasonable to assume that the Agency has penetrated all of the political parties in Chile." Colby replied, "I think we have an intelligence coverage of most of them. Let's put it that way."²⁵

Richard R. Fagen, Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, gave a personal version of political party infiltration before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs. At the time, Fagen was a social science consultant to the Ford Foundation and a visiting professor at the Latin American Faculty of the Social Sciences.²⁶ Recalling how an unnamed U.S. foreign service officer, who was an intelligence operative in the American Embassy, approached him while he was teaching in Santiago, Fagen noted, "I was told that the Embassy had succeeded in infiltrating all major parties of the Popular Unity coalition. It was not stated whether or not this was the work of the CIA or of other intelligence services. In particular, the official somewhat proudly mentioned that the contents of meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Chile—the most tightly organized of the parties on the left—were being reported directly to the Embassy."²⁷ The official then requested Fagen's help in infiltrating the major revolutionary group outside the coalition, the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), by giving him any information on people who were affiliated with the MIR, which had members in the university and intellectual communities.²⁸

Based on the material compiled, CIA involvement with the Chilean political party structures and their activities appears to be substantiated.

Several expenditures for the support of some private sector organizations were also authorized by the Forty Committee. An emergency allocation of \$24,000 was granted to a businessmen's organization in September, 1972, but others were refused because the groups may have had connections with anti-government strikes. Three private sector organizations (the businessmen's organization, associations of large and small businessmen, and an umbrella organization of opposition groups) received \$100,000 in October 1972. This was part of \$1.5 million of funding for the support of opposition groups. In CIA testimony, it was stated that this "was confined to specific activities in support of the opposition electoral campaign, such as voter registration drives and a get-out-the-vote campaign," according to the staff report of the Senate subcommittee.²⁹

The report also indicates that another \$1 million was authorized for opposition parties and private sector groups although both Ambassador Nathaniel Davis and the Department of State were against such funding "because of the increasingly high level of tension in Chile, and because the groups were known to hope for military intervention."³⁰ The agreement of Davis and the State Department was required before the funds would be released. While these were approved by the Forty Committee on August 20, 1973, they never reached the groups prior to the September coup.³¹ Harrington substantiates this report in his letter.³²

Attempts were made by the American Institute for Free Labor Development, which was financed by the United States government, to create a competitive trade union movement in Chile, according to Henry A. Landsberger, Professor of Sociology at the University of North Carolina and past president of the Latin American Studies Association. He explained that if the labor groups were receptive to this aid, it was because of the impetus from the political tensions. "Cooperating with us and with the kinds of groups we sponsored was distasteful to Chilean trade union leaders. But once the polarization within labor or any sector sharpens so that each side feels any weapon is acceptable to beat the other, then previously spurned U.S. help might well have become acceptable," elaborated Landsberger.³³

The CIA definitely appears to have been involved with private sector groups, such as the businessman's organizations. However, no particular connection could be found linking the CIA to any of the labor groups. Given the high degree of CIA activity in other fields, it would be hasty to state there was no CIA involvement. Therefore, the findings are inconclusive with respect to the labor groups.

Harrington in his letter mentions that Colby also testified that \$50,000 in funding was denied for the second truckers' strike in 1973.³⁴ While the Senate subcommittee staff report also states this, it adds that "all observers agree that the two lengthy strikes (the second lasted from July 13, 1973 until the September 11 coup) could not have been maintained on the basis of union funds. It remains unclear whether or not to what extent CIA funds passed to opposition parties may have been siphoned off to support strikes. It is clear that anti-government strikers were actively supported by several of the private sector groups which received CIA funds."³⁵ An incident is also cited in which the CIA discovered that one private sector group directly gave \$2,800 to the strikers despite CIA rules against this use. Although the group was admonished, funds for the next month still were given to it.³⁶

While the staff report conjecture seems quite plausible, there is no conclusive evidence indicating CIA complicity in the scheme. The incident cited above only illustrates that American money indirectly found its way to the strikers but not that the CIA

maneuvered it there. Therefore, there is no conclusive evidence of CIA involvement in the truckers' strikes of 1972 and 1973.

"I can state categorically and flatly that there was no U.S. government involvement in the coup that overthrew President Allende and led to his death. That includes all elements of the U.S. government, including the CIA," asserted Assistant Secretary of State Kubisch before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs on September 25, 1973.³⁷

Allegations of U.S. involvement in the coup surfaced because of the absence of Ambassador Davis from Chile just prior to the September coup and the presence of an American naval force of three destroyers and a submarine. Kubisch denied that these should indicate any involvement. He explained that Davis had been in Washington to meet with Kissinger who had just been nominated for Secretary of State. Several other Foreign Service officers and ambassadors also were called to Washington at his request. In refuting possible naval aid in the coup, Kubisch noted that the exercises had been scheduled for a year and that once there was word that the coup was taking place, the Defense Department was contacted by Kubisch and his associates. The units were told to leave the area and cancel the planned exercises with the Chilean navy.³⁸

Kubisch also was asked if U.S. officials had given the coup organizers any direct or indirect assurances. He replied that there had been no direct assurances, but that "This is not to say that there may not have been speculation and lower-level contacts, such as 'What do you think, Mr. U.S. official'—whoever he was—'what would be the attitude of the U.S. government, and the people of the U.S. and the Congress of the U.S. and the press of the U.S., if there were a coup, if the military intervened?'"³⁹

The Senate subcommittee staff report concurred that there was no direct U.S. involvement in the coup. However, it also indicated that such close dealings with the military may have indirectly affected the chances for a coup.⁴⁰ A communication in November, 1971 between the CIA Headquarters and the CIA Station in Chile is cited. The station had said that the principal purpose of its military penetration program was a military coup. This was denied by CIA Headquarters and it was added that the Forty Committee approval for such an objective had not been given. "Headquarters acknowledged the difficulty of drawing a firm line between monitoring coup plotting and becoming involved in a coup," continued the staff report.⁴¹

In his October 11, 1973 testimony before the House Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, CIA director Colby claimed the National Security Council had determined a coup would not serve the interests of the United States.⁴²

No connections can be discerned directly linking the CIA and the coup organizers. However, there could have been indirect assurances,

as Assistant Secretary of State Kubisch admitted.⁴³ The CIA's various entanglements may have helped to increase the coup's chances indirectly, as CIA Headquarters acknowledged to the CIA Station in Chile.⁴⁴

Based on examination of the alleged CIA activities, the conclusion is that the CIA appears to have been involved in the attempt to prevent Allende's election by the Congress (Track I and Track II) as well as assorted activities and funding of the media, political parties, and private sector groups. The findings were inconclusive in determining some definite connection between the CIA and labor groups, the truckers' strikes and the military coup toppling Allende's government.

Consideration also must be given to the principal motivation behind the authorization of such activities by the CIA in Chile. The reason advanced by political scientist Elizabeth Farnsworth is that the U.S. government's policy was guided by the interests of the corporations which were threatened with nationalization in Chile. She notes the presence of former corporate executives Peter Peterson, John Connally, John M. Hennessey, and John R. Petty who advocated the "hard-line Chilean policy" while they were stationed in significant governmental positions.⁴⁵

Several reasons can be cited for rejecting this explanation. The first centers on the fact that Allende's desire for nationalization was not unique among the Chilean politicians of the various parties. The principle target was the large copper industry, which accounted for much of Chile's trade. A moderate form of nationalization already had been instituted by the Frei administration which preceded that of Allende. In this plan, the government acquired 51 percent of the stock in the industry.⁴⁶ His Christian Democrat opponent in the September 4 election, Radomiro Tomic Romero, made similar promises.⁴⁷ Furthermore, a 1969 National Intelligence Estimate theorized that no matter who was the victor in the 1970 Presidential election, "steps toward either government participation in or outright nationalization of U.S. copper holdings in Chile were inevitable."⁴⁸

The chronology of events between the United States and Chile also reveals that the nationalization issue could not be the cause, since the CIA activity which is alleged to be the effect was authorized before Allende articulated his policy. On December 21, 1970 a constitutional amendment was proposed by Allende to turn control of the mines and certain other mineral deposits over to the state and to expropriate the foreign firms running them.⁴⁹ Prior to this proposal, CIA action already had been approved in Track I and Track II.⁵⁰

Another explanation offered centers around what columnist Jack Anderson termed "Nixon's paranoia over Allende."⁵¹ This "paranoia," which was not exclusively characteristic of Nixon, involved the belief that if Allende ascended to the presidency, then Chile would become a Communist nation with the rest of Latin America falling like dominoes.

This was considered to be against the interests of the United States and hazardous for democracy, defense, and the standing of the United States in the international community⁵²

The statement of Kissinger two days before the bribery proposal of Track I reveals this type of thinking. During the background briefing to the press after noting that Allende probably was a Communist (although he was a member of the Socialist and only was backed by the Communist Party), Kissinger theorized that Allende eventually would establish a Communist government in Chile. He continued:

In that case you would have one not on an island off the coast which has not a traditional relationship and impact on Latin America (Cuba), but in a major Latin American country you would have a Communist government, joining, for example, Argentina, which is already deeply divided, along a long frontier, joining Peru, which has already been heading in directions that have been difficult to deal with, and joining Bolivia, which has also gone in a more leftist, anti-U.S. direction, even without any of these developments⁵³

An Allende presidency was interpreted by Kissinger as a threat to democracy throughout the Western Hemisphere. He also viewed it as presenting a problem in the Western Hemisphere Defense Board and the Organization of American States.⁵⁴

One high-ranking official in testifying for the Senate committee staff report compared the situation to a chess game with Chile representing a couple of pawns. The conclusion was that "In the worldwide strategic chess game, once a position was lost, a series of consequences followed. U.S. enemies would proceed to exploit the new opportunity, and our ability to cope with the challenge would be limited by any American loss."⁵⁵ Therefore, it appears that when policymakers directed the CIA to conduct its various covert activities, they were guided primarily by a belief that Allende posed a threat to the democracy, defense and status of the United States.

NOTES

¹U.S. Cong., Senate, Select committee to study government operations with respect to intelligence activities, *Covert Action in Chile 1963-1973*, 94th Cong., 1st sess., p. 26.

²U.S. Cong., House, Committee on Internal Security, *The Theory and Practice of Communism*, Part 5 (Marxism Imposed on Chile—Allende Regime), 93rd Cong., 1st sess., pp. 2692, 2711, 2713, 2715.

³Tad Szulc, "The View from Langley," *Washington Post*, 21 Oct. 1973, Sec. C, p. 1.

⁴Richard Harris, "Reflections," *New Yorker*, 10 April 1978, p. 46.

⁵U.S. Cong., House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, *U.S. and Chile During the Allende Years, 1970-73*: hearings July 1, 1971-September 18, 1974, p. 134.

⁶U.S. Cong., House, Committee on Armed Services, (HASC), Special Subcommittee on Intelligence, Inquiry into matters regarding classified testimony taken on April 22, 1974 concerning the CIA and Chile, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., HASC 94-12 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1975), p. 33.

⁷HASC 94-12, p. 31.

⁸*Covert Action*, p. 2.

⁹*Covert Action*, pp. 23, 25.

¹⁰*Covert Action*, p. 24.

¹¹HASC 94-12, p. 33.

¹²Laurence Stern, "CIA \$400,000 Chile Fund Reported," *Washington Post*, 28 March 1973, Sec. A, p. 22, cols. 1-2.

¹³*Covert Action*, p. 24.

¹⁴*Covert Action*, p. 25-26.

¹⁵*Covert Action*, p. 11.

¹⁶*Covert Action*, pp. 25-26.

¹⁷*Covert Action*, p. 11.

¹⁸HASC 94-12, p. 33.

¹⁹HASC 94-12, p. 33.

²⁰*Covert Action*, p. 29.

²¹*Covert Action*, p. 29.

²²Harris, p. 46.

²³*Covert Action*, pp. 28-29.

²⁴HASC 94-12, p. 33.

²⁵Szulc, Sec. C, p. 5.

²⁶*U.S. and Chile*, p. 255.

²⁷*U.S. and Chile*, p. 257.

²⁸*U.S. and Chile*, p. 257.

²⁹*Covert Action*, p. 30.

³⁰*Covert Action*, p. 30.

³¹*Covert Action*, p. 30.

³²HASC 94-12, p. 33.

³³*U.S. and Chile*, p. 234.

³⁴HASC 94-12, p. 33.

³⁵*Covert Action*, p. 30.

³⁶*Covert Action*, p. 30.

³⁷*U.S. and Chile*, p. 134.

³⁸*U.S. and Chile*, p. 119.

³⁹*U.S. and Chile*, p. 97.

⁴⁰*Covert Action*, p. 38.

⁴¹*Covert Action*, p. 38.

⁴²Szulc, Sec. C, p. 5.

⁴³*U.S. and Chile*, p. 97.

⁴⁴*Covert Action*, p. 38.

⁴⁵*U.S. and Chile*, p. 658.

⁴⁶*U.S. and Chile*, p. 6-7.

⁴⁷*U.S. and Chile*, p. 375.

⁴⁸*Covert Action*, p. 58.

⁴⁹*U.S. and Chile*, p. 375.

⁵⁰*Covert Action*, p. 58.

⁵¹Personal interview with Jack Anderson, 19 September, 1978.

⁵²Richard R. Fagen, "The United States and Chile: Roots and Branches," *Foreign Affairs*, January 1975, pp. 297-298.

⁵³Fagen, pp. 297-298.

⁵⁴Fagen, pp. 297-298.

⁵⁵Fagen, pp. 297-298.

⁵⁶*Covert Action*, p. 52.