

THE LOYOLA UNIVERSITY
STUDENT HISTORICAL JOURNAL

VOL. VII

PREFACE

For a person with an interest in history, the joy and satisfaction of reading history can be enhanced by contributing to historical research and writing. The Loyola University Student Historical Journal functions as an outlet for those students who have made such contributions and desire to have them published. This journal is also a service to the members of the University community who will benefit from its contents.

The Loyola University Student Historical Journal has been sponsored jointly by the Loyola University Student Historical Association, Phi Alpha Theta, and the Student Government Association since Spring, 1966. This seventh volume of the Journal marks a continuance of our policy of publishing valid and scholarly research.

Editorial Board: Frank Leon

John Shinnors

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
1. HISTORIOGRAPHICAL STUDY OF ADOLPH HITLER, Trudie Byers.....	1
2. BENJAMIN DISRAELI: ATYPICAL VICTORIAN, Gayle Gulliver.....	11
3. THE NEMTSY AND NOVGOROD, A STUDY OF THE GERMAN KNIGHTS IN RUSSIA, John Shinnners.....	23
4. JOHN DAVIDSON ROCKEFELLER, A MAN WITH IDEAS, Regina Scotto.....	36
5. THE DEALINGS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN CONGELATING AND THAWING THE COLD WAR: THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF TRUMAN, EISENHOWER, AND KENNEDY 1945-1962, Sean O'Keefe.....	47
6. CONFEDERATE NAVAL CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLAND AND BRITISH LAW, Paul Reynold Duplechain.....	69

OFFICERS OF PHI ALPHA THETA:

John Shinnners
President

Frank Leon
Vice Pres. & Historian

Gayle Gulliver
Secretary-Treasurer

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL STUDY OF ADOLPH HITLER

submitted by:

TRUDIE BYERS

A popular psychological experiment compares the reactions of several individuals to a particular incident. Surprisingly enough there is often a great deal of variety in these opinions. Whether due to previously maintained prejudices and attitudes or simply to the degree of personal involvement in a situation, individuals tend to place emphasis on different aspects of an occurrence. In the case of reactions to a person within the incident, personality differences invade to further complicate the issue. Similarly even if the historian's topic is fairly contemporary, he is faced with a barrage of varying and sometimes conflicting information. The influx of new methods of study has only heightened this diversity as can be seen in some of the biographies of Hitler.

Probably one of the greatest biographies of Hitler was written by Alan Bullock, the noted English expert on contemporary Germany and professor of Modern History at Oxford. Bullock's purpose was to "discover how great a part Hitler played in the history of the Third Reich, [and] what the gifts were that Hitler possessed, enabling him first to secure and then to maintain such power."¹ Bullock assured his reader that he "wrote this book without any particular axe to grind or case to argue."² However his final appraisal of Hitler was condemning.

"The passions which ruled Hitler's mind," he charged, "were ignoble: hatred, resentment, and the lust to dominate to destroy. His career did not exalt but de-based the human condition, and his twelve years of dictatorship were barren of all ideas save one-- the further extension of his own power and that of the nation with which he identified himself."³

Although Bullock is never overly lavish with his praise, he does not condemn Hitler from the start. As he traces Hitler's life, Bullock shows that the foundation of Hitler's success was his own energy and ability as a political leader. "So long as his sense of mission was balanced by the cynical calculations of the politician, it represented a source of strength, but success was fatal."⁴ With success Hitler lost all sense of proportion and became a dreadful tyrant. "After the outbreak of the war and the conquest of the greater part of Europe, all practical restraint upon Hitler's translation of his fantasies into brutal reality was removed."⁵ Indeed with Hitler one was always uncomfortably aware of never being far from the irrational. However, "it is his [very] emptiness, his lack of anything to justify the suffering he caused rather than his own monstrous and ungovernable will which makes Hitler both so repellent and so barren a figure."⁶

Another Englishman who placed a great deal of emphasis on Hitler as a politician and villain was D. C. Watt. A lecturer in International History at the London School of Economics and Political Science and member of the British editorial group on "Documents on German Foreign Policy"

from 1919 to 1945, Watt denounced Hitler for his blood-letting terrorism. Watt saw Hitler as a man "obsessed with political power, who understood its changing nature in the early twentieth century as few men in his generation even if he came eventually to misjudge its scope."⁷ Thus Watt echoes Bullock's theme of a man who had great potential but grew to warp it into even greater disaster.

One of Watt's chief contributions was to question some of the previously accepted ideas of many students of Hitler.

"It would be a mistake," he warned, "to accept uncritically either of the two naive views of Hitler's achievement of power that are so often given currency in Britain. His appointment as Reichs Chancellor of Germany did not mark the successful conclusion of the Nazi revolution but rather the opening of it...it would be equally erroneous to see in his elevation to office anything more than the formal semblance of legitimization."⁸

Watt did not see Hitler's power as derived from the votes of the German people but from his own capacities and realized that Hitler's appointment as Reichs Chancellor was to affect all of Europe.

The revulsion towards Hitler felt by most Western historians especially those representing Allied countries is one of the chief deterrents to historical objectivity. Some historians including Emil Ludwig do not even try to obtain perfect objectivity. In fact they reject such an attempt. As Ludwig explains,

"Portraits of contemporaries cannot breathe that air of calm we try to give portraits of the past. An impartial 'History of our Times' is neither possible nor desirable. It is precisely because of their prejudices that the greatest histories, the works of Xenophon or Tacitus on their own epoch, are so interesting today. At the same time, there is a great difference between a personal view and partisanship."⁹

Ludwig certainly does not submerge any of his prejudices. Writing about the three great dictators of World War II, Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini, he denounces all three saying, "I am against all three because they are all against freedom." He goes on to explain his reason for writing his book; "Like everybody else, however, I am interested in their characters, since our fate today depends in part on them."¹⁰

Ludwig's pure contempt for Hitler is almost comical. He makes pointed jabs at Hitler's character with the slightest provocation. For example, Ludwig questions an incident which is usually unchallenged: Hitler's reception of the Iron Cross. Most historians accept this fact; however, for Ludwig, "Whether he was really awarded the Iron Cross has never been proved. It is unlikely to say the least."¹¹ At another point, discussing the authenticity of *Mein Kampf*, Ludwig jeers, "the grotesque German in which the book is written points to Hitler himself as the actual author."¹² These statements

are only a sampling of Ludwig's clear contempt.

A historian who showed equal disgust for Hitler was the German, Konrad Heiden. The leader of a small democratic organization at the University of Munich, Heiden declared himself one of the oldest Anti-Nazis. In his book he "tried to show the roots of Hitlerism and the growth of that sinister philosophy of force which seemed at one time almost destined to overshadow the earth."¹³ Unlike Ludwig, Heiden at least strove for some sort of objectivity. In his preface Heiden assures the reader that

"The narrative which follows is based partly on my own observations and experience then and in later years. However, even the most intimate episodes and reports of private conversations are grounded on documentary evidence or on statements of individuals who seemed to me thoroughly reliable."¹⁴

Heiden's philosophy of history is based on experiences such as those he had living under the Nazis. He explains that "great events can be understood only when they have been experienced or suffered at least in spirit; and to know something deeply is to experience it."¹⁵ His book is an attempt to "let the reader share the experiences of a generation; its story is the reader's own."¹⁶ Heiden saw that in the eyes of the German people Hitler assumed the dimensions of a historical, superhuman being, whose rights and reasons could not be questioned. Thus his final evaluation of the relationship between Hitler and the people is disturbingly pessimistic. He explains Hitler's supporters saying, "the belief in the necessity of evil which slumbers in the lowest depths of the human soul, had been awakened by Hitler as by no other man in the history of Europe."¹⁷

H. C. O'Neill followed a course exactly opposite that taken by Ludwig in approaching his subject. For O'Neill the study of history should be a precise science. He says that he has "chosen to steer by the ideal of Acton who maintained that our studies be all but purposeless. They should be pursued with chastity like mathematics."¹⁸ Much to his surprise O'Neill's study led him to believe that Hitler had some characteristics which at least made him a good leader. He observed that, although Hitler did not have the background of the other national leaders in World War II, "he led his party to power with equal confidence along a route lacking signposts and demanding constant initiative. He is found suddenly taking his place on the European stage as though born and bred to it."¹⁹

Even more remarkable, to O'Neill, than his diplomatic showing was Hitler's social behavior. O'Neill portrayed a man who was astonishingly swift in adapting himself to the needs of fresh experiences of all sorts. Although clearly Hitler was vicious, O'Neill does not even completely condemn Hitler for this. Hitler is seen as a man with a purpose. "Recognize his purpose, and the means he adopted become reasonable. It is the purpose that was without qualification evil and absurd."²⁰

Although all of the historians treated the importance of Hitler's sociological and psychological impact to some extent, their chief concern was rather with the actual historical developments surrounding Hitler. However two authors, Ernst and Speer placed their chief emphasis on the

sociological aspects; whereas, such authors as Langer, Waite, and McRandle, went even further afield by treating Hitler's mental state.

Fritz Ernst, a professor at the University of Heidelberg presented a lecture series entitled, "The History of the German People During the Past Fifty Years" in order to "see to it that students heard a frank and factual report of what had actually happened."²¹ He proposed to show how these events had affected the German people's thinking and acting in an endeavor to make the young people understand what their parents and their older relatives lived through."²² Ernst makes no pretext of being completely objective. In fact he explains that "there will of necessity be a certain degree of subjectivity implicit in any such presentation by a contemporary writer since any attempt to speak of the Germans after 1933 must be only tentative."²³ Ernst's main purpose seems to be to redeem the German people. He warns the younger generation to be "constantly reminded that Hitler did not have his many followers because he disclosed to them that he would forsake them in the midst of their extreme misery. Nor did he reveal that he would kill millions of Jews."²⁴

One man who could never forgive himself for his part in Hitler's atrocities was his director of armaments, Albert Speer. Twenty-five years after his release from prison for his part in the war crimes, Speer wrote a book in which he tried to explain to himself and the world how Hitler was able to wield so much power.

"I have tried," Speer explains, "to describe the past as I experienced it. I have set forth what I experienced and the way I regard it today. In doing so I have tried not to falsify the past. My aim has been not to gloss over either what was fascinating or what was horrible about those years. I have sought to show what came of one man's holding unrestricted power in his hands and also to clarify the nature of the man."²⁵

One of the chief reasons Speer offers for writing his book is to "issue warnings for the future."²⁶ Thus he shows that Hitler alone was not responsible for the terrors of the time. In fact, Hitler's entourage certainly bore a measure of the blame for his growing belief in his super-human abilities. The aura of unwarranted hero worship was thus the downfall of Germany.

In dealing with Hitler many people came to believe that historians should "explore and exploit the findings of modern psychology"²⁷ in order to gain a better understanding of the complex character. Thus the whole field of psycho-history was introduced into biographical studies of Hitler.

The pioneer effort to apply modern psychological findings to a historical figure was made by Walter C. Langer. Dr. Langer, a psychologist, first began to study Hitler during the war as a member of the Office of Strategic Services. Langer found that there were some difficulties in applying typical psychological methods to Hitler since he obviously could not interview him. Instead he had to make generalizations from interviews with people who knew Hitler and from the study of patients who had similar

characteristics. Langer himself warned that "my study must of necessity be speculative and inconclusive."²⁸ However he did not feel that such a study was useless. In fact Langer found that "we cannot content ourselves with simply regarding Hitler as a personal devil and condemning him to an Eternal Hell in order that the remainder of the world may live in peace and quiet."²⁹ Instead Hitler must be understood; so that, he could be dealt with.

Langer attempted to compensate for a serious lack that he found in the biographical information compiled on Hitler. He observed that, "if we scan the tremendous quantities of material and information that have been accumulated on Hitler, we find little that is helpful in explaining why he is what he is."³⁰ He then answers this problem, suggesting the image of a man whose every step served to convince him that he was the superman that he believed himself to be but brought no real sense of security. Langer felt that Hitler was unable to face real opposition on any ground. In fact "as long as there was a nation or a combination of nations more powerful than Germany, he could never find the peace and security he longed for."³¹ Langer's sole explanation for Hitler's Jewish purge was that "Hitler unconsciously felt that if he succeeded in ridding himself of his personal poison, his effeminate and perverse tendencies as symbolized in the Jew, then he would achieve personal immortality."³² Thus Langer emphasized motives rather than deeds in this analysis.

Langer's philosophy was furthered by Robert Waite who as chairman of the department of History at Williams College realized the danger of using psychology as a historical tool without fully denouncing its value.

"Any historian knows how much bad history has been written by those who are long on psychological training and short on historical evidence...yet, [Waite recognizes] in dealing with such pathological personalities as Hitler, historians soon encounter literally hundreds of facts that they are simply not trained qua historians to interpret."³²

Waite warned that his foray into psychoanalysis and history would not provide conclusive answers, but he presented his case with "the hope that the attempt will at least provide new departures for other investigators of the life of the bizarre little man who for a decade bestrode Europe like a colossus and decided the fate of nations."³³

As far as Waite was concerned, anti-Semitism was the most striking feature of Hitler's personality. He agreed that "historians may never know why Hitler became such a violent hater of the Jews," but goes on to say that, "we are not likely to find out if we continue to ignore the insights that abnormal psychology might be able to give us."³⁴ Waite's method is interesting although risky. After affirming that Hitler was primarily an anti-Semite, Waite determined the common characteristics of hundreds of American anti-Semitic personalities and went on to show how Hitler's life fulfilled each of these. For example, Waite noted that most anti-Semites are infantile personalities who show marked immaturity in their cultural tastes and political convictions. He then attempted to show that Hitler also had this characteristic, noting that the leader

of the Third Reich sucked his little finger and had a passion for cowboy movies. After making many similar comparisons, Waite seemed to feel that his reverse form of logic had answered his question. However the crux of the matter, the importance of Hitler's anti-Semitism, was never approached. Some of the defects in approaching history psychologically have been pointed out by another historian, W. Gatzke who paid special attention to Langer's work. Although Gatzke affirmed that Langer's work was "the most detailed and, despite its many flaws, most thorough study of its kind published to date," he also realized that, "such data besides being pertinent must be reliable."³⁵ Gatzke accused Langer of judging the reliability of his sources by the way they fitted his preconceived image of Hitler. He declared Langer's mode of inquiry "imaginative but hardly exact."³⁶ Indeed many of Langer's examples are historically inaccurate or at least excessively generalized. "Some of the most important conclusions of Langer's book are based on non existent, unreliable or misinterpreted evidence."³⁷ Gatzke's final conclusion was that "neither psychologists nor historians, working independently of each other seem to produce mutually satisfactory results."³⁸

One historian who seems to have bridged the gap rather admirably is James H. McRandle. McRandle emphasized the psychological makeup of Hitler without sacrificing historical accuracy. One thing he cleverly avoided was any attempt to make generalizations from the study of other patients. For McRandle, Hitler was a paradox whose life resembled "the suggestion of power, destructiveness, and loneliness inherent in the wolf figure [which Hitler attributed to himself]."³⁹ McRandle concluded that there were two Hitlers--"the one a dawdling dreamer with aspirations towards the artistic life, the other a ravening wolf hungering for, and attaining political power."⁴⁰ He went on to emphasize that an "understanding of both[characters] is necessary for a comprehension of the reasons for Hitler's successes as well as his failures."⁴¹ McRandle realized that the obvious contradictions in Hitler's lifestyle presented a major obstacle to a full assessment of his character; however, he was not willing to give them up. "The poses--the artist, Bohemian, the dervish, the man in the crowd, and the simple soldier--proved to be basic for Hitler's political career."⁴² Hitler was able to play many roles and thus control his associates. McRandle's most important contribution, however, is found in his unwillingness to limit the importance of this dual image to the man or the time. Instead he emphasized that "the volatile compound of artistic vision and destructive force has possibilities for attraction which have been effectively exploited in many eras of history."⁴³

Obviously no biography can be complete or perfectly unbiased. Further developments in means of studying a character have only increased the chance for disagreement. However such factors as psychological studies are valuable in that they do add to the historian's understanding of a character when properly confirmed by historical methods. Works such as those of Langer, Waite, and McRandle have great value for historians when properly used. Alan Bullock admitted that the personality of his subject baffled him and that he found Hitler's strange career offensive both to his reason and historical training. Speer also seemed to be searching for a psychological answer to explain both the people who supported Hitler and Hitler himself. Apparently psychological studies are

ardently demanded; however, when these works are marred by historical inaccuracies their value is seriously impaired. The blatant inaccuracies in many of these psychologically bent historian's works make them inadequate for today's historical methods. Nevertheless, we cannot do away with these attempts. Sociological and psychological factors are crucial to a proper understanding of any historical figure especially one who manifests as deviant a behavior pattern as Hitler did. If these areas are not considered the material tends to fall into an abyss of rather meaningless facts and figures.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Alan Bullock, Hitler a Study in Tyranny. New York, Harper and Row, 1964, 15.
- ²Bullock, 16.
- ³Bullock, 806.
- ⁴Bullock, 343.
- ⁵Bullock, 63.
- ⁶Bullock, 802.
- ⁷D. C. Watt. "Hitler Comes to Power," History Today, XIII (March 1963), 153.
- ⁸Watt, 158.
- ⁹Emil Ludwig, Three Portraits: Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin. New York, Alliance Book Corporation, 1940, 5.
- ¹⁰Ludwig, 5.
- ¹¹Ludwig, 18.
- ¹²Ludwig, 23.
- ¹³Konrad, Heiden. Der Fuehrer--Hitler's Rise to Power. Boston, Beacon Press, 1969, preface.
- ¹⁴Heiden, preface.
- ¹⁵Heiden, 7.
- ¹⁶Heiden, 7.
- ¹⁷Heiden, 629.
- ¹⁸H. C. O'Neill. Men of Destiny. London, Phoenix house, 1953, 9.
- ¹⁹O'Neill, 146.
- ²⁰O'Neill, 175.
- ²¹Fritz Ernst, The Germans and Their Modern History. New York, Columbia University Press, 1966, preface.
- ²²Ernst, preface.
- ²³Ernst, 100.

- 24Ernst, 100.
- 25Albert Speer. Inside the Third Reich. New York, Avon Books, 1971, Introduction.
- 26Speer, 659.
- 27Walter Langer. The Mind of Adolf Hitler. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1972, preface.
- 28Langer, 140.
- 29Langer, 139.
- 30Langer, 140.
- 31Langer, 199.
- 32Langer, 195.
- 32bRobert Waite. "Adolf Hitler's Anti-Semitism; A Study in History and Psychoanalysis," The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of History, edited by B. B. Wolmar. New York, Basic Books, Inc., 1971, 192.
- 33Waite, 192.
- 34Waite, 194.
- 35Hans Gatzke. "Hitler and Psychohistory," American Historical Review , LXXVIII (April, 1973), 397.
- 36Gatzke, 397.
- 37Gatzke, 400.
- 38Gatzke, 401.
- 39James McRandle. The Track of the Wolf. Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1965, 4.
- 40McRandle, 5.
- 41McRandle, 5.
- 42McRandle, 9.
- 43McRandle, 18.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bullock, Alan. Hitler a Study in Tyranny. New York: Harper and Row, 1964.
- Ernst, Fritz. The Germans and Their Modern History. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.
- Gatzke, Hans. "Hitler and Psychohistory," American Historical Review, LXXVIII (April, 1973), 394-401.
- Heiden, Konrad. Der Fuehrer--Hitler's Rise to Power. Boston: Beacon Press, 1969.
- Langer, Walter. The Mind of Adolf Hitler. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1972.
- Ludwig, Emil. Three Portraits: Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin. New York: Alliance Book Corporation, 1940.
- McRandle, James. The Track of the Wolf. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965.
- O'Neill, H. C. Men of Destiny. London: Phoenix House, 1953.
- Speer, Albert. Inside the Third Reich. New York: Avon Books, 1971.
- Waite, Robert. "Adolf Hitler's Anti-Semitism; A Study in History and Psychoanalysis," The Psychoanalytic Interpretation of History, edited by B. B. Wolman. New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971.
- Watt, D. C. "Hitler Comes to Power," History Today, XIII (March, 1963). 152-164.

BENJAMIN DISRAELI: ATYPICAL VICTORIAN

Submitted by:

GAYLE GULLIVER

In the twentieth century one tends to believe that the Victorian Age possessed no truly dynamic personalities. It is thought to have been an age of ossification. However, the Victorian Age was an era of change, which could only have been the case if there existed dynamic men. One of these vital men was Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881). To a great extent, he was responsible for the changes of the time. Almost singlehandedly, he created the modern Conservative Party, thus providing Great Britain with a two party system in fact, as well as in name.

Disraeli occupied the center stage of a changing social scene. It was an era in which the aristocracy was retreating in the face of the middle-class onslaught. Intellectually, the aristocracy had passed the torch to the rising middle-class. At Holland House, the Whig intellectual center, the brightest light was Thomas Macaulay, a member of the middle-class.¹

The decline of the aristocracy was inevitable, given its own peculiar temperament and the harshness of the Industrial Revolution. A German visitor likened this competition to Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, inasmuch as both involved competition to survive.² By temperament, most aristocrats could not deal in this world. Also, the aristocrat was able to escape the situation because of his birthright. However, by its voluntary removal the aristocracy ceased to have any influence in the shaping of the new environment. Thus, the middle-class remained as the sole generating force.

Many members of the middle-class welcomed this change. Men, like Jeremy Bentham, were delighted. Bentham felt that the aristocracy had made a muddle of things, and that it was time to give a chance to the energetic middle-class.³

This change was propitious for Benjamin Disraeli. Only with the total decline of the old aristocracy could he have risen to the pinnacle of British politics. Paradoxically, he was the greatest champion of the British aristocracy. Throughout his life, he felt the existence of a strong aristocracy to be necessary for a strong England. However, it must be noted that Disraeli felt an aristocratic party could not ignore the lower classes. It was important for the Conservative party to care for the workers. Only by injecting concern for the workers into a party based on the principle of exclusion could the aristocracy survive. He never relinquished this belief.⁴

To understand Disraeli and his importance, it is necessary to examine his personality. Only by a thorough examination of his outlook is it possible to see why he desired the creation of a viable Conservative Party.

Disraeli was baptised as a member of the Church of England on August 28, 1817.⁵ Hence, he was no longer a member of the Jewish religion, but he retained a strong feeling for the Jewish race, as he termed it. He believed in the divinity of Jesus Christ and in the Resurrection, but he failed to grasp the importance of these doctrines. Disraeli retained his enthusiasm for the Jewish race. Because of this feeling and his expression of it, he was destined to remain an alien.

In his novel Coningsby (1844) Disraeli states clearly his feeling on the subject of the position of the Jews in Europe. Sidonia, one of the main characters, is a composite of Disraeli and of Baron Alfred de Rothschild. Sidonia expresses the belief that the Jews are the best people:

The mixed persecuting races disappear. The pure persecuted race remains. And at this moment, in spite of centuries, of tens of centuries, of degradation, the Jewish mind exercises a vast influence in the affairs of Europe.⁶

If Disraeli felt pride in his ancestry, he felt only contempt for those who had injured the Jews. Again, he expresses this feeling through Sidonia:

But the Spanish Goth, then so cruel and so haughty, where is he? A despised suppliant to the very race which he banished for some miserable portion of the treasure which their habits of industry have again accumulated.⁷

These feelings influenced his attitude towards the Church of England. He felt it to be only a growth on the Jewish tree. He enunciated this idea in the debate over the question of Jewish emancipation.

The very reason for admitting the Jews is because they can show so near an affinity to you. Where is your Christianity, if you do not believe in their Judaism.⁸

Therefore, if Disraeli had any religious feelings at all, they were for the Jewish faith. His feelings for the Anglican Church were of a limited nature. He mourned the loss of Newman only insofar as Newman became a Catholic and not a Jew.⁹

Specifically, Disraeli believed his background to be of the Jewish aristocracy. He deluded himself into believing that his had been among the aristocratic Jews exiled from Spain in 1492. Furthermore, he subscribed to the belief that the Sephardi Jews were aristocratic. It is true his family was a member of the Sephardi branch, but there is absolutely no truth that the Disraelis were among the Jews expelled from Spain in 1492. Equally fallacious is his statement that the Disraelis were aristocratic merchants in the Venetian Republic. There is no record of this in Venice.¹⁰

Disraeli's belief in his family ancestry colored his view of

government and politics. He felt himself to be an aristocrat, which translates into the fact that he felt he should by all rights been a leader. However, because of his Jewish heritage, Disraeli was on the outside. He desperately desired to be inside. He expressed this state of mind in a letter to Sharon Turner in March of 1828:

Whether I shall ever do anything which may mark me out from the crowd I know not,...I am one of those to whom moderate reputation can give no pleasure...¹¹

In this desire to be great it was almost inevitable that Disraeli would become a Tory. His father, Issac, inclined towards Tory principles. Issac associated almost exclusively with men of conservative beliefs. He owned a country estate, Bradenham, where he lived like any other country squire. This atmosphere exerted a strong influence upon Benjamin. However, he flirted briefly with the Radicals. It was a short lived affair. By 1835 Benjamin was an avowed Conservative.¹²

The Conservative Party had as its basic tenets: a landed aristocracy, the Crown and the Church. However, Disraeli's interest in these did not exclude the other classes. He was in favor of a social hierarchy and a form of paternalism. Disraeli felt this would not alienate any one class at the expense of another. For that reason he disliked Sir Robert Peel's government which catered to the industrial middle-class at the expense of the laborers and the landed interest. It was, as he said in Coningsby:

'A sound Conservative government,' said Taper musingly. 'I understand: Tory men and Whig measures.'¹³

It was in response to such a turn of events that Disraeli became the leader of the Young England faction. In essence, Young England meant that the owners of property have a responsibility to those who work that property. This was a proposition that Disraeli would espouse for the rest of his life.

Disraeli claimed that in 1832 with the passage of the First Reform Bill, the lower classes were deprived of the power they had previously exercised. In a speech to Parliament he enunciated his belief that the laborers of England had had a share in the government, which imperfect, was viable.

Until the act of 1832 was passed the claims of the labouring class to a share in our Parliamentary system were acknowledged, and their rights were enjoyed and practiced. Although the mode by which they were asserted may not have been happily adapted to the circumstances of the present century, there can be no doubt that these claims were definitely acknowledged and settled upon...¹⁴

It was his assertion that in England, the true Constitution which represented all, had been perverted because the people had been deprived of their rights. Furthermore, there is no doubt that Disraeli believed sincerely in the working classes. In a letter to Lord John Manners on December 24, 1880, he gave vent to this feeling:

The only portion of the Constituencies in my opinion who may be depended on when affairs are ripe, are the English working classes.¹⁵

Disraeli could write such sentiments as he had a vision of a great national party which would have been hierarchical. He thought that the base of the structure, as well as the apex, would support the national institutions of England in opposition to the internationalism of William Gladstone and the Liberals. He gave this view in a speech in October 1867 at Edinburgh:

...I have always thought that those who were most interested in the stability and even in the glory of a State are the great mass of the population.¹⁶

However, Disraeli was not sympathetic to workers in the general sense. He was perfectly willing to deal with improvements for urban workers. He was not amenable to the idea of bettering the conditions of agricultural workers. Practically, Disraeli could not because the basis of support for the Conservative Party was the landed interest. Therefore, in 1875 he would secure the passage of the Trade Union Act. In 1867, however, he opposed, and he continued to do so, the suggestion of enfranchising the agricultural laborer.¹⁷

In fact, Disraeli had declared, as one of the objectives of the Conservative Party, to maintain the recognition of the aristocratic principle in the Constitution.¹⁸ Indeed, for the rest of his life, Disraeli was enamored with the English aristocracy. For him, the aristocracy was one of England's greatest assets. It was a great asset because of the possession of land. In a Parliamentary speech on February 11, 1867, he said:

...Take the peerage of England. It is probably the wealthiest body in the world, and it possesses particularly the kind of property which is most popular in England, because of a tenure connected with the fulfillment of duties--I mean the land.¹⁹

As Disraeli believed himself to be a member of the aristocracy, by virtue of being an aristocratic Jew, he desired certain things that then went only to aristocrats. In 1841 he requested a position in Peel's government.²⁰ He was refused in a rather frigid letter. No matter how much he felt himself to be a member of the aristocratic community, he was regarded as an alien.²¹

Disraeli was a man who lived in a fantasy world on that point. In

1863 Disraeli and his wife Mary Ann were invited to the wedding of the Prince of Wales. He believed the invitation to be a sign of Queen Victoria's personal favor. He was intoxicated. In a letter to a friend, Mrs. Williams, he wrote:

...None of my late colleagues are invited except Lord Derby and he would go as a matter of course as Knight of the Garter.
But I am Invited.²²

In truth, he was only invited because Lord Palmerston advised the Queen to do so.

It has been suggested to Viscount Palmerston that, as Mr. Disraeli, has like Lord Derby, behaved extremely well about the Bill for the Prince of Wales' establishment, it might be a gracious and not unuseful thing, if Your Majesty thought fit, that he, as Leader of the Conservative Party in the House of Commons, might be invited to the Wedding as well as Lord Derby.²³

Whatever the feelings of the true aristocracy for him were, Disraeli was determined to preserve and protect them. It was he not they, who insured that there would be no revolution through a series of reforms. It was Disraeli who saw to the preservation of Anglican Protestantism. Disraeli guided the Public Worship Bill through Parliament. This bill was aimed primarily at High Churchmen who were flirting with Catholicism. These groups were potentially dangerous to the foundations of the established order. Therefore, Disraeli undertook the onus of crushing these people with the Public Worship Bill.²⁴

Despite this action, it is likely that Disraeli himself felt very little need of religion. He once said, "I am the blank page between the Old and the New Testament."²⁵ In short, the Church was a convenient tool for the preservation of the traditional order.

In contrast to his political colleagues, Disraeli did not glory in the "manliness" of the era. He did not care for society that was exclusively male. He disliked their all male dinners, and he only went to the Carlton and the Athenaeum Clubs out of courtesy to his fellow politicians.

His friendships with men were limited. Of these few male friendships, they were usually with either younger men, such as Lord John Manners, or with older men, such as Lord Lyndhurst. A possible explanation for this curious situation may have been his sense of inferiority stemming from the fact he did not attend a famous high school (Hingham Hall was considered minor), or one of the universities.

Disraeli always wanted to be the leader. In a group of younger men he naturally would have been the leader. This is what actually happened. He was the leader of the Young England faction, a fact which was partially

due to his age. He was the only man under forty. The other members, Lord John Manners, George Smythe, and Alexander Baille-Gochrane were in their twenties.

It is possible that he felt a need to assert his superiority, but that he also realized his contemporaries would not have tolerated it. They regarded him as an alien. Their feelings for him probably began to be communicated to him at Hingham Hall. His school mates were blond and blue-eyed; Disraeli had black curly hair and dark eyes. In order to compensate, Disraeli avoided men his own age, and he developed his theory of belonging to the most noble aristocracy.²⁶

Disraeli's friendships with older men stemmed from the cynical side of his nature. These men were already established, and friendships with them were profitable in the political sense. It was through Lyndhurst's patronage that Disraeli first became acquainted with real politics.²⁷

There were only two strong friendships with men his own age. One was with William Meredith, Sarah Disraeli's fiancé. Meredith died suddenly from smallpox in 1831 on a tour of the Near East with Benjamin.²⁸ The other friendship was with Edward Bulwer-Lytton. This relationship became strained after the dissolution of Lytton's marriage and because of the meddling of Disraeli's wife in the affair.

Disraeli's greatest friends and preferred companions were women. This predilection is stated in Coningsby:

For three or four months, and for the first time in his life, he had passed his time in the continual society of refined and charming women. It is an acquaintance which when habitual, exercises a great influence over the tone of the mind, even if it does not produce any more violent effects. It refines the taste and quickens the perception, and gives, as it were, a grace and flexibility to the intellect.²⁹

In feminine society he glittered. He could indulge his passion for witty conversation. In male company he would have to be serious, and act as if he knew every detail of every piece of legislation being passed. Actually, the one thing in life he never mastered was details.³⁰

Specifically, he preferred the companionship of older women. It is possible he was searching for a mother substitute. His own mother, Maria, displayed very little affection towards him. In his papers, there is no mention of her at all. Probably, Maria was unappreciative of his genius. She did not comprehend his brilliance until it was too late to regain his affection. Maria did not express any acknowledgement of his talents until March 1847. The evidence is found in a letter from Sarah Disraeli to Benjamin's wife: "Mama at last confesses that she never before thought Dis was equal to Mr. Pitt. So you see, it pleases all variety of hearers or readers."³¹

In both fiction and life, Disraeli's most satisfying relationships

were with older women. In Coningsby the hero's most intelligent conversations are carried on with Lady Wallinger, his sweetheart's aunt. Edith Millbank may be the object of his love, yet they never really communicate. However, between Lady Wallinger and the hero, there exists a deep mutual respect.

This aspect of the novel was a reflection of Disraeli's own life. His older sister Sarah exerted a great deal of influence on him. One of the most important persons in his early career was Mrs. Sara Austen. Disraeli's mistress, Lady Henrietta Sykes, was several years older than he. His wife, the widow of Wyndham Lewis, was twelve years older than he.

In all of these women, Disraeli was searching for the affection his mother denied him. It is natural for an older sister to care for a younger brother, but this relationship took on the form of "mothering" with the death of Meredith. She pledged herself to his career, and she was the most influential woman in his life until his marriage in 1839.³²

Mrs. Sara Austen became Disraeli's agent when he began his career as a novelist. It was she, not Disraeli, who negotiated his contract with the publisher, Henry Colburn. Their relationship was on a personal level. she also took to "mothering" him. If he had a cold, she was upset:

I cannot continue my note thus coldly. My shaking hand will tell that I am nervous with the shock of your illness. What is the matter? For God's sake, take care of yourself...³³

His dependence upon older women is apparent in his letters to Henrietta Sykes. In her letters to him she signed herself "Your Mother." Henrietta also termed him "my child."³⁴ However, as a married woman she could not provide Disraeli with the security he needed, neither emotionally nor financially. He only found both in his marriage to Mary Ann Lewis, a widow twelve years his senior. Their relationship had the same characteristic of maternal solicitude found in the relationships cited above. He once wrote to her before they were married: "How is his darling? When will she come to see her child?"³⁵

It has often been alleged that Disraeli married her for purely mercenary reasons. No doubt he took her considerably comfortable financial position into account. There was more to their marriage than money. Mary Ann, a very blunt woman, testified to this: "Dizzy married me for my money, but if he had the chance again, he would marry me for love."³⁶

In his marriage Disraeli did not only receive, he gave. In 1868 when he had to resign as Prime Minister, Disraeli requested that Queen Victoria make Mrs. Disraeli a peeress in her own right. He did so despite the ridicule he knew he would incur. Disraeli wanted to give her something as her life drew to a close; he was well aware that she was dying of cancer. It was an embarrassing request as is demonstrated in a letter to the Queen from her personal secretary, General Grey, on November 23, 1868:

...and General Grey can quite understand your

Majesty's feeling--the desire to do what would gratify Mr. Disraeli, who certainly deserves it at your Majesty's hand, and yet not to expose him to the attacks, and even ridicule, which would surely follow the creation of Mrs. Disraeli a peeress in her own right, which is evidently the object to which he alluded...³⁷

The cynicism in relation to women of which Disraeli has often been accused is apparent in his relationship with Victoria. He realized she was starved for some kind of personal, almost romantic attention. He catered to her in an unbelievable manner. He acknowledged this to Matthew Arnold: "You have heard me called a flatterer, and it is true. Everyone likes flattery; and when you come to royalty you should lay it on with a trowel."³⁸

Such a manner is what led Gladstone to describe Disraeli as the "artful dodger." No doubt Disraeli realized such a manner would promote him and erode the position of his enemies. He told several friends of Victoria's feelings for Gladstone since she came under his influence: "She seems now really to hate Gladstone," and "...she really thinks Gladstone mad."³⁹

He did not operate without any consideration of her best interests. He coaxed her out of retirement, which was the best behavior to secure the monarchy. Disraeli did not do so on the grounds that she was a public monument, but on the grounds that she must appear. She was not to appear if her health could not bear it: "If your Majesty is ill, he is sure he will himself break down. All really depends upon your Majesty."⁴⁰

In her diary her favorable reaction was noted in an entry on September 28, 1868:

Took leave of Mr. Disraeli, who seemed delighted with his stay and was most grateful. He certainly shows more consideration for my comfort than any of the preceding Prime Minister since Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen.⁴¹

There is really only one incident in which Disraeli acted deceitfully. He never knew Prince Albert. However, in a letter on March 11, 1876, upon receiving a portrait of the late Prince from the Queen one would have thought the Prince and he had been extremely close: "It will have a more suitable home at Hughenden, but he does not like to be separated from it so soon and for so long a time."⁴²

With the Queen Disraeli found that he was not the only force. She pressured him to introduce the Royal Titles Act in 1876 although it was inconvenient for him to do so. She was determined to become Empress of India as soon as possible. Her attitude was a result of his demeanor towards her. Disraeli stated the matter succinctly in a letter to Lord Cairns on January 7: "The Empress-Queen demands her Imperial Crown."⁴³

Despite the opportunism of both parties, there existed a strong mutual affection. Towards the end of his life, Disraeli remarked: "I love the Queen--perhaps the only person in this world left for me that I do love."⁴⁴

Victoria always felt affection and high regard for him. A decade after his death, she recorded in her diary on April 19, 1891: "Ten years since Lord Beaconsfield, that kind, wise old man, was taken."⁴⁵ The name she remembers him by is significant. She had created Disraeli Earl of Beaconsfield in the hope of prolonging his life by removing him to the House of Lords.

In conclusion it can be stated that Benjamin Disraeli was an atypical Victorian. Other Victorians would defend the institutions of tradition and believe in them. He did not. The Crown was a convenient tool for him. The Anglican Church was a political necessity; it was never a personal necessity.

Unlike many of his Conservative Party colleagues, Disraeli recognized the need for social legislation to prevent revolution. He never intended that there should be a change in the social structure. Indeed, he wanted social legislation in order to preserve the aristocratic class of England.

In regards to sex, it can be stated that Disraeli did not care for convention. In his time marriage to an older woman was considered odd. Disraeli did not care what anyone thought of his marriage. Also, he flaunted his affair with Henrietta Sykes. He was sufficiently unconventional to work out an arrangement with her husband. In this respect, he was definitely atypical.

Disraeli was still a romantic in many respects. This also sets him off from his age, with its passion for facts. His fellow politicians poured facts upon Victoria; he did not. Disraeli made a dreary cabinet meeting sound like a dramatic play. Because of this aura of the fantastic, he was to remain an alien.

He always wanted to be inside. He had this characteristic, and it was the only thing he shared with the middle-class. In every other way he had the true aristocrat's scorn for the new moneyed middle-class.

In the final analysis, it can be said Disraeli was an atypical Victorian. He never became an accepted member of the group he wished to join. On the other side of the line, he detested the middle-class, the truly dominant class. Disraeli was always on a lonely island.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Esme Wingfield Stratford, Those Earnest Victorians (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1930), p. 29.
- ³Ibid., p. 80.
- ⁴R. C. K. Ensor, England: 1870-1914 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), p. 71.
- ⁵Robert Blake, Disraeli (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966), p. 11.
- ⁶Benjamin Disraeli, Coningsby (London: Henry Colburn, Publisher, 1844; reprinted by Capricorn Books, New York, 1961), p. 303.
- ⁷Ibid., p. 258.
- ⁸Blake, Disraeli, p. 259.
- ⁹D. C. Somervell, Disraeli and Gladstone (Garden City, New York: Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1926), p. 56.
- ¹⁰Ibid., p. 19-20.
- ¹¹Blake, Disraeli, p. 54.
- ¹²Ibid., p. 123.
- ¹³Disraeli, Coningsby, p. 124.
- ¹⁴Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, 3rd. series, Vol. 185, p. 216.
- ¹⁵Paul Smith, Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967), p. 318.
- ¹⁶Ibid., p. 103.
- ¹⁷Ibid., p. 35.
- ¹⁸E. J. Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Democracy and the Tory Party (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 21.
- ¹⁹Hansard, p. 231.
- ²⁰Blake, Disraeli, p. 284.
- ²¹Somervell, Disraeli and Gladstone, p. 50.
- ²²Blake, Disraeli, p. 432.

- ²³George Earle Buckle, ed., Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, Vol. I, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1926), p. 70.
- ²⁴Ensor, England 1870-1914, p. 141.
- ²⁵Blake, Disraeli, p. 504.
- ²⁶Ibid., p. 17.
- ²⁷Ibid., p. 116.
- ²⁸Ibid., p. 70.
- ²⁹Disraeli, Coningsby, p. 312.
- ³⁰Feuchtwanger, Disraeli, Democracy and the Tory Party, p. 22.
- ³¹Blake, Disraeli, p. 15.
- ³²Ibid., p. 70.
- ³³Ibid.
- ³⁴Ibid., p. 99.
- ³⁵Ibid., p. 106.
- ³⁶Somervell, Disraeli and Gladstone, p. 230
- ³⁷Buckle, ed., Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, Vol. I., p. 557.
- ³⁸Somervell, Disraeli and Gladstone, p. 230.
- ³⁹Phillip Guedalla, The Queen and Mr. Gladstone (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1934), p. 92.
- ⁴⁰Lytton Strachey, Queen Victoria, (New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1921), p. 347.
- ⁴¹Buckle, ed., Letters of Queen Victoria, 2nd. series, Vol. I, p. 539.
- ⁴²Ibid., p. 449.
- ⁴³Blake, Disraeli, p. 562.
- ⁴⁴Strachey, Queen Victoria, p. 356.
- ⁴⁵George Earle Buckle, ed., Letters of Queen Victoria, 3rd. series, Vol. III, (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1931). p. 23.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

Buckle, George Earle (ed.). The Letters of Queen Victoria, Second Series, 1862-86, (3 vols., 1926). New York: Longmans, Green, and Co.

Buckle, George Earle (ed.). The Letters of Queen Victoria, Third Series, 1881-1901, (3 vols., 1931). New York: Longmans, Green and Co.

Disraeli, Benjamin. Coningsby. Henry Colburn, Publisher, 1844, Capricorn Books edition, New York, 1961.

Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Third Series.

Secondary Sources

Blake, Robert. Disraeli. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1966.

Ensor, R. C. K. England: 1870-1914. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936.

Feuchtwanger, E. J. Disraeli, Democracy and the Tory Party. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1968.

Guedalla, Philip. The Queen and Mr. Gladstone. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1934.

Smith, Paul. Disraelian Conservatism and Social Reform. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1967.

Somervell, D. C. Disraeli and Gladstone. Garden City, New York; Garden City Publishing Co., Inc., 1926.

Strachey, Lytton. Queen Victoria. New York: Blue Ribbon Books, 1921.

Stratford, Esme Wingfield. Those Earnest Victorians. New York: William Morrow and Co., 1930.

THE NEMTSY AND NOVGOROD

A STUDY OF THE GERMAN KNIGHTS IN RUSSIA

Submitted by:

JOHN SHINNERS

I

During the thirteenth century the sprawling, unprotected borders of Russia provided an easy access into that country to willing invaders from both Asia and Europe. In 1223 at the Kalka River the Russians suffered the first blows of the fierce Mongol invaders who surged eastward from their conquered territories in Asia onto the Russian plains, retreated, and then--fourteen years later--returned to begin a successful campaign of conquest which resulted in two centuries of Russian obeisance to the Golden Horde. This Mongol irruption was the most thorough and influential attack ever brought down upon Russia. But the Mongols were not the only nation to make inroads into Russia. From Europe in the west there were several other groups who eyed the young, unsettled country with covetousness. The nations of Poland, Lithuania, and Sweden all made intermittent forays into Russia in the thirteenth and subsequent centuries. These western invaders--though not as bloodthirsty as the Mongols--were also inspired by the desire for territorial expansion and national aggrandizement. However, there was one final group of powerful assailants whose lust for power was not straightforward, but instead was cloaked in the insidious cover of religious justification. This group was the two military religious orders of German knights (the Teutonic and the Livonian Orders) who--representing the vestiges of the tenth century Drang nach Osten--went against the "heretical" Orthodox Russians and other Slavs with crusading fervor in the name of Christ. Although their genuine aim was clearly to gain territorial concessions from the Slavs, they never succeeded in permanently wresting land from Russia. But the history of their incessant encroachments into Russian territory over a period of three hundred years, and Russia's persistent resistance to them is an intriguing account of one facet of Russia's relations with the Christian West.

Throughout the years of initial conflict between the German knights and Russia, the towns of the northwest were the most frequent points of contact between them. (Pskov, Izborsk and smaller towns were all threatened by the knights.) Of course the principal city among these was "Lord Novgorod the Great." In fact, by the time the German knights were beginning large-scale attacks against Russia, Novgorod stood as the most important city in the country. With Russia divided into numerous appanages after the decline and initial fall of Kiev in 1169, only Novgorod survived as a strong city-state--probably largely because of its republican political design and its excellent trading stance vis a vis Europe.

Because of Novgorod's stability and its constant western contact, the Chronicle of Novgorod--which recorded the activities of the city from 1016 to 1471--is an excellent (if somewhat undetailed) source for examining German contacts with Russia. However, there is one drawback in using the Chronicle as a source. That is, the Russian word Nemtsy which is used in reference to

Germans can mean any German, whether friend or foe. (Nemtsy means a dumb or mute person which is what the Russians considered anyone who could not speak their language to be.) It can only be determined by the context of the reference or by cross-referencing to another source whether the Chronicle is describing a Hansa merchant, a German knight, or even possibly a Swede. This paper attempts to isolate only those references to Nemtsy which apply to German knights; and since the Livonian Order was more active in the Russian area than the Teutonic Order, the references usually refer to Livonian knights.

The association of Novgorod with the Germans prior to the onslaught of the German knights had been based upon peaceful trade relations. Even before the powerful German-based Hanseatic League was organized, Novgorod was trading with the Germans through the city of Wisby, established on the island of Gotland in 1160.² Eventually the Hanseatic League consolidated its power in the Baltic area and established a merchant quarter at Novgorod. But, as James Thompson explains "...the Russians hated the merchants, who were foreigners of a different belief, or rather disbelievers, which was about the same in the eyes of the mass of people."³ This German apprehension and Russian animosity are understandable; it must be remembered that the Novgorodians had not long before in 1242 met and defeated invading German knights at Lake Peipus. Thus, the relations between Novgorod and the Hansa merchants were never completely stable. Nevertheless, the flourishing trade of Novgorod expanded; and the prestige of the city in the eyes of the commercial world can be well measured in the Hansa dictate: "Who can prevail against God and the Great Novgorod?"⁴

Matters became more complicated with the emergence of the Teutonic knights in the Baltic area. Although by the fourteenth century the Teutonic Knights would be recognized as the "High Protectors" of the Hanseatic League's Baltic trade monopoly, the two groups would later engage in disputes over Prussia's right to conduct trade with Novgorod.⁵ Ultimately, in 1494 the German trade influence in Novgorod would abruptly end with Ivan III's expulsion of the Hanseatic merchants from the city.

II

The German knights who plagued Russia for three centuries were comprised of two separate military religious Orders of Knighthood which eventually merged. The most renowned of these two groups was the Teutonic Knights (or the Teutonic Knights of the Hospital of Saint Mary of Jerusalem) who are best known for having established the former country of Prussia. This Order was founded by knights of Lubeck and Bremen in 1191 during the Third Crusade.⁶ It was organized along the same discipline as the Knights Hospitallers, the knights taking vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. The purpose of the Teutonic Knights was "to care for the poor and the sick as well as to wage war against the foes of Christendom."⁷

When the crusading ardor against the Saracen infidels began to cool, it was suggested that a more local crusade be called against the Slavic heathens and heretics of northeastern Europe. Some military religious orders of knighthood were established specifically for these Slavic crusades, but the Teutonic Knights were already available for such an enterprise. Thus,

upon the invitation of King Andrew III of Hungary in 1211, a band of Teutonic Knights left their headquarters in Acre and went to fight the pagan Kumans.

Meanwhile, German missionaries had begun to move into the area around the Baltic Sea ostensibly to preach the Gospel to the suffering pagans. However, when the missionary town of Uxhol (in Livonia) was attacked by the pagans, it called for aid, and a crusade was preached against the north-eastern European infidels in 1199. Soon afterwards, the able missionary Albert established the town of Riga (1201) in Livonia. Then, one year later in 1202 in order to protect the town and spread the word of God with the cross of the sword, Albert of Riga founded the military religious order of the Fratres Militiae Christi (Brother's of Christ's Militia) also known as the Knights of the Sword, the Swordbearers or the Livonian Knights. After subduing the Livonian pagans the knights began a campaign into Estonia (Estonia) to subjugate the heathen tribes that dwelled there. Soon after this, the "missionary" exploits of the Livonian Knights began to appear in the Chronicle of Novgorod.

In 1219 the Chronicle reports that the Novgorodians went against a group of Livonian Knights near Pertuyev:

...The same year the Knyaz Vsevolod went with the men of Novgorod to Pertuyev, and they met outposts of the Nemtsy, Lithuanians, and Livonians (Libs), and they fought; and God helped the men of Novgorod; they went up to the town and stood there two weeks; they⁸ did not take the town, and returned all well.

Later, in 1224 the Livonian Knights captured the Russian town of Yuriev that had been founded by Yaroslav the Wise in 1030. The Chronicle succinctly records the capture of this important town which would become a strategic stronghold of the Livonian Knights.

...The same year the Nemtsy killed Knyaz Vyachko in Gyurgev (Yuriev or Dorpat) and took the town.

During the following years, the Livonian Order would work to firmly establish its authority among the Baltic tribes.

In 1225 the Teutonic Knights were expelled from Hungary because of the threat of their growing power to the Hungarian throne. Fortunately, in that same year they were invited by Conrad, Prince of the principality of Mazovia, to come into Poland and quell the marauding pagan Prussians who had apostatized from their recent conversion at the hands of Christian, Bishop of Prussia, and were now terrorizing the area. Although a special crusade had been preached against the heretical Prussians by the Pope, it was not able to secure the revolt. In order to maintain a permanent peace, Conrad thought that a standing military force should be garrisoned in his kingdom. The Teutonic knights gladly accepted his invitation to come to Poland (which was sweetened by the gift of tracts of land) where they settled at the Castles of Thorn and Kulm. In 1234 they absorbed the Dobrynian Order of Knights

which had been organized earlier to suppress the Prussians. Within fifty years, the Teutonic Knights had completely subdued the Prussians.⁹

Several years after the entrance of the Teutonic Knights into Poland, the Livonian Order--situated further north--began to suffer setbacks in its violent proselytizing efforts. The land that it had conquered were slipping into rebellion. In 1234 the Chronicle reports that "Knyaz Yaroslav with the men of Novgorod and the whole district and with his own forces, went against the Nemtsy towards Yurev" where "he let his people ravage the land." After fighting and meeting defeat the Nemtsky "did obeisance to the Knyaz, and Yaroslav took peace with them on his own terms." This was no isolated instance, and the revolts continued not only from the Russian Slavs of the area, but also from the various pagan tribes.

The outcome of these rebellions was that two years later on September 22 the Livonian Order (and its Slavic allies from Pskov)¹⁰ suffered a disastrous rout near Saule at the hands of the pagan Zemgals and Zhemoyts. This blow to the Order was so great that in 1237 it requested to be incorporated into the now prosperous Teutonic Order.¹¹ Their request was granted and the two Orders were combined although the Livonian Knights still retained a great deal of independence. The Teutonic Knights continued crusading in Livonia, Esthonia, Lithuania and the Russian area.

However, in order to reinstate the control of the Livonian Knights in the Baltic, the Teutonic Knight Hermann Balke (who had led the pacification of the Prussians) was made Landmeister of Livonia. He went there with a group of sixty Knights and soon peace was restored.¹² The knights now turned to Russia where they believed that the Russians would offer little resistance because of their preoccupation with the invading Mongols.¹³ The most famous confrontation between the German Knights and the Russians was about to take place.

III

Several significant events had occurred in the five years preceding the attack of the Livonian Order on Novgorod in 1242. As mentioned, in 1237 the Livonian Order had been incorporated into the Teutonic Order. In this same year the Mongols had swooped back into Russia--this time for a lengthy stay. In 1240 the Mongols viciously sacked and destroyed the mother city of Russia--Kiev. Although the fall of Kiev was a tragedy, it was not crucial to the fate of Russia. The seat of political power had already been transferred to the city of Vladimir where Knyaz Yaroslav II now ruled. His young son Alexander--in his early twenties--was prince of Novgorod.

That some year, on July 15, Alexander had defeated a surprise invasion force of Swedes in the bank of the Neva River. They had been sent by the Pope to crusade against the Russians, but "the power of St. Sophia and the prayers of our Sovereign Lady the Holy Mother of God and Eternally Virgin Mary" helped Alexander triumph over the invaders, who were thoroughly routed.¹⁴ Because of this great victory, Alexander was dubbed Nevsky (after the site of the battle).

Although the Swedes were repulsed, the Germans were still on the march.

Later on in the year, the Chronicle reports that the Nemtsky, with the men of Medvezha Golova, Dorpat, and Fellin (all chief strongholds of the Livonian Order), captured Izborsk. The "men of Pleskov" (Pskov) rushed to their neighbor's aid, but they were also beaten by the Knights and Pskov was besieged. The invading Germans ruthlessly "burned the whole place, and there was much damage, churches, honourable ikons, books and Gospels were burnt, and they devastated many villages around Pleskov." In the meantime, Alexander, "having quarrelled with the men of Novgorod" (as was often the case with the princes and people of the city), left Novgorod.

The Germans intensified their invasion. They attacked the primitive Chud people,¹⁵ and set up fortifications at the village at Koporya which blocked one of the trade routes of Novgorod. Next the Knights captured Tesov and "pushed to within thirty versts of Novgorod, attacking merchants, and hitherwards up to (the village of) Sablya."

In the meantime Yaroslav had sent his son Andrei to serve as Knyaz of Novgorod but the citizens were not satisfied and they petitioned Alexander to return to the city. By this time the Nemtsy were ravaging the outlying districts of Novgorod.

The desperate situation of Novgorod began to improve somewhat in 1241. Alexander agreed to return to the city "and the men of Novgorod rejoiced." He marshalled the city's troops together and began to repulse the German assailants. Also in 1241--although the Chronicle is silent about the event --the Teutonic Knights acting to aid Poland were sorely defeated by the advancing Mongol invaders at Liegnitz. This did not directly affect the events at Novgorod in 1242, but it did mark a humiliation for the German knights.

Finally, in 1242 Alexander began in earnest to repel the Livonian Knights so that "they might not boast, saying: 'We will humble the Sloven race under us.'" On April 5th Alexander Nevsky and the forces of Novgorod and its neighbors (especially Suzdal) engaged the Livonian Knights and their allies, the Chuds, at Lake Peipus (or Chud) in Estonia for the momentous "battle on the ice". The simple, yet dramatically vivid account of this great battle in the Chronicle of Novgorod merits a lengthy quotation. We begin the narrative after an initial skirmish at a bridge where Alexander's troops were forced to retreat.

...And the Knyaz (Alexander) turned back to the lake and the Nemtsy and Chud men went after them. Seeing this, Knyaz Alexander (sic) and all the men of Novgorod drew up their forces by Lake Chud at Uzmen by the Raven's Rock; and the Nemtsy and Chud men rode at them driving themselves like a wedge through their army; and there was a great slaughter of Nemtsy and Chud men. And God and St. Sophia and the Holy Martyrs Boris and Gleb, for whose sake the men of Novgorod shed their blood, by the great prayers of those saints, God helped Knyaz Alexander. And the Nemtsy fell there and the Chud men gave shoulder,

and pursuing them, fought with them on the ice, seven versts short of the Subol shore (of Lake Chud). And there fell of Chud men a countless number; and of the Nemtsy 400, and fifty they took with their hands and brought to Novgorod. And they fought on April 5th, on a Saturday, the Commemoration Day of the Holy Martyr Feodul.... The same year the Nemtsy sent with greeting, in the absence of the Knyaz: "The land of the Vod people, of Luga, Pleskov, and Lotygola, which we invaded with the sword, from all this we invaded with the sword, from all this we withdraw, and those of your men whom we have taken we will exchange, we will let go yours, and you let go ours." And they let go the Pleskov hostages and made peace.¹⁶

The spectacle of many of the Livonian Knights perishing as they broke through the ice on the lake into the freezing water, although inexplicably excluded from the Chronicle's account, is probably not apocryphal. Riasanovsky includes it in his history of the battle, and this type of accident is reported in other accounts of battles in the Chronicle.¹⁷ Other descriptions of the action at Lake Peipus typically mention that heavenly armies were seen aiding the Russians against the Knights.¹⁸

IV

Although the rout of the Nemtsy on Lake Peipus was decisive, it by no means marked the end of German invasions into Russia. Their continued irruption into Russian territory can partly be explained by the German Knight's attempts to subdue the growing power of the pagan Lithuanians. After the battle of Saule in 1236 where the defeat of the Livonian Order forced it into merger with the Teutonic Knights, the campaign against the Baltic pagan tribes continued under strong reinforcements from the Teutonic Knights. The primitive Kur tribes were crushed and the province of Kurland was established in that area. The tremendous pressure of the German Knights against the Lithuanians finally forced their leader Mindovg hastily to accept Christianity and endow the Knights with land in order to avoid destruction. This move was merely to buy time, however, and was never sincere. The widespread seizure of heathen land by the Livonian Order soon began to stir dissent among the many tribes of the area. Finally, in the 1260's, revolts broke out which even spread into Prussia. The convert Mindovg soon apostatized and renewed his hostile actions against the Knights. The Livonian and Teutonic Knights were forced to initiate a series of campaigns to quiet the unrest.¹⁹

In Novgorod, Alexander was now occupied with the Mongol demands for tribute. He had received an offer from the Pope to send the Teutonic Knights to aid him against the Mongols if he would accept Roman Catholicism.²⁰ But Alexander realized that even the Teutonic Knights would be futile opponents against the strength of the Mongols. He also knew that to invite the

Knights into Russia would divide the country between the Nemtsy on the one hand and the Mongols on the other. Therefore, to hold the country together he dismissed the offer of Christian succor and accepted the Tatar Yoke.²¹

In 1263 Alexander Nevsky died. Three years after his death the men of Pskov--the sister city of Novgorod--"set as their Knyaz, Dovmont, Knyaz of Lithuania."²² This was a startling example of the growing push--under Teutonic pressure--of the Lithuanians into Russia. The Lithuanians wished to seize the Russian towns because they could provide the foundation for political and social organization that was needed to make the Lithuanians politically united and militarily strong in the face of the German Knights.²³ Thus, the Lithuanian settlement movement added another factor to the struggle between Novgorod and the Nemtsy. Accordingly, the period from 1268 until the Battle of Tannenberg in 1410 is one of the constant inconsequential skirmishes among the Russians, the Nemtsy, and the Lithuanians.²⁴

Nevertheless, Russia was now somewhat on the outskirts of Nemtsy pressure, for the real power struggle between the Nemtsy and the Slavs was occurring in Poland and Lithuania. In 1386, as "a direct result of the aggressive policy of the (Teutonic) Order," Poland and Lithuania were united.²⁵ This union, in which the Lithuanians converted to Christianity, destroyed the German Knights' ostensible reason for existence: i.e., the conversion of the pagan Slavs to Christianity. The antipathy which the union created between the Polish-Lithuanians and the German Knights eventually led to the momentous battle of Tannenberg in 1410. This battle has always been considered to have stopped the "Drang nach Osten of Germanism for several centuries..."²⁶ The Teutonic Order suffered tremendous losses at Tannenberg, and afterward began to slip into a rapid decline. In 1525 it received a final humiliation: in the sweep of the Reformation, the Order's Grandmaster--Albrecht of Brandenburg--converted to Protestantism and secularized the Order's possessions.²⁷ Ironically, the group which fought so vehemently against the "heretical" Russians in the name of the True Faith, abandoned that faith for an even greater "heresy" than Orthodoxy--Protestantism.

Upon this apostasy, the Livonian Order separated from the Teutonic Knights. It had not suffered as greatly at Tannenberg as the Teutonic Knights had, and thus it was able to continue to administer its Livonian, and Baltic lands. However, by this time, the Livonian Order was faced with a threat from the growing power of Moscow. The great prestige of Novgorod had been extinguished in 1478 when Ivan III had seized the city and symbolically carted off its veche bell. The seizure of Novgorod by Moscow adds another irony to this narrative: This great city of Novgorod which withstood the attacks of outside invaders for so many decades and protected the interior cities from Nemtsy attack, was finally undone by the cities which it had safeguarded.

Moscow was able to menace the Livonian Order's possessions because the Mongol domination of Russian affairs was now waning. Finally, in 1558 Ivan IV, seeking access to the Baltic, declared war on the Livonian Order. This Livonian War which was to last for years proved ultimately a disaster for Moscow. It also sounded the death knell for the Livonian Order.

The weak Livonian Order turned to its stronger neighbors for aid when

Ivan attacked. The lands of the Order (Livonia, Estonia, Kurland, and Osel) were then invested to Lithuania, Sweden and Denmark. Kurland remained as the fief of the Livonian Order's last Master--Gotthard Kettler--who placed himself in vassalage to Poland. With this complete secularization the Order disbanded in 1561.²⁸ Thus, the Teutonic threat to Russia had finally ended--at least for a few hundred years.

V.

The influence of the German Knights in Northern Europe is immeasurable. They brought Western Christianity and the civilization of Europe to the vast, primitive areas of the North.²⁹ Their settlement and control of the Baltic area allowed the Hanseatic League to expand its trade and stimulate the commercial activity of the whole Baltic coast. One must naturally abhor their methods, but still marvel at their accomplishments. Yet in spite of the German Knights' successful influence in Northern Europe, they never prospered in their efforts to subdue Russia. Nevertheless, one cannot disregard the effects--direct and indirect--that their constant invasions had upon that country.

It is reasonable to attribute the German Knights' failure to conquer Russia to the country's relative organization. For the most part, the peoples that the Knights subdued and civilized in Northeastern Europe were heathen tribes which possessed little cultural unity and no political organization. Thus, it was easy for the Knights to overcome their disunited resistance and put them under the yoke of an advanced culture. Russia, however, was a country a little over three hundred years old at the time of the first German invasions. Granted, it was politically fragmented with no central authority after the fall of Kiev (and was soon to be under the subjugation of the Mongols), but it still possessed a firm national unity and--more importantly--a strong cultural unity. The bulwark of Russian culture was the product of its Byzantine heritage: the Orthodox Church.

The Orthodox Church not only unified Russia culturally, it also provided a compelling reason vehemently to resist the Nemtsy invaders. This reason was the preservation of their religion which was intolerant to the heretical beliefs of other people. Thus, while the German crusaders justified their endeavors with the stamp of Catholicism, the Russians justified their enthusiastic resistance to the Germans with their Orthodoxy. Many battles are fought under the banner of God.

If at all, the German invaders influenced Russia directly only by reinforcing an already existing and growing hatred for the West. We have seen how the Russians loathed the "disbelief" of the Nemtsy merchants in Novgorod (page 3). This anti-Catholic sentiment had begun to grow in the early thirteenth century. The Germans, who were frequent visitors to Russia because of trade with Novgorod, were easy targets for this prejudice. Dvornik relates that in 1212 a prince of Pskov was deposed because "he married his daughter to the brother of a German bishop."³⁰ Thus, the invasion of the German and Catholic knights just gave the Russians another reason to despise the West.

Nevertheless, the crusading German Knights did have an important indirect influence upon Russian history. Because of their constant attacks on the Lithuanian tribes, they forced the growth of a politically organized group for defense (see page 13). Lithuania developed into a strong state and absorbed many Russian lands in its territorial expansion.

This seizure of Russian territory by Lithuania aroused continual friction between the two countries which resulted in several wars over territorial disputes in later centuries.

Thus, the legacy of the German Knights to Russia is mixed. On the one hand, their crusading zeal failed to subjugate Russia and merely intensified Russia's suspicion and hatred of the West. On the other hand, they helped beat into shape a more significant menace to Russia: Lithuania. This menace would sap Russia's patience and energy long after the Knights laid down their holy swords.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹The edition of the Chronicle used in this paper is translated by Robert Mitchell and Nevill Forbes, Camden 3rd Series, Volume XXV (London: Royal Historical Society) 1914.
- ²The Cambridge Medieval History (J.R. Tanner, et al, ed.) Volume VII, (Cambridge: University Press) 1964, p. 217.
- ³James Westfall Thompson, Economic and Social History of Europe in the Later Middle Ages, (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.) 1969, p. 350.
- ⁴The Age of Chivalry, Merle Savary, ed., (National Geographic Society) 1969, p. 350.
- ⁵Alfred Bilmanis, Baltic Essays (Washington: Latvian Legation) 1945, p. 9. and The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume IV (Cambridge: University Press) 1963, p. 391.
- ⁶Several good histories of the Teutonic and the Livonian Orders are available. See in particular James Van der Veldt, Ecclesiastical Orders of Knighthood (Washington: Catholic University of America Press) 1956, pages 23-27; The Cambridge Medieval History, op. cit., chapter IX; F.C. Woodhouse, Military Religious Orders of the Middle Ages (New York: Pott, Young & Co.) 1879; and Harry Grant Plum "The Teutonic Order and Its Secularization" (State University of Iowa Studies, Vol. III, No. 2.: University of Iowa Press) 1906.
- ⁷James Van der Veldt, op.cit., p. 24.
- ⁸The Chronical of Novgorod. See note 1. Since all dates in the Chronicle are naturally in chronological order and are thus easily located, pagination will be omitted in future references.
- ⁹The Cambridge Medieval History, page 254.
- ¹⁰On some occasions the Russian cities would ally with the Livonian Order to fight mutual enemies. See Bilmanis, op.cit. pages 41 and 129.
- ¹¹F.C. Woodhouse, op.cit., p. 271. Alexander Bruce Boswell in The Cambridge Medieval History (see above) concludes that the Livonian Order chose the Teutonic Order as an ally because of the prestigious reputation of the Teutonic Knights. (page 254).
- ¹²The Cambridge Medieval History, page 254.
- ¹³George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (Vol. III "The Mongols in Russia") (Yale University Press: New Haven) 1953, p. 54.
- ¹⁴In the following account of the years leading up to 1242, excerpts from the Chronicle will not be noted. Because they are easy to spot and because they coincide to the year being discussed they are easily located in the Chronicle for further reference.

- ¹⁵The Cambridge Medieval History (p. 249) identifies the Chud people as "dwelling north of the Gulf of Finland and round the Gulf of Bothnia." They were frequent allies of the Livonia Order against the Russians.
- ¹⁶For another, less poetic account of the battle see Bernard Pares, A History of Russia, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) 1958, p. 57.
- ¹⁷See Nicholas Riasanovsky, A History of Russia, (New York: Oxford University Press) 1969, page 87 and The Chronicle of Novgorod: an account of a battle against the Nemtsy in 1234.
- ¹⁸Constantine DeGrunwald, Saints of Russia, (London: Hutchinson & Co., Ltd.) 1960, p. 63. It was not heavenly aid that caused the Knights' defeat as much as it was their depleted condition after their defeat at the hands of the Zemgals in 1236. See Bilmanis, op.cit. p. 42.
- ¹⁹The Cambridge Medieval History, pp. 256-258.
- ²⁰Michael Prawdin in The Mongol Empire (New York: Free Press) 1967, p. 393 concludes that to have accepted this offer "would have certainly ended with the victory of Asia and the complete annihilation of Russia." His view is shared by Vernadsky, op.cit. p. 149.
- ²¹Vernadsky, op.cit., p. 149.
- ²²The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1266 A.D.
- ²³Vernadsky, op.cit., p. 155.
- ²⁴Some of the dates of these erratic contacts between the Russians and the Nemtsy are: 1268, 1269, 1298, 1342, 1343, 1350, 1363, 1367, 1368, 1370, 1371, 1381, 1406, 1407, 1409, 1410, 1412, 1417, 1444.
- ²⁵The Cambridge Medieval History, p. 259.
- ²⁶Constantine Jurgella, Tannenberg (New York: Lithuanian Veterans Assoc.), 1961, p. 9.
- ²⁷For the decline of the Teutonic Order see James Van der Veldt, op. cit.
- ²⁸For the decline of the Livonian Order see Jesse D. Clarkson, A History of Russia, (New York: Random House) 1961, p. 113.
- ²⁹The Cambridge Medieval History, p. 268.
- ³⁰Francis Dvornik, The Slavs in European History and Civilization (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press) 1962, p. 229. Ironically, the German bishop in question was Albert of Riga who founded the Livonian Order.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Billington, James H. The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf), 1966.
- Bilmanis, Alfred. Baltic Essays, (Washington: Latvian Legation), 1945.
- Carsten, F.L. The Origins of Prussia, (Oxford: Clarendon Press), 1954.
- Cherniavsky, Michael, Tsar and People (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press) 1961.
- Clarkson, Jesse D. A History of Russia (New York: Random House) 1961.
- Cross, Samuel Hazard, Slavic Civilization through the Ages (New York: Russel & Russel, Inc.) 1963.
- DeGrunwald, Constantine. Saints of Russia (London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd.) 1960.
- Dvornik, Francis. The Slavs in European History and Civilization (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press) 1962.
- Florinsky, Michael T. Russia: A Short History (New York: Macmillan Co.) 1964.
- Jurgela, Constantine R. Tannenberg 15 July 1410 (New York: Lithuanian Veterans Association, "Ramove") 1961.
- Mitchell, Robert and Nevill Forbes. (translators). The Chronicle of Novgorod: 1016-1471, Camden Third Series, Volume XXV, (London: Royal Historical Society) 1914.
- Pares, Bernard. A History of Russia (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) 1958.
- Plum, Harry Grant. "The Teutonic Order and its Secularization," State Univ. of Iowa Studies in Sociology, Economics, Politics and History, Vol. III, No. 2. (Iowa City: University of Iowa) 1906.
- Postan, M.M. et al (editors). The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. III, "Economic Organization and Policies in the Middle Ages" (Cambridge: University Press) 1963.
- Prawdin, Michael. The Mongol Empire (translated by Eden and Cedar Paul), (New York: Free Press) 1967.
- Riasanovsky, Nicholas, A. A History of Russia (New York: Oxford University Press) 1969.
- Severy, Merle (ed.). The Age of Chivalry, (National Geographic Society) 1969.
- Tanner, J. R. et al, (eds.) The Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. III "Decline of the Empire and Papacy" (Cambridge: The University Press) 1964.

- Thompson, James Westfall. Economic and Social History of Europe in the Later Middle Ages (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co.) 1960.
- Van der Veldt, James, O.F.M. The Ecclesiastical Orders of Knighthood (Washington: Catholic University of America Press) 1956.
- Vernadsky, George. A History of Russia, Vol. III "The Mongols and Russia" (New Haven: Yale University Press) 1953.
- Woodhouse, F. C. The Military Religious Orders of the Middle Ages (New York: Pott, Young, & Co.) 1879.

JOHN DAVIDSON ROCKEFELLER

A MAN WITH IDEAS

Submitted by:

REGINA SCOTTO

"In appraising a man's work, it is not enough to ask what he accomplished. We must supplement this by an inquiry into what his objectives were, and what kind of man he was."

--W. Trevor Holliday
John D. Rockefeller
(1839-1937) Industrial
Pioneer and Man.

A character study of any prominent individual is complicated by the extreme views many people form in their interaction with the individual or with his ideas and business. Because of the scrutiny from reporters, politicians and the public, leaders of big business are especially vulnerable to this type of characterization. John Davidson Rockefeller is no exception. An analysis of him and his business career entails balancing much of what has been said about him, good or bad, with what he has written about himself, tempered with the attitude of the time.

A brief look at his childhood gives some insight into this motivations. As the oldest of his family, much responsibility was forced upon him by his father's frequent and long absences. The financial situation of the family therefore was none too stable, but his mother still instilled the ideas of working, saving, and giving early in his childhood. Foreexample, each of the children was expected to give a little of his earnings each week to the church.

John Rockefeller began working at the age of sixteen as a bookkeeper. It is here where he received his first experiences that helped build a goundation for Standard Oil. The firm was small enough for him to witness the functioning of business and learn from these processes. A few years after working for Hewitt and Tuttle he began his own business partnership with Maurice B. Clark. The commission merchant business now had a new member. At 20 years of age, he was an independent businessman. The road to success was already paved by past achievements and sincere enthusiasm. Security became a goal to Rockefeller and he translated this into order and efficiency. Without this, his next endeavor would never have succeeded.

John D. Rockefeller began his economic endeavors in oil during the tumultous events of the Civil War and Reconstruction. He did not rush off to fight in the Civil War because, like many other, he recognized what

benefits were available if he remained occupied with what to him was more important; establishing a firm foundation for his business. The personality characteristics and motivations needed by such a man were already assimilated into Rockefeller's nature by the end of the Civil War.¹

Perhaps it is too harsh to ascribe to Rockefeller's character the traits of money, power, and greed. As a successful businessman, many assume that these are to be found in him. However, an examination of differing opinions might reveal another, perhaps more honest picture. W. Trevor Holliday describes a man whose "fundamental motivating quality... was what we might call perfectionism."² His drive for efficiency and organization might at times have appeared as greed but overall analysis doesn't support this contention. For Rockefeller this efficiency was basic and he knew only one way of achieving it: knowledge of facts and proper use of these as a foundation for action.³ He had many goals in mind stemming from this feeling, but among them was not an accumulation of wealth for private satisfaction. "I know of nothing more despicable and pathetic than a man who devotes all the waking hours of the day to making money for money's sake," he states in his Reminiscences.⁴

Most people who were intimately connected with Rockefeller through business and social relations came to know him as quiet, patient, simple, religious, and charitable.⁵ The qualities of leadership, manifested quietly, combined with what Holliday maintains to be his greatest asset, vision,⁶ gave Ida Tarbell the caricature she needed to sketch Rockefeller as "Low-voiced, soft-footed, humble, knowing every point in every man's business, he never tired until he got his wares at the lowest possible figure...to drive a good bargain was the joy of his life."⁷ She further characterizes him as "...a brooding, cautious, secretive man, seeing all the possible dangers as well as all the possible opportunities in things, and he studied, as a player at chess, all the possible combinations which might imperil his supremacy."⁸

J. D. Rockefeller appears to have been a man you either admired or despised. To those who worked with him, his efficiency and ability to act with foresight made him a natural leader. But there was more; the primary principle that seems to have ruled his life was one based on trust in men, not money and materials. His religion was important to him and from what I have read, he appears to have been faithful to its ideals. Being a Baptist, however, did not in any way cloud his humor and gaiety. The reserved man known to many becomes a balanced person with these traits.

Another aspect of his personality was his patience, coupled with determination. There are many examples where he would simply wait until circumstances improved before he acted. Tarbell relates that the men in the Oil Regions felt that "To Mr. Rockefeller...a day is as a year and a year as a day. He can wait, but he never gives up."⁹ The time spent waiting was not idle, for Mr. Rockefeller was always busy doing something. The simple life he led was not dull nor lazy.

As an economic innovator and decision-maker his personality enabled him to have many strengths. His patience and determination helped him maintain control even in such a speculative industry as oil. While others

were moved by the short ups and downs, it appears that his insight enabled him to balance the losses against gains. Perhaps his principal strength was his ability to organize. He knew what was needed to gain control and through efficient structuring, he achieved it.

Rockefeller never lost sight of his goal of improving the oil industry. Even under severe criticism he moved ahead.

He had the powerful imagination to see what might be done with the oil business if it could be centered in his hands--the intelligence to analyse the problem into its elements and to find the key to control. He had the essential element of all great achievement, a steadfastness to a purpose once conceived which nothing can crush.¹⁰

This steadfastness also characterized others in the Rockefeller industry. So the policy of J. D. Rockefeller was to listen and discuss all ideas with the others until some sort of conclusion was reached as to a course of action. Planning, a key aspect for any business achievement, was a strength developed by Rockefeller in his oil refinery. Discussion was not enough unless analysis and planning resulted from it. Once decisions were made, his determination carried them out. One of his characteristic strengths was his ability to get strong-willed men to act in agreement. Holliday feels that the harmony in the business was due to Mr. Rockefeller's leadership.

In manner he was never anything else but the gentlemen. It was Mr. Rockefeller's demeanor which made me realize that a gentleman is just what the word says: a man who is gentle. It seems astonishing that a man of that type could hold such bold and spirited associates together. But I know it was his own suave courtesy, self-restraint, and constant kindness, coupled with utter fearlessness, that not only held his associates together but maintained among them the cordial relations that existed.¹¹

Albert Carr recognizes another feature when he writes:

In evaluating the reasons for the success of the association, Rockefeller's willingness to let other men get rich must have a high place. He was always ready to spend freely in order to buy power. While firmly in control of Standard and the association he saw to it that men who served him well shared the rewards.¹²

The insight of Rockefeller encouraged him to see business not as a short run career, but possessing a type of life. He inspired others to continually strive for improvement. While doing this, he developed high morale among his associates and employees. "Business he knew, was an

activity of human beings, and business would not work efficiently and economically without the fullest cooperation and sympathetic support of the people who made up the organization."¹³

Efficiency meant knowledge and proper use of facts. He had a highly organized system of learning every detail of the oil trade. But these traits would have meant little without one major strength: unshakable confidence in the industry and its future. Holliday wrote that Rockefeller recognized the potential of the oil industry, knew that it must be orderly and efficient and saw that the only way to achieve this was through central control to insure a smooth flow from producer to consumer.¹⁴

From this confidence grew an ability to adapt to necessity and wait for the critical moment, not for profit's sake but as Carr feels "it was an imaginative adaptation to necessity, a purely defensive move."¹⁵ All this directed toward the principle of controlling the transportation of oil.

Another strength that grew out of his insight and confidence was his willingness and ability to learn from experience. He paid close attention to all details of as many businesses as possible and improved on failures and successes. Rockefeller approached his associates with his full personality and abilities and so drew them close together. He did not rule Standard Oil with an iron hand, but instead, the leadership was divided equally among his fellow associates. Other industries of the time were controlled by only one man. The power and the responsibilities of Standard Oil rested in the hands of several capable men who combined their strengths and characters to make this industry great.

A man in Rockefeller's position also exposes his faults and weaknesses to the world. Perhaps his principal weakness as a decision-maker was his inability to grant the public its due worth. For example, Albert Carr relates that Rockefeller "regarded the Hepburn probe [into allegedly monopolistic operations] as a minor nuisance."¹⁶ He did not attempt to appeal to the public, in fact he ignored them. Tarbell wrote that between Standard Oil and the public in Cleveland there existed "none of the camaraderie, the mutual good-will and pride and confidence which usually characterize the relations between great business and their environment."¹⁷ In later years Rockefeller would regret his failure to develop a good public relationship which might have saved his reputation.¹⁸

His participation in such episodes as the South Improvement Company did little to improve his image. He emerged with a strong foundation for the Standard Oil Trust but lost much of the public's faith. Reporters fanned the hot fires of emotion while Rockefeller did nothing for his defense. His understanding of popular psychology was lacking as was an "appreciation of the fact that in the last analysis business must work within the rules imposed by public opinion."¹⁹ In later years Rockefeller recognized this weakness and in defense claimed "The public hears the wrong--it never hears the correction."²⁰

Despite all the good that can be said about John D. Rockefeller one must be wary of giving him so much praise. It seems that his determination verged on being too extreme. He in effect became close-minded and saw only his business interests transposed over the interests of the industry and

the nation. Too much control over the industry has its bad effects, despite the efficiency that might result. Even the writings about Rockefeller and Standard Oil reflect this to a degree. David Chalmers concludes that there is a danger when business historians are absorbed into the industry they are writing about. They soon fail to distinguish between what is right and what is right for the firm they are writing about.²¹ The weaknesses of John D. Rockefeller are therefore played down or seen in an entirely different light: that of strengths. The devices resorted to, such as rebates, price-cutting, etc., are not considered as being the result of an inability to achieve his goals in other ways, but instead as the best and only way. These activities were aimed at one end: better control of the industry, especially in the area of transportation. He perceived the problems of the industry as resulting from too many small firms. In the name of efficiency for Standard Oil and the industry, they had to go.

The most crucial decision Rockefeller made during his period of leadership lies in this realm of control of the transportation segment of the oil refining industry. Railroads were long considered the best way of transporting the oil. However, pipe lines were being experimented with in an effort to reduce time, labor and thereby, cost. "The first pipe of any length, laid in 1863 from the Tart Farm on Oil Creek to the Humboldt Refinery on Cherry Run, was only a partial success, for the oil had to be driven by steam power 400 feet above the creek....But it demonstrated what might be done."²² This new innovation met with mixed reactions. The railroads and the men dependent on these companies for jobs saw the pipe lines as a way to reduce costs and increase profits. The larger refiners

did not believe in free competition, with a fair chance for all. They saw free competition as responsible for the heavy over-production of crude oil, excess refining capacity, the abysmal prices, the pipeline wars, the constant railroad dogfight. They wanted to replace its waste and lawlessness with order and assured profits.²³

Out of this chaos Rockefeller structured his company. He quickly saw the advantages of pipelines over railroads and not only transferred the company's oil to pipelines, but decided to control his own company of pipelines. "At Rockefeller's suggestion, Bostwick commissioned O'Day to build a line [pipe] from Emlenton to the new Clarion County oil fields. By the fall of 1873 the energetic Irishman had put down about 80 miles."²⁴

Now Rockefeller's control and efficiency was directed toward a new area. This decision affected several industries involved in the oil business and also the economy of the nation. The pressure on the railroads was increased, for competition from the pipelines hurt. Because of the decreased costs of production for Standard Oil, the edge over its competitors grew. As prices dropped and production increased, new uses were developed and promoted for oil and its by-products. Within Standard Oil itself, a new concern was added.

The complex of gathering pipes called the United Pipe Lines became one of the two cornerstones of the Standard's pipeline network. The other, the American Transfer Co., was soon completely owned by Rockefeller and his associates...at the close of the year 1876, the two systems comprised 400 miles of pipes, with a tankage capacity of nearly 1,400,000 barrels. Rockefeller had thus blocked the formation of a monopoly by the Empire or any other group. Indeed, he was already dreaming of his own pipeline monopoly.²⁵

By this time, Rockefeller was well on his way to "improving" the industry. His control over transportation through the pipelines was almost absolute; his goal of complete efficiency almost realized. The profit increase due to this decision was tremendous. Competition again weeded out, combined with cheap transportation and better utilization of technology, resulted in lower prices, greater production and higher returns of Standard.

The development of the Standard Oil Company and all it entailed offered several contributions to the economic history of the time. Rockefeller achieved success from controlling the oil refining industry by establishing a management capable of outstanding results. His preoccupation with transportation and its connection with efficiency, power, and profits in his industry enabled him to set his goals and see how to achieve them. His decisions, along with the other members of the company, improved the industry along all lines of production. He developed an example of harmonious association among his associates that enabled progress to proceed rapidly. His largest contribution to his own time and later history was his degree of efficiency. His concern for men over profits also must be seen as a contribution. This concern was translated into old-age pensions formulated on a personal basis before they became widely accepted. Perhaps this reflects his own motivation based on security, for he "realized that a feeling of security was the basic ingredient in the morale of a company. He also recognized the value and necessity of incentives."²⁶ Rockefeller appeared to have a grasp on psychology as far as his workers and associates were concerned. He maintained that there were two types of people: caretakers and builders. The competitive rate was sufficient to determine the pay of the first group. Also the sense of security in the form of sick leave, pensions, continuity of employment, etc., should be provided. However, the builders, of which there are relatively few are the "life blood of an organization...and you can never overpay a builder."²⁷

Other contributions include his abilities as an administrator and innovator. Holliday feels that Rockefeller helped make "accounting an affirmative and forward-looking thing."²⁸ His ability to bring competitors together into a common company and have them quickly assimilate their ideas and talents toward one goal speaks highly of him. This was far-reaching in its effects.

The alliance of extremely individualistic former competitors on the basis of equality was a major

factor in the adoption of a system of management for the whole enterprise by which decisions were arrived at through consultation and agreement. Had the forces of unity not been so great and so generally felt, and had the affiliation with the alliance not been so voluntary, the group could not have become so inclusive. Had the system of management not given wide scope to the talents and ambitions of able men, the Standard Oil combination of owner-management would have been neither so permanent nor so successful as it turned out to be.²⁹

The model of Rockefeller's Standard Oil company still stands as an example of successful "big business." The ideas begun by him are still used in the management and formation of companies. His determination and leadership, displayed quietly yet effectively, contributed to the development of other industries and the well-being of the national economic picture. The Trust developed out of his original refinery laid the groundwork for later combinations in other industries who advanced the technology of American industry.

Rockefeller realized that much was to be gained by offering a "standard" product that people could rely on. His ability to promote this idea and keep his product at a high level of satisfaction helped set the pattern for the future of not only big business, but most areas of production.

However there are a few areas where his impact was a negative one. Standard Oil, typified in John D. Rockefeller, soon developed a bad name in the eyes of the public, and hence, the government. Pioneering in Big Business 1882-1911 summarizes the reasons for this.³⁰ The public saw John D. Rockefeller and his monopoly as a destructive force against the welfare of the country. When attacks were levied against him, because of his little regard for the public, he ignored them until it was too late. Standard Oil used rebates, drawbacks, trust formations, and other forms of questionable practices to stifle competition in the name of greater efficiency and control. The secrecy demanded on these deals extended to all policies so an air of illegality hung over Rockefeller. Despite the good they see in Rockefeller, Nevins and Flynn, among others, agree that the drawback was the most negative practice resorted to.

But there was no practice which the Standard Oil exacted and which apparently these oilmen invented for which no excuse can be found; a practice which perpetuated an injustice so grave, so cruel, so indefensible, that its exposure put a stain upon Rockefeller's name which he has never been able to efface. This was the drawback. Some searcher in our economic history may find a prior use of this deadly and ruthless weapon. I have not been able to find it.³¹

Without John D. Rockefeller's innovations and capabilities the oil

industry would have taken a longer time period to achieve its prominent position in American life. A man of such strong character, who achieved fame and wealth in so short a time, has to be admired for his abilities. The American dream of rising to the top is surely realized in this man. When he retired, he continued to help his fellowman through his wealth and concern. The company he formed continued to prosper under the management system that had been established by Rockefeller and his associates. Perhaps this is the most positive sign of his strength, despite his faults and weaknesses. American business would never be the same because of his profound affect on industry.

"Sometimes I feel that we Americans think we can find a short road to success, and it may appear that often this feat is accomplished; but real efficiency in work comes from knowing your facts and building upon that sure foundation."

--John D. Rockefeller
1933

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Ida M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company. Ed. David Chalmers. New York, 1969, p. 11. "Almost from the first the venture was profitable, but Rockefeller now revealed a restless urge to expand that compelled the firm to increase its indebtedness, until in 1865 it owed \$100,000. When Clark, a cautious man, became alarmed, Rockefeller unhesitatingly bought him out, meanwhile divesting himself of all connections with the produce business. Thus, as the Civil War came to its end, he found himself in control of a highly profitable refinery in a strategic location. The qualities which were later to make him a living legend of America business--the independence of mind, the need for power, the driving energy, the economy of speech, the austerity of manner, the intense religiosity, the aversion to publicity--were already firmly fixed in his character."
- ²W. Trevor Holliday, John D. Rockefeller 1839-1937 Industrial Pioneer and Man. New York, 1948, p. 25.
- ³John D. Rockefeller, Random Reminiscences of Men and Events. Barden City, 1933, p. 75.
- ⁴Rockefeller, p. 20.
- ⁵Ralph Hidy and Muriel Hidy, History of Standard Oil Company New Jersey. New York, 1955. p. 25.
- ⁶Holliday, p. 10.
- ⁷Tarbell, p. 24.
- ⁸Tarbell, p. 27.
- ⁹Tarbell, p. 98.
- ¹⁰Tarbell, p. 42.
- ¹¹Holliday, p. 17.
- ¹²Albert Carr, John D. Rockefeller's Secret Weapon. New York, 1962, p. 36.
- ¹³Holliday, p. 20.
- ¹⁴Holliday, p. 10.
- ¹⁵Carr, p. 56.
- ¹⁶Carr, p. 65.
- ¹⁷Tarbell, p. 126.
- ¹⁸Carr, p. 18. "The boycott hit Standard a telling blow...Nine out of every 10 employees had to be let go, until in March, 1872, only a skeleton force

of 70 were on the Standard payroll (in Cleveland). But Rockefeller remained coldly indifferent, refusing to kowtow to the producers or to make any apology or explanation to the clamorous newspapers and the angry public... "I shall never cease to regret," he said... "that at that time we never called in the reporters."

¹⁹Allan Nevins, Study in Power. New York, 1953, p. 131, Vol. I.

²⁰John T. Flynn, God's Gold: The Story of Rockefeller and His Times. New York, 1932, p. 261.

²¹David Chalmers, "From Robber Barons to Industrial Standard Oil and the Business Historian." Reprint: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Vol. 20, No. 1, Oct. 1960. The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in History, pp. 50-51.

²²Nevins, p. 45.

²³Nevins, p. 200.

²⁴Nevins, p. 184.

²⁵Nevins, p. 185.

²⁶Holliday, p. 22.

²⁷Holliday, p. 22.

²⁸Holliday, p. 19.

²⁹Hidy, and Hidy, pp. 18-19.

³⁰Hidy and Hidy, p. 207. "In general the broad brush strokes were as follows: Standard Oil Trust was a dangerously powerful monopoly and all monopolies were contrary to the general welfare; it had achieved its monopolistic position as a result of gross discrimination by the leading trunk line R.R. systems; in the course of erecting and operating the monstrous combination, Standard Oil officials had used rebates, control of tank cars, and various associations to kill off small refiners or to force them into the combination or to compel them to sell at ruinously low prices; they had utilized the gathering and trunk pipelines as a means of imposing their will as to prices of crude oil upon the defenseless producers; they had practiced espionage upon competitors and cut prices in order to kill off wholesalers and jobbers of refined products in competitive areas, only to reinstitute high monopoly prices after the death of competition; they had bribed and corrupted legislators and had grown prodigiously wealthy as a consequence of these measures; John D. Rockefeller was regarded as the leading figure among the Standard Oil executives responsible for the entire record of anti-social behavior."

³¹Flynn, p. 267. And Nevins, p. 107.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Carr, Albert Z. John D. Rockefeller's Secret Weapon. New York; McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc., 1962.
- Chalmers, David. "From Robber Barons to Industrial Statesmen: Standard Oil and the Business Historian." Reprint: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol, 20, no. 1, Oct., 1960. The Bobbs-Merrill Reprint Series in History.
- Flynn, John T. God's Gold: The Story of Rockefeller and His Times. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co., 1932.
- Hidy, Ralph and Muriel Hidy. History of Standard Oil Co., New Jersey Pioneering in Big Business 1882-1911. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955.
- Holliday, W. Trevor. John D. Rockefeller 1839-1937 Industrial Pioneer and Man. New York: The newcomen Society of England, American Branch, 1948.
- Nevins, Allan. Study in Power: John D. Rockefeller Industrialist and Philanthropist. Vols. I & II. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953.
- Rockefeller, John D. Random Reminiscences of Men and Events. Garden City: Doubleday, Doran and Co., Inc., 1933.
- Tarbell, Ida. The History of the Standard Oil Co., Ed. David Chalmers. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.

THE DEALINGS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT IN CONGELATING AND THAWING THE COLD WAR: THE
ADMINISTRATIONS OF TRUMAN, EISENHOWER, AND
KENNEDY 1945-1962

Submitted by:

SEAN O'KEEFE

The news, though ultimately expected, met with hysterical jubilation and overwhelming relief. On August 14, 1945 reporters were summoned to the Oval Room of the White House and informed at precisely seven P.M. that the Japanese Government had unconditionally surrendered.

The day after V-J the new President replaced the model gun on his desk with a shiny model plow, and he made it a point to indicate the change in his office to all visitors. Truman, with a smile on his face and optimism in his heart prepared to enter the new age. The United States was entering the newest of its eras in a curious, unprecedented jumble of moods.

Through a series of events, both plan with unexpected repercussions and sheer accidents, Harry Truman and the United States were on the verge of entering a new type of war, a different concept in confrontation, the Cold War. From year to year the two "frozen" superpowers, United States and the Soviet Union, saw a change in strategies, administrations, and efforts, yet the frightening ideologies remained the same.

In the United States the Cold War produced many unusual circumstances, particularly in the Executive Branch of government. The confrontations, implications, and ideologies expressed in the following pages of this paper serve to illustrate not only the effects of the Soviet Union upon the United States, but also the effects of the reactions of the United States upon its future. Since it is useless to theorize if the Dulleses, Eisenhowers, Trumans, McCarthys, and Achesons had not been involved would the Cold War be known as such today, it is my contention that the Cold War, its advances, withdrawals, and thaws is the product of the United States government Executive Branch. Therefore, the thrust of this paper will be centered on the mobility of the Presidents during the Cold War in handling this new, and strange "mental warfare".

Through the 1930's the United States held a curious foreign policy. Basically holding the concept of isolationism, the United States government observed the events in Europe, Russia, and China with a noncommittant air. American newspapers carried news of wars and civil wars in China ever since 1931. The American people began to view Nazism and Fascism with distaste as their "colonization" process continued. By the time the war had gone

into full swing the "causes" had been established and through a quirk of events the United States and the Soviet Union had established a common goal, to defend themselves from aggression. The spirit of "comrade" grew quite strong between these two nations to the extent that the United States forces "saved" the conquest of Berlin for the Soviet troops in the final days of the European conflict. The note of good faith expressed by the United States to the Soviets proved to be a sore point in European relations for years to come.

The decision to hand over the victory of Berlin was made three months prior to the toast of the fall of Berlin. In March 1945 the Big Three met at the Yalta Conference. Churchill states, "Poland had indeed been the most urgent reason for the Yalta Conference, and was to prove the first of great causes which led to the breakdown of the Grand Alliance."¹ The results of the conference were poor, yet it supplied the provisions for division in Europe.

With respects to Poland, Churchill knew that Russia, in victory, could not be expected to forsake its ambitions in this country as it made claims to the Russo-Ukrainian population of Eastern Poland. It was Churchill's hope that the Soviets would at least recognize the independence of the rest of democratic Poland, faithful ally to Great Britain. Unfortunately the efficient Soviet government had sealed Churchill's hopes long before Yalta as a pro-Communist satellite group, the Lublin Government, was already installed in Warsaw. At best, by Yalta, Churchill and Roosevelt could only hope for a combination Soviet-democratic government in Poland, which was theoretically granted.

In Yugoslavia, a national Communist force had emerged as the major power with the Yugoslav government of National Unity, which was, in effect, the Tito Regime and a few exiles of the former Royalist government.

With reference to the rest of Europe, in exception of Germany, a general policy of democracy and free elections was granted to the people. This is probably the most difficult aspect of the Yalta Conference as the vague nature provided a base for loose Soviet interpretation, something the United States would deeply regret. Given the nature of the feeling of good will that the people of the United States had, explains the lack of questioning of the Yalta Agreements. With respects to President Roosevelt it is entirely beyond me how he found Yalta acceptable given the fact that Stalin stated desires for Eastern European expansion as far back as 1943.

In Germany, the demarcated occupation zones were confirmed, which included four zones between the Soviet Union in the east, Great Britain in the west, the United States in the south, and France as an accommodation, squeezed into a central locale.

While the decisions for the outcome of war were being "settled" at Yalta the war continued around Germany with Russia showing undeniable intentions of interpreting the Yalta Agreement in Poland as if it meant

little else than confirmation of their control of that country. The independent elements of the Polish political life were quietly shuffled out to accommodate the "colonization process." In the history of democracies seldom has there been such a difference between the surface impression of historic developments and the reality. While victory relieved and inspired hundreds of millions throughout the world, communications between London, Washington, and Moscow continually revealed the dim future which lay ahead.

The last opportunity to rectify the balance was developing. The advances of the Allies were so rapid that by the time of the German collapse, many Allied units were already in the Russian zone moving toward Berlin to aid the Soviet advances. Churchill's intention was that the Allies would advance as far east as possible to include violations of the Yalta agreements, the Allies would hold the most valuable parts of the Russian Zone. Once again Churchill's hopes were stifled as American political and military leaders rolled back the advances. Eisenhower halted the rapid movement to Berlin and withdrew American troops from Czechoslovakia.² The United States had lost its strength in negotiations with the death of Roosevelt. Churchill begged Truman, who listened strictly to his advisors, not to withdraw until the Potsdam Conference. Truman refused due to the violent disapproval of Churchill's proposition by Stalin. The Soviets, occupied Berlin and by July 1945 the rest of the proposed Soviet Zone.

In July 1945 the geographic conditions of the Cold War were set. These conditions, intended by the United States as temporary and by the Soviets as quite permanent, hardened the "freeze." The assumptions of the fact were based upon the separate ideologies. The American concept of Age of Democracy provided for the will of the people through independent voting. In contrast the Soviets, in accordance with Lenin's statement in 1917, "voted with their feet" to end the war. Therefore, further alterations were not necessary. Despite the miserable control of Eastern Europe the Soviets persisted for years.

At this point, the actions of the Soviets in Eastern Europe, Iran, and Berlin confirmed the western notion of an expansive Soviet Union. American policy, especially in its attempts to thwart Communist intervention in Eastern Europe, assumed a threatening aspect to the Soviets. In the process of these attempts to influence and control, each superpower confirmed the fear of the other that it was bent upon world aggression. This fear was a direct result of the concepts held by both nations that its own security as well as the safety of world peace depended solely and entirely upon its own conception of world order.

The years of 1946-1947 proved to be very formative years for Harry Truman. The nation waited anxiously for a course of action in the new peach and they were answered with deflation in the economy. Truman at first appeared to be an obnoxious little man who would sit and watch the country fall around him. By the election in 1948 Truman was only a little obnoxious in the eyes of the American public. Despite the infidelities of the Marshall Plan for reconstruction in Europe it provided a much

needed economic boost for the United States economy. With reference to the spineless President who apparently knew of difficulties as President, when John L. Lewis and the coal miners marched out on strike in 1946 a government injunction marched them back in again. Truman continually proved that he was determined to be a peace time President in a prosperous nation. The question in the minds of most Americans was still unanswered about Harry's policy on the Communist bloc.

Senator Robert Taft remarked very early in the session, "It would be ironical if this Congress which really has its hearts set on straightening out domestic affairs would end up being besieged by foreign problems."³ The world of 1947 had a way of being ironical. The Eightieth Congress had hardly assembled when news from abroad was hammering at the door of every Congressman.

Since the end of World War II, the anti-Communist government in Greece had been under Red guerilla attack. The reserves of the Greek forces continually dwindled until February 1947 when it appeared imminent that Greece would fall into the Soviet orbit. More frightening was the fact that if Greece fell the independence of Turkey would be overshadowed and the whole eastern Mediterranean could slide behind the Iron Curtain.

The United States government after becoming fully aware of the nature of Greece's impending disaster, first attempted to settle the dispute diplomatically.

Secretary of State Marshall immediately flew to a Big Four Conference in Moscow which was supposed to arrange peace treaties for Germany and Austria. Marshall intended to address the conference on the state of siege in Greece and convince if not threaten the Soviets to discontinue the aggression. For forty-four sessions the meetings dragged on with absolutely no headway except to give Marshall an unmistakable indication of what the Soviets meant by diplomacy. Eventually when Marshall did get the opportunity to present his government's attitude of the Greek confrontation, the conference began to resemble a high school pep rally. Marshall began his presentation, but when he reached a section concerning human rights he was doomed. The Soviet delegate to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights addressed a question to Secretary Marshall, "Do you know that Alabama has a law which permits a man to beat his wife provided the stick is not more than two inches in circumference?"⁴

On March 12, 1947 Truman appeared in Congress with a message concerning American security against Communist actions. The President proposed that the Congress aid the floundering Greek-Turkish governments by appropriating four hundred million dollars in military and economic aid any by sending American military personnel to supervise the use of the aid. "I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."⁵ Thus, the birth of the Truman Doctrine.

Truman had quickly shed his previous appearance and now had a course of action. The Truman Doctrine insured the people of the United States that he was aware of Communist activities and the Cold War terminology "clarified" the nature of the Communist-democratic confrontation. All he needed now was a foreign policy that packed a punch. For this Truman relied upon Marshall to clarify the intentions of the United States government in dealing with Communist influence.

George Kennan, an expert on foreign affairs and chief of Marshall's "Policy Planning Staff," was called upon to do the honors. Kennan's basic premise was that Russia feared intervention or takeover by another world power, a premise that Kennan contended was always in the history of Russia.

They sensed their rule was relatively archaic in form, fragile, artificial in its psychological foundation, unable to stand comparison or contact with political systems of western countries. For this reason they have always feared foreign penetration...And they have learned to seek security only in patient but deadly struggle for the total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.⁷

To Kennan the only possible answer to Communist expansion was to regulate American foreign policy so as to halt Red gains. Through this policy the approach was to avoid war or indefinite Communist Expansion and hopefully eliminate Bolshevik disturbance. In any effort to stop said expansion the United States would have to "encourage healthy societies" primarily through economic aid. The main focus of attention would be on Western Europe and Japan, two industrial centers near the Soviet Union. To Marshall the plan was complete: a massive offer of American resources directed towards all of Europe with no ideological overtones, in a positive effort to restore economy and pro-American sentiments.

On June 4, 1947 Secretary Marshall appeared at Harvard to make a speech at the commencement exercises. He stated:

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy...so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist... Any government that is willing to assist in the task of recovery will find full co-operation, I am sure, on the part of the United States Government.⁸

The speech was intended to create a spark of interest and at least sew the seeds of the concept in the minds of world leaders. Instead,

the plan met with overwhelming, overnight success. A meeting was immediately assembled in Paris to discuss the American ideas. The proposal that went to the Congress asked for an appropriation of seventeen billion dollars to be spent in the next four years beginning in 1948 for the purpose of bolstering the economies of all European countries outside the Iron Curtain. The plan, officially the European Recovery Plan, soon became simply known as the Marshall Plan.

The Senate picked at the proposal and right-wing Taftites accused Marshall of authoring a "global New Dealism." During the Congressional bickering the situation in Europe continued to look grim. The Czechoslovakian government had been absorbed into the Communist bloc and the upcoming Italian elections revealed a fifty-fifty chance of a Communist victory. Senator Vandenberg sealed the approval of the Marshall Plan by implying that Communist expansion would surely mean atomic war. He contended that economic revival in Europe would at least prevent this holocaust. Given the nature of the paranoia that this hypothesis suggested to the Congress, it is understandable to see why even Robert Taft voted "yes" for the proposal. On April 2, 1948 the Marshall Plan was law with no vital change from the form in which it was first presented to Congress.

When in July 1947 the Marshall Plan was first announced the journal Foreign Affairs ran an article entitled "The Source of Soviet Conduct" by "X." The newspapers immediately identified X as George Kennan and spread the key phrase of the article, "the containment" of Communism. This expression grew to encompass Truman's policies in foreign and domestic affairs. Internationally, Communist expansion was to be halted and prevented from affecting American life any further. The Containment Policy was, in actuality the "Kennan" half of the "Marshall Plan." In any event, Truman's policies were complete and in an election year at that. After all the initial confusion, the Truman Administration was finally consolidated. Stretched out on a comfortable bed of dogma the Trumanisms were about to enter the ominous phase of Cold War diplomacy.

Along with the rounding out of Truman's Administration, July also brought the Presidential nominating conventions. Despite Truman's apparent ability to unite a confused nation he was still a little obnoxious in the eyes of the American people and frankly, it didn't appear that he, under any foreseeable circumstances, would win the election of 1948. The Democrats tried unsuccessfully to interest General Eisenhower in Presidential aspirations, yet to no avail. It would seem that Harry "was a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch."

The Republicans nominated Thomas Dewey, over Robert Taft, a middle of the road man in domestic opinion and confident. Dewey had no doubts in his mind that he would be the next President of the United States and thusly initiated the "Victory Special" a railroad car that rolled around the country letting people meet "President" Dewey. He never attacked Truman by name, yet always referred to his administration as "tired."

In contrast, Truman sponsored a whirlwind campaign sweeping the country speaking to anyone he happened to run into on the campaign trail. He viciously attacked Republican strategy and insulted Dewey for his "mealy-mouthed" indifference and overconfidence. It seemed that Dewey's campaign was following Truman's path rather irregularly and Harry decided to address this circumstance. In his wrap-up speech at Madison Square Garden, Truman deviated from the prepared text and stated quite gravely,

I have had a consultation with the White House physician. I told him that I kept having this feeling that wherever I go there's somebody following behind me. The White House physician told me not to worry. He said 'You keep right on your way. There's one place where that fellow's not going to follow you and that's into the White House.'⁹

The reaction was simply that it was too bad that this perky little character would lose. There is no sense belaboring the Chicago Tribune blunder and the complete and total miscalculation of the polls and odds makers (some even thirty to one). The United States had made fools of the experts, it pulled off the most spectacular upset in political history, Truman had won. Senator Taft exclaimed, "I don't care how the thing is explained. It defies all common sense for the country to send that roughneck ward politician back to the White House."¹⁰

Truman had initiated the Fair Deal and armed with the facts, policies and Acheson, Truman galloped toward the next four years. Unfortunately, he had not considered whether his policies were complete or not, he simply acknowledged that he had policies. The turn of events in the next few years found the President completely disillusioned and on the defensive. The problem began to shift to the foreign aspect again.

In late 1948 Mao Tse-tung's revolutionary forces had overrun Manchuria and were pushing south. By January Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government fled to Formosa and by May the Reds were in Shanghai. On August 5, 1949 every newspaper, radio station and television outlet was focused on the Far East. A "White Paper" of the Department of State was officially announcing that China, in its entirety, had fallen to Communist armies. Secretary of State Dean Acheson revealed that the Truman had given large scale aid to the Nationalist government since 1945. More than two billion dollars in surplus war supplies stock had been left with the Nationalists. Acheson explained that the aid was given in an effort to aid China destroy Communism. He went to say farther that the fall of China was solely the fault of the Chiang Kai-shek government which he described as corrupt, inefficient, and ignorant of the aspirations of the massive Chinese population. Acheson's assessment of the situation was correct, yet the results of China's fall was nearly a quarter of the earth's surface and more than

a quarter of its people were ruled by the Communist leaders of China and Russia.

The China Crisis was frightening to the American people, but the blow to their confidence was yet to come. Despite the struggles the people of the United States remained confident that the United States was still the most powerful world power due to its sole control of the atomic bomb. On September 23, 1949, the aura of the upper hand ideology broke as Presidential Press Secretary Charles Ross announced that evidence had been found that an atomic explosion occurred in the Soviet Union. The Truman Administration worked to keep the report from setting off hysteria. President Truman was faced with an unexpected trump card that had never seemed imaginable. He tried to play down the impact of the Soviet bomb on the grounds that United States atomic weaponry was far superior, but to no avail as the news stripped the American people of whatever security they had felt behind their atomic stockpile. To add to the confusion, American scientists since 1945 had held that Russia had not the technology to perfect the weapon until 1952 and the nuclear bomb until 1955. Therefore, the Soviet test not only destroyed American security, but also proved that the trusted timetable of American scientists had been off. Harold C. Urey, Nobel Prize winner in atomic research, illustrated the severity of the problem when he stated, "There is only one thing worse than one nation having the atomic bomb--that's two nation's having it."¹¹

The ideology of both superpowers continued to increase in that democracy and capitalism appeared to be dependent on war to the Soviets, and to the Americans, Communism appeared bent upon engulfing the world into a huge orbit within a orbit. With the fall of China, it appeared to the American people that the efforts of Containment had been successful in Western Europe, but Communism had infiltrated the "nooks and crannies available to it" in Asia. Walter Lippmann in his columns attacked the apparent infidelity in the Containment Policy when less than two years before in attack of "X"'s policy he stated,

All of the other pressures of the Soviet Union at the 'constantly shifting geographical and political points," which Mr. X is so concerned about--in the Middle East and Asia are, I contend, secondary and subsidiary to the fact that its armed forces are in the heart of Europe. It is to the Red Army in Europe, therefore, and not to ideologies, elections, forms of government, to socialism, to communism, to free enterprise, that a correctly conceived and soundly planned policy should be directed.¹²

This illustrates the nature of the objections which like a balloon, if you held it in one place it would move to the other side, the nature of the infidelities of Containment. No matter what the actions of the Truman Administration the reverse would be espoused as most effective.

This proved to be the beginnings of the Truman Administration's most aggravating years. A different type of conflict was about to arise. The nature of the problem was to be found in a different type of American paranoia--subversion, the possibility that Communism had infiltrated the depths of government procedure.

A shocking case revealed in 1948 was made quite public by the hearings in 1949 concerning the Alger Hiss Case, a case of subversion in the State Department. In effect the case did nothing more than make a Woodstock typewriter famous. Theoretically, it disturbed the people of this nation in that the possibility was there that suggested that a Communist was in the United States government.

An obscure little Congressman, who eventually became an overpowering President, launched his career by embarking upon a campaign to uncover Communist connections in the State Department. Congressman Nixon found documents which implied that Whittaker Chambers, editor of Time magazine had been a Communist but also an espionage agent. Further, he named Alger Hiss, a State Department official, as an associate during his stint in espionage. Nixon brought Chambers before a hearing of the American Activities Senate Committees and he made the same statements he had made to Nixon in the interview. Hiss denied the charges and denied that he had ever known Chambers, yet in any event, Hiss, Chambers, and Nixon all became famous overnight. Hiss filed a \$75,000 libel suit against Chambers for making these statements on the television on the Meet the Press show. Nixon immediately arranged a meeting of the two men and upon meeting Chambers, Hiss recognized him as George Crosley. The confusion was ludicrous, yet it continued to mount until the day of the hearings when Chambers or Crosley, or whoever, appeared with a huge stack of documents. They were presented to the Committee and were certifiably copies of State Department secret documents, which Chambers contended, Hiss stole, copied, and returned. Further, Chambers indicated that the copies in microfilm were placed in a hollowed out pumpkin and buried on property owned by him. The FBI confirmed, after much investigation involving over four hundred FBI agents, that the papers hence referred to as the "Pumpkin Papers" had been typed on a Woodstock typewriter which had once belonged to Hiss.

Truman referred to the whole proceedings as a "red Herring" implying that the committee was simply seeking headlines. In effect, Truman was correct as ultimately, after two years and three trials, circumstantial evidence convicted Hiss on two counts of perjury; the first on the statement that he has not passed "numerous secret, confidential, and restricted documents" to Chambers-Crosley after January 1, 1937. According to Truman the trials were ludicrous and composed of an incomplete mish-mash of evidence which produced an indignant conclusion. The verdict implied more than what was stated because it was obvious that the statute of limitations made it impossible for an indictment of espionage to be brought against Hiss. Alger Hiss, in fact, was being indicted for spying on the United States on behalf of the Soviet Union. Hiss was sentenced to five years imprisonment which he served and upon release obtained a job as a

comb salesman in New York City which he still holds to this day.

It was fairly well assumed by a majority of Americans that Hiss had, in fact, carried on espionage activities with Chambers and with this belief came a mounting sense of questioning. If a man of Hiss's virtually unimpeachable background had spied for Communism, who's to know how many other Red agents were in the government.

In 1948 the Soviets blockaded Berlin from all ground movement in an effort to prevent intervention in Soviet activities and to control the inter-dealings of all of Berlin. President Truman sponsored the 1949 airlifts of supplies flown over the city to aid occupants. The international situation was getting worse and Truman was forced to deal with both foreign "containments." In point of fact, Harry had many "chestnuts" in the fire and worked double overtime to pull them out and deal with them. The first phase of the Cold War congelation point was attained. The most debateable point of the Cold War confrontations in United States policy, the Korean War was to set a precedent which would be difficult to reverse for two decades after. The Korean Conflict confirmed the Soviet notion that the United States was a war-mongering nation, maybe not far from the truth, yet the onus belongs on the policy makers of this next phase of the "freeze."

It is ironic that along the borders of American and Soviet spheres war suddenly broke out in a country that neither superpower ever showed very great concern about. At the close of World War II the segment of Korea north of the 38th Parallel fell under the protection of the Soviets and the south to the United States. Slowly the south came to be controlled by Syngam Rhee and the north under Chinese Communist influence. In 1948 the United Nations recognized the government of Syngam Rhee and the Soviet Union recognized the North Korean Communist government. In 1949 both Russia and the United States withdrew from Korea. The Soviet Pact included no military support alliance with North Korea whereas in South Korea, United Nations recognition guaranteed it. When war did break out no Soviet troops were to be found.

It is not even entirely understood why the North Koreans jumped the border of the 38th parallel and attacked South Korea in the summer of 1950. President Truman saw this as an ideal opportunity to illustrate the seriousness of the United States policy of Containment. Without hesitation he ordered immediate invasion of United States naval and air forces against North Korea. An American resolution called for the members of the United Nations to come to the aid of South Korea. In the absence of the Soviet veto, who's delegate was not present, the United States could intervene in the name of the United Nations. Truman's determination insured the free world that the United States was serious and determined to be in accordance with its policy and the United Nations had come to the rescue of a free nation of the world.

There was only one big problem with the noble nature of the United Nations, the U.S. airpower superiority was undisputable, but the North Koreans poured southward over the inexperienced United Nations forces.

The offensive effort was so overwhelming that the U.N. defeat was comparable to the unfortunate Canadian disaster of World War II at Diem. In addition, U.N. troops were completely unprepared to fight a huge attack in a guerilla environment. In September the course of the war shifted and General MacArthur commanded an attack which drove the North Koreans over the 38th parallel back into Communist territory and overtook the Pyongyang, the capital, in October. Victory seemed almost complete, despite the miserable beginning, as the war appeared at an end in late October, early November. In early November the Chinese Communists indicated that they would intervene if the American-U.N. forces did not withdraw from North Korea. The original plan was to completely stomp out North Korean Communists and so the Chinese warning was ignored. The Mao government felt that if the United Nations "Crusade" was not halted that China's security could be seriously threatened due to the geographic proximity of Korea. As a result, American-U.N. victory met with unexpected defeat as the Chinese Communists drove over the Yalu River and pushed the United Nations forces back over the 38th parallel. In February the thrust of the attack was spent and the United Nations forces regrouped and pushed the North Korean-Chinese Communists north to a stalemate at the 38th parallel.

At this point in 1951 a serious decision had to be made. General MacArthur passionately wanted to continue the Korean advances whereas United States and Britain were content to discontinue advances. It was evident that MacArthur's propositions would have to be rejected since the Chinese could be backed up against the wall and a full scale war would result, and this is precisely the way MacArthur felt this was should be fought. He could not condone a defensive war and therefore, would not accept the decision made by the United States government and accused them of attempting to appease the Communist, a popular crime to accuse people of. Truman was left with no other alternative but to dismiss MacArthur of his Supreme Command on April 11, 1951. When later asked why he fired MacArthur, Truman replied, "I fired General MacArthur because he wouldn't respect the authority of the President. I didn't fire him because he was a dumb son of a bitch, although he was, but that's not against the law of generals..."¹³

For all practical purposes the war was at an end, a Chinese offensive was ruled out and complete stalemate on the 38th parallel was the beginning of the end, an end which would take two years to officially end.

The United States aided South Korea enthusiastically in the name of a principle that it maintained with honor to the end of the war. The score point could not be hidden, however, the remote, inconclusive end to the Korean War was disillusioning. For nearly two years negotiations rattled on with no positive conclusions and in doing so, troops remained on the 38th parallel fighting skirmishes for some unknown end. The prospect was demoralizing and Truman suffered the wrath of an American society who had only known victory and were faced with an inconclusive war. Further the war was still undeclared as Truman had completely sidestepped the necessity of granting the power of declaration of war to Congress and as Commander-in-Chief of the United States

Armed Forces ordered intervention.

As much as the United States had held their own, Russia lost the North Korean satellite, as the Chinese were the true victors. The North Korean Communist government fell into Red Chinese step after the war. Russia, through a proclaimed ally of Red China, made many concessions to them and in the end lost many of the gains Stalin had worked for since the losses in the 1904 Russo-Japanese War.

The Korean War produced many serious repercussions for President Truman on the domestic front. Immediately after the intervention in North Korea, Truman was asked if the United States was, in fact, at war. He replied, "We are not at war" and agreed that Korea was "a police action under the United Nations."¹⁴ The intentions that Truman had in mind were quite noble in theory, yet in practice the intervention raised a series of Constitutional questions.

In 1861 the United States engaged in warfare with the rebel forces of the Confederacy, yet declaration of war was not issued because how can a nation legally declare war on itself? Therefore, "The War Between the States" was a police action conducted by the United States against dissenters. In accordance with this, and totally in theory, the battles fought were frequent mass riots conducted by armed Confederates on the Union "police" forces.

Therefore, in the context of Korea, using the terminology, and by admission of Truman, the United States was engaging in a police action; what distinguishes mass "police action" from "acts of war"? Ultimately the question is reduced to a quibbling about semantics. The United States was engaged in the acts of war in Korea under the phraseology of police action, without a declaration of war from Congress and by direct authorization of the President of the United States as Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Armed Forces. For all practical purposes the United States Congress had been relieved of the Constitutional authority to decide if the United States would engage in the acts of war and the power was indirectly granted to the President. In effect, the decision to engage in warfare was placed in the hands of one man rather than the Congress, the conglomerated representative of American sentiment. The Korean War was Truman's decision, not the decision of the people of the United States.

This previous interpretation, in my estimation, has held grave consequences for the policy of the United States. Since 1945 two wars have been fought by the United States, neither of which declared, neither of which the decision of the people of the United States.

The question of Communist expansion was debated also in the form of domestic affairs with the continuation of the subversive era. The comic Crusader Joe McCarthy entered with his white socks and inquisitive nature of suspecting a Commie infiltration.

McCarthy began as an eccentric side show and ended inspiring a

national movement of paranoia. In his early years McCarthy was frowned upon, yet tolerated by the Truman Administration. The Korean War converted the McCarthy cause from an oddity to a national image. The Senator pointed out that Communists were killing Americans in Korea so therefore why should Communists here in the United States be given any special treatment. In 1947 Truman's disloyalty programs had overridden traditional safeguards of freedom, yet McCarthy extended the "witch hunt" to an absurd point. By December 1952 over six million people had been "checked for security." Of these about six thousand were intimidated so much that they resigned and about 490 others were dismissed as ineligible on loyalty grounds. No cases of espionage were uncovered by any of the McCarthy investigations. By the elections of 1952 the McCarthy movement left the Truman Administration, especially, Secretary of State Acheson, defenseless against tremendous attacks of accusations of Communist sympathy.

The November elections finally removed the onus from the Truman Administration. Truman was at his lowest point of popularity in late 1952 as only twenty-six percent of the nation still supported him.¹⁵ The nation was restless and desperately desired a leader to guide them from the depths of foreign and domestic confusion. It is necessary at this time to present an account of the election of 1952 in an effort to convey the full impression of the expectations of this nation during this age. Further it provides a prime example of propaganda and direction of the upcoming Eisenhower Administration.

Early campaigning in 1952 showed promise of an exciting election. The Democrats, despite their Democratic supremacy in the Presidency for twenty years, were falling apart. They summoned the mentor of the Party Adlai Stevenson to run for office, a prospect very near and dear to his heart. The Republicans gambled on popularity and favoritism in their bid for the President with nominating the fatherly General "Ike." The Republicans hoped to bolster the ticket with a young, shrewd, up-and-comer, Richard Nixon, famed of old Hiss days and a supporter of the McCarthy program. In the summer of 1952 the election looked like a cliff hanger, yet in September the campaign trail took on a strange appearance, the Republican bolstering and Democratic demise.

For some reason the New York Post had its eye out for Nixon and in September revealed that he had collected numerous campaign contributions which enabled him to live far beyond his means. The crux of the discrepancy was not the donations, as Stevenson had engaged in similar activities to much larger proportions, but rather the means by which Nixon struggled to remain on the ticket thereby producing great public sentiments of approval. Nixon's first reaction was to blame the accusations on the propaganda techniques of the "Communists in government" trying to discredit a promising Vice Presidential candidate. Unfortunately, Nixon had used that excuse once too often for one too many problems and the nation just didn't buy it. Naturally Eisenhower's reaction was to seriously consider dropping Nixon from the ticket. No official request was made to Nixon by the General himself either publically or privately. Rather, the requests came to Nixon directly through the staff, namely Tom Dewey, a former Vice Presidential hopeful, to "request" Nixon's

resignation. Within the next few days the newspaper columnists were asking for Nixon's resignation. The request was answered with one of the most clever propaganda pieces in history--the Checkers Speech.

The gamble was a big one, a Presidential campaign had no room for scandals and Eisenhower knew that Nixon had one shot and one shot alone. In a conversation with Nixon before the television speech was scheduled Eisenhower told him, "I think you ought to go on a nationwide television program and tell them everything there is to tell, everything you can remember since the day you entered public life. Tell them about any money you have ever received."¹⁶ Nixon knew what Eisenhower, a man who always spoke in generalities, was implying: He would not accept Nixon on the ticket unless the public sentiment revealed that he was still wanted. An insurmountable task had to be accomplished by a half hour television spot revealing Nixon's life story, no doubt the situation looked grim for the abandoned Quaker.

For two days Nixon worked laboriously assembling what would prove to be the greatest attempt in history to solicit public sympathy.

One other thing, I probably should tell you, because if I don't they'll probably be saying this about me too, we did get something--a gift--after the election. A man down in Texas heard Pat on the radio mention the fact that our two youngsters would like to have a dog. And believe it or not, the day before we left on this campaign trip we got a message from Union Station in Baltimore saying that they had a package for us. We went down to get it. You know what it was? It was a little cocker spaniel dog in a crate that he sent all the way from Texas. Black and white spotted. And our little girl--Tricia, the six-year-old named it Checkers. And you know the kids love that dog and I just want to say right now, that regardless of what they say about it, we're going to keep it.

--The Checkers Speech

Dick, the good Republican cloth coat, Pat, Checkers, and Tricia had done it, the sympathy was so fantastic that the reactions to the speech revealed that Nixon could not be dismissed, he was a hero--the epitome of the "average man." Nixon had spent three months before the speech travelling around on an enthusiastic Eisenhower campaign, yet no singular campaign event of Nixon's could ever match the contribution of the Checkers Speech. The ticket was now idealistically perfect, "dad and your next door neighbor" running together.

In addition to the Republican approval, and in contrast, the Democrats were headed for a miserable defeat. Stevenson opposed McCarthy, the bomb, fighting for democracy; all the intellectual "egghead" attitudes so devoid of American approval. For all practical purposes the election was decided two months before a single poll opened.

The election was an overwhelming Republican success, "America had come home." As President-elect Eisenhower immediately flew to negotiations of the Korean War in December and, already near completion, the peace talks reached a tentative mutual agreement. Even before Eisenhower took office in January he was heralded as the man who began the end in Korea.

In turning to domestic affairs, Eisenhower relied on the incoming Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles. The Dulles policy contended that the Communist nations would be informed that the United States had learned from its mistakes of the Korean Conflict and that further attempts at expansion would result in consequences of a very serious nature. This policy was cumbersome to Eisenhower, a military man who was used to the concise briefings delivered by Army officers. The President's brief, simply explanatory style was incompatible with Dulles' long pauses and extended explanations. Despite this problem, Eisenhower was patient and as the years wore on Foster Dulles and he grew to be quite harmonious in their relationship.

In March 1953 it was announced that Stalin was dead. The report raised a series of questions concerning diplomacy with the Soviets over the Korean peace talks. Eisenhower was convinced that the continuation of the stalemate in Korea, as toned down as it was after his post-election trip, was intolerable.

The postwar relations remained at the same point of congelation with the Soviets. In the summer of 1953 the events of the Cold War continued to build with East Berlin in open revolt, Justice Douglas' stay of execution of the convicted atom spies, the Rosenbergs, and Sungman Rhee's determination that there would be no truce in Korea except one that united Korea under him. The time was crucial and Eisenhower had to make a series of decisions in order to maintain the nation's approval. The President met the challenge.

Within two weeks in June 1953 Eisenhower inspired the culmination of two important factors; domestically, the end of the tolerance of the McCarthy ravings and in foreign affairs, a truce in Korea.

At the height of the "book purge" segment of McCarthy's movement, Eisenhower delivered a striking blow to alter the once passive acceptance of the "Pepsi-Cola Kid." On June 14, 1953 in a speech at Dartmouth, Eisenhower stated, "Don't join the book burners. Don't think you're going to conceal faults by concealing evidence they never existed... How will we defeat Communism unless we know what it is? What it teaches--why does it have such an appeal for men?... We have got to fight it with something better."¹⁸

One week later the President worked with Dulles and carefully picked bombing targets beyond the Yalu River as to limit a proposed massive retaliation to areas of undisputable military importance. At the negotiations the policy of the Eisenhower Administration was made quite clear. On July 27, 1953 the negotiations were officially over

and a truce was declared. The military demarcation line was fixed near the 38th parallel. The United Nations and the United States had stopped aggression; they had neither won nor lost the war. They had managed a truce, yet it was so vague that its interpretation to the Communists was as solid as the Soviet interpretations of Yalta.

Just as the United States was withdrawing from Korea there were those in the military force who were making plans for another intervention, this time in Indochina. The French had been appealing for military aid since early 1953, to aid in the defense of her colony in Viet Nam which was in a state of civil war. The Communist Vietminh had been carrying on hit-and-run guerilla tactics against the polished French forces for nearly eighty years. In early 1954 the French devised a military plan in which a French garrison would be used as bait at an outpost in the highlands, at which time the Vietminh would attack the garrison in force. Therefore, when the Vietminh were amassed the French would attack and thus, crush the guerillas who had eluded them for so long, and delivering a decisive victory to the demoralized French. The stage was set for the French disaster at Dienbienphu.

The French outpost to be used as bait at Dienbienphu was located on a hillside. The French planned to organize in the valley and when the Vietminh took the hill the French would surround them. Now common sense tells even a military science freshman to never, intentionally or unintentionally, leave the high ground to the enemy. The nature of the blunder was that the French felt superior to the Vietminh, they felt that the Vietminh would not have artillery and even if they did they'd not know how to use it. Unfortunately, Westerners always respect the enemy too late and in this case the Vietminh did have artillery and they did know how to use it; the French were trapped in the valley at Dienbienphu.

In January of 1954 government spending was trimmed on the military budget. The former budget used to accomodate the prolonged, drawn out limited warfare tactics was scrapped and replaced with the theory of massive retaliation. Incorporated in this course of action was a proposed "New Look" by Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The proposition was based upon the theory of airstrikes and naval bombardments as a means of attack contrary to ground troop movement. The proposal trimmed a considerable sum off the military budget and therefore, was adopted. In view of the disaster at Dienbienphu the French government appealed to the United States government for aid in neutralizing the aggression at Dienbienphu. The time was right, Radford wanted to test his "New Look" and the French were being squeezed out by Communist aggression, it was perfect.

The pressure from the French continued to build. With the garrison at Dienbienphu obviously trapped there was an emotional quality to the crisis. Admiral Radford, Dulles, and Nixon all seemed sympathetic, yet Eisenhower seemed very uneasy. Radford made a strong presentation of his proposed airstrikes, he explained that they were almost sure of halting the Chinese Communist attack on the French. General Mathew

Ridgway was completely opposed to the project on the grounds that if the airstrike failed, United States involvement in a colonial war would be escalated beyond reasonable proportions. Failure, could involve ground troops, since the airstrikes would commit United States forces to the aid of the French. If the United States did have to involve ground troops it would take five to ten divisions, as opposed to six in Korea, to wipe out the enemy. The facts were grisley and the prospects were very poor. The project was abandoned in early May.

Less than a month later Redford wanted to intervene in Guatemala to aid the revolutionary forces against Communist forces. The plan was again rejected.

This constant military desire to test new methods through intervention in the name of the United States and Containment was to prevail for most of Eisenhower's term of office. Cold War diplomacy constantly teetered with reference to the combat of Communist military forces to indecisive diplomatic negotiations. The attitude would prevail far into the Kennedy Administration and ultimately to Viet Nam. This form of action is a direct result of the precedents created by the Korean War.

In June 1954 the problem reshifted to domestic affairs of the Cold War attitude. McCarthy and his harrangues of Communist subversion came to a pinnacle with the Army-McCarthy hearings. McCarthy's Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations filed forty-three counts of subversion against the Army Signal Corps. The Senator's display on nationwide television was so embarrassing that the American nation was forced to question his common decency. As a result of McCarthy's actions the Senate voted to censure him in December on the grounds that he had displayed behavior unbecoming of a United States Senator. For the rest of his term in office he was humiliated each time he rose to speak as all the members of the Senate would leave the chambers. The McCarthy Era has ended, yet the pieces of his destructive campaign were left to see for years to come.

Between 1955-1957 Cold War policy was at a complete standstill. The Eisenhower Administration was allowed a breathe for a short period as the Soviet leaders vied for power, producing very little animosity other than to each other. The United States watched closely as the Isrealis triumphed in the Middle East against the Egyptians. It would seem that the trek for peace in the free world was scoring considerable victories and little opposition. Toward the last three years of the Eisenhower Administration the Cold War showed faint signs of a thaw. Relations became a little more tolerable, but the aims were now for technological superiority. The Cold War had suddenly taken on a new appearance. The Soviets showed few signs of "colonization" and seemed to concentrate its advances on the technology of its country. In October 1957 the Soviet Union launched the first manned space craft, the Sputnik. A few months later the United States indicated the "space race" was launched as the first U.S. satellite was in space. In May of 1958 the United States supported the Isrealis in the Labanon Crisis, effectively "containing" Communism again in the Middle East.

The thaw took on a turn for the worse in February 1959. The first successful Communist coup not supported by the Soviet Union occurred in Cuba as Fidel Castro proclaimed himself the Premier. Immediately following the takeover, the Soviets supported the regime to the tune of approximately one million dollars a day. In return for support the Cubans have been exporting commodities at a consistent price for years. Eisenhower viewed the Communist takeover with a very curious air. He knew little or nothing could be done in Cuba as the take over was very simply due to internal infidelities and the reactions were not overwhelmingly poor. In this case, no one was fighting for rights against oppressive Communists. The only course of action would be to leave the problem in the hands of Allen Dulles and the CIA.

In February 1960 the onus of the Cold War turned for the worse was given a foundation to be passed on to the Kennedy Administration. A U-2 surveillance flight over Russia was shot down and its pilot, Gary Powers, revealed that the mission was reconnaissance. The Soviets, and justifiably so, accused the United States of spying on Russia which Eisenhower curtly denied and refused to accept responsibility for.

The election of 1960 produced very difficult conditions for the incoming President. The newly elected President, by a very slim majority, John F. Kennedy was immediately faced with the crisis in West Berlin. The Soviets erected the Berlin Wall and for all practical purposes, negotiations with the Berlin situation were finished. The Soviets refused to yield to the requests of a balance of power and equilibrium with satellite nations. American and Soviet tanks stood barrel to barrel on the Berlin Line waiting for instructions to fire. The mood of the nation had resolved itself to acceptance of Cold War and Containment. Walter Lippmann states of the state of the nation at the outset of the Kennedy Administration,

The critical weakness of our society is that for the time being our people do not have great purposes which they are united in wanting to achieve. The public mood of the country is defensive, to hold on to and conserve, not to push forward and create. We talk about ourselves these days as if we were a completed society, one which has achieved its purposes, and has no further business to transact.¹⁹

The Kennedy Administration would experience two events which would determine the course of the Cold War for at least a decade to follow: the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis.

At a time when the Cold War showed certain signs of evolving to Cold Peace the settlements were interrupted with the Bay of Pigs fiasco. In early 1961 the United States devised a plan to upset the first Communist dictatorship in the Americas. The new President Kennedy was carefully coached by Allen Dulles, director of the CIA, in a plan for

the invasion of Cuba. The CIA, since Eisenhower's sponsoring, had been training the Cuban exile army in Guatemala. The plan was so poorly conceived that on April 17, 1961 when fifteen hundred Cubans put ashore at the Bay of Pigs they were met by the Castro forces. No internal uprising, American armed support, or element of surprise occurred. The designed invasion was a complete disaster. The end result was genuinely embarrassing yet the problem had set a precedent for the coming Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy openly admitted the United States involvement in Cuba, contrary to Eisenhower's previous exhibition with the U-2 incident.

The coming of John Kennedy to the Presidency produced a new feeling in the United States. The conditions of the nation formerly illustrated by Walter Lippmann were reversed by the prospects of a new era, not since Roosevelt has a President been quite so inspiring. In October 1962 the strength of the United States in the face of all out nuclear war was put to the supreme test of the Cold War. In the summer of 1962 Russian engineers, technicians, and military-technicians arrived in Cuba and began the construction of "defensive" structures for the Castro Regime, to ward off any future intentions of attack by the United States.

In early October Kennedy received information indicating that the Cubans had a series of missile sites which the direction of which was pointed at the southern portion of the United States. A U-2 had spotted "the first rude beginnings of a Soviet medium-range missile base."²⁰ For the next few days secret cabinet meetings were conducted in an effort to establish a policy or course of action concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis. The alternatives produced were either invasion or a blockade of the island to prevent further Soviet armaments from entering Cuba, the sentiment was split over the question and the military completely favored the invasion plan. The lid was placed on the invasion can when General Shoup, Commandant of the Marine Corps, illustrated the stupidity of the plan.

When talk of invading Cuba was fashionable, General Shoup did a remarkable display with maps. First, he took an overlay of Cuba and placed it over a map of the United States. To everyone's surprise, Cuba was not a small island along the lines of, say Long Island at best. It was about 800 miles long and seemed to stretch from New York City to Chicago. Then he took another overlay, with a red dot, and placed it over the map of Cuba. 'What's that' someone asked him. 'That gentlemen, represents the size of the island of Tarawa,' said Shoup... 'and it took us three days and eighteen thousand Marines to take it.'²¹

Some military officers still favored invasion, yet the consensus was for a blockade. On October 18 a blockade of United States ships "quarantined" Cuba. Eighteen Soviet ships bound for Cuba turned around and headed back to the U.S.S.R. Kennedy and Khrushchev came to a mutual agreement, the Soviets would dismantle the missile bases in Cuba and the United States would promise not to invade Cuba at any time in the

future.

The entire crisis was based upon the Soviet's reason for the "defensive" weapons, to prevent United States invasion. The reason was perfect. Under the pretext of defense the Soviets tried to establish missile bases ninety miles from the coast of the United States. The display of determination by the United States indicated to the Soviets that the American government had no intention of yielding to Soviet displays of aggression. The Cuban Missile Crisis marked the end of the Cold War ideology, however, the precedents of the Cold War gave rise to the Viet Nam War and a period of Cold Peace.

Since 1962 the United States has moved considerably in Soviet relations and the movement for world concepts have progressed closer to each other. The Cold War, in itself, was not just a conflict of Communism versus capitalism, but also a vying for power between the United States and the Soviet Union. The basis of the "freeze" in the United States revolved around a two-fold concept, economic and idealistic. Throughout the Cold War period of 1945-1962 the United States initiated plans of action to aid the economic conditions in the free countries to insure the possibility of democracy. The United States held no imperialistic sentiments or desires in contrast to the Soviet Union and its plans for satellite nations. The dichotomy of economic and idealistic tendencies is the root of the problems after the Cuban Conflict.

The power created by Truman's intervention in Korea in 1950 bolstered the nature of the office of the Presidency. In Guatemala, Viet Nam, Berlin, and Cuba the President could, and did in different respects, intervene in the name of democracy. The position of the President as the combined sentiment of the American people in decisions of warfare and national crises is a perversion of the concept. However, in say the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, if the President had waited or adhered to the sentiments of Congress the world could have been in the midst of a holocaust. Therefore, the outcome of the crises have been based upon the competency of the President.

The Cold War was a consequence of the Second World War, and now the greatest guarantee against a Third World War is the memory of the Second. Despite the miscalculations of Kennedy and the isolationism of Eisenhower both Presidents knew that Khrushchev was aware of the consequences of war. These two Presidential Administrations would wage their own war and set guidelines for a limited war, yet both would never engage in the most dreaded of all wars. Undeniably the Presidents of this era have waged a war on the Alger Hisses, the McCarthys, the Achesons, the Dulleses and themselves in an effort to defend a concept of freedom.

FOOTNOTES

- ¹Lukas, John, A New History of the Cold War, p. 49.
- ²Lukas, ibid., p. 56.
- ³Goldman, Eric, Crucial Decade and After 1945-1960, p. 57.
- ⁴Goldman, ibid., p. 58.
- ⁵Goldman, ibid., p. 61.
- ⁶Goldman, ibid., p. 61.
- ⁷Thomson and Laves, Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy, p. 116.
- ⁸Goldman, ibid., p. 76.
- ⁹Goldman, ibid., p. 88.
- ¹⁰Goldman, ibid., p. 90.
- ¹¹Lippmann, Walter, column in New York Times, September 26, 1949.
- ¹²Lippmann, Walter, The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy, 1947, p. 39.
- ¹³Miller, Merle, Plain Speaking, p. 308.
- ¹⁴Goldman, op. cit., p. 166.
- ¹⁵Goldman, ibid., p. 217.
- ¹⁶From previous page--Wills, Gary, Nixon Agonistes, p. 103.
- ¹⁷Excerpt from Checkers Speech obtained from Nixon Agonistes, p. 110.
- ¹⁸Goldman, ibid. from the text of Eisenhower's Speech at Dartmouth, June 14, 1953.
- ¹⁹Goldman, ibid., p. 342.
- ²⁰From previous page--Lukas, op. cit., p. 241.
- ²¹Halberstam, David, The Best and the Brightest, (1972), p. 185.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Conversations with Walter Lippman, Little, Brown, and Company, 1960.

Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command of American Power, Drum-Roscoe, (Weidedfield and Bicholson), 1961.

Last Call for Common Sense, Warburg, James P. (Harcourt, Brace and Company) (New York), 1949.

Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy, (Indiana University Press) 1963.

The Making of the President, 1960, White, T. H. (Atheneum Press), (New York), 1961.

The Best and the Brightest, Halberstam, David, (Fawcett Publications, Inc.) Greenwich, Connecticut, 1972.

A New History of the Cold War, Lukacs, John, (Doubleday and Company), New York, 1966.

The Crucial Decade--and After, America 1945-1960, Goldman, Eric, F., Vintage Books, New York, 1960.

Nixon Agonistes, Garry Wills, (Mentor Book), New York, 1969.

Plain Speaking, Miller, Merle, Berkley Publications, New York, 1973.

Other Sources:

At the Brink, unpublished paper by Robert DeVoto.

CONFEDERATE NAVAL CONSTRUCTION IN ENGLAND
AND BRITISH LAW

Submitted by:

PAUL REYNOLD DUPLECHAIN

The idea behind the building of the commerce raiders of the Confederacy was to destroy the stranglehold of blockade by the Union, not through tactical battles but rather through diversionary chase across the seas. The reasoning of the Confederate States was that through privateering blows against the Northern middle class, pressure would be brought to bear upon Lincoln's government to turn naval vessels to capture of the raiders and therefore a subsequent relaxation of the blockade.

This reasoning did not arise with the development of the war. It was a revolutionary idea in the waging of naval war, an extension of the strategy of total war. Captain Semmes (of later Alabama fame) wrote a Southern Congressman months prior to the firing on Fort Sumter stating:

"You ask me to explain what I mean by an irregular naval force. I mean a well organized system of private armed ships, called privateers. If you are warred upon at all, it will be by a commercial people, whose ability to do you harm will consist chiefly in ships and shipping. It is at ships and shipping therefore, that you must strike; and the most effectual way to do this, is by means of the irregular force of which I speak. Private cupidity will always furnish the means for this description of warfare and all that will be required by you, will be to put it under sufficient legal restraints, to prevent it from degenerating into piracy, and becoming an abuse."

Possibility became reality, not through private armed ships, but through government commissioned raders.²

To the leaders of the Confederacy, however, the inability of the South to build these raiders and more importantly to put them to sea past the Federal squadrons was apparent. It was for this reason that Confederate agents and diplomats were sent out to secure the services of the greatest of the European neutrals, Great Britain.

At the time of the Civil War, British statutes put legal restrictions on the nation to observe neutrality through prohibitions on export

of certain goods. At the fore of these statutes was the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1819 which stated the illegality of such acts in its Section VII, "...any person shall equip, furnish, fit out or arm, or procure to be equipped, furnished, fitted out or armed, or shall knowingly aid or assist, or be concerned in, the equipping, furnishing, fitting out or arming, of any ship or vessel with intent or in order that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of any Foreign prince...." Because of a relative lack of attention and administrative laxity, The Foreign Enlistment Act had never passed the tests of court battles and its defects remained concealed until the Civil War. In the case of a prosecution under the law, it is important to note that reasonable evidence had to be presented before law processes could be initiated upon the ships and their builders.³

Confederate agents, however, had done their work in preparing a thorough defense in anticipation of the utilization of these laws against them. Captain James D. Bullock employed a prominent Liverpool lawyer to locate loopholes in British neutrality law.⁴ The lawyer decided that it was no violation of the law for a British subject to equip a ship outside British territorial jurisdiction; it was no violation for a British subject to equip one within British jurisdiction, if it were not intended for use against a nation with which Britain was at peace; whatever the intentions of the parties concerned, it was no violation to build a ship within her Majesty's dominions. These conclusions were undoubtedly sound, as the two pertinent facts to a case of this sort were the intention of the builder and the equipment of the ship.⁵ Armed with this legal surety, Bullock let a contract for the Florida (the Oreto) to W. C. Miller and Sons, Liverpool and a contract for the Alabama (the 290) to the Lairds of Birkenhead. Throughout these negotiations, Bullock remained silent as to the purpose of his vessels.⁶ In doing so, Bullock obeyed the letter of the law, if not its meaning. It was also his intent to spare Laird, the owner of the Birkenhead shipyards and a member of the House of Commons, all embarrassment when he replied to the attacks of his enemies and stated that he knew only what had been revealed to the general public.⁷

The American Minister to the Court of St. James, Charles Francis Adams, was not lying idle as the work progressed on the raiders. One of his specific duties in being sent to London was to prevent the creation of a Confederate navy in British shipyards. Through remarkable intelligence work on the part of his agents, Adams was able to know of every move that Bullock made and file a concurrent protest with the Foreign Office under Earl Russell.⁸

The first investigation and testing of British law occurred in early 1862 and ended in a decisive legal victory for the Confederacy. Adams, on February 17, 1862, called to Russell's attention to the Florida, "an armed steamer evidently intended for hostile operations on the ocean." The Foreign Office asked the Treasury to investigate; the latter then asked the Customs Board to make a report. On February 22, the Custom Board replied that the ship had been built by Messrs. Miller and Sons for Messrs. Fawcett, Preston and Company; it was intended for the use

of Messrs. Thomas Brothers of Palermo; it had no guns on board and that it was not fitted for the reception of guns. On this basis, the British government had no grounds to seize the vessel and despite the mounting protests of Adams, the Florida was allowed to sail out of Liverpool in March.⁹

After this defeat, Adams was increasingly hostile to the Foreign Office and Bulloch was increasingly more careful in his moves. In his own words, Bulloch stated that, "...it was necessary to act with prudence and caution, and to do nothing in violation of the municipal law, because a single conviction would expose the object and defeat its aim."¹⁰ The legal advisers of the British Government proceeded slowly in their impartial examination of the issues before them. Two points of view seemed to arise among the law officers. The broad view stated that the Foreign Enlistment Act included any ship constructed in an area of British jurisdiction with an intent of attack on a foreign power at peace with Great Britain, while the opposing narrow view stated that the Act applied only to ships which were so armed as to immediately put out to sea and attack a foreign power at peace with Great Britain. The fact that the proponents of either view felt that the other was expressing a contradiction to the policy of the Act did not speed the issue to a conclusive legal ending.

As this debate was going on in the judicial offices of England, a prosecution under the statutes of the Foreign Enlistment Act was being conducted in the Crown colony of the Bahamas. The raider Florida, still unarmed, had arrived in Nassau and been seized by the Governor. The evidence was scanty as to the fact of the fitting out the vessel as a ship of war and totally lacking was evidence relating to its destination or an official connection with the Confederacy. With this in mind, the judge presiding over the case ordered the Florida reinstated to her owners. British legal officers assumed after this trial that no prosecution of the same type would be instituted in a long while, or if instituted, it would be unsuccessful.¹¹

Adams was well aware of the legal setback which had befallen him both in England and in the West Indies in the pursuit of his duties. He was also well aware that the Alabama would be ready to sail soon after the Florida put to sea and he was determined to stop that voyage. In concert with the American consul at Liverpool, Adams gathered as much evidence as possible on the construction and intent of the Alabama. Using this as a basis, he again began making heated protests to the Foreign Office, stating that continued construction of these vessels was a violation of British neutrality and demanded their stoppage and seizure.¹² However, some of the affidavits gathered as evidence were questionable in nature, holding in part that some swore under oath that they had heard Bulloch giving instructions and describing the type, arrangements, and ultimate destination of the ships. While it is true that the Laird building yards were open to the public, it does seem rather inconceivable that Bulloch would discuss his secret mission on board for the casual ear to overhear.¹³ Bulloch was well advised of the law and knew of the negotiations between Adams and the Foreign Office and he was continually on guard to

insure secrecy and to observe the legality of his actions.

In spite of the protests of the American ministry, the Commissioners of Customs at Liverpool decided that evidence was lacking and insufficient to justify seizure of the Alabama. Throughout late July of 1862, Adams hammered away in vain at the Foreign Office and reiterated his protests. However, it was not until he submitted to Russell an opinion of the Queen's Counsel (known as the Collier opinion) that the evidence conclusively showed a violation of neutrality. In growing concern, Russell submitted these papers to the law officers of the Crown but due to a mental collapse on the part of the Queen's Advocate their findings were delayed, during which the Alabama put to sea. Only on the date July 28 did the other law officers of the Crown, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General, get hold of the papers. Their recommendation was holding of the ship but the impossibility of detention was obvious as the vessel was no longer in port.¹⁴

Although the report of the British law officers was not given out until July 29, the signs that the Alabama should be put to sea were apparent. Bulloch claimed that no officer of the British Government ever gave him a hint to lead him to anticipate future governmental action, but rather he was informed through Confederate Commissioner Mason as to all that he heard that was pertinent to naval affairs. Through private friends Mason was able to have opportunities to learn both the general and specific purposes of the government.¹⁵ Bulloch's knowledge of the statements and affidavits forwarded by the American consul at Liverpool led him to fear possible detention by the British, a fear which would be borne out after his ordering the Alabama to sea.

Adams was completely indignant after the loss of bringing the Alabama into detention. In concert with American governmental and public opinion, he complained that Her Majesty's Government was both lax and slow in putting the municipal law into effect so as to prevent the acts in question and did not enforce the punitive clauses with the rigor which the United States Government expected. In answer to this, the Crown's legal officers stated that the Government of Great Britain was one of limited and legally defined powers and authority could be exercised only in subordination to the law. The Government could not seize vessels on allegations of Confederate ownership or arrest persons accused of violating the law, unless there was sufficient prime evidence to render a probable conviction; and neither the evidence obtained through British law advisers nor the evidence tendered by the United States Minister and Consuls was considered sufficient by the law officers of the Crown to justify seizure and prosecution.¹⁶

The next point of contention concerning the raiders legal standing was again to be shifted from the courts of England and to the island of Barbados. In early 1862, Foreign Secretary Russell informed British colonial officials that ships belonging to the warring factions in America could coal at British dependencies in an amount necessary to reach a home port or their nearest destination once in every three

months. A final clause in his message, however, stated that in cases of emergency special permission might be given before expiration but for no more coal than the stipulated amount.¹⁷

Admiral Wilkes, commander of the Federal West India Squadron, charged Governor Walker of Barbados with violation of Russell's instructions, inasmuch as he had allowed the Florida to refuel at Barbados although she had fueled only a month before at Nassau in the Bahamas. Walker stated that he had been unaware of the Bahamian fueling, but even so he felt that the Florida was qualified under the emergency clause as she had just weathered a storm of tropical severity.¹⁸ Both of these gentlemen referred the matter to their respective home governments.

Colonial Secretary Newcastle, after reading the correspondence from the Barbadian governor, referred the matter to the Foreign Office. Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Hammond studied the text and in turn referred the matter to the Law Officers of the Crown, requesting an opinion. Following a review of the case, the law officers reported the Governor's innocence of partiality and exonerated him of any breach or violation of the regulations. However, they were critical of Walker in his answers to Wilkes, because they felt that the Americans might have been able to construct a case on the basis of his reply. They also questioned the amount of coal allowed to belligerents. The Colonial Secretary was displeased with the Law Officers' opinions as they left several fundamental queries on procedure in similar cases unanswered.¹⁹

The dissatisfaction of the Colonial Secretary was transmitted to Foreign Secretary Russell, who resubmitted the case to the Law Officers. In their second report they stated that a ship could obtain no more coal than was necessary to reach its home port, regardless of whether or not it was under blockade. On the question of boarding to determine the need of fuel, the Law Officers stated that this would undoubtedly lead to charges of insult which might result in diplomatic controversies. On the basis of this, Colonial Secretary Newcastle relayed an order to all colonial governors that after refueling a belligerent, a circular letter must be sent to all West Indies colonies stating the name of the vessel, the date of the reception of the coal and the amount. Such a practice as this would disallow such controversies as had arisen over the Barbadian question.²⁰

In the statement of their opinion, the Law Officers were upholding a literal interpretation of Foreign Secretary Russell's instructions. There were other factors, however, which influenced their opinion. The British government was becoming aware of the fact that legalized precedents involving neutral aid to belligerents might at some future date be used against her. Both the act of building and outfitting raiders as British shipyards had done and the use of neutral colonial areas as refueling stations could just as effectively be turned against Great Britain. An indication of these factors and their bearing on legal opinion is evident in the statement of the Solicitor General, Sir Roundell Palmer, who said that the law officers always based their findings on governmental policy as well as the law.²¹

Debate in the Parliament brought out the point that violations of neutrality could easily be turned against Great Britain in a foreign war. Consider the speech of a member of the House of Commons, a certain Mr. Cobden:

"...Now is there, let me ask, no way in which you can prevent ships of war from sailing from your ports, threatening, as they do, the commerce of a friendly country, all of them built in England, manned from England, armed and equipped from England, roaming the seas without any fixed goal, and marking their track by fire and devastation? That is the question to which you have to address yourselves; and unless you are prepared effectually to put down this system, the Foreign Enlistment Act will be, as the Honorable and learned member from Plymouth said, a dead letter: and if it be made a dead letter here, most assuredly the same state of things will result elsewhere. Who then, I should wish to ask, has the most to lose by such a revolution in the maritime law of nations? What proportion of the value of ships and cargoes which float on salt water belongs to British capitalists?... A better state of things has gradually grown up; and shall we, I would ask, by virtually repealing the Foreign Enlistment Act, be the first to go back to the barbarism of the Middle Ages? I cannot help thinking that this House, when it reflects on the facts of this case, will refuse to give its sanction to a retrograde policy which would be unworthy of this country, and a great crime against humanity."²²

This fact did not go unnoticed by the mercantile class of Great Britain. Liverpool merchants looked into the future and saw a conflict of interests between themselves and the shipbuilders. The time was early 1863 and British doubt toward the interpretation of their law was beginning. However, the leaders of the British government were swayed little by public opinion but rather paid more attention to an American declaration to issue privateers if more raiders under the Southern flag sailed from English waters.

Russell intended to again test the law to placate the Americans. His first opportunity to do so came in April of 1863 with the seizure of a ship being built at the Laird shipyards, namely the Alexander. Orders were issued by his office to stop the ship on evidence that the vessel was apparently intended for the Confederacy. This was far from being the same thing as the "conclusive evidence" which the British Government had maintained as necessary for seizure the year before.²³

The reason given for this sudden change in British policy was the uneasiness which was felt toward the American privateering bill. Russell's interpretation of the American plan saw in it a very grave danger to British

commerce and an inevitable clash leading to war. No doubt this was Secretary of State Seward's desired reaction from Russell, though in Seward's message he had never specifically explained the purpose of the privateers in exact terms. Nine-tenths of the actual blockade running was being done by British ships, and in view of this it was presumed that the Federal navy, in the form of privateers, would commit interference with British merchantman found on the seas in their search for blockade runners.²⁴

As usual, the attention which prompted Russell to action was brought to him by Adams, who forwarded the evidence collected by Consul Dudley at Liverpool. In late March of 1863, Dudley formally requested a seizure of the ship by the customs officers on the grounds that it was in violation of the Foreign Enlistment Act, in that it would be put into the service of the Confederacy with the intent of committing hostilities against the American government. Ambassador Adams forwarded this information to Russell, claiming that this affair was just a part of a vast network of Southern naval activity in England. Officials of the British government did indeed suspect that the Alexandra was being built as a gift to the Confederacy from Englishmen sympathetic to the Southern cause, although technically the ship belonged to a private British firm, Fawcett, Preston and Company (who also owned the Florida). The collector of customs at Liverpool and the solicitor of the treasury felt that the evidence available could possibly be used to detain the ship for a short while but there was nothing to base an official impoundment upon.²⁵ However, the Crown's law officers felt that immediate seizure was the right move in this case. They based their findings on the fact that they thought the ship's structure might afford reasonable grounds for seizure. With this shaky legal backing, and eager to make a conciliatory gesture to the American government in view of the proposed privateering bill, Russell overrode the custom's and solicitor's findings and ordered the seizure of the ship in April of 1863.

Russell knew that the owners of the vessel would try to all legal means to regain their property, but actually welcomed these attempts as he felt that this would force the courts once and for all to clarify the statutes of the Foreign Enlistment Act and set guidelines to aid him in all similar future cases. Also, if a court sanctioned the seizure of property upon suspicion of intent, the entire Southern construction program would be discouraged. In doing this, he would be able to solve his legal interpretation problems and at the same time reestablish harmonious relations in this regard with America.²⁶

The counts on which the Crown built its case were as follows: the first count charged that certain persons in the United Kingdom without licensing had equipped the Alexandra in order that it be put into the service of certain foreign states with the intent to commit hostilities against the United States of America, a country with which the United Kingdom was not then at war, contrary to the form and statute made and provided for under the Foreign Enlistment Act. The remaining counts varified and clarified this description. The intent of the use of the vessel was stated in two ways in order to meet the ambiguous language of the Act, as either the intent to cruise or intent to commit

belligerencies in the employ of a foreign state. The Crown's legal representatives were therefore directed by the court to prove that, first, the Alexandra was built for the purpose of a belligerent cruise; second, that she was intended at some stage or other of her construction for the service of the Confederacy.²⁷

The Crown had little success in the ensuing legal battle. The defendants (the owners and agents of the Alexandra) drew from their gifted attorneys, Sir Hugh Cairns and George Mellish, to exploit the many weaknesses of the Crown's case. Sir Hugh pointed out to the court the reversal of previous Crown opinion, stating that laws enforced against English subjects were based on fact, not suspicion. The Queen's Solicitor was hard put to refute these claims, stating rather ineptly that they were inapplicable in this case. Sir Hugh also masterfully brought out the jurors' latent anti-American feelings, stating that America had no right to complain about the British enforcement of law based on fact. He lastly built his case around the mercantile interests of the country, stating that an adverse opinion against the defendants would paralyze the industrial business and shipbuilding in the ports. (It is interesting to note on this point that the trial had been moved from Liverpool to London in order to forego the commercial interest of that city in the case.)²⁸

The defendants found another friend in the person of the Lord Chief Baron of the Exchequer Sir Frederick Pollock, the judge presiding over the trial. Giving considerable evidence of bias in favor of the Southern cause, Sir Pollock told the jury that he felt, in view of the law, that ships did not fall under the restrictions of the Foreign Enlistment Act and more specifically that the Alexandra did not appear to him to be intended to be armed as a raider. He told the jury that if they felt that the ships were built merely as fulfillment of a contract then there was no violation of the law.²⁹

In view of the cases presented, the jury decided in favor of the defendants. The Crown's legal officers tendered a Bill of Exceptions, in order that all points might be argued in the Court of Appeals. However, this was abandoned in November of 1863 and instead of new trial asked for. Carried before an en banc hearing of four judges, the decision was split, and in accordance with practice an appeal was made to first the Court of Exchequer Chamber and secondly to the House of Lords. All motions were dismissed on preliminary objections of a technical nature and as such the questions raised as to the interpretation of the Act remained unanswered still.³⁰ The Crown's attempts to answer the questions it had missed in allowing the Alabama to escape ended in another reversal in litigation.

Although the jury's finding was applauded by the South, both the British and American governments remained uneasy over the decision. Both felt the law to be unsatisfactory and the precedents declared in the trial were felt by many high ranking Englishmen to be ominous for the future. In effect it was making the construction and supplying of raiders in England perfectly legal acts.

American Minister Adams feared the judicial decision, as he felt it would lead to a hastening of cruiser construction to prey on American commerce. In a letter to Seward, he stated that he believed that Great Britain appeared ready to furnish means against nations with which she was professing to be at peace. He was also perplexed by the fact that he knew Great Britain realized she had as much to lose from a lax morality on the seas as any other nation.³¹

In the House of Commons, Prime Minister Lord Palmerston reminded his listeners that in accordance with the Foreign Enlistment Act evidence on oath must be had before preventive measures would be allowed. The Prime Minister observed that the Alabama had received her armament, equipment and crew in a foreign port. Her condition, in view of the Alexandra decision, would not have justified seizure either. In other words, there had been no criminal action against the Act in either English or international law.³²

The American government appears to have been satisfied with the action taken in the matter of the Alexandra. Secretary of State Seward wrote to Minister Adams after the verdict, saying:

"You are authorized and expected to assure Earl Russell that this government is entirely satisfied that her Majesty's Government have conducted the proceedings in this case with perfectly good faith and honour, and that they are well disposed to prevent the fitting out of armed vessels in British ports to depredate upon American commerce, and to make war upon the United States. This Government is satisfied that the law officers of the Crown have performed their duties in regard to the case of the Alexandra with a sincere conviction of the adequacy of the law of Great Britain, and a sincere desire to give it effect."

One easily notes, however, that this satisfaction was based on the seizure of the ship and the prosecution of its owners and not on the actual outcome of the suit.³³

As these plaudits sailed across the Atlantic, the builders of the Alexandra had in the meantime made a claim for damages against the Crown which the solicitors of the treasury eventually settled at £3700. There were those in the Foreign Office who were urging the British Admiralty to purchase the Alexandra even as these negotiations were going on (the offer having come from Fawcett, Preston, and Company themselves). However, the Admiralty was uninterested and the Treasury refused to outlay the money for the purchase. This decision was based less on economics and more on the fact that it would appear as if the Crown was attempting to circumvent the law. The issue of the Foreign Enlistment Act was reaching a critical impasse, with Parliament not willing to bend to American pressure and change the statutes of the Act and yet fearing the consequences of the South taking advantage of the law.³⁴

The reason for England allowing herself to be manipulated into legal entanglements were several. Her foremost reason was to maintain a state of peace in order to safeguard her maritime interests and wartime profits. The British government, basing its position upon well accepted American precedents as well as her own, contended that England as a neutral had a right not only to build but to arm and sell to belligerents all provisions of war, including ships. If both the Union and Confederate governments had been treated equitably under the law, for every single case brought against one belligerent under the statutes of the Act, a similar case could have been brought against the other.

For all practical purposes, the Alexandra was to be the last ship constructed and successfully brought to the Confederacy. The case of the Birkenhead rams would see the tide turn against the Confederacy. It is evident that it was not a violation of the law to build or arm the ships and that the United States had no legal right to ask for seizure of any cruiser. However, England was unwilling to go to war with America and so despite the legality of her action and as a matter of establishing future precedent, she was willing to forego her rights and Southern sympathies.

- ¹Frank Bredlow Edna, Here Comes the Alabama (Cape Town: A.A. Balkema, 1958), p. 19.
- ²*ibid.*, p. 20.
- ³W. D. Jones, The Confederate Rams at Birkenhead (Tuscaloosa: Confederate Publishing Company, Inc., 1961), p. 19.
- ⁴Richard S. West, Jr., Mr. Lincoln's Navy (New York: Longman's, Green and Company, Inc., 1951), I, p. 276.
- ⁵Jones, p. 34.
- ⁶James D. Bulloch, The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe, Or How the Confederate Cruisers Were Equipped (1884; rpt. New York: Sagamore Press, Inc., 1959), I, p. 63.
- ⁷Bulloch, p. 64.
- ⁸Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1936), p. 378.
- ⁹Jones, p. 35.
- ¹⁰Bulloch, p. 65.
- ¹¹Jones, p. 42.
- ¹²E.D. Adams, Great Britain and the American Civil War (New York: Longman's, Green and Company, 1925), II, p. 118.
- ¹³Bulloch, p. 69.
- ¹⁴Bemis, p. 378.
- ¹⁵J. M. Callahan, The Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy (Springfield: Walden Press, 1957), p. 129.
- ¹⁶Bulloch, p. 297.
- ¹⁷Don Higginbotham, A Raider Refuels: Diplomatic Repercussions, *Civil War History*, 4, No. 2 (1958), p. 129.
- ¹⁸Higginbotham, p. 130.
- ¹⁹Higginbotham, p. 137.
- ²⁰Higginbotham, p. 138.
- ²¹Higginbotham, p. 139.
- ²²William Ridgeway, Speech of Mr. Cobden, on the "Foreign Enlistment Act," in the House of Commons (London, 1863), p. 25.

²³Adams, p. 136.

²⁴Adams, p. 138.

²⁵Frank Merli, Crown versus Cruiser: The Curious Case of the Alexandra, Civil War History, 9, No. 2 (1963), p. 169.

²⁶Merli, p. 178.

²⁷Bulloch, p. 333.

²⁸Merli, p. 172.

²⁹Bulloch, p. 335.

³⁰Bulloch, p. 336.

³¹Merli, p. 175.

³²Merli, p. 176.

³³Bulloch, p. 337.

³⁴Jones, p. 50.