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A NOTE ON PUBLICATION

The editorial board has attempted to reproduce all of the papers in this journal in the same form in which they were first submitted. The board has formatted the papers for the sake of publication. Other than formatting style, however, the following works reflect the writing style and skill of the individual authors.

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MULTIPLE SHOTS: IRANIAN FILM AND MODERN IRANIAN SOCIETY

PATRICK DOUGHERTY

In Asghar Farhadi's 2011 film, *A Separation*, a character named Razieh calls a religious authorities hotline in Iran to figure out whether it is sinful to change the soiled clothes of a senile man whom she cares for. She has her young daughter along, but as the only adult in the home to help the old man, the legality of undressing him is unclear to her. Thus, her phone call to the Islamic "hotline": "I was wondering if I could change him myself, would it be a sin?" *A Separation* is not only a narratively engaging film, it is also a valuable lens into the multiplicity of identities under the Islamic Republic. Class, degree of religiosity, occupation, and gender lead the characters in the film to differing moral conceptions. They are not homogenous.

Films like *A Separation* can tell us a lot about life in modern Iran, but so can the history of the Iranian film industry itself. This evolving industry has witnessed huge strides creatively despite Iran's censorship laws, lack of domestic funding, and history of anti-cinema sentiments. With the increase in the quantity and quality of films in recent decades, Western critics and audiences alike have developed an interest in and taste for Iranian cinema. Farhadi's film stands as the symbolic culmination of this Western reception, as it won the Oscar in 2012 for Best Foreign Language Film, the first Iranian film to do so. Before this achievement, the films of Abbas Kiarostami, including *Through the Olive Trees* (1994), had garnered numerous international film festival awards both before and after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. All this attention has prompted my study of Iranian cinema. By examining mainly three films—*A Separation*, *Through the Olive Trees*, and Marjane Satrapi's *Persepolis* (2007), which is not produced in Iran but is certainly an Iranian story—I will undermine the popular Western notion of a homogenous Iranian society. Iranians are not all pious Muslims, fearful of and oppressed by the state. Iranian society differs greatly between urban and rural, rich and poor, educated and uneducated, devout and secular. This multi-dimensional society, along with its filmmakers, has both struggled and strived under the Islamic Republic, finding pockets of wiggle room in the law to express their discontent with the regime, as well as their ambivalent relationship with the West.

A SHORT HISTORY

Iran's film industry has a rich history, predating the twenty-first century, beginning in the 1900s with the first public theater.[1] The first feature film was not released until 1930, and not until the 1960s and 1970s, under Mohammad Reza Shah's

regime, would Iranian cinema reach international acclaim.[2] From its inception to the present-day, Iranian cinema has faced state censorship. Both Reza Shah and his son imposed authoritarian measures on the cinema to propagate nationalist rhetoric. Protests and dissidence in response to censorship repeatedly arose, causing the level of censorship to wax and wane throughout the century.[3] Despite the creative roadblocks, the film industry witnessed a general growth during the Pahlavi period.

But the Revolution in 1978-79 completely dismantled the Iranian film industry. As the clergy came to power, they perceived the formerly Shah-controlled cinema as both a remnant of his regime and a symbol of Western influence. This anti-Shah, anti-West mission led to 180 out of 436 movie houses being set on fire during the Revolution.[4] As Ayatollah Khomeini consolidated his power and began to codify the laws, the regime's official stance towards cinema shifted from the hostile view during the Revolution. Once comfortably in power, Khomeini, like the Pahlavis, used the cinema to his advantage, rather than completely rejecting it. He officially stated that cinema is a tool for "educating the people," to be used "in the service of Islam."[5]

Not until 1982, however, with the creation of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance (MCIG), would Iranian cinema pick back up. The MCIG's concentration of power "helped both to reduce the confusion and chaos of the transitional period and to enhance government control, thereby setting the stage for emergence of an Islamist unity out of revolutionary destruction."[6] Religious intellectuals from the reformist wing of Iranian politics headed the MCIG, and with their reformist policies ushered in a new wave of Iranian film. Economic incentives, technological advancement, and artistic appreciation led to an increase in the number of films—from 12 to 40—between 1981 and 1984.[7]

Despite the quantity of Iranian films appearing in the 1980s, the quality of the cinema would not gain international acclaim until later in the decade, continuing on into the 90s and 2000s.[8] The 80s witnessed a proliferation of war films, historical dramas, and adventure stories, none of which really challenged the dominant ideology of the state. Fear of censorship or punishment, as well as a heavy sense of nationalism during the Iran-Iraq War, led most filmmakers away from social or political commentary. Not until the mid-80s would women on-screen even begin to appear as important characters, a trend that would significantly increase into the 90s.[9] Hints of conservative backlash within the MCIG would arise in the 90s, but on the whole, Iranian cinema has become more critical of the regime, more gender-centric, more socially reflexive, and more stylistically diverse since the initial homogeneity of the early 1980s.[10] Kiarostami, Satrapi, Farhadi, and their artistic contributions are reflective of these new trends in the Iranian film industry.

COMPROMISE OR CREATIVITY?

According to Hamid Naficy, the evolution of Iranian cinema since the 1979 Revolution has roughly followed two courses: populist and "quality" cinema.[11] The former upholds post-revolutionary values more fully, while the latter engages with those values in a more critical and subversive discourse.[12] After Mohammad Khatami assumed the position as minister of the MCIG, censorship laws eased up considerably. His influence would eventually usher in a reformist discourse in the county as a whole.[13] Still, filmmakers had to deal with censorship laws that limited their scope of expression. The manifest and latent codes of these laws remained unclear, however, allowing for a new dialogue between the cinema and the state.

The films of Abbas Kiarostami, arguably Iran's most famous director, exemplify Naficy's idea of post-revolutionary quality cinema in many respects, while also exhibiting artistic "compromises" with the state. Instances of compromise include the casting of children as protagonists, ambiguous endings, and the blending of fiction and nonfiction within the films as a whole. While these traits could be seen as compromises, they might better be described as creative negotiations that critique social conditions while avoiding censorship.[14] Lack of compromise may lead to outright censorship, which does little to advance the creative freedom allowed within Iranian cinema as a whole. Thus directors like Kiarostami navigate the law as best they can while still maintaining a critical perspective and their artistic integrity.[15] This balancing act lends Iranian films a subtlety that has become a major point of appreciation at international film festivals in recent years.

THROUGH THE OLIVE TREES

Kiarostami's *Through the Olive Trees* blends nonfiction and fiction in a way that plainly reveals rural Iranian society without explicitly stating a social message or criticism. The divisions between urban and rural, educated and uneducated, and rich and poor are on display throughout the film, providing audiences with a multi-dimensional look into modern Iran. The film opens with a film director (Mohamad Ali Keshavarz)— who we can assume to be a stand-in for Kiarostami—speaking to the camera. He is in a rural village in Northern Iran that recently suffered from a terrible earthquake. Two previous Kiarostami films, *Where is the Friend's Home* (1987) and *And Life Goes On* (1992), took place in the same village. *Through the Olive Trees* revisits the process of making those films in an often-ambiguous blend of nonfiction and fiction.

HOSSEIN AND TAHEREH IN KIAROSTAMI'S *THROUGH THE OLIVE TREES*

The two main characters in the film's "fictional" narrative are Hossein and Tahereh, young villagers who are hired as actors in the film-within-the-film. Hossein, an illiterate bachelor in his late teens or early twenties, repeatedly asks for Tahereh's hand in marriage. She remains silent in the face of his requests, much to Hossein's dismay. The director of the film-within-the-film intervenes by giving Hossein advice, and setting the two up to work with each other during a scene. These interactions between the director and Hossein shed light on the social protocols in the village, namely the process of courtship. Hossein knows that his lack of education and money make him unsuitable for marriage in the eyes of Tahereh and her family. He asks Tahereh's grandmother why he isn't a suitable husband, and she points to his illiteracy as the main reason. Despite the role that elders play in the marriage process, the importance of literacy and the power the grandmother wields shed light on the evolving social norms of rural Iranian villages like the one in the film. While it is still much more traditional than urban society, rural Iranian life is not static—Tahereh's implicit demands for an educated husband subvert the rude, reductive stereotypes of life in the Iranian countryside.

By the end of the film, it is not entirely clear whether or not Tahereh accepts Hossein's proposal. After an extended sequence in which Hossein follows her through a patch of trees—all the while pleading his case for marriage and her silently refusing to engage—the camera stands atop a hill overlooking the valley below. An extreme long shot reveals the two characters walking across the valley, eventually stopping and facing each other. It is the first moment in the film that Tahereh appears to even acknowledge Hossein, and is also the only moment in the film accompanied by music. Kiarostami seems to be suggesting a union between the two villagers, but we cannot know for sure since their interaction is inaudible and barely visible.

Christopher Gow offers an extended discussion on the ambiguity of Kiarostami's endings, including the final scene of *Through the Olive Trees*. For Gow, one of the most important effects of an open-ended resolution is audience-engagement.[16] Even though Gow argues that the final shot is not inherently ambiguous, he acknowledges Kiarostami's invitation for audience engagement, for the creation of multiple endings.[17] This kind of critical invitation stands in stark contrast to the kind of propagandistic filmmaking one might expect in a country where the cinema is largely overseen by the state. Additionally, Kiarostami's social criticism emerges through character dialogue throughout the film. At one point, the director, during a conversation with one of his actors, muses on the differences between urban and rural Iranian life: "It is not possible to live only on fresh air!" The director enjoys the countryside, but in a village recently impacted by an earthquake, he has seen the economic and infrastructural woes of rural life. Less apparently, Hossein offers his own type of criticism within the film. The young Iranian has an idea of marriage that stands in contrast to the older generation, as well as to many of his peers: "Sometimes I will serve the tea and sometimes you will. This is the way I see marriage. And this is life!" Even though Hossein is imposing this idea of marriage onto Tahereh, it reflects an equality-based union that contrasts with many conservative Islamic (and Western) values.

Kiarostami's glimpse into rural Iran avoids condescension because the characters create their own society, it is not "given" to them by the urban filmmakers nor is it imposed solely by the state. They are their own agents within a larger, multi-dimensional Iran. Kiarostami employs a subtle, minimalist blend of fiction and nonfiction to create this depiction of Iranian society. He may not attack the regime head-on, but he certainly steers away from nationalist rhetoric—the type that pervaded the Pahlavi era. The canon of Iranian cinema is replete with films like this one that subvert censorship laws in attempts to *show* rather than *tell* us about Iranian society.

PERSEPOLIS

Because it was produced in France, *Persepolis* (2007) is able to critique the Iranian regime directly, free from state censorship laws. Additionally, the diasporic experience of so many Iranians is a focal point of the film. Based on Marjane Satrapi's two graphic novels, *Persepolis* and *Persepolis 2*, this film was directed by Satrapi and Vincent Paronnaud, and is told for Western audiences. Even though it was produced in France, the story is told by an Iranian and deals with Iranian history and society. Unlike Kiarostami's films, its animated visual style is not minimalist *per se*, re-creating the black and white illustrations of Satrapi's novels. Also unlike Kiarostami's films, *Persepolis* is explicit about its message, tackling issues of displacement, authoritarianism, gender

discrimination, and identity head-on with Satrapi's voiceover, as well as the story's action. What makes the story most valuable is that while it is in many ways uniquely Iranian, its overall message and conflicts are universal in their appeal. The relatability of Satrapi's narrative "de-otherizes" Iranian society, bringing it within a global diasporic framework.

CLERGY AND THE WEST IN *PERSEPOLIS*

Satrapi's youth was spent in Iran during the 1970s and 1980s, witnessing the Islamic Revolution, the Iran-Iraq War, and a marked shift in everyday life. She comments on the hope that her parents and many intellectuals had leading up to the Revolution, only to see Khomeini and his supporters install another oppressive regime after the ouster of the Shah. The ensuing hopelessness of the war years is caused by increased injustices on the part of the government, including rampant imprisonment of political dissidents. Satrapi listens to American music and wears jean jackets in open and covert defiance of the regime. This defiance leads to her parents' decision to send her to a boarding school in Vienna, where Satrapi has her first diasporic experiences of feeling out of place. Eventually, Satrapi returns to Iran after the war and attempts to make a life there, but under the oppressiveness of the regime, she feels suffocated. She repeatedly comments on the blatant gender discrimination she experiences with university professors and governmental authorities. A police raid at a house-party leads to a friend's death, resulting in her decision to emigrate once again. In a Parisian airport, Satrapi again feels confusion between worlds, between identities.

In her article on *Persepolis* and Iranian exiles, Amy Malek discusses the ways that Satrapi and other Iranian exiles create a new cultural space.[18] Repeatedly citing Naficy, Malek states that the space that Satrapi exists in and produces is born out of Iranian and Western society, eventually resulting in a new "third space."[19] This third space, according

to Naficy, is not a lost state, but a state of "in-betweeness", a "fusion or admixture."[20] The third space is a space of potential productivity. In the case of Satrapi, the product of her in-between space was *Persepolis*. By telling her story, Satrapi deconstructs the notion of a stock, Iranian woman, demonstrating the multi-faceted nature of Iranian women and Iranian society as a whole.

Satrapi's story coincides with a general increase in recent decades in the exposure and influence of women in Iranian cinema. By no means equal or free from the oppressive constraints of the regime, Iranian women are nevertheless creating a niche in Iranian cinema in which to express their struggles. *Persepolis* may not be a product of this niche, but it is indeed an exhibition of Iranian women's struggles, dispelling any notion of the pious, passive Middle Eastern woman that has come to popularize Western imagination. Through its universal themes and blending of Western and Iranian tropes, it also introduces the exilic component of the twenty-first century Iranian experience. Universality is a hallmark of cinema in Iran because so many of its films express the common Iranian desire to break free from many of the constraints of the state, both before and after the Revolution.

A SEPARATION

Another film that explores gender roles in modern Iranian society is Asghar Farhadi's *A Separation* (2011), a "courtroom drama" that takes place in Tehran. Aside from gender, however, Farhadi's film deals with many facets of Iranian society, including class and religion. Despite the extraordinariness of the film's plot, *A Separation* maintains a harsh realism through its lack of a musical score, the subtle acting style of each character, the handheld camera-work, and obstructed—with doorframes, household objects, and window panels—mise-en-scène. The pull of the narrative, coupled with a Kiarostami-esque minimalist style, gives the events within the film great import. As we come to care for the characters in the film, we come to care for Iranian society in general, since the problems on-screen feel so realistic.

The film opens with a couple facing directly at the camera, and we soon learn that they are filing for a divorce with the government. Throughout the scene, as Simin and Nader argue their respective cases, we adopt the view of the judge proceeding over the hearing. This point-of-view is maintained without any cuts, never revealing the face of the bureaucratic figure handling the divorce case. Both Simin and Nader have good reasons for why they do or do not want to split up. Simin wants to leave the country with her children, but Nader is not ready because he has to take care of his demented father during his last few years. Simin would rather put Nader's father in a home or have someone else watch over him, since he does not even recognize Nader anymore. Nader

responds by saying that he still recognizes his father. Both characters stand on solid moral grounds, leaving us torn between them. This kind of moral ambivalence is the film's centerpiece, as conflicts arise without clear villains or heroes, leaving the audience to sympathize with all parties involved.

NADER AND SIMIN IN FARHADI'S *A SEPARATION*

Without getting too in depth, the film's plot centers around an unfortunate accident that befalls Nader's father's caretaker, Razieh. Razieh suffers from a miscarriage that may or may not have been caused by Nader shoving her out of his home after an incident involving his father. Razieh had good reason for leaving Nader's father home alone, but Nader does not know this. Thus he has good reason to make her leave. Pushing her out crosses the line, but is by no means an unbelievable response. Did he know that she was pregnant? This question will loom over the courtroom scenes, as Razieh and her husband charge Nader with the murder of their unborn child. All the while, Nader struggles to deal with his senile father, his perceptive teenage daughter, and the feuding Simin. And the courtroom is actually more of an office, the judge more of a clerk, the lawyers the plaintiffs themselves. Nader argues his case against Razieh and her angry, debt-ridden husband in a series of scenes that reveal the informal, yet effective workings of the Tehran justice system. Also during these scenes, we come to learn of the divisions between classes in Iranian urban life. Nader and his family are educated and middle-class. They are not religious but obey Islamic law like everyone else. Razieh and her husband are poor and uneducated. Both are devout followers of Islam, and their respect for the law seems more out of piety than practical adherence. We learn all this as the plot pushes forward, culminating in a final shot that, like in *Through the Olive Trees*, leaves

the story open-ended. The state of Simin and Nader's marriage, as well the fate of their daughter and Nader's father, are all left unclear.

Farhadi may leave the film open-ended to avoid a clear message that could implicate him and his film. Film censors often block films that depict a negative image of Iran, so an ending that sees Nader and Simin fleeing to America, or being attacked by Razieh's husband, could lead to censorship. The ambiguous ending maintains realism by not taking a side, since our own lives are also morally complex and ambiguous. Our own lives have no clear villains or heroes. The economic constraints pitted against Razieh and her family, coupled with an, if anything, admirable religiosity, force us to sympathize with their situation. But this does not lead to faulting Nader and Simin, whose care for family is unquestionable and equally admirable. Both groups of people are attempting to make happy lives for themselves despite economic, political, and social woes. Incidentally, the blame in the film lies with the regime, which remains faceless, and yet pervasive throughout the film.

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The separation between the Iranian regime and the Iranian people is a hallmark of the modern Iranian experience. Western perception of Iran often fails to take this separation into account, conflating state ideology with popular sentiment. An examination of Iranian cinema quickly undermines this misguided conflation, as it becomes obvious of the heterogeneous nature of Iranian society. Clearing up any misconceptions is important on a cultural level so that Westerners and Iranians can interact without a heap of misinformation thrown between them. *Through the Olive Trees*, *Persepolis*, and *A Separation* are only three films that help bridge the gap between cultures, offering universal themes and conflicts that make the very notion of the gap between them seem fabricated. In other words, these films demonstrate that Iranian society does not exist "out there," in the Orient, removed from the Occident.[21] The problems that Iranian people face may carry some uniqueness because of the uniqueness of their opposition—the regime—but their desires for freedom and progress are universal.

These films echo the recent "discourse of rights" in Iran, a trans-national discussion amongst intellectuals, clergy, bureaucrats, activists, and activists about the lack of rights given to Iranian civil society and how to attain those rights.[22] This socio-political discourse and movement gives these films an obvious societal import because it too calls for rights that are deemed universal. Modern Iranian society is witnessing a shift away from over-simplified nationalist movements in favor of reform that includes a multiplicity of voices and strategies. The memory of the 1979 Revolution and its aftermath weighs heavily on how Iranians think about change since the basic anti-Shah

tenant of that revolution gave Khomeini an opening in which to seize the harnesses of change. Iranians remain critical of the state, but they are also critical of how to approach changing the state. Casting aside east-west rhetoric, the umbrella discourse of rights shirks political factionalism and cultural prejudice in order to establish lasting and fruitful change by and including a multiplicity of groups and peoples. These films, and many more, reflect this conceptual shift in modern Iranian society.

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[2] *Ibid.*, 548.

[3] Nikki Keddie, *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006). 88-89, 233.

[4] S. Zeydabadi-Nejad, "Iranian Intellectuals and Contact with the West: The Case of Iranian Cinema," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 34, no. 3 (2007): 378.

[5] *Ibid.*, 379.

[6] Naficy, 549.

[7] Zeydabadi-Nejad, 379.

[8] *Ibid.*, 375.

[9] Naficy, 550.

[10] *Ibid.*, 550-551.

[11] Hamid Naficy, "Veiled Voice and Vision in Iranian Cinema: The Evolution of Rakhshan Banietemad's Films," *Social Research*, 67, no. 2 (2000): 559.

[12] *Ibid.*, 559.

[13] Keddie, 269-270.

[14] Christopher Gow, *From Iran to Hollywood and Some Places In-between*, (New York: I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, 2011), 27-39.

[15] Zeydabadi-Nejad, 387-389.

[16] Gow, 27-39.

[17] *Ibid.*, 37.

[18] Amy Malek, "Memoir as Iranian Exile Cultural Production," *Iranian Studies*, 39, no. 3 (2006): 353-380.

[19] *Ibid.*, 357.

[20] *Ibid.*, 355.

[21] Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Random House, 1978), 12.

[22] Negan Nabavi, *Iran: From Theocracy to Green Movement*, (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2012), 40.

"ALL YOU BLACKS WANT ALL THE SAME THINGS"[1]: BLACK LEADERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES

JASMINE M. JACKSON

INTRODUCTION

Divergent styles of leadership have generated the question: is there a universal definition for black leadership? In its most basic form, leadership requires a following of some sort. However there are certain characteristics that leaders must possess in order to gain their following and subsequently be considered leaders. In the case of black leadership, certain distinguishing points must be made when considering who is a leader. Firstly, black leadership is different from leaders that happen to be black. Essentially, black leaders are individuals that attempt to change the conditions of black Americans for the better, whereas leaders that happen to be black are individuals of African descent that hold a leadership position but do not actively seek to change the black community from their position.

For the purposes of this paper, individuals that have largely been considered black leaders will be examined. Rosa Parks will serve as an example of an important activist that misses the designation of leader. Marcus Garvey will be shown as an individual with flawed leadership qualities but nevertheless still a leader. Ruby Duncan and her coalition of women in Nevada that fought to end poverty in Las Vegas and later nationwide will be shown as exemplary leaders that garnered success. Stanley "Tookie" Williams will serve as an example of a gang leader, and will provide insight to the question of whether black leaders are meant to exist as perfect examples of leadership. Lastly, rapper and producer Kanye West will be examined as a leader who exists outside of the realm of politics.

DEFINING LEADERSHIP

In order to understand black leadership, leadership without any connotations to race or ethnicity must be understood. Manning Marable states that:

> "Leaders are essentially individuals who have the ability to understand their own times, who express or articulate programs or policies that reflect the perceived interests and desires of particular groups, and who devise instruments or political vehicles that enhance the capacity to achieve effective change."[2]

Marable's definition provides a crucial start for defining black leadership; however adjustments must be made to include leaders outside of the political realm. Essentially,

black leaders are: risk-taking, charismatic individuals that are aware of the conditions and needs of their perceived community and intentionally lead a form of public activism that is relevant to their political economy.

As a whole, there is no one true "black community". The phrase "black community" denotes a group of people who "derive from the cultural synthesis of our African heritage and our experiences in American society, first as slaves and then as sharecroppers, industrial laborers, the unemployed, and now as the core of the postindustrial urban underclass in semi-destroyed central cities of North America."[3] Universal shared black experience is no longer the marker for blackness. There are undoubtedly areas of injustice that many African Americans face, but racial discrimination is no longer a universal legal truth for black Americans. The current "black community" of the United States is composed of millions of individuals whose conditions and needs are significantly varied. Because there is no universal group, black leaders must be aware of themselves and their perceived black community.

Black leaders must in essence be risk-takers. Risk-taking does not imply that leaders should be reckless in their positions, but rather that they are willing to accept some form of personal sacrifice if it helps to advance their cause. Black leaders must also be charismatic. In a basic sense, charisma denotes having the ability to inspire or influence others. Marable also noted the importance of charisma by stating that leaders must have the ability to "revolutionize men from within".[4] Thirdly, black leaders must be conscious. Consciousness implies the understanding of the racial dynamics of one's political economy. Lastly, black leaders must intentionally lead a form of public activism. Many actions can qualify as activism but that form of activism must be relevant to that leader's political economy. Changing political economies mean that the relevance of some actions may change over time. The action taken by leaders must be able to be seen or heard by the public. In order to be denoted as leaders, black leaders must be identifiable as leaders by at least a fraction of their community. Individuals whose activism takes place largely behind the scenes are important; however leaders require some public acknowledgement of their leadership.

SYMBOLISM ≠ LEADERSHIP

Rosa Parks is an excellent example of an activist, however her lack of intentionality coupled with her acceptance with her designation as a symbol negate her leadership. Jeanne Theoharis' book *The Rebellious Life of Mrs. Rosa Parks* provides a brief look into the activism of Parks' life beyond her familiar work in Montgomery. Theoharis aims to show that Parks is largely remembered as the "accidental matriarch of

the civil rights."[5] The author maintains the idea that Rosa Parks' leadership potential was stultified by her political economy from the start.

Rosa Parks took an extreme risk by refusing to comply with laws she found unjust, but she was not the first person to be arrested in Montgomery for refusing to give up her seat to a white patron. Claudette Colvin was actually the first put in the same situation as Parks however the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) believed that she was not a particularly good fit for their movement.[6] Rosa Parks was seen as a better fit because she was "middle-aged, religious, of good character, known and respected in the community for her political work, and brave."[7] Although Parks was not placed on the bus to act as a catalyst for a movement in Montgomery, fellow local activists in her community essentially used her as such. Even if Parks was essentially used to fit an agenda, it was an agenda that Parks wanted to be a part of. From her first moment in the national public eye, Rosa Parks was content with relegating herself to the status of a symbol.

Even after her time spent in Montgomery, Rosa Parks continued to be an advocate for the black cause in Detroit. While living in Detroit, Parks was particularly focused on educating and altering the lives of the youth and thus became an active member in the Friends of Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) organization, otherwise known as FOS. FOS was largely responsible for raising funds that would be used for SNCC and Rosa Parks essentially ran the organization alongside Dorothy Dewberry.[8] While funding is crucial for most actions, it is entirely possible to be an extremely important asset of an organization or movement without being a leader. Leadership requires intentionality. Although Theoharis proves that Parks remained active throughout her life, she fails to reveal the extent of her activism. The author frequently notes that Parks *participated* in events but the details and accomplishments of her activism are largely missing. Parks' contributions are in no way diminished by her symbolic status, but that status prevents her from being considered a leader.

FLAWED LEADERSHIP IN MARCUS GARVEY

Colin Grant's *Negro With A Hat* holds a great truth about Marcus Garvey that was highlighted by W. E. B. Du Bois; Garvey was "a little difficult to characterize."[9] Garvey was indeed a leader however his leadership style was flawed. In certain instances, Garvey acted more as a boss than a leader. Being a boss is similar to being a leader however a clear distinction exists in consciousness of leaders and bosses. Bosses are not required to fully understand the dynamics of their political economy and furthermore, their course of action does not need to be representative of what their perceived black community

wishes. Leaders, on the other hand, must understand the dynamics of their political economy and act as a representative of a cause that their perceived community wants.

Garvey was a risk-taker in two key aspects however the same two aspects are the heart of his flaws as a leader. Garvey operated on a Black Nationalist platform which is a risk in itself in pre-Civil Rights era America however he undertook an even bigger risk by holding conversations with the Ku Klux Klan. His movement preached black pride and power while simultaneously arguing for black purity and supremacy. Although the KKK argues for the exact opposite, Garvey and the leaders of the KKK were able to find common ground because they both believed in racial purity and because Garvey was attempting to facilitate a way for African Americans to leave the United States.[10] While meetings with the Klan were seen as beneficial to Garvey, it is questionable whether black leaders should form alliances with organizations that help contribute to the detriment of black Americans.

It is evident that Garvey understood the racial dynamics of the black experience in the Americas and abroad in England. Garvey gained his consciousness by experiencing discrimination in Jamaica, England and Harlem. While he mainly relied on his speeches to convey his consciousness, his awareness was highlighted in the Declaration of the Rights of the Negro Peoples of the World which was adopted at the United Negro Improvement Association's (UNIA) First International Convention of the Negro Peoples of the World. The declaration begins with twelve complaints on the issues that face the black population worldwide, and then demands fifty-four solutions to the issues. The demands range from practical requests that deem "any law especially directed against the Negro [...] because of his race or color is unfair and immoral, and should not be respected" to demands of questionable relevance that require "That the anthem "Ethiopia, Thou Land of Our Fathers etc.," shall be the anthem of the Negro race." While understanding the racial dynamics of one's political economy is crucial in becoming a leader, the step that one takes after their understanding is equally as important. Marcus Garvey saw injustice in three places he lived in, and decided that the solution was not to fix the injustice of his setting but rather to change the setting completely. The back-to-Africa movement that Garvey created was meant to give black Americans a means to return to Africa if they wished to do so. While the plan seemed ludicrous to some, many were intrigued by the plan because of Garvey's charisma. Garvey "communicated on a level that 'black yeoman' could understand, and touched on the emotional intelligence of his audience [...] He understood the temper of black people and wove himself and his movement into the tapestry of their lives."[11] Garvey's failure as a leader is not because he

failed to fully enact his vision but rather because his leadership style was largely centered on his charisma.

Charisma is a necessary quality for a leader because it enables them to engage their followers. In its most basic definition, leadership requires followers and charisma acts as a means to gain followers. However, charisma does not counterbalance Garvey's lack of understanding the wants of the black community and the dynamics that could have made his movement successful. Furthermore when Garvey was asked about certain issues that related to his lack of understanding the dynamics of his movement he crumbled under the pressure and could not provide answers. When Ida B. Wells asks Garvey to explain his plan to request money from black people around the world it "wanted to see and hear concrete and realizable plans but all she heard sounded fanciful and impractical [...] 'they sowed doubt amongst the audience', wrote Amy Ashwood, and Garvey was so furious that he 'refused point blank to pay her the $150 fee and travelling expenses."[12] Garvey's movement died with Garvey, further indicating that he may have been a leader for some time in his life, but he was nevertheless flawed at best.

"WE CAN DO IT AND DO IT BETTER"[13]

Ruby Duncan and the Nevada Welfare Mothers that fought to end poverty are brilliant examples of leadership. Ruby Duncan attempted to escape the racist practices of the South by moving to the West. Instead, upon entering Las Vegas she and other women who were in comparable situations found themselves in similarly unjust circumstances. Upon seeing that the racial dynamics that existed in the South had directly influenced the racial dynamics of the West, Ruby Duncan and other welfare mothers realized that it was not the South that had to change but rather the dynamics that allowed racism to thrive had to be changed.

The conditions in Las Vegas were at times better than the living conditions in the South but Ruby Duncan's consciousness allowed her to recognize that one thing being better than something horrid does not mean that it should be accepted. Indeed, mothers in Las Vegas had better job opportunities but their job choices were extremely limited and in many cases their employers used discriminatory practices. Mary Wesley was once told to "cut her hair, wipe off her makeup, and take her earrings off before she could be hired for a chambermaid job at the Sands. [...] Hotel operators were worried that women would drag their husbands out of casinos if they saw them flirting with black women employees".[14] The mothers realized the problems that they faces nationally as black women, and decided to become leaders by taking matters into their own hands.

The mothers' first main concern was the issue of providing health care for their children. Instead of waiting for the government to change or help them, the women took a

risk by taking a hands-on approach and decided to open their own clinic. The women's Operation Life clinic became the most successful Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and Treatment Clinic in the nation despite the opposition the women faced from their local and state governments.[15] Ruby Duncan's leadership is extremely based in her "refusal to take no for an answer".[16] When the mothers were told that the state could not supply a venue or employees for their clinic, they did not change their vision of a clinic. Instead the women found their own building and trained themselves to work in the clinic. The women did not cease their activism with the creation of the clinic; they continued on and were able to gain both a library and a swimming pool for the youth of their city. The success that Operation Life enjoyed can partially be attributed to the charismatic abilities of Ruby Duncan.

"Ruby Duncan persevered through sheer determination, but also because she had a keen sense of when to change tacks."[17] Duncan had only received a ninth-grade education but she did not let that fact inhibit her. She had been labeled a "rabble-rouser, street protester, and a loudmouth" and many believed they could outsmart her, but she always came back with a quick response.[18] [19]Duncan mesmerized her audiences with her dramatic forcefulness that boldly challenged the white power structure.[20] Although Duncan was challenging a dominant white power structure, she did not speak about her blackness which could have potentially alienated many white audiences. Instead, Duncan was known for focusing on her gender because it related directly to motherhood which would generate support from more than just black women. Harriet Trudell, a white mother in Las Vegas remarked that seeing Duncan on television left her "absolutely blown away. She was screaming about how the children were starving and the outrage of what the children had suffered. I wasn't turned off. My first view of her was that she was phenomenal."[21]

Although the women's achievements were ultimately literally dismantled by the State and George Miller's excesses, the women are still excellent examples of leadership that functions from a grassroots organization. The Operation Life women effectively "strengthened their city and neighborhood, they created a new community— what civil rights worked called a 'beloved community,' nurturing bonds of love, friendship, and political commitment across lines of racial, religious, and economic difference."[22]

FROM BLUE LEADER TO BLACK LEADER

Stanley Tookie Williams was the co-founder of one of the most notorious gangs in the United States, the Crips. His autobiography, *Blue Rage, Black Redemption* clears common misconceptions surrounding the "blue" rage of the Crip mentality, and the self-

reeducation process that Stanley underwent to achieve his redemption as a black man. Williams' leadership existed in both the Crippen and redemption phases of his life.

Williams' leadership within the circle of the Crips was condemnable because it contributed to the detriment of the larger black community of Los Angeles, however, it should be noted that the Crips was started "to protect ourselves and our families."[23] Although Williams' method for protection was the creation of a violent gang, the motive behind the creation of the Crips shows Williams' intentionality, awareness and activism. In an environment where gangs blossomed, it becomes understandable as to why Williams' first form of activism was formulating a gang. In 1979, Williams was sent to San Quentin prison where he embarked on a different form of leadership as redeemed leader.

The risk-taking in the second phase of Williams' life is evident in his renunciation of gang life while in prison. Surrounded by Crips and members of other gangs in prison, it was comforting for Tookie to be around allies that recognized him as "Big Tookie" the street hero.[24] Making the "transition from thug to thinking black man with a purpose" was a risk to undertake in prison because it meant "wading into uncharted territory that would bring unwanted attention from prison authorities".[25] Williams would be receiving attention from the same prison authorities that had demonstrated that they had no qualms with treating him unjustly, as evidenced in Williams' routine drugging upon entering San Quentin prison. Although unjust, the routine drugging Williams faced brought him closer to obtaining his black redemption, and thus contributed to his consciousness.

Part two of Williams' autobiography gives an account of his path to redemption. The awareness he gains in prison not only enables him to become conscious of the racial dynamics that exist in prison, but also of the racial dynamics that enhanced his blue rage and thus influenced the creation of the Crips:

"From the beginning I was spoon-fed negative stereotypes that covertly positioned black people as genetic criminals— inferior, illiterate, shiftless, promiscuous, and ultimately "three-fifths" of a human being, as stated in the Constitution of the United States. Having bought into this myth, I was shackled to the lowest socioeconomic rung where underprivileged citizens compete ruthlessly for morsels of the American pie. […] Like many others I became a slave to a delusional dream of capitalism's false hope: a slave to dys-education; a slave to nihilism; a slave to drugs; a slave to black-on-black violence; and a slave to self-hate. Paralyzed within a social vacuum, I gravitated toward thughood, not out of aspiration but out

of desperation to survive the monstrous inequities that show no mercy to young or old."[26]

Williams' consciousness enabled him to recognize the issues in his political economy that fostered his rage and continue to foster the rage of other African-Americans. Illustrating his redemption process serves as a continuation of his personal redemption but also acts as a means to deter readers of similar backgrounds from making the same choices that he made. Although he has educated himself, he is aware that "real redemption cannot be faked or intellectualized. It must be subjective: experienced, and then shared."[27] In essence, the entirety of his story is told so that others living in the same environment that gave birth to his rage can relate to his story of redemption so that they too can be redeemed. It is in this sense that Williams exhibits his form of intentional relevant activism.

Williams' autobiography acts as his form of activism because it serves as an attempt to "connect the reader to a deeper awareness of a social epidemic that is the unending nightmare of racial minorities in America and abroad as well."[28] Williams took on the monumental task of helping other minorities educate themselves and renounce reckless violence and "aggression [...] as a poor man's merit for manhood", a task that culminated with the inclusion of "The Tookie Protocol for Peace: A Local Street Peace Initiative."[29] While in prison, Williams was able to influence and change the lives of many youths that were heading down the same rage-filled path Williams embarked on. A juvenile rehabilitation officer in Florida wrote to Williams to inform him that his words "may be saying the same things I tell the inmates, but when you say something it reaches so many more."[30] The life of Stanley Tookie Williams illustrates two entirely different faces of black leadership. The first example of leadership was not particularly positive or beneficial to the larger black community but still existed as a form of leadership nonetheless. Williams' leadership demonstrates that black leaders are human, and are thus entirely capable of making mistakes and furthermore that leaders are not meant to be perfect.

"PRAY TO GOD THAT MY ARMS REACH THE MASSES"[31]

Kanye West once said "I realize that my place and position in history is that I will go down as the voice of this generation. Of this decade, I will be the loudest voice."[32] The public was not amused by another trademark Kanye West ego fiasco. West was born in Atlanta to Donda and Ray West, and later became a well-known producer for Jay-Z before venturing in to rapping himself. West's music has frequently been praised but his seemingly unplanned outbursts have called his personality into question. In fact many

would argue that Kanye Omari West is not a leader, but rather an arrogant rapper with a god complex. However, West has repeatedly used his public image to voice his opinion on race relations in the United States and abroad.

In the current political economy, it is sometimes difficult to fully understand the racial dynamics in the United States because many issues that black Americans stem from *de facto* racism as opposed to legal racism. The latter half of the 20th and the 21st century has left black Americans with a lack of representation, yet West has risen to the status of cultural representative:

> "If not Kanye West, then who? No artist in the last decade better represents the times. No figure has been more present in the times of controversy. No other celebrity had been the source of politically charged comments from equal parts Bush and Obama. [...] His controversies, while receiving negative feedback from the media and the public, have almost always involved socially relevant issues that help define the past decade. [...] For better or worse, West, better than any other figure in the decade, represents the now, and that's why he serves as an excellent lens to look at the 2000s."[33]

West's risk-taking is often the source of his controversies. On many separate occasions, West has taken risks by deviating from what has been deemed tolerable and politically correct to state how he truly feels.[34] His risk-taking is enhanced by the fact that he knows that his risks could affect his life. In one of West's biggest successes to date, "Jesus Walks", he raps "They say you can rap about anything except for Jesus that means guns, sex, lies, video tapes, but if I talk about God my record won't get played, huh? Well if this take away from my spins, which will probably take away from my ends"[35] His lyrics indicate that he is aware that what he is doing is a personal risk because it may subtract from the amount of radio plays he receives which would subsequently affect the amount of the money he could have made, yet he chose to release the song anyway. It is evident that West has no qualms about voicing his opinion in his music but the same can also be said for West's appearances in interviews.

In perhaps his most controversial risk to-date, on September 2nd 2005 stood on national television and went off-script to declare that the president of the United States "George Bush doesn't care about black people". The remarks on the president were made after West had already deviated from his script in which he stated:

> "I hate the way they portray us in the media. You see a black family, it says, 'They're looting.' You see a white family, it says, 'They're looking for food.' And, you know, it's been five days [waiting for federal help] because most of the people

are black. […]America is set up to help the poor, the black people, the less well-off, as slow as possible.[36]

West's comments about the media's portrayal of African-Americans were largely forgotten and overshadowed by sources claiming that West had stated that George Bush was a racist.[37] Perhaps West did not have the best timing, but the core argument behind his words contains some merit in discussing the race relations of the United States. West was indeed telling the truth about the media's portrayal of "looters" and "finders" in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.[38] West's mother remarked that she would have been surprised if he had stuck to the script because "he is not someone you can just hand a script to and expect him to follow it verbatim, unless it expresses how he truly feels". In their family, Kanye was raised to tell the truth, especially if it was a truth that needed to be said that no one wanted to hear.[39] By making statements that he believes need to be heard, West effectively extends his consciousness to his audiences and utilizes a form of activism that has great relevance for black Americans and Americans in general.

Hip Hop Activism has emerged as a synthesis of hip hop music and consciousness.[40] Tricia Rose argues that:

> "Life on the margins of postindustrial urban America is inscribed in hip hop style, sound, lyric and thematics. Situated at the "crossroads of lack and desire," hip hop emerges from the deindustrialized meltdown where social alienation, prophetic imagination, and yearning intersect. Hip hop is a cultural form that attempts to negotiate the experiences of marginalization, brutally truncated opportunity, and oppression within the cultural imperatives of African-American history, identity, and community.[41]

Stand & Deliver's author Yvonne Bynoe maintains the idea that artists from many different genres have always spoken out on social issues but "only in discussion related to political action and young Black people has the celebrity of a few rap artists and rap moguls become conflated with political leadership".[42] Bynoe fails to realize the implications of a changing political economy. Leadership is not only relevant in the political realm in today's political economy. Activism is no longer solely about political policies and campaigns. Because the racial injustice that exists in American society no longer exists on a purely legal platform, it is necessary to move activism out of the realm of lawyers, politicians and policymakers. Furthermore, playing Hip Hop activist music aloud is not only for one's own listening pleasure, but also acts "as part of an ad hoc war of position. The noise constitutes a form of cultural resistance that should not be ignored".[43] Kanye West has not come forth with an official political plan to change the

state of race relations but he has utilized his celebrity to illustrate the race issues to as many people as possible.

In 2013, Kanye West released his much anticipated sixth album, *Yeezus*. The song which sparked the most controversy due to the provocative nature of its lyrics was "New Slaves". The lyrics offer West's commentary on the historical and contemporary race issues of the United States. West raps:

> "My momma was raised in the era when, clean water was only served to the fairer skin, doing clothes you would have thought I had help, but they wasn't satisfied unless I picked the cotton myself, you see it's broke nigga racism, that's that "Don't touch anything in the store", and it's rich nigga racism, that's that "Come in, please buy more" "What you want, a Bentley? Fur coat? A diamond chain? All you blacks want all the same things""[44]

West demonstrates his knowledge of the current political economy by deviating from the generally understood concepts of racism and the discriminatory practices of certain stores. In order to ensure that his message reached not only his fans, West premiered the song by displaying a minimalist black and white video that "provided a striking context for the rapper's searing lyrics on race and materialism" in 66 different locations across the world.[45] West has undoubtedly made his thoughts and opinions on race extremely relevant in racial discourse internationally.

CURRENT IMPLICATIONS

Kanye West sharing his consciousness to a larger audience is considered activism in the current political economy because he illustrates racial experiences that are prevalent in the United States that all African-Americans may not share. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 certainly did not mark the death of racism, but it marked the death of *de jure* discrimination to a certain extent. Pre-civil rights leaders were able to come up with clear agendas because they were opposing a clear agenda based on injustice. Post-civil rights leaders have both the palpable advantages and obscure disadvantages of living in a legally equal society. An "equal" society means that there are no longer universally shared experiences of oppression and discrimination. Of course this does not mean that oppression and discrimination cannot be found in the legal realm, but there is no longer a universal experience of that discrimination. Activists like Parks were able to participate and gain support in boycotts and marches because segregation was a legal truth that affected all African-Americans. The same cannot be said for different types of discrimination that plague a very diverse group of African-Americans in today's political

economy. Current black leadership is not only difficult to characterize, but the effectiveness is also questionable.

Defining leaders as "risk-taking, charismatic intellectuals that are aware of the conditions and needs of their perceived community and intentionally lead a form of public activism that is relevant to their political economy" has two main risks. Firstly, individuals who may often be regarded as leaders like Parks lose the designation of being a leader. Important activists, thinkers and organizers are not included in this definition. While certain individuals may not be included, it does not diminish their work, nor does it diminish the necessity of such individuals. Furthermore, the proposed definition has zero mention of success meaning that some individuals can be deemed leaders without necessarily achieving much of anything, while others may not be deemed leaders even if they have achieved a great deal. Garvey, although flawed, is considered a black leader even though his movement was largely unsuccessful whereas Parks was not considered a leader even though the movements that she participated in achieved success for all African-Americans.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most significant aspect of the definition of black leadership I have proposed is consciousness. In an ever-changing American society, it is essential for leaders to remain aware of the racial dynamics in their political economy. Only then can leaders use their charisma to take a risk by leading a form of relevant activism.

Another key facet of the proposed definition of black leadership is the idea of a "perceived community". As mentioned before, there is no universal black community. It is questionable whether "black leaders" truly exist if they are only helping a small section of the black population. Robert Smith proposes that there are no black leaders because the black caucus of the United States is too varied and unorganized. Furthermore, he argues "the discordant parts of the black community probably cannot be brought together in a single national institution because the discordances— institutional and ideological— are unbridgeable."[46] Lewis Gordon also suggests that leadership may be unnecessary and perhaps even detrimental to African-Americans. He states that "to be a black leader is regarded, for the most part, as a relegation to the status of sheep dog– to keep the flock in line until they are available for Master consumption."[47] Gordon's metaphor brings forth the notion that perhaps leadership is not the best means to gain what African-Americans need. With no unified community, two perhaps insoluble questions arise: what is the best means to get what we need, and furthermore what do we need? In the words of Kanye West perhaps as a people, "our work is never over."[48]

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THE WIND THAT BLEW THE AFRICAN GODS ACROSS THE SEA AND INTO OBSOLESCENCE

ALEXIS PREGEANT

As the Africans sailed across the Atlantic sea and into bondage, did the gods, cosmology, superstitions, and rituals of their native land travel with them to the Christianized world where they were forcibly headed? Dislocated from their native land and cultural groups, African religious beliefs are often seen as dissipating with the wind that blew slave ships across the Atlantic. Yet religion, from folk superstitions to complex cosmologies, gives an individual both a sense of community and an explanation for daily occurrences. African slaves, though often deemed soulless or unevolved by some Americans, needed the peace of mind and sense of community that religion has given man since the birth of social consciousness. The religious lives of slaves cannot be ignored or demeaned, for a vibrant religious community undoubtedly existed amongst the dislocated peoples just as it did amongst their white brethren. As people with a centuries old culture and belief system, was forced migration and bondage enough to eclipse engrained religious beliefs? If not, then manifestations of slave Christianity, theories of slave cults hidden beneath histories' surface, Afro-synthesized religions such as Voodoo, and the eventual emergence of the black church should all show vestiges of the worldview and rituals that were once practiced in Africa. If these manifestations of African American religious beliefs do indeed testify to the ongoing life of the gods of Africa, then the traditions of a great and historical people did not die under the masters' whip or cultural dispersement; rather, they were somehow transformed to fit the social situation of a people placed amongst one of history's most "peculiar institutions."

The majority of slaves destined from North America originated in West Africa or the Congo-Angola region from a wide variety of cultural groups: Youba, Fon, Ewe, Dahomey, and others who each possessed their own complex cultures and religious rites and pantheons.[1] In the state of Louisiana, the history of slave religion is both strikingly similar and often slightly different than her Protestant counterparts. Slaves destined for the Catholic colony came from the regions of Guinea, the Gold Coast, and Angola and encompassed the cultural groups of Mandinkas, Fon, Bambara, Fanti, Gambrans, and Senalese.[2] Like their East Coast counterparts, slave groups in Louisiana carried distinct and differing religious beliefs across the sea with them. Yet between both Protestant and Catholic territories, there was a distinct African view of the universe that pervaded every slave ship. As historian Daniel Fountain explains, Africans believed that "To live is to believe in and interact with things both spiritual and supernatural."[3] West and Central African cosmology did not separate the realms of the living and the dead, the natural and

the supernatural, or the transcendent and the temporal. This shared cosmology, despite a wealth of manifestations in practice and deities, led to common principles about the functions of the universe and basic ritual patterns. At the pinnacle of this cosmology stood a High God or Supreme Creator of the world who was distant and uninvolved in human affairs. Prayer, sacrifice, and ritual were rarely directed toward this High God and were instead performed for lesser deities, nature spirits, or ancestors. These lesser deities and nature spirits are multitudinous in number and vary in names from culture to culture, but govern natural phenomenon (thunder, lightning, rain) that transcends cultures. A priest, trained in the language and rites of a particular deity, conducted sacrifices, prayers, and rituals toward his god of choice. Devotees studied under these priests to prove their devotion to a particular god. They then undertook a symbolic death and rebirth before being initiated and allowed to participate in the characteristic African ritual of spirit possession wherein their deity may possess them in an ecstatic trance and reveal divine messages. Beneath this world of deities lay a realm of sprits that resided in lakes, trees, herbs, and all natural objects. This world of spirits not only played an active and tangible role in human life but could also be harnessed by witches, conjurers, or diviners. Diviners could read the ripples on the lake, the entrails of an animal, or perform complex rituals to access the spirit world and foretell the future. Conjurers were integral as well for they could harness these spirits to harm or hurt, charm or curse. This worldview interwove all aspects of reality—the environmental, social, national, and cosmic aspects of the human world could be entwined with the supernatural through sacrifice, divination, magic, conjuring, and spirit possession. Another important aspect of African religions was ancestor worship, for the dead human spirits were directly between the spiritual realm and the human world; therefore, they could intervene on man's behalf and more easily access the supernatural blessings and curses that were available. If one's ancestors were not revered, they could impart sickness or misfortune while veneration imparted fertility and health. For this reason, complex and careful funeral rites were performed to appease spirits and assist them in a happy afterlife. Ceremonies for ancestors, possession, divination, or deities nearly always included music, dance, drumming and song. When the devotee began to dance and call upon his deity in a possession ceremony, it was the beat of the drum that summoned the spirit into the worshipper's body.[4] Yet this way of life—the freedom to bury one's ancestors beneath their native soil, the freedom to dance ecstatically for whichever deity one chose from the many African pantheons, or the freedom to call upon the spirits of the world for good or evil—was suddenly and violently disrupted by the forced migration to the United States and the disbursement of cultural and family groups.

After the horror of the middle passage, dispersed in an alien land, and separated from their families, slaves' religious practices were disrupted, interwoven, and often forced into secrecy. Specific deities, liturgical calendars, rituals, and myths were often completely lost after the middle passage; yet a poignant and common sense of loss for gods, tribes, families, prophets, priests, diviners, and medical men remained. Soon, Americans attempted to fill this loss with their Westernized, often racially subjective view of Christianity. To the majority of Christians, the religion that slaves carried with them was heathenistic, barbaric, and over sexualized while Christianity possessed the rational, civilized truth.[5] Further, the common justification for slavery was that the Christians had been divinely charged with bringing salvation to the peoples of Africa. Although the Protestant slave territories would succeed in converting slaves en mass before Catholic Louisiana, both initially faced the same dilemmas. The amount of missionaries was scare and masters, due to a fear of organized religion amongst their property or a simple denial that they even had souls, were often opposed to slave conversion. Even when missionaries did reach slaves, the latter frequently found the subjective message that they preached distasteful. Often, African Americans were told that as descendants of the Canaanites, they were cursed to serve whites by Divine mandate.[6] Even when this extreme justification of slavery was not present, the Bible's messages on submission to God were emphasized to highlight submission to Earthly masters.[7] In Church services, free men would sit in the pews while slaves had to stand on sides on sit in the aisles.[8] In Louisiana, the Code Noir attempted to ensure the Christianization of its incoming "heathens." It mandated that the "Catholic, Apostolic, and Roman Church was essential to the colony's well-being"; Article II ordered that all slaves be instructed and baptized in the faith while Article III forbade any other religion than Catholicism.[9] The illiteracy of slaves and carelessness of masters often reduced this mandate merely to baptism and the most rudimentary catechism. It did, however, ensure that the slaves would be exposed to the symbols, beliefs and rituals of Catholicism.[10] With knowledge of their own native religious practices, those of slaves around them, and the Christian practices of their masters, Anthony Pinn explains the synthesis that then occurred, "Not all those of African descent, whether free or bond, responded to the Christianization process in the same way. For some, the hardships of enslavement created an absurd world that could only be responded to by rejecting all traditional forms of religious practice and embracing those that did not give consideration to the idea of God or gods…Some encountered Christianity for the first time and embraced it with modifications to meet their particular needs within their unique social context. Other combined Christianity with traditional African practices and developed religious systems that greatly resembled belief systems such as Vodu and Santeria."[11] By examining these

varieties, from modified Christianity to synthesized Afro-Christian cults, the traditional African religious pattern can be traced to the emergence of the Black Church and the ultimate opportunity and community it provided for these displaced peoples.

For many slaves, the transition to a religion which incorporated a high God, intermediaries (Jesus and the saints) between humans and this high God, death and rebirth, and a strong belief in the Spirit of the world was a consoling and natural transition. Whether Protestant or Catholic territory, the appeal of Christendom to slaves would have been much the same. Even in New Orleans, one of the few locations where traditional African drumming and Voodoo were tolerated, free women of color founded the Sisters of the Holy Family in 1842.[12] Yet these free women had better access to a trained clergy and literacy; slaves, however, were often deprived of these tools necessary to follow Orthodoxy. The segregation found in most Christian churches, the barrage of subjective sermons, and irregular access to trained clergy undoubtedly affected Christian slaves' approach to Christian worship. Instead of Orthodox services, they reverted to the communal, musical, emotionally charged worship that their ancestors had practiced for generations. Despite regularly attending white's community worship services or listening to sermons preached by plantation ministers, these Africanized Christian worship services occurred in "hush arbors," aptly named for their hidden locations and hushed tones.[13] Gathered from slave narratives, these hush arbors usually occurred in woods, gullies, fields, or other secret places. Blankets, rags, or quilts would be wet and hung into makeshift rooms or iron pots were laid in the middle of the room to stifle the sound of the services. If slaves were caught holding their own services, punishments could be extreme; such measures were taken, however, for these uplifting and consoling services.[14] In hush arbors, preachers were not hired by masters or pressured into preaching subjective sermons on the Bible. Rather, men or women skilled in memorization or secretly literate would be licensed simply by the spirit to preach messages of hope and freedom to their brethren.[15] There was a distinct Christian aspect to these services, for it was the Holy Book which provided the core of the sermons and Christian phraseology and imagery that dominated prayers and songs. Equality before God was stressed, Jesus' messages of equality were professed, and imagery of the Jews in Exodus gave slaves an identity as a divine peoples being lead through hardships ultimately to be freed by God. Further, Christianity provided spiritual relief and eternal hope as slaves prayed to a God who could grant them freedom.[16] Services in the hush arbors began with the reading of scripture, followed by a prayer and a lesson on the scripture which had been read, the preacher's sermon, and finally the shout. These "shouts" represent the distinct African characteristic that was added to these Christian services. While the few white observers who have documented the phenomenon have described the shout as "barbaric" or "wild,"

there was actually a very organized method and tangible therapeutic effect involved. A leader would begin by calling out a verse of scripture or a spiritual hymn and shouters responded by shuffling to the rhythm of the call in a counterclockwise circle. When a singer outside of the circle began to sing the song, foot-tapping and hand-clapping began to truly create the musical rhythm of the experience. Shout proper then began, and the song could be taken up and improvised by any member or the circle to express either personal joy or sorrow; these individual shouters, picking up the chorus and the rhythm, often became ecstatically entranced and communicated with the Spirit.[17] If a shouter became too overzealous and the dampened blankets or iron kettle were not enough, rags were often stuffed into their mouth to maintain secrecy.[18] These songs, ripe with Christian imagery yet styled to the African rhythm and song pattern, exemplify the synthesis of African traditions and Christian religion that served to comfort a great number of slaves:

> You got a right, I got a right, we all got a right, to the tree of life
> Yes, tree of life, De very time I thought I was los'
> De dungeon shuck an'de chain fell off
> You may hinder me here, but you cannot dere
> Cause God in de heav'n gwinter answer prayer[19]

Although this hymn exemplifies the modified and egalitarian form of Christianity that suited the needs of a great number of religious slaves, there is evidence and a high probability that syncretized African cults existed amongst the slaves on plantations as well.

If the worship of African gods did indeed occur on plantations, there are a multitude of reasons why these religions may be nearly lost to history. While narratives of former and fugitive slaves recount hush arbors, these services were merely stylized Christian worship and would not have greatly tarnished the black man's fragile place in American society. While Americans on plantations often condoned secular conjuring practices or Africanized Christianity, these usually did not differ greatly from European superstitions or Christianity. Secret African religious cults, however, would most likely involve the African practices of animal sacrifice, ecstatic trances, and worship of other deities that would be highly offensive to Americans, detrimental to the notion that slavery was divinely mandated to spread Christianity to the heathens, and reinforce the image that blacks were uncivilized savages. For this reason, neither masters nor former slaves would be very willing to speak of these practices. Yet there is significant archeological evidence, probable cause, and hints in slave narratives that suggest just such a thing. The presence of secret hush arbor meetings, archeology's findings of guns, objects stolen

from masters, and literacy tools found at slave sites all demonstrate that masters had little control over both the spiritual and physical activities of slaves.[20] From Chesapeake Bay to St. John 's River in Florida, West African style pottery was found with curious "X" markings upon them. This marking is also found on spoons, knives, forks, and pots unearthed at slave sights. One theory suggests that this "X" represented the intersection between the living and the dead, the natural and the supernatural, that is so important in African religion. Further, blue beads sacred in West Africa for warding off the evil eye, cowrie shells, coins pierced with intricate patterns, prisms, and ebony rings found scattered about slave sites echo charms and sacred objects in Africa. [21] On the Jordan plantation near Houston, Texas and plantations in Annapolis, Maryland, traditional ritual items such as used chalk, bird skulls, fragments of weighing scales, and animal paws have been found. Digs have unearthed cups, mirrors, saucers, clocks, and animal remains on slave graves that are reminiscent of African beliefs about the afterlife. [22] The narrative of former slave Charles Ball vaguely hints at some of these things. He discusses his grandfather, who refused to listen to preachers or attend Sunday services and grumbled about his suppressed beliefs in ancient deities. He also vividly describes assisting two young slave parents in burying their young child with a small canoe and oar so that he may return to his home country and material which would identify him as a tribe member when he returned as a spirit. [23] Methodist missionaries in Alabama speak of some slave's religious ideas consisting "solely of crying to the sun and moon upon awakening."[24] Further, Christian slave narratives often speak of divisions within their own community, dismissing slaves who danced or sang in traditional ecstatic ways.[25] These cults may have been similar in rhythmic style to the worship ceremonies performed in the hush arbors, but the key difference lies in the object of worship, the God or gods who received veneration. Although the predominant historical theory that slaves abandoned their deities and converted to a modified Christianity is applied in a blanket fashion to all religious slaves on plantations, archeology and snippets of accounts show that this may not always have been the truth. Further, the cult of Voodoo that existed in New Orleans testifies to the fact that the African gods were capable of surviving in North America.

Voodoo's roots go beyond Louisiana and the West Indies directly to Africa. As Daniel Fountain explains, "The images of zombies, lurid daces, and mystical concoctions conjured by Hollywood and novelists have made the existence of Voodoo in America common knowledge as well as a viable tourist attraction. However, Voodoo rightly deserves scholarly attention."[26] This is because at Voodoo's core, beyond all sensationalization, lies a real and historical synthesis of African theologies and Christian imagery that is a prime example of the African American religious experience. It stands as the strongest, and despite the lack of accounts, most well-documented example of the survival of traditional African beliefs in North America. Antebellum Voodoo boasted a formal pantheon of gods, priesthood, initiation rites, a rudimentary liturgical calendar, and developed religious symbols.[27] Vodu, the original term for Voodoo, refers to the Dahomean word for god. Similar to most African religions, Vodu revolves around a distant high god, shows devotion to a singular lower deity but acknowledges multiple, actively seeks to interact with natural spirits and ancestors, and believes in a highly interconnected universe of natural and supernatural. [28] During the Dahomean's territorial and economic expansion in Africa during the seventeenth century, the religion came to encompass Yournam, Mahi, and Ketu gods into their pantheon, testifying to the African religious ability to synthesize. The forced migration of the eighteenth century to the multiethnic islands of the West Indies further contributed the religions' expanding practices. [29] Not only were deities from the Nago, Senegalese, Obo, Congo, and Angola regions incorporated into the religion but Catholic saints and Christian rites as well. By equating African deities with Christian saints, Voodoo was able to slither by the legal prohibitions mandated by the Code Noir .[30] In 1716, Louisiana bought her first slaves from the islands of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and Saint-Dominique. By 1782 Governor Galvez forbade the purchase of any further slaves from Martinique because "these Negros are too much given to Voodooism and make the lives of the citizens unsafe." [31] In 1792, slaves from Saint Dominique were banned for the same reason. Yet in 1803 the purchase of Louisiana by the United States lifted these Spanish bans and 1809 saw a huge influx of slaves from the West Indies as their masters fled the Haitian slave revolt and Spanish wars. [32] In Louisiana, Voodoo undoubtedly maintained the aspects that it had absorbed in Africa and the West Indies, possibly even adding more as it encountered different cultural groups. History, however, has trouble tracing this as there are only two accounts in the early nineteenth century and one in the late nineteenth century. Newspaper articles do speak of the subject as well, but always in a sensationalized way. Each of these three accounts agrees on the presence of a snake (a remnant of Dahomean religion that represents the lower deity who's worship is emphasized, Li Grand Zombi), drumming, singing, dancing, ecstatic spirit possession, offerings of food and liquor to the deity, Catholic candles, an altar, and prayers to the virgin.[33] These descriptions all fit depictions of Haitian Voodoo as well which includes a highly evolved pantheon that many consider absent in the "superficial" Voodoo of North America.[34] Evidence shows that Voodoo ceremonies, which were held annually on St. John's Eve, occurred as far North as Missouri .[35] This cult of synthesized African theology and Christian imagery is hypothesized to have traveled throughout the antebellum slave community due to its capability to address everyday issues such as healing, protection against evil through conjuring, experience of the supernatural through possession, and sense of community in

ceremonies.[36] The generally lax moral atmosphere of New Orleans and the secrecy of slaves on plantations allowed this cult to flourish, but with the coming of the Civil War and white racism blossoming in fear of the free black, the religion saw fascination and tolerance evolve into fear and demonization. The claims of New Orleans city newspapers continued to escalate as the Civil War approached: rituals now involved human sacrifice, orgiastic rites, copious amounts of liquor, and chickens ripped apart by the teeth of Voodoo queens .[37] Before the 1850s and 1860s, Voodoo arrests in New Orleans were scarce and whites often contacted Voodoo conjurers for their own purposes; yet these decades saw a multitude of arrests for medical malpractice, the gathering of African Americans, and even insanity.[38] With the dawning of Emancipation and the growth of Protestant churches controlled by African-Americans, traditional African religious practices suffered an attack from both black and white that led to an institution that would simultaneously pioneer equality and deem African traditions barbaric.

True Protestant efforts to convert slaves began with the Great Awakening in the 1830s and greatly succeeded with their egalitarian message, unsegregated services, fierce devotion, emphasis on Christ in the heart above formal training, and emotionally charged gatherings. In these churches, slaves who had once met in hush arbors found a liberation theology that mirrored their own and a morally sanctioned outlet for their traditions of music and spirit-possession.[39] Protestant Christian leaders had long prophesized and strove toward the end of slavery; with the emancipation proclamation, the prayers of Christian slaves and prophesy of Christian leaders had come true. This gave African-American Christians and white religious leaders justification to criticize conjure and created new ground upon which to convert: emancipated slaves stood as a testimony to the divine power of God .[40] As Fountain explains, "freedom, rather than slavery, proved the greatest force for conversion among African Americans in the South."[41] By 1871, the majority of African Americans worshipped in black majority churches led by a black minister.[42] From these pulpits, they could safely preach the Bible's messages of social liberation, for whites could not disenfranchise the religion that they claimed to believe in. African Americans thus had moral and institutional control over their own institutions that had once been the symbol of white power. In the public eye, these Christian African Americans negated the long held notion that blacks were inhumane, soulless, and savage. Yet as a powerful and liberated black church emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, leaders strove to pull their brethren closer to societal and religious norms to gain acceptance within a racist, white dominated community. This involved attempts to oppose, direct, or recast African religious customs and beliefs into Christian molds so that African Americans would seem more American than African.

After the Civil War, African religious patterns can be seen by examining black community leader's reactions to them. The American Methodists, leaders in forming black churches in the South, complained in shock that African-American conversion still occurred through trances, dreams, and ecstasies that mirrored those of their African ancestors. Srieby, a member and spokesperson of this church, touted that "all the educated negro ministers discourage or forbid the use of it [traditional African music] among their people, and the strange, wild songs, whether religious or not, are coming to be regarded as relics and badges of the old condition of slavery and heathenism and the young men and women are ashamed to sing them."[43] Despite many negative comments on his black brethren, African American social critic William Hannibal Thomas aptly explains the educated black man's view of the "old" as opposed to the new, socially accepted African American: "The old represents dreams, shadows, misdirected energy, ephemeral infidelity, deficient judgment, and thorough satisfaction with specious achievement. The new exacts character, consistency, integrity, industry, common sense, simplicity, clearness, beneficent services, and above all, fervent piety in word and deed. [44] Entwined with this notion of "old" that must be shed to birth a new and better African American were the traditional African religious rites. Leaders like Booker T. Washington and W. E. B Du Bois believed that the retention of a spirit-filled worldview was a mere retention of slave culture and was an impediment to black success and equality. Du Bois speaks of the witch woman and the Voodoo priests as the greatest impediment to conversion and black education.[45] In such a racist atmosphere that deemed all traditional African culture heathenism, these critics were undoubtedly right. George Washington Cable echoes the white view in his description of Voodoo: "that worship was as dark and horrid as bestialized savagery could make the adoration of serpents."[46] This religion, "bestialized savagery," was portrayed as immune to reason and incapable of civilization despite the newfound freedom of its practitioners. With whites awaiting any opportunity to demean and further disenfranchise blacks, these so-called heathen rights were rightly feared by blacks who wished to promote black equality and civility. These traditions thus became inhabitants of the shadows as shameful remnants of the horrid institution of slavery or unfortunate consequences of poverty. The pluralism of African American Christianity and African worship whittled away after Emancipation. The freedom of slaves brought a tidal wave of Christian converts and birthed the church that would eventually succeed in attaining equality and respect for its constituents in the civil rights movement; however marvelous and liberating this achievement was, the post-Antebellum black church had to pave the road to equality by suppression of traditions that were not mere remnants of slavery or byproducts of ignorance but ancient traditions belonging to a civilization with a history as deep, complex, and evolved as Western traditions.

Throughout the horror that was the institution of slavery, African religious traditions were modified, synthesized, hidden, demeaned, and eventually disenfranchised in the New World. The slave community possessed vibrant religious life both influenced by the master and hidden from him; in this community, whatever combination of Christian or African synthesis may have been practiced, slaves found meaning and explanation for their peculiar and cruel situation. In Christian prayer and hush arbors, they were given hope and an outlet to plea for freedom. Through Afro-Christian synthesized cults and conjure, blacks could fight the oppression of white culture theologically and work in the temporal realm for healing, protection, and curses. The mere fact that slaves kept the traditions of their ancestors alive— whether through the rhythm of song, veneration of ancestors, or worship of their deities—is a testament to the strength of African religious traditions and their ability to merge and synch with other cultures. Ironically, slavery allowed for this African ancestry to remain more intact than after Emancipation; it allowed whites to feel a level of social and economic superiority that relatively insulated the African American religious community. With emancipation and the movement of the black church into the public sphere, whites were forced to confront the equality of these peoples and fiercely demean all aspects of their culture to assert their own superiority. Although blacks were now given an excellent opportunity to move toward their own equality, they could only do so by burying the long standing traditions that whites considered heathenistic. At the same time, modern black churches cannot be accused of completely forgetting their religious ancestors, for their worship is tinged with a distinct liberation theology, rhythm, and emotional contact with the Spirit that filled the hush arbors in the days of slavery. Yet the evolution of society and dominance of white culture within America has nearly eroded the interwoven world populated by numerous deities and nature spirits that once constituted the fabric of African life. The gods of Africa, their rites, and the cosmology of the African people who once worshiped them have been transformed by a church that has achieved one of the greatest egalitarian feats in history.

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NOTES

[1] Anthony B. Pinn, *The African American Religious Experience in America* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2006), 20.

[2] Claude F. Jacobs and Andrew Jonathan Kaslow, *The Spiritual Churches of New Orleans: Origins, Beliefs, and Rituals of an African-American Religion* (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1991), 21.

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[4] Albert J. Raboteau, *Slave Religion: The "Invisible Institution" in the Antebellum South* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 7-13.

[5] Pinn, *The African American Religious Experience*, 1.

[6] Anthony B. Pinn, *Terror and Triumph: The Nature of Black Religion* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2003), 84.

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[8] Claude and Jacobs, *The Spiritual Churches*, 22.

[9] Ibid., 24.

[10] Ibid., 23.

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[20] Fountain, *Slavery, Civil War, and Salvation*, 72.

[21] Ibid., 81-83.

[22] Ibid., 89.

[23] Ibid., 81.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid., 91.

[26] Ibid., 76

[27] Ibid., 77.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid., 77-89.

[30] Ibid., 77.

[31] Raboteau, Slave Religion, 76.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid., 79.

[34] Ibid., 27.

[35] Ibid., 80.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Claude and Jacobs, *The Spiritual Churches*, 26.

[38] Patrick Bellegarde-Smith, *Fragments of Bone: Neo-African Religions in a New World* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005), 187.

[39] Fountain, *Slavery, Civil War, and Salvation*, 70.

[40] Ibid., 92.

[41] Ibid., 92-93.

[42] Ibid., 104.

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[44] Ibid.

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A HISTORIOGRAPHY OF DEATH IN 19TH CENTURY AMERICA

CAROLINE STALLARD

Historiography is the study of written history, usually confined to that of a specific time period, region, or topic. The goal of historiographical writing is to review the major works in a field of history, describe the larger scholarly trends within which those works arose, and identify the historical contexts that informed these trends. In reviewing work, the historiographer seeks to weigh each author's contribution to the area of study, while critically analyzing his or her own biases and agendas in writing what he or she did. In determining the broader trends and their social, political, and cultural settings, the historiographer seeks to inspire critical readings of works among the field's audiences. By reviewing the entirety of a single area of expertise, a historian offers a starting point for interested students and professionals as well as an indication for current scholars in the field of where there is room for growth and improvement. This historiography is intended to inform the reader about a burgeoning body of scholarly work on the evolution of America's deathways in the 1800s, to introduce the major subspecialties and important books and essays, to discuss why this topic is and has been important to historians and society at large, and to identify the gaps remaining in the existing scholarship.

America's culture of death has been researched and written on for quite some time, but in recent years it has spawned many more specialized studies of death in certain times, places, and sociohistorical contexts. The broader arc of the historiography of death in America has been one that moved from big-picture, chronologically comprehensive social histories toward a dazzling array of works on seemingly infinitely more specific elements of death culture, allowing for rich discourses within these subspecialties. This field's increasing breadth and depth can be attributed to historians' ever-expanding access to a wider variety of primary sources and historical points of view, as well as authors' varying motivations for writing about American deathways as a response to their own times. Scholarship on American death in the 19th century, especially during the Civil War, has grown into a lively conversation among distinguished academics, and even the wider reading public, in the last ten years or so. Many of the publications and much of the research on this particular topic have come out of the Northeastern United States, particularly Philadelphia, whether it be from University of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania State University, Temple University, or a private publisher. This kind of research has blurred lines between historical, sociological, anthropological, and literary scholarship. Many of these works focus on all or part of the 19th century and most take on other thematic frameworks—the many casualties of the Civil War, changes in funerary and burial practices, the emergence of an industry of death, Victorian ideals, romanticism,

contested memory and public commemoration, sexuality and motherhood, childhood mortality, racial and class dimensions, medical and surgical histories, insanity and asylums, crime and murder, or irony and sentimentality in poetry and literature. This diverse collection of subtopics can easily be further divided into narrower categories; for instance, the development of deathways along race and class lines involves the mechanics of mutual aid societies and governmental institutions for dying. This essay seeks to provide an overarching narrative of the written histories of 19th century death in America, though the historiographer acknowledges the limitations of time and space that preclude thorough discussion of tangential topics of study, like commemoration and public space.

Robert Habenstein and William Lamers arguably founded the field of American death history in 1955. The keystone work *The History of American Funeral Directing* described the emergence and development of modern American deathways, namely professional undertaking and funerary services.[1] Indeed, as the title implies, the book can be classified as a strictly occupational history, but it was functionally more than that. Straddling the disciplines of history and sociology, Habenstein and Lamers' book was original in its discussion of the evolution of the social implications of death in America. The first part of the book laid out the cultural antecedents of American death traditions, and the second part traced the transformations of those traditions from colonial times to the authors' own times. The authors' personal interests in the topic of death culture are estimable; William Lamers was a Civil War historian and biographer, and Robert Habenstein was a World War II veteran cum sociology professor, so both had thought extensively about what it means to die.[2] A laundry list of other contemporary conditions made the topic relevant at the time—the new proximity of death due to the nuclear threat of mutually assured destruction, the approaching centennial of the American Civil War, socialist undercurrents that sought to subvert institutions of capitalism and its hegemonic cultural values (i.e., an expensive funerary industry). The authors' exploration of the changing culture of death throughout American history was the intellectual forebear of the more chronologically specific death histories written about the 19th century. They may have also spawned the more general intellectual discourse on death in America. Interestingly, William Lamers' son grew up to pioneer hospice care services in the United States. Written in the 1950s, this monograph is still important today, as evidenced by its prominence among the footnotes of recent American death scholarship, like Drew Gilpin Faust's *This Republic of Suffering*.[3] Its vast scope begged for scholarly elaboration on each of the countless topics on which it touches.

Jessica Mitford, a wealthy New York socialite and known Communist, wrote a humorous, biting, accessible exposé of the greed and deception involved in the undertaking industry in 1963, called *The American Way of Death*. This book brought American death culture to the forefront of the popular imagination, shattering or at least challenging deep-seated received American values, for which Mitford got much flack from the country's conservative anti-Communists. More investigative journalism than history or sociology, Mitford's book was not annotated with references to scholarly works; rather, the author pored over national governmental publications and private funeral home documents to synthesize her argument against modern American consumerist funerary practice. It is hard to say whether Mitford knew about Lamers and Habenstein's work, but it is easy to see her influence on subsequent works in the field, in which she has been frequently cited. Furthermore, she engaged the wider American public in an important discourse about what was important to them in the face of death and how they had come to those conclusions.[4]

Some scholarship on American death added to the nascent field in the long period between Habenstein and Lamers' book and the more frequently published and more numerous books of the '90s. One of these, *Death in America*, was a collection of essays edited by David Stannard and published in 1975. Though not all the essays were about the 19th century or even the United States, their arc alluded repeatedly to the changes in deathways wrought by the 1800s. This narrative was told through Lewis O. Saum's essay, "Death in the Popular Mind of Pre-Civil War America," Ann Douglas's "Heaven Our Home: Consolation Literature in the Northern United States, 1830-1880," and Stanley French's "The Cemetery as Cultural Institution: The Establishment of Mount Auburn and the 'Rural Cemetery' Movement." Two more far-reaching essays, Jack Goody's "Death and the Interpretation of Culture: A Bibliographic Overview," and Philippe Ariès's "The Reversal of Death: Changes in Attitudes Toward Death in Western Societies," supplemented 19th century death history with important insights on what deathways and their historical transformations can tell us about the Western societies in which they are formed. The editor's introduction condemned Americans' denial of death in a way that revealed the ideological influence of Jessica Mitford on his work.[5] In 1980, James J. Farrell published his book *Inventing the American Way of Death, 1830-1920* as part of a series of books on American civilization. His book corroborates the idea of the 19th century as one of drastic change for American deathways, in what Farrell calls "the dying of death". This concept and his case study in Vermillion, Illinois would show continuity with later death scholarship. The book cites Habenstein and Lamers as well as Stannard, but makes most extensive use of primary sources and highly specific scholarly journal articles. Farrell, too, was probably shaped by Mitford: in his title, the choice of the word "invention" was no accident but a reminder that we are given our cultural understanding of death and that there are other ways to conceptualize it.[6] Charles O. Jackson's lengthy, comprehensive article on the history of American approaches to death,

published in 1977, read much like a historiography of the field at large up to that point and was a useful survey of the beginning of American death scholarship.[7]

During the 1980s, the lull in book publication on this topic did not imply a lack of scholarly work. The field instead shifted for a time towards journal articles that explored highly particular subtopics in American deathways. James Moorhead's article focused on a religious theme (Protestantism) in a specific, and indeed uniquely demarcated, time period (1840-1925).[8] Sylvia Hoffert's piece of a few years later on infant mortality was thematically, chronologically, and regionally precise and novel, again revealing the infinite possibilities of expanding this field.[9] After a long period of dormancy, the bibliographic history of American deathways was resurrected in the 1990s and 2000s with a new sense of focus, either on certain time periods, regions, or themes. Published in 1994, James Crissman's *Death and Dying in Central Appalachia* offered a more geographically specific but chronologically broad narrative of the culture of death in an isolated area from the 1600s to the present. The book cited Habenstein and Lamers frequently, also periodically referencing the less scholarly work of Jessica Mitford. More than either of these sources, though, the Appalachian social historian Crissman drew from prior regional scholarship and an impressive amount of primary documentation. In his use of primary sources and his assertions in the book about the transformation of Appalachian deathways wrought by technology in many forms (communication, transportation, weapons), Crissman predicted some of the characteristics of many subsequent American death histories. Similarly, his blend of scholarly and general target reading audiences foreshadowed some of the more recent important works on 19th century deathways. This book was a prime example of the ability of authors in this field to write expansively on a narrow topic, opening up new areas for research while making detailed conclusions about their clearly circumscribed area of expertise.[10]

In 1996, Gary Laderman, an American religious historian, published his landmark book about death in the 19th century, *The Sacred Remains*. Laderman's book examined the ideas of Habenstein and Lamers about the emergence of the funeral industry through a religious lens, while introducing the concept of the 19th century as an era of dramatic transformation of death culture. He focused on the removal of death from the everyday collective consciousness as it became sentimentalized in the context of the Civil War.[11] While his assertions were seminal in the historiography of 19th century American death, they were made imprecisely using imperfect evidence, including outdated secondary sources, incorrect citations, and unattributed information. Furthermore, his study focused exclusively on white, middle class Northern Protestants and gave limited attention to postbellum death rituals. Thus Laderman's work left room for improvement and

historiographical dialogue in terms of identifying all of the specific changes in the American peoples' various perceptions of dying.[12]

The 2000s saw an explosion of scholarship on deathways in the 19th century, mostly thematically centered around the American Civil War, with its massive casualty count totaling higher than all other American wars combined. There were many plausible reasons for the renewed academic interest in death. Authors were now writing in a post-9/11 world constantly on high alert for terrorism and public shootings. Perhaps more integral to the growing appetite for death history was the baby boomer generation's rapid maturation into middle age. This country was and is preparing to experience death on an unprecedented scale, much like it did during the Civil War, due to the aging and inexorable passing on of a huge group of people born in the 1950s. And though it won't be as violent as the Civil War, the mass exodus may seem gruesome to Americans' modern sensibilities, as not everyone will be able to afford adequate medical or hospice care. Anticipating this change has not only inspired scholarship on death in the Civil War, it has also given rise to a number of debates in popular consciousness about social security, public healthcare, life support, proper hospice care, the right to die, and physician assisted suicide. Our current industries of medicine and funeral practice are both simultaneously too big (i.e., costing our country too much money) and not big enough (i.e., not providing basic needs equitably to all citizens). It therefore makes perfect sense that historians in this context have been looking to the past to understand where we got our illusory notions of gracious death and how we are to cope with our inevitable mortality. These intellectual explorations were just in time for the Civil War's sesquicentennial anniversary, and they were also in fitting with the darker and more doubtful tones of recent Civil War historiography. The Civil War has previously been painted as a noble and necessary fight for black emancipation, an unnecessary conflict over states' rights, and other inadequately nuanced historical clichés. The new death history, though, sought to see the American Civil War for what it really was rather than what past historians may have wanted it to be.[13]

Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg published a cornerstone work in 2002, their collection of essays on early America, *Mortal Remains*. This collection of essays added many pivotal contributions to the growing body of American death scholarship. The book covered the period from 1620 to 1860, so it gave an essential antebellum context for the more recently prevalent historiographical theme of the Civil War's transformation of deathways. This work also expanded the scope of the American cultural history of death to women, Indians, slaves, and other less preeminent demographic groups, while continuing with Laderman's interdisciplinary approach (indeed, the title could be a nod to his). *Remains* offered future historians a broad range of tools in the study of death,

ranging from literary critique to primary source analysis to interpretation of political icons and war heroes. Since it was not a monograph, it left a space open for more overarching explanations and theses of death in 19th century America. This was the first major work on the topic of American death culture after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, which may have sparked or at least fueled some of the contributors' interest in deathways.

William Blair, a historian of Civil War political culture at Pennsylvania State University, infused politics into the predominantly social and cultural field of Civil War death history with his book *Cities of the Dead* (2004). Interestingly, Blair is a historian of the Confederate South though he lives in the Northeast, which may have given him an interesting perspective on the experience of death in that time and place.[14] Blair's book focused on black emancipation and Confederate memorial ceremonies after the Civil War. His narrow scope reveals yet again the depth and breadth of analysis possible in this field. There are infinitely many derivative yet important aspects to the cultural understanding of death before, during, and after the American Civil War, and the evolution of Memorial Day and Emancipation Day celebrations is just one of them. Blair's contribution to the field was unique and meaningful though it was not a universal interpretation of deathways, but rather a discussion on one aspect of them. However, the ideas of commemoration, memory, and public space are part of a much larger, somewhat distinct historiography to that of cultural histories of death. Blair's work was unique in that it challenged commonly held perceptions about the apolitical nature of death commemoration and the oversimplified sense of defeat in the South. He was one of few in the field to discuss racial aspects of death. The author's strength was in his subtle understanding of the use of death and its memory to empower subversive cultural movements.[15]

John Neff's 2005 book *Honoring the Civil War Dead* began a dialogue within Civil War commemoration scholarship. Neff's book raised very uniquely nuanced questions about the post-war realities of memorialization and reconciliation. Neff asserted that racism and sectionalism lived on in national culture, maintaining ideological division between Unionists and Confederates that shared grieving could not overcome. He was more thorough than Blair in his discussion of race. His work was constructive in its exploration of the political and practical implications of cultural deathways, which enriched the field of cultural history, and in its use of a wide variety of primary sources. *Honoring the Civil War Dead* is also now seen in dialogue with *This Republic of Suffering* (2008), making a competing assertion that the memory of the dead further divided the North from the South, as opposed to Faust's claim that the collective unnamed dead helped form a unified national identity.[16]

This Republic of Suffering, the new standard in the field by Harvard President Drew Gilpin Faust, offered continuity with past historiography as well as new and important assertions when it came out in 2008.[17] Faust's main assertion was that the unprecedented scale of death wrought by the Civil War in the context of the Victorian Good Death mentality transformed American culture and society. She traced the development of literature, governmental institutions, and individual social and familial experiences as they were shaped by the atrocities of the Civil War. The book built on the young but growing body of work exclusively about the Civil War dead. Faust cited other big names within the larger field of American death culture, like Habenstein, Lamers, and Laderman. She also drew on social histories of the Civil War, like Earl Hess's *The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal in Combat* (1997). Her main sources, though, were numerous and varied primary documents, including many personal letters and journals.[18] A social historian of the Civil War and former University of Pennsylvania professor, Faust brought a feminine perspective to a male-dominated field in a way that profoundly deepened the field's implications. She was also influenced by her own historical context—"Writing her book amid 'the daily drumbeat of loss' in coverage of Iraq and Afghanistan, Faust's focus on the horrors of this earlier war was reinforced."[19] *This Republic of Suffering* successfully proved its assertions and has been widely critically acclaimed; the book won the American History Book Prize in 2008 and the Bancroft Prize in 2009. Its emotional affectivity is notable in the way many reviewers responded to the book with a personal anecdote about a veteran in their family.[20] Faust's book has been influential and widely read. Particularly important was its scholarly but accessible style.[21]

Interestingly, Faust published her book contemporaneously with two other monographs on Civil War death in 2008, Neely's *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction*[22] and Schantz's *Awaiting the Heavenly Country: the Civil War and America's Culture of Death*[23], which both complicated and complemented *Suffering*. Faust's book seems to have been such an important and exhaustive contribution on the subject of Civil War death that there has not been much scholarship on it hereafter. Still, her success has encouraged the work of other social historians of the Civil War, like Bruce Levine and David Goldfield.

In *The Civil War and the Limits of Destruction*, Mark Neely asserted, in contrast to Faust, that Civil War history has exaggerated the extent and effects of actual death and destruction; in his review of her book, he nonetheless acknowledged her important contribution to social histories of death, though he did note a shortcoming in her underdeveloped discussion of nationalism.[24] As a Southerner and a historian of Abraham Lincoln, Neely may have had personal reasons to be an apologist for the war's staggering

body count. Still, Neely's military viewpoint and contradictory argument served to make the field more global in perspective.

Mark Schantz's book, *Awaiting the Heavenly Country*, indeed added to Faust's picture of American deathways, postulating that the preexisting Victorian culture of valorized death framed and extenuated the mass killing of the Civil War. One reviewer noted the depth that this understanding gives Faust's book, which focused on wartime and postbellum experiences without illustrating the antebellum mindset as thoroughly as Schantz.[25] As a Southern cultural and religious historian and social scientist, Schantz's perspective offered a good counterpoint to the many 19th century death authors concentrated in the Northeast.

Alongside these three titles on death in the Civil War was published a journal article that explored a similar topic, Sean Scott's piece in the Journal of Social History, which he regretted publishing before the release of Faust's *Suffering* despite his article's regional and thematic singularity and extensive primary source evidence.[26] Though virtually no books on American deathways in the 19th century have been released since the publications of Schantz's, Neely's, and Faust's, there have been journal articles on specific regions and themes, sometimes comparative. For example, Melissa Brown's "In Loving Memory" compared and contrasted American and English cultural mourning practices (including jewelry, clothing, and poetry) from Victorian times to the present.[27]

This field of history is unusually influential on the wider arena of public thought. As the 150th anniversary of the war passes, how should we as a nation remember the Civil War?[28] Was it inevitable? Could emancipation have happened without it? Was it, as many historians have claimed, fought over a states' rights issue, or was the main point of contention in the war the institution of slavery? What are the limitations of our remembrance, and can looking back on the Civil War decidedly nostalgically incite a martial national feeling? What is the relevance of the ideas of inevitable war and its unintended consequences to the wars that Americans are now fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan?

Because of the cultural importance of these questions, popular publications have also started to discuss the nuances of American deathways. In 1998, a revised version of Jessica Mitford's classic *American Ways of Death* was published posthumously. The author's additions include condemnations of multi-national funeral corporations and funeral prepayment plans, an index of reasonably priced funeral service organizations, and comments on poor enforcement of legal death policy in modern day America.[29] More recently, another book on American death culture, Lawrence Samuel's *Death, American Style* entered the public discourse, urging the end of our nation's last cultural taboo, death, in a socially revolutionary embrace of our own mortality.[30] The particular

experience of death in the 19th century was revealed to a larger American audience last year via the PBS *American Experience* documentary *Death and the Civil War*, which director Ric Burns based off of *This Republic of Suffering*. Public awareness of Civil War death culture at the timely juncture of the war's 150th anniversary was compounded in effect by J. David Hacker's and others' new, higher estimates of Civil War casualties— 750,000 rather than the 620,000 previously accounted for.[31]

There are, obviously, infinite variations in content and scale of potential scholarship on death in America in the 1800s. There are also, though, some fundamental gaps that could stand to be filled. The Darwinian concept of death—an inevitable part of the endless competitive struggle between and among humans and all other beings— introduced in 1859 may have had interesting effects on the intellectual undercurrents of the time that have not yet been sufficiently explored. Another area lacking in scholarship is the history of deathways in other regions of America less involved in the Civil War. For instance, how was death on the American Western frontier romanticized and reconciled, and what were the unique funerary and burial customs in this region? These and other narrower topics that have not been written about at length deserve the attention of the able historians who have brought us so much good, relevant history on the culture of death in 19th century America.

NOTES

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THE MEDIEVAL CORONER

ANDREW QUEALE

The early morning fog lifts along a small road in the English countryside. A body is discovered by a local farmer who is walking out to his fields to begin the day's work. The farmer does what the law requires, he raises the hue and cries at once in order to alert all in the area to what he has found. Eventually word will spread throughout the area and soon after, a lone horseman will ride into town. This man is the coroner, a king's agent who would be charged with identifying the corpse's cause of death. The process of medieval criminal investigation has begun. At the heart of this process lay the coroner. The coroner was the foundation of the early English system of criminal common law. Without the coroner this process would have been difficult, disorganized, and inefficient. With the coroner the system was relatively professional, contained oversight, accountability, and consistency. While obtaining a successful criminal prosecution in early modern England, or even getting a suspect into court, involved the energies of a variety of people,[1] there is a strong argument to be made that the coroner held, among the numerous people involved, the single most important role in the process. The sheer scope of the coroner's responsibility alone would make him the kind of jack-of-all-trades that proves time and time again to be indispensable within a system that existed before instant communications or formal training institutions. Of course, some would prove to be better than others, however, coroners did not just fall into their positions, they were either personally selected by the king or were elected into office by sitting royal justices. With the vastness of the responsibility required of a corner along with the instinctive nature of the work, it is quite clear that to just fall into the role of coroner was a rare occasion. The majority of these men would have to be reliable, trustworthy, and intelligent to adequately carry out their tasks. It also stands to reason that if coroners had not held those traits then the position itself would have never lasted. Yet that was not the case. The position of coroner as it existed in medieval England was still in existence up to the beginning of the nineteenth century. So, who were these men? How exactly did they become coroners, how were they trained, what exactly did they do, and how were they different than other officials? All these questions will be answered and it will become clear that the coroner, more than any other royal official, was the backbone of the criminal system within the English common law.

The office of coroner was established in September, 1194, when justices were required to see that three knights and one clerk were elected in every county as "keepers of the pleas of the crown."[2] This introduction of the coroner was not an accident; the position was created to fulfill what is arguably the most important in any organized

society, to administer the collection of money due to the government. In this case it took the form of fees that were levied on those who used the king's court. The academic expert on the subject of coroners, R.F. Hunnisett explains, "Because of his perennial continental wars and the need to pay his ransom, Richard I was desperate for money. He could not afford to lose any of the financial issues of crown pleas...Neither the Sheriff nor his subordinates could adequately accomplish this task. The Sheriff was already overburdened and his tendency to become over-powerful and corrupt, always strong, had undoubtedly been fostered by John's recent rising, while his subordinates could naturally not act as an adequate check upon him."[3] So with these reasons, the king ordered the formation of the coroner's office. It is not insignificant that the coroner was created as a means to both relieve some of the work required of the sheriff but also keep the sheriff from having access to the funds that crown pleas generated. Already it is being shown that the officers in place were not able to function reliably, effectively, or honestly. While the sheriff was not a simple job, the coroner soon became the steward of numerous additional responsibilities. This would create a situation where they were equally burdened by extra work, and yet they continued without major incident. Eventually the coroner would be called to perform what would become their primary role: holding inquests. Carol Loar details the initial steps of an inquest as, "Following an accidental death, suspected suicide, or homicide, or upon the discovery of any unexplained death, the constable or other reliable individual summoned the coroner."[4] James Sharpe provides further details into the process by saying that the purpose of these inquests was for the coroner to, "Issue his precept or warrant, to be directed to the constables...to return a competent number of good and lawful men, twelve at least, who after being sworn, viewing the body, and hearing the evidence upon oath, are to make an inquisition. The jury would then declare their verdict on the cause of death, and both a brief account of the circumstances of the death and the jury's verdict were recorded in an official document known as an inquest or inquisition."[5] While the actual investigation was the coroner's main function, they were also important record keepers of those investigations. An example of such recording is found in the rolls, "Inquest was taken by said coroner at Terrington on the following Thursday by [twelve sworn men] and by the said four townships (sworn). They say on their oath that on Monday next after the feast of St. John the Baptist in the thirty fifth year of King Edward the third Peter Wrenn assaulted John of Nettleham with a drawn knife at Tilney, to wit, in the fens of Marshland, and feloniously killed him by striking him with the said knife on the left arm of which he died forthwith. Peter fled forthwith; and he had no lands, goods, or chattels. The knife was worth two pence, for which the township of Tilney will account."[6] This single passage describes the crime and lays out the steps for adjudicating a crime. If a situation has a criminal who

flees, a coroner would know to take his property; if he has no property, the coroner would make his township pay a fair amount. These types of rolls were so important that Carrie Smith makes the claim that, "All future legal process concerning any of these matters depended upon examination of, or reference to, the written record of the coroner concerned."[7] All in all, the coroner was soon the cornerstone of the English criminal common law system. While the physical investigation of deaths would be invaluable for determining criminal responsibility, his record keeping of those same investigations would prove important for the commonality of the common law to be established.

So, who were the coroners? After all, a man charged with such responsibilities as the coroner would indicate he must be a special type of person, a type that all societies need yet seldom like to admit. James Sharpe says, "They were chosen from 'the meaner sort of gentleman.' There was no requirement that the coroner should have legal or medical training or experience...Nationally, county coroners were probably drawn from the ranks of substantial county gentlemen, below the county elite from which justices were recruited, and perhaps with a grounding in the law."[8] This is an indication that the coroner was a person within high society but not necessarily concerned with the niceties of that society, and yet had enough social standing to protect him, allowing him to make the hard decisions. This social and personal freedom to investigate a murder could only allow the coroner to be able to conduct his investigations without the social fear of being seen as the "bad guy" or the real fear of retaliation by those whom his decisions affected. This ability is essential to someone with the scope of responsibilities that the coroner held. The sheriff for example had to live among the people he would interact with in the course of doing his job and was therefore subject to the aftermath of his official duties. This reason made him less likely to upset people. The coroner was socially higher than the peasant and therefore free to enforce his own code as he saw fit. The fact that coroners were not paid probably has a lot to do with this. James Gross says, "The coroner was to exercise his office without reward; no fees could lawfully be imposed for holding inquests in cases of sudden death, but in the hundreds rolls there are numerous complaints that such fees were extorted from individuals and townships...But the office was evidently regarded as a burden, for many persons obtained royal grants which exempted them from acting as coroners."[9] We can see that those who did not wish to be coroners had a means to avoid the office. Therefore, those that did accept the position were either motivated to do the job properly or motivated for the opportunity to extort. It must be remembered that this was a fairly common practice at all levels. Sheriffs were infamous for graft, juries could be "influenced", and the king especially was always looking to make a little extra coin. Even the corrupt coroners were not any different than any other official, but the honest coroners were enough to keep the office in high regards

by most. Existing in a world where one is constantly seeing death and the worst parts of human nature can make anyone cynical; it shows how strong in character those who remained honest were. After all, death is an ugly business and it takes ugly types of men to pursue the details of that business. This alone makes those who became coroners a necessary type of person, not just within the English system, but any system though out history.

Not only were coroners the rougher types found within society, they also held the role until they were unable to fulfill their responsibilities. This means they held the office until death or retirement. This is important because there was not any formal training for the coroner. So, how were coroners chosen if it would stand to reason that any incoming coroner would not know how to do his duty? Some hereditary coronerships existed, mainly in liberties, however all other coroners were either appointed or elected.[10] It is a strong possibility that coroners would pass their knowledge of the work on to their sons, and those sons would then become ideal candidates for election or appointment. So, while coronerships were not technically hereditary, it is a theory that they were in effect just that. If this is indeed the case then the coroner would prove to be exponentially more effective, making him more and more important to the criminal justice process as the subtleties of the trade would become something that a new coroner would start with and not have to learn as he went along. If this indirect hereditary system was not the case, the importance of the coroners' extensive record keeping would make up the difference. If a newly elected or appointed coroner was not fortunate enough to have his father's knowledge of the job passed down to him, he could still review previous case rolls, and at the very least get a good working knowledge of the law. This would make him much more effective at performing his duties at the beginning of his service. So, regardless of the circumstances of how a coroner was trained, he would still be able to perform his duties immediately and with some degree of experience. This informal training was a result of the coroners' responsibility to provide recorded details of private suits, recorded confessions of those claiming sanctuary and assigning them ports from which to abjure the realm, and attend and record all county court and jail deliveries.[11] Not only was this variety of records important for the training of coroners, but the records would also help coroners improve even after they had begun their service. The records would in effect provide a handbook for the coroner; he would be able to use them as a means to improve not only his own understanding of the position but would also allow him to develop a deep understanding of the law as a whole. Due to the position requiring many different roles, this ability to study across multiple disciplines from inquests, to confessions, to tax collection cannot be overstated. Had the coroners not been required to make such detailed records, not only would future coroners suffer, but future lawyers, jury members, or other

royal officials would be unable to review them as well. Here is another clear example of how the coroner was indispensable: they were, in effect, the scribes of the common law as it was used on a day to day basis.

The details of how coroners performed their duties within the courts themselves are vast due to the records they were required to keep. Coroners were also required to keep rolls for court cases that were often times separate from the actual investigations with which they were personally involved, increasing their work load considerably. This is another indication of how important the coroner and his records were toward the functioning of the criminal and court system. R.F. Hunnisett says, "Coroners had to bring their rolls and other records to many other courts for the determination of the cases. In the thirteenth century many special commissions were appointed to determine individual appeals and there can be no doubt that the county coroners had to attend their sessions with their record of the original appeals."[12] This passage strongly indicates that criminal justice was a slow process that would take place over a long period of time. Due to the length of the process, the coroner's records were invaluable to providing the details of those long past investigations. Without them the actual conduct of a trial would be strictly based on personal testimony without any real evidence to support claims. The length of time could be so great and the importance of the coroners' rolls equally great that the heirs of coroners were held responsible for producing the records of dead coroners, and fined if they were unable to do so.[13] The fact that these records were required to be archived by a coroner's family speaks volumes about the importance of those documents and more importantly the fact that the rolls were not kept by anyone other than the coroner, up to and beyond his death. The coroner's rolls were regarded so highly, that even if discrepancies were discovered between two rolls from two different coroners, the most widely used means to find the truth was to compare them to other coroners' rolls on the subject. According to Bracton, "What if one coroner's roll disagrees with those of the others, when there are several? The majority will prevail. If there are but two corners and [their rolls] disagree, the corner's roll with which the sheriff's roll agrees will prevail. If there are four coroners and two disagree with the other two, and there is no sheriff whose roll may serve as evidence, reliance shall then be placed on the two who have any jot of evidence to support them and who agree with the appellor."[14] While there can be little doubt that a record of an investigation is important, the trust that is shown toward the coroner keeping his own records would indicate that quite a lot of faith was shown to him by the court and its officials. Would documents that may be needed years into the future be trusted in the hands of a common person? Common sense would say no; common sense would say that such responsibility and trust would only be allowed to someone who could be considered reliable enough to keep those documents secure. In fact, the only

thing more telling about this responsibility is that there were plenty of other officials who were not asked to maintain the records.

Another role the coroner was entrusted with was the empaneling of juries. Raising the jury was a portion of the process of holding an inquest for a found corpse. The jury independently reviewed the facts of a case as they saw them, in this sense without the jury a case would be a complicated, unorganized affair. In the same manner as with the keeping of rolls and other records, the selection of the group that would ultimately lead to any court decisions being left up to the coroner is important. With this responsibility the coroner was, in effect, responsible for assembling the most important single body for actually going through with a trial. "Once assembled, the coroner and jury viewed the body, which was not supposed to have been moved from the location where the death had occurred, noting and measuring all wounds. Unlike trial juries, whose autonomy came under attack in the early modern period, coroners' juries retained their self-informing nature. They interviewed witnesses, collected and examined evidence, and pursued lines of inquiry, often outside the inquest setting.[15] Here is another example of how the coroner's authority was respected and in fact superior to most others: their selected juries were allowed to pursue their own line of investigation to determine the facts of a case. However, the jury was not always the final word in a case, in cases of homicide, the inquest verdict generally served as the indictment under which a suspect was brought to trial, while in suicide and accidental deaths, the ruling of the coroners' inquest was the final verdict.[16] What does this really mean though? It points out that criminal homicide cases were not, nor could they be tried without the coroner. Therefore, without the coroner, the process would not even begin. While it can be argued that anyone could have been assigned this task, the fact that it was the coroner further shows how much faith the crown had in the coroner. Not only was the coroners' jury first to make any type of determination in a case by freely investigating a crime, but they were also able to make decisions based on those facts. As the common law became more extensive and the laws within it more specific, these juries were able to use more discretion in their decision making process. Coroner's inquests provided jurors both an opportunity to exercise their consciences as they saw fit and a motive for doing so.[17] Chancery courts would show that there was a real problem with the rigidity of the common law for most legal issues. They would go on to establish a system to allow bishops to make legal decisions based on conscience and common sense. The coroners and their juries were already providing this type of service. However, since the coroner's juries were only to render decisions on cases involving a death, their jurisdiction was limited. There is an argument to be made that the coroners' jury was the model that would influence the establishment of the chancery courts. If this is the case then the coroner would prove to not only be a key

player within the medieval criminal justice system, but also an example of how to conduct a court of any type.

While the holding of inquests and the keeping of roles became the coroners' most important functions within the criminal court system, they were also responsible for other duties in medieval England. The practice of sanctuary was a well-used technique for criminals to take refuge on holy grounds from the law for forty days. At any time or at the end of the forty days, the criminal could summon a coroner to take a confession and arrange a port with which to abdicate the kingdom. However, "Before a felon could abjure the realm or turn approver, he had to confess, and so hearing and recording these confessions was an important part of the coroner's work. When hearing confessions or taking abjurations, the coroner was usually accompanied by the sheriffs, but he seems sometimes to have acted without them. On the other hand the coroner was always present and the sheriffs never acted without him."[18] It is interesting to note in this passage that the coroner was involved in all cases, while the sheriff was probably closer in proximity to a sanctuary, he was not always involved. The fact that sheriffs were either unable, unwilling, or untrustworthy to complete this seemingly simple task of hearing and recording confessions is good evidence that their reliability was still questionable. This also shows that another important function the coroner filled was that of a check upon the sheriff. "The coroners were always ordered to collect and pay amercements suffered by the sheriff and any other debts which he owed, but the check exercised by the coroners on the sheriff became more regular and effective with the Exchequer reforms towards the end of Edward II's reign."[19] This shows how much of a superiority in status the coroners had over the sheriffs. The fact that coroners were responsible for and expected to collect debts that a sheriff would owe shows that the sheriff was not only an office that the king simply expected to owe money and were not trusted to repay it, but that the coroners did not suffer the same problems. Since coroners were drawn from those that were more financially secure this makes sense, but it also shows that the men elected to fill the coronerships were well chosen. Finally, and perhaps the most telling about how important the coroners were in medieval England was their initiative to maintain the peace on their own accord. "Some coroners felt themselves obliged to take steps to help preserve the peace in emergencies, even if it meant that they were exceeding the normal bounds of their office without a special warrant to do so."[20] Here it is shown that the coroners were not simple bureaucrats, but highly motivated citizens who held the status, authority, and personal nature to act in an official capacity as they saw fit. While other officials were being checked upon by others, i.e. the coroner maintaining accountability over the sheriff, the coroner himself was known to go above and beyond his prescribed duty. This really is the clearest argument that the coroner was the backbone of the English system. Even

though it could be argued that the coroner was overburdened, had multiple responsibilities that kept him constantly moving, and could be prone to extorting people, he could still be expected to perform additional duties. This type of selfless service is what great societies are built upon, and the coroner certainly gave a lot in the pursuit of an ordered society. More so, this is how law is kept in those kinds of ordered societies, by those that enforce order not because they have to, but because they know it's what needs to be done.

So what conclusions can be made from the preceding arguments and examples? As for showing that the coroner in medieval English criminal common law was the foundation of this system and arguing that without the coroner the system would have found itself in disarray, the documents cited have made my thesis stronger. After all, the coroner has been shown to be an office of multiple uses, trusted with multiple responsibilities, and in fact relied upon to act beyond his capacity. Due to these facts the argument is actually fairly easy to make that the coroner was the backbone of the criminal system. The first and most important of the coroners' duties proved to also be the foundation of all of his roles. In the process of holding an inquiry into the discovery of a dead body we see that the coroner had to simultaneously interact with the people within the realm, use his best judgment when selecting the members of his jury, and take the kinds of detailed records that could perhaps be needed long after the initial inquiry and trial. This single task of holding an inquiry would go on to effect the course of the criminal justice system long after it was held, therefore without the coroner holding his inquiry the process would have glaring difficulties. If it was not for the coroner performing all these different duties, there would be an incredibly large problem with multiple offices ranging from the sheriff to the bailiffs to jury members having to collect and organize separate bits of information and coordinate with each other to share that information. The lack of a coroner would also mean that the justices of the courts would have to find the officer that held the information needed and get them to court with it. Not only would the lack of a centralized administration system have caused problems during the time a case would be investigated and the cases held, the lack of the coroners roles would impact the study of the common law for years to come. In the case of Norwich, England, Philippa Maddern says that, "Coroners' records are in fact the only ones which document a significant proportion of cases of violent crime in the medieval city."[21] So, not only was the coroner an important part of inquiring into and trying a case, his roles were also important for those who would want to study the figures well after the events had occurred. The coroner was in a unique position to be trusted with the responsibilities needed to keep the criminal justice system running smoothly. Not only that, justices and juries later on would look back to the records kept by the coroner to find details of earlier cases. Therefore, as the investigator of deaths, holder of inquests, responsible for raising coroner's juries, keeping the legal rolls of not only the cases they investigated but also the roles of any other courts they were required to attend, the coroner was the most indispensable official within the court's ranks. More than that however were the coroner's rolls in the smaller, more commonly overlooked tasks that kept daily law running smoothly. By taking confessions, collecting the occasional taxes, providing a check on the power of the sheriff, and filling in anywhere they saw a need, the coroner was also an unsung hero by serving his kingdom selflessly and responsibly. While the coroner doesn't have the fame of the sheriff or the outlaw, he is still just as, if not more, interesting. Yet their importance cannot be overstated and the fact that they are not as popular as others is probably something they would be familiar with. As the "meaner sorts of gentleman," it seems likely they would be used to operating out of the limelight and therefore their absence from popular culture is a situation they would be very comfortable with.

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Redefining the Political Woman: The 2011 Egyptian Uprising

Marlee Clayton

Abstract

Women actively participated in the 2011 Egyptian Uprising that ousted President Hosni Mubarak only to see themselves gradually and systematically excluded from post-revolutionary politics. I argue that this discrimination stems from a cultural bias against women's participation. This bias is rooted in the historical appropriation of discourses of women's liberation in Egypt. I contend that women's experiences during and after the 2011 protest movement allowed for the evolution of political consciousness enabling them to now constitute a viable threat to cultural myths of their inferiority and the consequent political exclusion.

Introduction

The dashed hopes seem to be inescapable phenomenon of social movements. Women actively participate in political demonstrations and resultant revolutions, from mass rallies to internet activism and everything in between. They mobilize in order to enact structural, and social, change in their societies. Once the revolutionary fervor subsides, however, women face the attempts of others to silence their voices. As various groups exert their influence in these unstable and shifting societies, women's interests fall victim to others' self-interested political maneuvering. This circumstance has grown more complicated in the modern era as forces fight in support of or in opposition to the ideals of globalized modernity.

Egyptian society fits this mold during and after the 2011 protest movement that deposed longtime president, Hosni Mubarak. The very different positioning of women during and after the uprising warrants further exploration. The juxtaposition of women's participation in the different phases of regime change begs the question of how we can explain and contend with this phenomenon. My work conceives answers that lie both in historical processes and contemporary developments.

In the historical section I argue that throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries different political and social forces served their own ideological and political interests by forming and appropriating the discourse of women's liberation in Egypt. This period saw the dramatic transformation of international and internal power schemas. One consequence of these processes was the universalization of women's character by groups

contending for power, under the guise of universalizing standards of women's rights. Groups manipulated this discourse to further entrench their power, which led to a negative association of women's rights with imperial and state control. This contributed to the creation of a cultural barrier to women's political participation. Such a bias supplemented the many physical obstacles present in the authoritarian systems of the Egyptian Republic, under which the gap between legal parity and de facto equality became apparent.

While exploring the 2011 Egyptian Uprising, I demonstrate that women constituted a powerful force in the protest movement. The gradual exclusion of women from post-revolutionary decision-making and governmental reforms marked a dramatic departure from the just and egalitarian spirit of the uprising. Women were not only politically excluded on several institutional levels, but they also suffered from a deluge of gender-based physical harms during many subsequent public protests. I contend that we should not view the discrimination against women as a result of their political incapabilities or their silence on these issues. These inequalities instead stem from the cultural barrier to women's equal citizenship rooted in Egyptian history and entrenched in society.

I argue that women now constitute a viable threat to the cultural myths of their inferiority, partially due to the valuable experiences and knowledge garnered during and after the 2011 Uprising. Their participation in the social movement marks an important milestone in the evolution of their political consciousness. I employ Karl Marx's theory of consciousness to explore how dominant ideologies influence people's self-identification within a society. Through these ideologies, ruling classes distort society's perceptions of political interests and thus attempt to manipulate their constituency. Women, similar to Egyptian society as a whole, were subjected to the manipulation of public identities by the ruling classes and their ideologies. Just as the uprising shattered any illusion of the Egyptian government's legitimacy, women's experiences during the revolution allowed them to deconstruct antiquated views of women's proper public role. While this idea evidently did not permeate all sectors of society, Egyptian women themselves have expressed the transformation of women's self-confidence and political drive as precipitated by their experiences within the Uprising. Political and social illusions will be increasingly harder to maintain in the face of women's persistent activism, which proves itself all the more tenacious in a hostile environment. The tireless public action signals the reclamation of the narrative of Egyptian women's potential and the continued development of their political empowerment.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Due to the relative recentness of the 2011 Uprising, there is not yet a substantial body of academic literature analyzing the events. This remains especially true concerning the role of women during and after the protests, although considerable attention has been paid to this issue by journalist-activists and in online communities. Scholarly sources that are already available often depend on the author's firsthand accounts of the protests and blur the lines of distinction between primary and secondary accounts. Some of these works include those by Esraa Abdel Fattah (2012), Holger Albrecht (2012), Sheila Carapico (2012), and Hania Sholkamy (2012); most disagree on how we should characterize the events. While these personalized works are undeniably valuable, they tend to focus on specialized interests or are constrained by publication timelines.

One strength of academic works on the Arab Spring as a general phenomenon is that most keenly criticize the structures of power altered and created through the protest movements. Authors like Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren view the events of the Arab Spring not as inevitable instances of social change but rather as a part of an already evolving process. (Noueihed and Warren 2012) Their chapter on Egypt emphasizes the embedded nature of the Egyptian army in the regime's systematic oppression. Javed Maswood and Usha Natarajan take a similar stance. They claim that, prior to the uprising, the military succeeded in presenting itself as a symbol of unity and nationalism through its management of both internal and external threats. They further argue that the military is capable of eliminating dissent and cementing its own position of power by avoiding reforms that would threaten the army's interests. (Maswood and Natarajan 2012)

The same critical evaluation of societal hierarchies is found in the considerable body of work on women's activism and political roles in the Middle East. This collection is marked by the tendency of editors to compile case studies of different countries into one anthology that provides only snippets of general information. A complete survey of this literature would be more fitting for doctoral work, and thus I only examined those which contained chapters specifically on Egypt or women within regime changes. These include anthologies edited by Nadje Sadig al-Ali and Nicola Christine (2009), Suad Joseph and Susan Slyomovics (2001), and Minky Worden (2012).

My work synthesizes elements from these bodies of literature in order to provide a more comprehensive look into the development of women's rights over the life cycle of the protest movement. Many of the works I examined, as well as interviews with protestors themselves, referenced Egyptian culture's skepticism of women's participation, but I did not find any works that detailed the development of this skepticism over an extended period. Thus my work connects that historical appropriation

that created cultural barriers to the institutional and public discriminations against women following the uprising. I also seek to integrate the importance of the social movement as a whole and women's participation in the regime change. Given my distance from the subject, my work also seeks to provide an objective survey of the uprisings events.

PLAN AND METHODOLOGY

The multi-faceted nature of my argument led me to divide my work into three major parts. The first part discusses the historical evolution of the discourse of women's liberation in Egypt, from the turn of the twentieth century to the eve of Mubarak's power in 1981. The second part explores the situation in Egypt under Mubarak's presidency. The first half of this part focuses on the regime's manipulation of narratives, both those concerning women and those pertaining to greater society. The latter half examines in detail the 2011 uprising. The final part discusses women's position after the uprising and what positive implications we may still draw from this case-study.

My historical section relies on the considerable scholarship on Egyptian women's personal lives and political contributions throughout the twentieth century, such as those by Beth Baron (1994) and Margot Badran (1995). These secondary accounts were organized and connected relying heavily on the theoretical frameworks of Edward Said's Orientalism (1978) and Leila Ahmed's exploration of the relationship between gender and Islam (1992). I use the work of Mervat Hatam (1992, 1994) to pinpoint the gender strategies of the various leaders of the Egyptian Republic, along with work by Azza Karam (1998). Both scholars analyze feminist issues under the authoritarian governments and how they were affected by various internal factors such as Islamism.

In my second part I use statistical data, along with secondary sources, to illustrate the position of women under Mubarak. I utilize Marx's theory of consciousness to draw parallels and demarcate differences between the oppression of women and the oppression of greater Egyptian society during the thirty year dictatorship. My account of the uprising itself is constructed from a variety of primary sources including the New York Times; The Guardian; Daily News Egypt, an Egyptian newspaper published in English; and al-Jazeera, in English. I also integrate information from these sources into other parts of my paper, notably the section on discrimination against women in the post-Mubarak constitutional period. Some of my analyses are also based on academic works, many of which were composed after the revolution by participants and firsthand witnesses.

Finally, I rely heavily on interviews of Egyptian women conducted by various news outlets and, notably, the 'Egyptian Women of the Revolution' project to demonstrate the evolution of women's consciousness. Overall, the tone of my work is

influenced by the writing of Marxist feminist Nawal el-Saadawi. This entire project has been guided by the desire to reach a basic understanding of the intersections and interactions of culture, politics, and gender.

I. HISTORICAL DISCOURSES OF EGYPTIAN WOMEN'S LIBERATION

The 'liberation of women' narrative has been exploited in various ways within Middle Eastern countries. Various actors used the ideas of Woman and in what capacities she should exist as means to serve their political and ideological ends as they contended for societal and political dominance. The universalization of woman's character disadvantaged real women as women found themselves inadequately fulfilling society's expectations and then bearing the costs of their supposed deficiencies (a phenomenon equally prevalent across the globe). The continued alienation of women from ideas of their own liberation exacerbated the depoliticization that occurred at the hands of nationalist movements, colonial powers, and post-World War I autocratic regimes. In the latter half of the century, neocolonial influences and paternalist policies of authoritarian governments resulted in the association of women's empowerment with despotic regimes and their alleged ties to profit-motivated Western policies (the exception to the last being Nasser's presidency). In response, religious groups also employed gendered rhetoric in their attempts to advance their ideological agendas.

The aggregate effect of political manipulations of the 'woman question' was the cultural denial of gender inequality as a problem. Women languished under patriarchal hierarchies that limited their participation and voices, while they were supposedly being freed from the negative effects of these very hierarchies. This cultural denial is coupled with, and perhaps results in, negative connotations of women's rights in the present-day. Egypt provides an excellent example of this phenomenon. The study of Egyptian cultural discourse's development allows us to perhaps better understand the continued marginalization of women in the political realm.

NATIONALIST GROUPS AND THE BIRTH OF THE WOMAN QUESTION

Egypt remained under the colonial influence of the British Empire from the end of the nineteenth century to the establishment of the Egyptian republic in the mid-1900s. The 'woman question' first emerged as a nationalist (or, anti-imperialist) means of coping with the shifting dynamics of Egyptian society after the abolition of slavery in the late nineteenth century.[1] Women became symbolic figures in the fight between secular and religious nationalist groups; this fight mirrored the contest between constructed ideas

of modernity and tradition.[2] Nationalist groups operated within a society subject to the modernizing agendas of both European colonizers and the Egyptian government, agendas which became preoccupied with the regulation of the domestic realm. Women, as mothers and the sculptors of future generations, formed the crucial bond between national modernization and citizens' personal identities.[3] The concentration on domestic lives emphasized that the reformation of women would lead to the greater reformation of the nation. These late-nineteenth century discourses saw the emergence of the issues of veiling and education as primary markers of women's 'progress.'

These issues are chief among those discussed in the work of the man dubbed 'Egypt's first feminist. Qasim Amin, an Egyptian educated in France, published two essays that have long been hailed as the first to articulate Arab feminist thought, a distinction that is predictably and extensively contested by contemporary scholars. His essays, The Liberation of Women and The New Woman, published in 1899 and 1900 respectively, argue that the liberation of Egyptian women is essential for the liberation of greater Egypt from its backwardness and inferiority complex to the West.[4] Amin, a 'nationalist' at the turn of the century, posits that the subordinate status of women in Egyptian society reflects the country's poor moral standards. Amin blames the rule of despots over Islamic societies for the perpetuation of biased traditions, such as the seclusion of women. Only the development of an intelligentsia and the subsequent education of women will allow society to move forward. He emphasizes the importance of knowledge and determination in the future struggles of women, traits that his contemporary women supposedly lacked. By citing unveiling as one of the most viable avenues for women's liberation, Amin implicitly suggests that women can liberate themselves by simply shirking their own Muslim culture and adopting Western styles.[5] However, his work provides an excellent example of the nationalist manipulation of the woman question as the influence of European colonial powers intensified.

Rather than presenting women's issues as those that will improve the lives of women as independent subjects, Amin's treatment of the woman question diminishes the capability of women to make these decisions on their own and thereby demonstrate any agency. His demarcation of women as markers of progress was one common among nationalist discourse; this approach has been characterized by later scholars as a clear product of imperial invasions. Amin has been accused by those like Islamic feminist scholar Leila Ahmed of internalizing colonial rhetoric of the West's superiority over the backward Middle East. Ahmed criticizes Amin of casting women as cultural symbols of the society's barbarousness only because he was swayed by imported attitudes about inferior cultures. Ahmed's argument, with which I concur, differs from that of historian Beth Baron over the true foundation of such narratives. Baron sees Amin as an independent Egyptian actor, whose work is a product of "the unravelling of elite Ottoman-Egyptian households" rather than European influence.[6] Baron implies that Egyptians, nationalist and imperial-leaning alike, were the key players in the crafting of their own narratives.

While not attempting to deny agency to the burgeoning Egyptian intelligentsia and nationalist forces, Ahmed's argument attributes more power to colonialism as British forces attempted to extend and institutionalize their power within Egyptian society. Indeed, it seems impossible to examine the development of the 'woman question' without acknowledging that the question in this context was perpetuated largely due to the unsettling effects of British colonialism. Even if one was to argue that the woman question would have persisted without the polarizing presence of the British, the specter of the West undeniably altered the development of this issue. It eventually contributed to the creation of an environment hostile to a more genuine discourse of women's rights, namely one forged and carried out by indigenous women themselves.

COLONIAL POWERS: THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND ORIENTALISM

The adoption of women's empowerment narratives by British forces during the first half of the twentieth century played a major role in the creation of a hostile environment. Their methods mirrored and supplemented similar nationalist agendas. Colonial agents used the language of women's emancipation to justify extensive legal measures and solidify their imperialist domination of the region. Ahmed illustrates this with the juxtaposition of the supposedly pro-woman rhetoric of Lord Cromer during the British protectorate with the detrimental results of his policies.[7] Cromer denounced the veiling of women as part of the Islamic social system, which he deemed responsible for the region's backwardness. Yet Cromer implemented regulations on government schools that stifled girls' opportunities to receive an education and prevented the training of female doctors. Cromer, a founding member of the Men's League for Opposing Women's Suffrage in Great Britain, exemplifies the 'colonial feminism' that served colonial interests much more than feminist interests.[8]

The exploitative practices of British agents in Egypt were representative of the British Empire's approach to gender throughout its (geographically) extensive history. In her examination of the empire's eighteenth century record, Kathleen Wilson observes that, "Gender ... was a mode of power through which metropolitan and colonial modernities were mutually constituted, construing the categories and experience of sexual, national, and racial difference within Britain and without."[9] Rather than liberating women, the colonial emphases on gendered issues both created new hierarchal structures

and reinforced existing patriarchal control of women. This diminished the efficacy of women's organizations such as the Egyptian Feminist Union (al-Ittihad al-Niss'i al-Misri) established in 1920.

The complications of constructed colonial modernities remained present during the autocratic governments that followed imperial rule. These governments unsurprisingly included the emancipation of women rhetoric in their modernization agendas, which often served as part of their larger schemes to remain in the good graces of neocolonial powers such as the United States. Why was neocolonialism repeatedly correlated to indigenous groups' desire to 'modernize'? The connection between Western powers and modernization arises repeatedly throughout the last two centuries and warrants further exploration.

The extent and internalization of neocolonial rule led to the polarization of interests and identities between the 'Orient' and the West, as described by Edward Said in Orientalism. Said argues that the identities of the West and the Orient have developed in relation to each other and support one another, mirroring the transient and constructed nature of human identity.[10] For Said, the influence of imperial power cannot be understated. In addition to controlling the infrastructure and daily realities of the 'Orient,' Said asserts that imperial forces control (or at least heavily influence) the way in which the Orient is depicted and understood, even by those within the culture.[11] Orientalism reflects the Western world's self-perceived cultural supremacy. Westerners juxtapose their lives with those whom they view as intrinsically inferior, and thus they justify any dysfunctions within the Western system. This comparison works extremely effectively in justifying the suppression and exploitation of the people that one believes exists in opposition to one's self. The creation of new and artificial hierarchical structures perpetuates inequalities and further complicates the attainment of goals that 'modernizing' governments assumed in the first place.

The self-definition of the East in relation to the West was thus responsible for the preoccupation with modernity and, by extension, with control over women. The obsession with modernity and women evidences the internalization of colonial mindsets, even after the establishment of autonomous nations. Social structures were only rearranged to further embed (neo)patriarchal norms. Imported ideals of modernity were thus imposed on societies that lacked the necessary institutions and popular support. This contributed to long-term instability and further entrenched the power of autocratic governments.

APPROPRIATION OF WOMEN'S ISSUES IN THE EGYPTIAN REPUBLIC

The profound implications for women are impossible to ignore. Neocolonial influences -- the West-Orient polarization -- and paternalist policies of authoritarian leaders like Nasser resulted in the association of women's empowerment with despotic regimes and, in the cases of Sadat and Mubarak, their ties to profit-motivated Western agendas. The government of Gamal Abdel Nasser, in power from 1956 to 1970, demonstrated the complexity of post-colonial governance and its mixed results for women. Egypt witnessed the emergence of state feminism during Nasser's reign. Nasser's policies aimed to secure legal and civic equality for women through a top-down approach that did not emphasize on superficial methods of reform like the regulation of veiling.

Scholars have dubbed Nasser's approach as 'state feminism' rather than simply women's policy because the goal of equality was inscribed in the legal system. Women were granted the right to vote, as well as to run for office, in the 1956 Constitution approved via referendum alongside Nasser's presidential nomination. Once in office, Nasser's paternalist approach afforded women many gains, such as family policy measures and the right to work. Such measures carved out an unquestionable space in the public sphere for women, a step that illustrated Nasser's commitment to secular ideals of citizenship (rivaled only by his dedication to Pan-Arabism).

State feminism's commitment to equality during the 1950s and 1960s becomes suspect when one considers that Nasser banned independent feminist organizations shortly after he came to power. The only women's group that was allowed to operate was the woman's auxiliary of the state party (a circumstance repeated during the reign of Mubarak). This fact highlights the Nasser state's usage of women's rights to further expand and legitimize its power. The progressive message of government policy was thus further validated by its 'modern' acceptance of women as full citizens.[12] The ban on women's organizations reveals the state's interest in women's public participation as a mere symbolic gesture in its larger ideological schema.

The economic and (minimal) political reforms also failed to alter public opinion concerning women's proper sphere; this idea was influenced both by religious factors and the region's imperial past. Indeed, any liberal change in religious figures' policies was only at the prompting of the state. For example, muftis only supported women's right to vote and elections after the state initiated its own modernizing agenda.[13] Traditional family values were further perpetuated by the same personal status measures that had been in place since the British protectorate period.[14] The consequences of the Nasser period can best be described as women's economic independence coupled with

dependency on the state.[15] This paradox refers both to the paternalistic welfare state and the state's appropriation of women's liberation.

Scholar and politician Hala Shukrallah succinctly describes the transformation of societal identity in this period: "Egyptian national identity merged with Arab as well as Islamic identity, albeit in the context of nationalist secularism and Pan-Arabism."[16] The Nasser regime effectively ignored the inherent contradiction of a secular government's rule over a country that identified Islam as integral to its national identity. Faced with denial of political power under Nasser, Islamist groups like the Muslim Brotherhood instead resorted to cultivating different forms of authority, such as the powerful image of the martyred or imprisoned Islamic activist.[17] The contention between secularism and Islamic modernism came to a head under Anwar el-Sadat, who was in power from Nasser's death in 1970 to 1981.

The elevated discord can be traced to Sadat's diplomatic rapprochement with the United States, a move away from Nasser's anti-imperialist and pro-Soviet Union foreign policy. Islamist groups, in particular, increasingly criticized many of the actions taken by the government as being too Western. Partially in response to American-led Western pressure, Sadat's government began a program of political liberalization. The result was a three-party system that still relied on violent and repressive means of state control.[18] The government did, however, exhibit more leniency to Islamist groups, who expanded their social influence through various outlets. Islam was presented as an avenue of escape from state dominance; the proliferation of private mosques that began in the 1980s attests to this image.[19]

Islamic opposition forced the state to devise new strategies of control, one of which centered on women. Sadat chose to emphasize the gendered differences between men and women in his justification of paternalistic policies that sought to 'protect' women from political exploitation.[20] Such a commitment to serving women's interest proved to be hypocritical at best. The 1977 personal status law reform campaign headed by First Lady Jehan Sadat illustrates an attempt by the regime to capitalize on women's issues for political gains. By seeking to reform laws dealing with marriage, divorce, and child custody, the campaign catered to women and hoped to win the allegiance of the large number of woman involved in Islamist groups.[21] The campaign truly served as the government's response to the Islamist opposition to state authority. The group of laws would hopefully garner both internal and international support, thereby aiding the Sadat government in securing support for its other (more pressing) ideological aims. The government's attempt to fight its opposition led to their further polarization.

Interestingly, the government of Sadat and Islamist groups both employed dichotomizing arguments to vilify the group whose power each wished to curtail. Scholar

Azza Karam points out that this binary reasoning shows the convergence of state and Islamist/religious discourses. Speaking of his assumption of the presidency, Sadat claimed that he "called for the rule of reason and was faced with fierce resistance from those who had ruled Egypt through slogans ... This is why they [Nasserite Leftists] reject logic and organize emotional demonstrations..."[22] Gendered Islamist arguments provide a comparison. Seeking to separate subservient women's roles from the dominance of the male, several prominent Egyptian sheikhs argued that, "...the emotional (woman) must cede to the rational (man)."[23] The repeated emphasis on the superiority of reason over emotion alludes to Enlightenment-era revelations (the era during which gender began to be politically exploited as a categorical difference). Most notably, this thinking eerily echoes the Orientalist triumphing of the rational European over the passionate and earthly indigenous populations of the Middle East. Both discourses thus seem to evidence the internalization of colonial rhetoric. The parallels between male/female subordination and European/indigenous subordination become undeniable; the effects remain evident decades later. Both lines of thinking engage in the universalization of character, a useful ideological tool that often disadvantages its object.

ISLAMISM AND WOMEN

Islamism, the politicized version of Islam, stands distinct from Islam itself in that its key concern is to implement Islamist ideology in the political realm. Thus the advancement of ideology was, and remains, the key concern of Islamists in Egypt. Despite their protestations against Western powers and authoritarian governments, Islamist groups have been equally guilty of utilizing women's issues to their political advantage. Perhaps partially in response to their political marginalization throughout the twentieth century, religious groups employed this gendered rhetoric in their attempts to establish social authority. The regimes of Nasser, Sadat, and eventually Mubarak witnessed the evolution of Islamic ideals from those belonging to a counterculture to those of the "dominant political idiom."[24] Some argue that the Islamic discourse gained popularity in this period precisely because it rejected all other discourses, especially those associated with an overarching political system tied to impoverishment and exploitation.[25]

Islamism in Egypt became a visible and influential entity during the 1970s, with many scholars pointing to Israel's defeat of Egypt in the Six Day War of 1967 as the key turning point.[26] Of course the strategies of Islamism cannot be discussed without acknowledging that, as with any ideological grouping, there exists a variety of manifestations. Some Islamist groups followed militant and highly conservative paths,

while others focused more on political avenues to power. The former category cast their fight against the state as an inevitably violent one, from which women had to be protected and thus excluded. These more conservative strands emphasized the image of the modern, Western-styled woman as proof of the necessity for Islamic law in an increasingly corrupt world. Politically-oriented groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, alternatively relied on notions of gendered differences, which also restricted women's political participation.[27] The different groups converged in their idealized restriction of women to domestic roles, through which leadership roles could not be attained. The Islamist ideal of woman's place was reinforced by the everyday reality of women's limited political roles during the latter half of the twentieth century.[28]

Thus, the question of women's issues was one of several reasons that politicized Islam found fruitful ground for its development under authoritarian governments. Citizens across Egyptian society were discontent with the Sadat government's policies that exacerbated inequalities and poverty. Islamic groups have historically garnered power in societies plagued by frustration with the government and its failures. The Islamist party in power then pacifies the male population by restricting women's rights and giving the men more control over their wives and daughters, women whom the man perceives as belonging to him.[29] By focusing on women's position as a marker of culture, attention is diverted from preexisting economic and political conditions that Islamist groups may be incapable of remedying. Islamist associations utilized similar rhetoric during the reign of Hosni Mubarak, the vice-president of Sadat who assumed power after the president's assassination in 1981. Both Islamism and authoritarianism gradually constricted the room within dominant political and social discourses for the expression of both secular and Islamic feminisms.[30]

The gynophobic political maneuvering by Islamist groups (and to a lesser extent, by their authoritarian opponents) can also be understood as a symptom of globalized modernity. The attempts to establish absolute values of women and their roles come as a response to the problems of transitioning an already complex society into a new era of modernity, a space rife with its own internal contradictions and complexities.[31] A society developing in several uncontrollable directions forces groups to split their attention between destabilizing modernization and containing the problems that arise. Crises of rationality and masculinity are undeniable accompaniments to modernity, and they further push groups like fundamentalists to fight for "control of mechanisms of cultural representation."[32] As evidenced, women have historically served as this battlefield, and their role unsurprisingly continues to be appropriated in similar manners.

It remains important to recognize the tendency of Western scholars to vilify the members of these Islamist groups for continuing the same pattern of abuse against

women practiced by the very powers that the Islamist groups sought to criticize. However, it is equally important to realize that citizens espousing conservative Islamist views were also subject to the oppressive rule of various ruling forces! We must also acknowledge, as Leila Ahmed does, that by imposing its own definitions, Orientalism reinforced establishment Islam's view of itself as the only acceptable version of Islam.[33] This hinders the acceptance of alternative interpretations of Islam that might rely more on Islam's cultural and ethical strengths and thus embrace greater equality (interpretations like those of contemporary Islamic feminists!). The equalizing potential of Islamic law is limited by Islamic fundamentalism's self-perception as the only absolute solution.

The fundamentalist tendency to create such absolute values mirrors the transgressions of every dominant power previously discussed. I do not wish to give the impression that the universalization of the problem of women's rights serves as a hindrance to women's emancipation from patriarchal constraints. Rather, women's character was universalized by various entities of power in order to serve their own political ends. By casting women as objects in need of saving, these groups co-opted the discourses of women's liberation. This contributed to the association of women's rights with the oppressive control of various authorities, thus creating a public environment hostile to women's political and social equality. Resulting from the co-optation of 'their' struggle for liberation, the cultural barriers to women's participation alienate women from their true political selves in Egypt.

II. THE EGYPT THAT ERUPTED: THE 2011 UPRISING

WOMEN UNDER MUBARAK

Women continued to suffer doubly from the burdens of an oppressive cultural discourse and the political realities of an authoritarian government under Hosni Mubarak's thirty year presidency. Women's issues became another vehicle of state control, and thus in this respect Mubarak continued the trend of his predecessors. The interactions of the hierarchical state and the general Egyptian population similarly reflected the inherent contradictions of a modernizing, secular government ruling over a resistant and largely religious population. The Mubarak government even attempted to use religious institutions to gain legitimacy among religious citizens, which served to further entrench state power in the public sphere.[34]

Mubarak's policies glossed over the issue of women's role in the public sphere. The regime approached women's issues by designating equality as derived from the sameness of the sexes.[35] In other words, the government established equality by granting

women the same formal rights as given to men - a strategy more similar to that of Nasser than Sadat or the Islamists. An example of this formal 'sameness' is provided by the National Democratic Party's inclusion of women, a move that might initially be deemed progressive. However, the NDP, and by extension the state, failed to provide any semblance of real equality. The merely marginal role granted to women in their party demonstrates this. Female members, potential political candidates, were repeatedly denied nominations for elections to the Peoples' Assembly, because male members of the party decided that they would not make viable contenders in difficult electoral competitions.[36] This position reinforced traditional ideas of women's inability to play a political role and effectively contradicted any pretense of inner-party equality. It also reinforced the general interpretation of the political and public arenas as overtly masculine.

Mubarak and the NDP's gender agenda also failed Egyptian women in the much larger sense that women overall suffered from a dearth of economic participation and political representation. The persistence of such inequalities demonstrate that laws cannot institutionalize norms that have not developed organically as a part of society's natural progression. Simply put, legal equality does not necessarily translate into reality, and this process is even further complicated when long-time authoritarian governments stifle societies!

Consider the labor force participation percentage of the Egyptian population: over 90% of males aged 15 to 64 were in the labor force while barely over 30% of women participated in the labor force.[37] In a similar vein, youth unemployment was over double that amongst young women compared to young men.[38] These discrepancies persist despite the growth and diversification of the Egyptian economy, which saw a GDP growth rate of nearly 5% annually during the last decade of Mubarak's rule. A changing labor market is one potential reason for the decrease in higher educated women's participation and the increase in less educated women's participation (such as the former change stemming from public sector cutbacks).

Most importantly, these economic inequalities evidence how slowly societal norms can change. This is particularly notable considering how women's economic independence had been developing since the time of Nasser and was supposedly encouraged by the state under Mubarak. The entrenchment of traditional attitudes can be at least partially credited with the slow evolution of women's economic standing (as well as their political position, as we will explore). The pervasiveness of traditional ideas itself stems from the social authority of Islamic groups rooted in Sadat's time and expanded during Mubarak's rule. Informal barriers to women's public participation, like these social ideals, constitute another legacy of authoritarianism.

Women's political participation similarly suffered from Mubarak's myth of equality. Women were disadvantaged at the most basic level by their restricted participation as well as by the continued association of women's rights - or even women's increased role in the public sphere - with the state's oppression. These detriments occurred both at the formal and informal levels of political participation.

Parliamentary elections provide an example of the former. In the fraudulent elections of late 2010, 64 of the 518 Parliamentary seats were reserved for women, allowing women to hold approximately 12% of the legislature.[39] There had previously been only 444 elected seats (two for each of Egypt's 222 constituencies), with an additional 10 presidentially appointed members. (The 2005 Parliament included of 4 elected women, 5 appointed women.) The gender quota was established by the National Democratic Party in 2009 electoral reform laws and was the subject of much debate in the months leading to the 2010 election.[40] Some viewed the quota as the government's efforts to alter the long-inherited cultural stigma against women in politics. Others, more critical of the Mubarak regime, identified the quota as a ploy by the NDP to amass and maintain power.[41] As with most Parliamentary seats, the spots reserved for women were expected to be taken by NDP members.

The Parliamentary elections of 2010 have been generally recognized as one of the last straws of the Egyptian public's tolerance of the Mubarak regime. Thus the election's association with an unprecedented number of female politicians detrimentally affects the public's view of women in politics. According to Egyptian anthropologist Hania Sholkamy, such an association will, "...haunt women's rights advocates and has cast a long shadow over the immediate post-revolutionary future."[42]

Such a negative association with women's rights was likely reinforced by the dearth of women's organizations operating in the public sphere. Women's associations were banned under Mubarak with the exception of the women's auxiliary of the NDP. Women's issues were instead swept under the state's umbrella agenda, with First Lady Suzanne Mubarak playing the key figurehead role. Politically sponsored organizations like the National Council for Women (NCW) were somewhat successful in securing some protections for women - but only those in line with the NDP's greater strategies.[43] Established in 2000, the NCW purportedly functioned as an independent institution. However, its efforts to "advance the status of the Egyptian women through social, economic and political empowerment" excluded ordinary women and alienated them from any sense of their own empowerment.[44]

The NCW, and Suzanne Mubarak's support of such organs, has since been criticized as hindering the development and success of a feminist movement in Egypt by feminists like Nawal el-Saadawi. The top-down approach to women's issues allowed for

the routine denial of issues like street harassment as a problem by figures like the First Lady, which furthered disadvantaged women suffering from such discriminations.[45] The criticisms launched by el-Saadawi and others draw attention to the value normally attributed to the political and civic participation of citizens as an activity guided by their everyday realities.

OPPRESSION IN A CONSTRUCTED AUTHORITARIAN REALITY

The state's intervention in both formal and informal sectors reveals its usage of the woman question and actual women themselves as one of its numerous means to legitimize and sustain its power. The state's anxiety to maintain its power is typical of such an autocratic regime; its chief aims are often self-preservation and self-perpetuation. Such anxiety is often dealt with by the regime through the establishment of a coercive apparatus that permeates all sectors of society or at least poses a reasonable threat to do so if needed to crush viable opposition. Scholar Eva Bellin sees the efficacy and strength of state security apparatuses in their ability to maintain the monopoly on violence, which can in turn determine if revolutions can successfully lead to government transitions.[46] Such a coercive apparatus can function in a number of ways, such as Egypt's extensive police network, the ministry of interior, and the state command of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF). The degree of institutionalization of the coercive apparatus can also contribute to the potential power of revolutionary movements. Interestingly, scholars like Bellin posit that the more institutionalized the establishment is, the more likely it will disassociate itself from the political state and make way for political reformation.[47] SCAF's disengagement with Mubarak's government during the Egyptian Uprising validates this point.

Of course the state does not operate in a strictly violent sense. The regime must also create the illusion of political legitimacy in order to ensure its survival, especially in the context of a globalized world. Political legitimacy is a complicated and intangible concept. This reason (combined with state monopoly of violence) allows the illusion of political legitimacy to act as an extension of the regime's creation of consciousness. Here I wish to employ Karl Marx's theory of false consciousness to describe how the state employs ideology to determine dominant discourses.

Dominant ideologies, interpreted according to contemporary standards, contribute to a person's consciousness, or their self-identification within society. A person's consciousness orients their political interests towards those of others who occupy similar positions, and their self-perceived interests arise from this solidarity. Marx argued that false consciousness arose when expressions of self-perceived interests were distorted or misinterpreted by the influence of the dominant ideologies, or, the ideology of the ruling class. False consciousness then works in the advantage of the ruling class, the bourgeoise in Marx's examples, as oppressed groups see their interests as aligned with those of the ruling class. The subjugated classes are blinded to their needs, and the cycle of oppression continues. Marx contended that false consciousness arises from the capitalist system as a reflection and correlate of a person's alienation.

Naturally I must make several distinctions from Marx's theory while exploring its applicability to the case of Mubarak's Egypt. Most obviously, Egypt's ruling political class, rather than Marx's reviled bourgeoise, attempted to shape society's consciousness. Marx's ruling class constituted those in charge of the means of production, namely those possessing economic power. In Egypt, political elites, those instrumental in carrying out the state's agenda, are more complicit in the state's manipulative agenda.

The power of the political elite recalls Marx's assertion that false consciousness is correlated with the average worker's alienation from the nucleus of power. This idea is easily relatable to Egypt's elite and the general population's alienation from the center of political power. One's relationship to power is crucial in defining one's citizenship, especially if we determine the definition of power to be the ability to participate meaningfully in decision-making processes. The relation to power is key to distinguishing the different ways in which people are oppressed, even under an umbrella state control program like that of Mubarak.

This allows us to recognize that, even in the shadow of this universalizing false consciousness, women's relation to power remains different from that of the general population. Oppression occurs at different levels. Women are subjugated by the state's suffocating presence, the tribulations of patriarchy, and the combination of the two that keeps women distanced from power. Women's frustration with their inequalities parallels the larger Egyptian population's dissatisfaction, but its differences highlight the great importance of the question of women's participation in dismantling oppressive realities. Notably the concerns of women and Egyptians' develop and express themselves in a similar manner. Rather than coming to a head spontaneously and completely unexpectedly, they evolve as a result of a multitude of micro- and macro-discontents

The presence of these frustrations brings us to another important departure from Marx's theory. I do not want to completely mimic Marx's assertion that members of the subjugated classes are completely oblivious to their own needs and ignorantly follow the dictates of the dominant class. Instead, I would like to suggest that this circumstance exists only in the reality constructed by the state. In this formulated reality, the general public perceives its interests to be the same as those of the ruling party, and thus the two groups exist harmoniously in the pursuit of the ruling group's interests. Thus, this false

consciousness functions more effectively as the state's means of assuring itself of its own security rather than convincing its citizens that it truly serves them. Thus the state's illusion of political legitimacy arises within this constructed reality as a part of the state's imposed discourse. The pervasive nature of state control, and its hindrance of responsible institutions' development, allows for the perpetuation of this myth. In the case of Egypt, this was further aided by the state's focus on minor achievable reforms that were meant to divert public opinion away from larger issues of contention and the state's obvious shortcomings.[48]

The false consciousness of state legitimacy was thus passed down through generations of Egyptians, due to the longevity of Mubarak's dominance as well as his equally imperious predecessors. Here we can observe the notion of inherited oppression, a facet of Egyptian life referenced to repeatedly by both ordinary citizens and academic observers. The importance of this notion became evident through the protests of early 2011. One of the strongest thematic elements of the protests was the idea of young Egyptians throwing off this inherited oppression and inspiring others to follow their lead. The initial mobilization of young people evidences another importance aspect of Egyptian citizenry under Mubarak: counter-narratives to the regime's false reality were also passed down through generations. Dissent through underground channels and by those in diaspore was common! The existence of these counter-narratives confirms that the average citizen was truly conscious of their own oppression and alienation from power.

The protests demonstrated the power of these counter-narratives, and the mobilization of all sectors of society to protest broke the illusion of Mubarak's political legitimacy. The people refuted the regime's attempts to continually dominate societal discourses. The strength, length, and success of the protests attest to the people's will in reclaiming full ownership of their political consciousness. Indeed the very success of the protests and their development into a full-fledged social movement attests that any delusions of political legitimacy were destroyed. Here I employ sociologist Charles Tilly's definition of a social movement as consisting "of a sustained challenge to powerholders in the name of a population living under the jurisdiction of those powerholders by means of repeated public displays of that population's numbers, commitment, unity, and worthiness."[49]

When autocratic regimes attempt to eliminate room for this kind of action within their public sphere, the existence of such action may very well spell the beginning of the end of the state's monopoly on discourse as well as violence. The extinguishment of the former monopoly may be true more universally. Despite the successful case of Egypt, the latter certainly does not hold true in all situations; one can merely reference other cases of the Arab Spring to find evidence. The Egyptian efforts to seize back control of discourse and power in their society thus constitute a huge step. However, the persistence of negative attitudes about women remains problematic. The social movement reminds us of the key role that people's voices play in the maintenance of their relationship with power. The alienation of people from power and their own voices is not an insurmountable issue. Women's issues demonstrate that in order to enact real and lasting change, representative of a healthy society, the voices of all of that society must be involved. The experience of the protests provided women with the crucial tools to move further in this direction.

EGYPTIANS IN THE STREETS - THE 2011 UPRISING:

In his last speech to the nation before his resignation, President Hosni Mubarak declared that the Egyptian spirit would continue to live "amongst all of our people, farmers, intellectuals, workers ... in the hearts of our senior citizens, our women, our children, Christians and Muslims alike..."[50] The mass protests that precipitated Mubarak's speech and his downfall were widely lauded for their inclusion of every class and group of Egyptians, the same diverse population that Mubarak referenced in his address. The Mubarak regime disadvantaged and alienated most segments of its citizenry, and thus a large percentage of the population experienced a similar resentment towards their leader(s). This resentment, and the fatigue resulting from thirty years of comparable suppression, mobilized Egyptians - those previously politically active as well those who had experienced otherwise apolitical lives. The unity and harmonious existence of diverse protestors was a pervading theme of the revolution. As writer Nawal el-Saadawi exclaimed, "The revolution cleansed all the conflicts created by Sadat and Mubarak's regimes."[51]

While different sources credit various groups with continuously fueling the protests, many agree that young Egyptians were the first to mobilize. These Egyptians had lived their entire lives under the rule of Mubarak though in an age of increasing levels of education and globalization. Once the protests began members of older generations were sometimes brought into the streets as they searched for their younger family members. The revolutionary fervor seemed contagious and the pro-democracy demands of the protestors held the attention of many marginalized groups. Political groups that were banned under Mubarak found a new outlet for the expression of their frustration with being continuously sidelined. Both rural and urban Egyptians suffered from restrictions on civil society and the increasingly high (monetary and social) costs of living. Working-class protestors, both those in and outside of controversial trade unions,

found a new medium of voicing their dissatisfaction with growing economic disparities and the cost of living.[52]

Young Egyptian Gigi Ibrahim says she began her political activism through the labor movement, which she learned was often fueled by other women. Ibrahim saw the extensive participation of women in the January 25 protests as a continuation of this activist work, stating that, "In my experience women play a pivotal role in all protests and strikes. Whenever violence erupts, the women would step up and fight the police, and they would be beaten just as much as the men."[53] The equality of all protestors, regardless of their sex, was a facet of the revolution widely discussed and praised (although some Egyptians criticized Western media's attention to this detail). Filmmaker Salma El Tarzi, new to political activism, described the changed gender relations over the course of the movement, "Something changed in the dynamic between men and women in Tahrir. When the men saw that women were fighting in the front line that changed their perception of us and we were all united. We were all Egyptians now."[54] Here again the sentiment of unity appears. The protestors sought to oust Mubarak in the belief that this move would create the best possible future for Egypt, a united nation of hopeful citizens.

The days and weeks leading to the outburst of the protests saw the gradual establishment of an online presence of reformist individuals who had tired of Mubarak's long oppressive regime. Egyptians had previously gathered in outrage over the summertime death of young Khaled Said at the hands of the police, and frustration with the regime's brutality simmered on through online portals. While some of these online activists were part of prior protest groups like the April 6th Youth Movement and Kifaya, many were young people who did not espouse any particular political or ideological orientations.[55] Many were inspired by online videos posted by April 6th leader Asmaa Mahfouz, in which she called on both men and women to protest in Tahrir Square to express their desire to live in dignity and demand their human rights. (She also questioningly appealed to the honor of men in protecting women in an apparent attempt to draw attract more protestors.) Religious identity was downplayed as an issue of protest, despite the recent and controversial bombing of a Christian Coptic church. The online community denoted January 25th, a national holiday honoring the police, as the day for protests against the oppressive practices of the government. As Mahfouz declared, they would say, "No to corruption, no to the regime."[56]

Thousands of people gathered in the streets on Tuesday the 25th in Egypt's capital as well as in smaller cities such as Alexandria and Suez.[57] While the government immediately named the Muslim Brotherhood as the chief instigators, the protestors themselves voiced an anti-Mubarak sentiment that transcended societal divisions. It was only on Wednesday morning, the 26th, that police, many in plain-clothes, used coercive means to evacuate protestors from sites like Tahrir Square, in which the largest demonstration took place in Cairo.[58] The drive was accompanied by the government's ban on public gatherings and the detainment of a large number of protestors despite the government's dismissal of the protests as largely non-threatening.[59] Their reaction changed as the demonstrations on Friday grew to an unprecedented size.

The Cairo protests on Friday the 28th grew after midday prayers ended at mosques and again involved a wide variety of Egyptians.[60] The Muslim Brotherhood now encouraged its supporters to join the protests, and the scattered usage of religious slogans could be witnessed during the day (an element previously absent). Overall, however, protestors utilized slogans that emphasized human rights, freedom, and equity (themes that pervaded the entire revolutionary movement).[61] The government reacted to the growing protests by deploying the military, a controversial actor, to maintain public order.[62] In an even more startling move, nearly all Internet and cell phone service was severed.[63] Government buildings were attacked in Cairo, and protestors clashed violently with military forces in Alexandria.[64] Many protestors across Egypt refused to abide by the government's curfew, a measure imposed under the state of emergency put into place by Mubarak decades prior.

The first capitulation from the government came early Saturday, when President Mubarak made a television appearance during which he promised that he would replace some of his government ministers. In the face of waning police and military support, Mubarak followed through with this promise and dismissed his cabinet.[65] Mubarak's most notable move was his appointment of intelligence chief Omar Suleiman as vice-president, an office left vacant since Mubarak himself assumed power after the death of President Anwar el-Sadat.[66] Mubarak also named Ahmed Shafiq as prime minister. Notably, both appointments were men who formerly held positions in the military with Mubarak. Many protestors remained skeptical of Suleiman, while others took the appointment as a signal of Mubarak's forthcoming resignation.

As the protests moved into Monday the 31st, Egypt began grappling with the abrupt halt of its economic operations. The port of Alexandria was closed, and international corporations in several major industries were forced to discontinue services.[67] State-run television continued to downplay the protests, only featuring pieces to reinforce the idea of the protestors' lawlessness and foreign influences.[68] However, protestors countered this image by demonstrating peacefully. Feminist writer and ardent protestor Nawal el-Saadawi noted to an American news source that, "Women and girls are besides boys in the streets ... calling for justice, freedom and equality, and real democracy..." [69] Mubarak reinstated several members of his dismissed cabinet, but his

government's stability suffered a blow when the Egyptian army stated that it would not forcefully engage against protestors.[70]

In a Tuesday speech, Mubarak declared that he would not run for President again but would, "close my service to the country in a good, safe way that keeps the constitution and ensures security."[71] Consequently, Suleiman, the Vice President, declared that he would be open to negotiations with oppositional forces. However, this gesture may have been largely symbolic as the protestors remained loosely organized. No single leader emerged on whom the protestors could agree.[72] One of the most predominant figures was Nobel laureate Mohammed ElBaradei, although some of the protestors repeatedly denounced him as an unfit representative of their goals.[73] The Muslim Brotherhood took a greater role as protest organizers on Monday and Tuesday, although the diverse Egyptian public was still largely represented in the demonstrations.

The demonstrations took a violent turn on Wednesday February 2nd. Supporters of the Mubarak regime attacked protestors in Tahrir Square with a variety of crude weapons and wounded hundreds.[74] The military remained a bystander as Mubarak's supporters infiltrated the protests and erupted into violence at exactly 2:15 pm. Some anti-Mubarak protestors were forced to fight back with makeshift weapons, while others formed makeshift hospitals in which both male and female volunteers tended the wounded. Protestors would later report that reports of sectarian and gendered violence were based solely on the actions of pro-Mubarak actors.[75] Gigi Ibrahim noted that women assumed the important role of securing the exits of the square and maintaining communication among those recovering and those fighting Mubarak's 'thugs'.[76]

The crackdown on protests continued on Thursday, February 3rd. Journalists and activists alike were arrested as protesters rejected the meager concessions offered by the Mubarak government.[77] The Muslim Brotherhood officially requested the Mubarak resign and allow for the implementation of a transitional government.[78] Their declaration was met with Suleiman's offer of beginning a dialogue between oppositional groups and the government. Prime Minister Shafiq promised that the cause of violence would be investigated.[79]

Friday the 4th saw the continuation of talks on the potential of a transitional government headed by Suleiman. Along with other military officials, Suleiman sought to strip Mubarak of some presidential powers while allowing him to remain in office.[80] This was met with scorn by opposition leaders, especially as the government's coordinated attack against free media continued.[81] The policies and practices of Suleiman were criticized into Monday, as Suleiman talked with American officials and representatives of the Muslim Brotherhood.[82] The latter discussion included other opposition leaders but was derided as a political ploy.[83]

The government attempted to instill a sense of normalcy on Monday February 7th. The cabinet reconvened and officials offered pay raises to employees.[84] State-run television reinforced the idea of government supremacy, continuing to depict protestors as overtly violent and foreign.[85] Protestors rejected the image of the transition government. Protestor Nawal El-Saadawi expressed the persistence of protestors' anti-Mubarak stance; she informed an American reporter that, "we became one in the street … So the plan is, we will never move. And we are increasing, increasing, increasing, until Mubarak says, 'I'm leaving. I'm leaving.'" The words of El Saadawi proved true as Wednesday the 9th brought a fresh round of protests. Many involved labor strikes that shut down post offices and factories. Egyptian officials announced the government's waning tolerance for the protests and attempted to reemphasize that the police were firmly under the control of the state.[86]

Mubarak spoke publicly on the night of Thursday the 10th, much to the anticipation of many citizens. Mubarak praised the beginnings of "a national dialogue, a constructive one, that included the youth who have called for change and reform, and also with all the factions of opposition and of society."[87] However, the protestors' hope for Mubarak's resignation was dashed when the president instead announced that he was transferring constitutionally mandated presidential powers to his right-hand man, Vice-President Suleiman.[88] Amidst rejection of Mubarak's announcement, there were rumors of renewed violence in the following days.[89]

The violence did not come to pass after Suleiman announced the following day, February 11th, that Mubarak had relinquished his authority to a military council.[90] The military had earlier that day declared solidarity with the protestors as they took to the streets in the morning in response to Mubarak's disappointing speech the previous night. The resignation of Mubarak came as a surprise to many leaders, both those in the opposition and of foreign countries. It was met with unabashed joy by the protestors, finally successful in their aim of ousting their long-detested ruler.

The movement's success in an authoritarian state, of course, marks it all the more impressive. This is especially true when one considers how many protests had erupted across Egypt over the last several years of Mubarak's reign and their limited efficacy. The eighteen days of protest were closely watched and widely discussed across the world, especially as one event of the larger 'Arab Spring' that swept across the MENA region. Egypt had long been held as the beacon of the Arab world, and the Egyptian popular uprising in particular sparked an explosion of discussion of the implications for the region's internal and international affairs. Much analysis also focused on the very nature of the Arab Spring and whether the circumstances in each country actually constituted a successful or thwarted revolution. Scholars, journalists, and average citizens alike were

mixed in their characterization of Egypt's change of government and its innumerable consequences. The successful overthrow of the government was the goal of the protestors and one that they achieved, which would seemingly make 'revolution' an accurate description. However, the messy aftermath, a society still in flux today, drove people to speculate on how much was achieved and if there was even any revolution at all.

III. WOMEN AS PARTICIPANTS IN AND BENEFICIARIES OF THE POLITICAL REALM

Just as the protest movement of early 2011 was the most notable in contemporary Egyptian (and global) history, women's participation was also the most notable instance of recent times. The aims and motives of female protestors were the same as their male counterparts. They protested in support of the common goal of Mubarak's departure, rather than in pursuit of any gender-specific solutions. Members of all sectors of society unified without distinctions, thereby erasing many of the divisions and hierarchies that variously disadvantaged women. Interestingly, the problems that are common for Egyptian women were not visible throughout the protests. Both active participants of the protests and outside observers noted the absence of constant sexual harassment and sexual violence against women over the course of the protests, especially in the heavily occupied Tahrir Square. As Nawal el-Saadawi claimed, "We were men and women in the square day and night, not a single harassment of any woman." This assertion, while perhaps slightly exaggerated, attests to a profound shift from the Egyptian society in which 83% of women reported experiencing sexual harassment.[91]

The absence of gendered violence was mirrored, and perhaps correlated to, the general acceptance of women as ordinary public political actors, a facet of Egyptian public life previously missing. Women marked themselves as participants in the larger civic process, making claims for the entire citizenry's rights due from the government. This trend, its roots in the initial protests, was repeatedly seen in post-revolutionary discussions and discourses.[92] Women as activists were not confined to simply vocalizing women's rights issues. Rather, their activism -- both for specific women's issues and greater citizenship issues -- signaled the redefinition and continued evolution of their political consciousness. As political beings acting regardless to their expected sex roles and political contributions, women shirked the previous understandings of women's relationship to power. The protest movement demonstrated the false reality of the government's politics, while women protestors simultaneously revealed the falsity of society's expectations of women's capabilities. The absence of 'women's empowerment' in revolutionary slogans signals that women's own sense of empowerment underwent a transformation. The protests not only allowed women to recapture ownership of the narratives of their liberation but also crucially led women to actively participate the crafting of society's greater narratives. Notions of women's citizenship have been irrevocably altered.

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN IN THE POST-MUBARAK CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD

Women's mobilization, however, did not continue into post-revolutionary society. It was during the period after the ousting of Mubarak that the gap between the acceptance of women's mobilization and acceptance of their political participation became apparent. Women were excluded and discriminated against on many different levels - both institutionally and informally. Despite the supposed transformation of the Egyptian government from one authoritarian to one more based on the people's ideals, the hierarchical constructions of power and gender remained in place. Such hierarchies were perhaps even exacerbated in this time of change, especially after the facade of the Muslim Brotherhood and SCAF's commitments to justice and equality were respectively destroyed. As one journalist wrote, "Women may have sustained the Arab Spring, but it remains to be seen if the Arab Spring will sustain women."[93]

I will first explore three tiers of institutional exclusion of women from politics and then continue onto the gender-based physical harms inflicted on average Egyptian women in post-Mubarak society and protests. While institutional factors provide us with crucial hints about dominant cultural and ideological discourses, they also provide the equally important context of women's relation to powerful decision-making processes. First and foremost, there were no female presidential candidates (at least serious contenders) in the June 2012 election that brought Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood to power. Women were similarly underrepresented in the legislative arena.

The new electoral laws established after the downfall of the old regime mandated that women run on the rosters of all parties taking part in the Parliamentary elections of late 2011. Women's activists have pointed out that the women who ran in the post-uprising elections were often veiled and even marginalized on their party lists, which demonstrated parties' lack of desire for women to engage in meaningful political participation. The inclusion of women was rather more demonstrative of "each party's ability to pay lip service" to notions of women's inclusion.[94] The Salafist al-Nour party merely featured images of roses in place of their female candidates' pictures on party posters.

The NDP's gender quota was abolished in the post-uprising Parliamentary elections, through which only 8 women were elected to positions in the new 500-member

body (a less than 2% presence).[95] SCAF additionally appointed 10 Parliament members, two of which were women - bringing women's representation to an equally disheartening 2.2%. (The new Parliament then chose the members of the Constituent Assembly that compiled the new Constitution voted upon by the general population. This Parliament was later dissolved by SCAF amidst claims that election procedures had been unconstitutional in July 2012.) These figures pant an abysmal picture of women's representation, one that would surely evoke greater public ire. However, the dismal number of women holding elected positions is not always identified as a problem in the general public because women are not barred de jure from running for legislative or executive office

Furthermore, many women's rights activists have denounced the elected women, claiming that they do not truly represent the interests of women. These legislators thus embody the 'woman against women' phenomenon that is witnessed in many legislative bodies, through which female politicians follow conservative agendas that often disadvantage other women. Political activist Rania Refaat Shaheen spoke of the female legislators, perhaps harshly, that, "Chairs are more useful than them. You can use a chair, but you can't use them."[96]

In a post-revolutionary society, perhaps the most pressing source of institutional exclusion is the weighty task of constitution-making. Such a task is surely paramount to a society that successfully ousted its long-time dictator in the name of justice! Despite any ideals of justice, there were no female members on the constitutional review committee convened by the interim military government in February 2011 following the fall of Mubarak. Women were also vastly under-represented in the 100 member constituent assembly convened for the first time in early 2012 (only six female members). The second constituent assembly formed in mid-2012 after the Supreme Administrative Court dissolved its predecessor. Its negotiations for a first draft ran from June until October 2012. Tension arose primarily between liberals (with greater tendencies to secularism) and Islamists (including the conservative Salafists of the al-Nour party and the more moderate members of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party). Two of the most contentious issues during the drafting were Sharia as legal foundation and women's rights, which are intimately connected to one another in this context.

Assembly salafists wished to make rulings (ahkam) of Sharia the source of legislation, replacing Article 2's stipulation that the principles (mubaadi) of Sharia serve as the basis of law.[97] The lack of fixed Islamic principles allowed for greater interpretation on the part of lawmakers, and liberals heavily objected to the change of vocabulary. The draft constitution that was eventually voted on by the public kept the original wording. Article 219 of the accepted constitution stated that, "general evidence,

foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines" composed the principles of Sharia.[98]

Equally controversial, and more unresolved, was the position of women's rights within the new constitutional framework. The new constitution included articles that emphasized the state's role in securing the morality and health of the public as well as the preservation of the traditional Egyptian family. The new document demonstrated the tension between the modern and the more traditional conceptions of a woman's civic duty. Article Three of the Preamble provides the first example. While claiming that women, "are half of society and partners in all national gains and responsibilities," the article implied that a woman's role as a mother remains the most important.[99] Perhaps more comforting for women's activists was Article Five of the same section, which stated that, "Equality before the law and equal opportunities for all citizens, men and women, without discrimination or nepotism, especially in rights and duties."[100]

Activists still feared that certain language provided opportunities for inappropriate state intervention in matters of personal health and responsibility (such as female genital mutilation and child marriage). Much of this language appears in the first part of the Constitution, entitled State and Society. Article Ten declares that the family is the foundation of society and that the state has a vested interest in preserving its "genuine character" as well as "moral values." Women's activists were also particularly critical of the State's promise to reconcile "the duties of a woman toward her family and her work."[101] The word "duties" might potentially perpetuate a double burden (of house work and public labor) on women or reinforce a public opinion that a woman must sacrifice her job for the benefit of her family.[102] The next article reiterated the state's devotion to commitment to safeguarding public morality.

The second part of the Constitution covers the rights and freedoms of Egyptian citizens. Article 33 stipulates that all citizens are to enjoy equality before the law and freedom from discrimination. Article 33 faced criticism from human rights activists as it does not specify on which bases citizens cannot be discriminated against.[103] This article's equivalent in the 1971 Constitution, Article 40, explicitly stated that race, ethnic origin, language, religion, or creed were protected.[104] Notably, gendered discrimination is absent from both constitutions. Article 55 in this same section dubs participation in public life a duty of the national citizenry.

The debate over the constitution was one of the inevitable affects of the Mubarak regime's downfall and evidences the protest movements' aim of regime change (a change that ultimately implied reform). Predictably there was substantial criticism of various other articles focused on the size and shape of the government, the military's power, and their possible infringement on citizens' rights. Women's concerns, as well as those of

other political and actual minorities, revolved around potential discrimination against them. This potential lies in the varying interpretations of the constitution's text that could be used to formulate law and reshape the conventions of public life. Interpretations of both the constitution and the principles of Sharia on which it is based have been and will surely continue to be examined by Islamic feminists in Egypt.

While illustrating the potential danger of a lack of female contribution to decision-making processes, the constitution also provided a lesson on legal restructuring in a climate rife with social and self-identification anxieties. Pro-woman activists, discussing the text and other developments, point out that the subjugation of women will continue regardless to the structure of government if this government is grounded in a document imbibed with patriarchal thinking. If one attempts to measure the 'progress' of a democratizing society, one might look at the citizenry's participation in the formulation of policy. While the number of people involved in the composition of the constitution was limited, many Egyptians contributed their opinions in public manner and the voting population ultimately made the decision to accept the draft. However, the acceptance of such a draft again reinforces the patriarchal denial of gender inequality as a problem, a phenomenon that is both political and cultural. The concerns of women's equality again lose out to society's desire to establish a stable government and safer civic realm.

Despite any hopes of a safer public sector, women also fell prey to an increasing number of violent attacks during the subsequent protests against their exclusion and various decisions of the provisional and then elected governments. The continually unsettled state of Egyptian politics seemed to be reflected in the increasingly riotous protests and the negative consequences for women. Public sexual assaults - ranging from groping to mass gang rapes - became increasingly prevalent. Political gatherings, more volatile and violent than the original protests, witnessed a large number of sexual assaults; one example is provided by the public demonstrations held during the Parliamentary elections of late 2011 and early 2012. This phenomenon ominously hinted at a return to pre-uprising gender relations in the public sphere. It has resulted in the increasingly important role of citizen vigilante groups, such as Harrassmap. Harrassmap is a website where victims of sexual harassment can report the place and nature of assaults, primarily in Cairo but also across other governorates.[105] Working in conjunction with many other citizen groups, Harrassmap seeks to raise awareness of the persistent problem of sexual harassment and expose it as a criminal activity.

Unfortunately, citizen groups have lessened impact when faced with the brunt of state power. The oppressive forces of Mubarak's regime limited the reach of such groups, while the military rule that followed the overthrow of Mubarak did not officially restrict the activities of popular organizations. However, the new Egyptian government was overtly bellicose. As the road to electing a new government during 2011 was painstakingly traveled, many Egyptians became increasingly disillusioned with the interim government. Unsurprisingly, their discontentment found expression in new public protests, to which the military responded violently. Speaking of her beating at the hands of security officers during November 2011, Journalist Mona Eltahawy described of the symbolic role of the military's violence. She writes, "The viciousness of their attack took me aback. Yes, I confess, this feminist thought they wouldn't beat a woman so hard. But I wasn't just a woman. My body had become Tahrir Square, and it was time for revenge against the revolution that had broken and humiliated Hosni Mubarak's police."[106]

As Eltahaway testifies, female protestors were not spared any violence because of their sex. They were additionally targeted in a very specific manner, as evidenced by a disastrous protest on March 9th 2011. Only mere weeks after SCAF claimed power thanks to the occupation of Tahrir Square, soldiers brutally cleared demonstrators from the square and arrested scores of protestors. Many women were taken into custody, and seventeen were subjected to virginity tests and torture. Once released, the battered women widely publicized the abuse they suffered at the hands of the state, only to have their stories denied by military forces. Months later, a SCAF general finally admitted that virginity tests had been forcefully administered.[107] While such an admission justified the criticisms of many worldwide, the political power and strength of the Egyptian military remained firmly entrenched.

This remained true even into election time. A sit-in held in front of the Council of Ministers in December of the same year demanded that the military abdicate power in favor of a civilian administration. The sit-in erupted into violence as soldiers attacked activists. The sit-in became notorious because of widely circulated footage and pictures of a female protestor being beaten by soldiers. Surrounded and immobilized by soldiers, the woman in the image has had her upper clothing torn off to reveal a blue bra. Quickly dubbed the 'Blue Bra Woman,' she became a symbol of the numerous victims of the military's brutality.[108] The army's abuse of female demonstrators sparked even more protests, during which thousands of women (as well as men) marched in opposition to the military's cruelty.

These protests largely addressed the violent tactics of SCAF but also spoke to society's growing intolerance of sexual violence. As Eltahaway wrote, "It's one thing to be groped and harassed by passers-by, but when the state gropes you, it gives a green light that you are fair game."[109] The vulnerability of women to attacks by fellow civilians and the military quickly became the focus of the international media, especially after attacks on several Western journalists. Some called for women protestors to return home and for the reassignment of female reporters. Such attitudes demonstrated the success of

fighting tactics that targeted women, which does not serve as a positive harbinger of women's political participation. I will later return to women's battle against these biases.

CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS, HISTORICAL ROOTS?

The phases of regime change thus become more clearly demarcated when one considers the differing positions of women during certain periods (such as during the revolt, in the interim period, etc.). Women's rights activists constitute the primary actors forced to try to reconcile the varying acceptance of women's roles in the public sphere. Scholar Nadine Sika asks the crucial question, "How do we reconcile the wide acceptance of women as activists and instigators of the revolution with the denial that women are entitled to demand their rights within the context of wider revolutionary change?"[110] Before any viable strategy for such reconciliation can be formulated, potential causes of women's exclusion must be identified.

The most obvious answer is the renewed power of SCAF; it remains unsurprising that any type of military rule would have a negative impact on women's inclusion. The army institutionally excludes women from its own ranks! Furthermore, the army's usage of violence against the general population, and the targeted sexual violence against women, revealed that SCAF was never the paradigm of stability and civic support that protestors had hoped. Those like scholars Lin Noueihed and Alex Warren argue that the protests merely enabled the army to publicly claim the power that was always theirs. They assert, "...by stripping away the cladding that was the NDP, the interior ministry forces and the Mubarak family, protestors had merely exposed the power that had been at the core of the Egyptian regime all along."[111]

However, the power of SCAF alone cannot be blamed. Although there admittedly may not be a monocausal explanation for the paradox of women's participation, I propose that the most credit be given to the cultural reticence towards women's public participation. The long development of misogynist ideals and the over-arching patriarchal structure allowed for the firm entrenchment of these antiquated notions of women's proper place and capabilities. Encompassed within the idea of Egyptian 'culture' stands Islamism, an increasingly influential force since the 1970's. The traditional ideas of women that persist are often emblematic of Islamist ideals. The pervasive power of culture (and cultural myths) enables these traditional ideas to prevail in the common narrative despite the progressive and ground-breaking actions of real women. We again see a disconnect between society's idealized 'woman' and the realities of actual woman. This situation is certainly not unique to Egypt, but it is one rendered all the more dangerous given the instability of the political environment. The generally unprecedented nature of the protests themselves and their aftermath necessitates an equally unprecedented evolution of societal expectations.

Unfortunately, the case of Egypt shows us that society's narratives are slow to change, even slower than political change. As explored earlier, the movement of women between the public and private spheres has long been manipulated and regulated by those seeking to solidify power. It thus remains not altogether surprising that this strategy continues in the contemporary period. The presence of this historical phenomenon has been noted by many protesters as well as outside analysts. As one protestor expressed to politician Catherine Ashton, "The men were keen for me to be here when we were demanding that Mubarak should go. But now he has gone, they want me to go home."[112]

The embedded nature of cultural objections to women's empowerment is further demonstrated by several factors. One is the emergence of these sentiments in government institutions, those that are supposedly reformulated with the people's interests and input in mind (although admittedly these institutions are undeniable extensions of SCAF's power). The revised National Council for Women provides an example. Reestablished by Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi in February 2012, the NCW was composed of civilian men and women, many prominent figures in various occupations. The new mission statement of the NCW states its goal of reinvigorating the political and social roles of women, but only to the extent that it leads to economic empowerment that could benefit their families. The NCW seems to limit women's political potential from the very beginning. It promises to "help women fulfill their time-honored mission of raising a coming generation with great potentials and even greater understanding and awareness; a generation capable of leading Egypt in the future."[113] Such a statement, emphasizing women's biological position to reproduce and the traditional role of homemaking, harkens back to nationalist sentiments of the early twentieth century! If the new state's appropriation of women's issues relies on stringently traditional and heavily gendered views of empowerment, how can women hope to actually benefit in the political and social realms?

The persistence of negative associations with women's empowerment is also attested to by the role of gender-based violence. While this is undoubtedly an offshoot of the greater violence that has erupted from the rapidly and dramatically shifting fault lines of Egyptian society, it still evidences the unfortunate patriarchal reaction to the increasingly important public roles of women. Violence on the street can reflect the domestic situation, where domestic violence is not legally a crime and quite common. While domestic violence is a universal problem, Egypt remains in a unique position in that the efforts of women's rights NGO's to criminalize sexual violence have repeatedly been interrupted with the dissolutions of Parliament.[114] Efforts to stop violence through

other avenues are hindered by victim blaming; assault survivors in post-revolutionary society are not questioned just about the modesty of their clothing but also of their presence at demonstrations and in the public sphere.

Gendered violence in public thus demonstrates the longtime usage of 'woman' as a society's means of coping with abrupt changes and general dissatisfaction. This naturally brings us to the question of whether women were 'used' as tokens in the protests themselves, an issue of contention that arose once women's exclusion post-revolution became obvious. Some critics claim that the images of women are hoisted up, as proof that times have gotten so desperate that even the gentle sex has to mobilize. Writer Nesrine Malik even asserted that some used women as means of, "underwriting the revolution by bringing their matronly dignity to the crowd like some mascot."[115]

While I agree the ideals of women have been manipulated, I think that the view that they were completely tokenized during the uprising devalues the contributions of real women. The mobilization of women was enacted through the desire of women to establish a more just and equal Egyptian society, a society in which they suffered from many levels of oppression. Their position in post-revolutionary society attests again to the many complications of democratization, namely that the slow transition to a more democratic order may not necessarily produce greater rights for all citizens. However, the silver lining of the Egyptian Uprising for women is that the experiences contributed to an evolution of political consciousness, which will only further augment women's participation in social movements and organizations that will truly secure their rights.

Redefinition of Political Consciousness

Women legitimized their own activism during the revolution, and the effects are seen today. Women functioned as free agents on the ground during the uprisings and they continue to do so in the contemporary period - both as general reformists and women's rights activists. The fact that women continue to operate in this capacity speaks not only to their tenaciousness, but also offers evidence of the redefinition of political consciousness that occurred during and as a result of the uprisings. The continued resilience of women's participation in a public environment openly hostile to women's presence underlines the importance of women's civic participation. The combination of women's activism during the protests and their fight for inclusion in the aftermath provided them with the necessary experiences for the evolution of their political identities.

We are able to recognize the development of Egyptian women's political consciousness through the responses of women to the many negative consequences of the uprising. As discussed earlier, sexual violence was increasingly committed against women by both civilians and instruments of the military state. Observers have argued that since the uprising sexual violence has been used as part of an attempt to victimize women and thus subordinate them. However, women actively deny these notions of victimhood and very publicly challenge the attempts of those wishing to silence them. The two responses are intricately related. Being a survivor of sexual violence is supposed to carry the burden of shame; however Egyptian women's fight against perpetrators of violence and the public's acceptance demonstrates their rejection of victimization. As Ahdaf Soueif wrote, "What they [male attackers and SCAF] are not taking into account is that everybody's grown up – the weapon of shame can no longer be used against women."[116]

Soueif's point is evidenced in part by the lawsuit of Samira Ibrahim against the military doctor that performed virginity tests on Ibrahim and 16 other women against their will following their arrests during a March 2011 protest. Highly publicized, the lawsuit and the trial drew the world's attention to the prevalence of the problem and the risks women faced even from institutional forces. While it was eventually admitted that the virginity tests were carried out, the military court did not convict the accused doctor. However, Ibrahim's persistence and outspokenness on the issue was widely hailed as courageous. More importantly, the case was credited with drawing attention to the link between women's issues and the revolutionary agenda.[117]

The denial of victimhood was continually seen through women's participation in protests against the new regimes and their ideologically driven policies. As Sawsan Bastawy stated, "While men may trying to make victims of women- through institutional discrimination or otherwise- women are not making victims of themselves."[118] This circumstance signals the evolution of women's political consciousness, which entails heightened self-esteem and acute awareness of one's own abilities to enact and participate in political reform. I do not wish to suggest that Egyptian women suffered previously as ignorant beings, but rather that their desires to participate publicly have found fruitful ground in their alliances with one another and the proliferation of protests in Egyptian society.

Furthermore, Egyptian women themselves have expressed the change in their self-definition repeatedly. I provide only a few examples for the sake of brevity. Librarian and protestor Rasha Kenaway optimistically described this evolution. She states that, "...the Egyptian woman started to believe in herself, she became conscious that she can participate in society, that she can bring changes. The ones that felt fear don't feel it anymore. The women that believed that only men could demonstrate are the same one that take the streets today to express their opinion."[119] Reporter Samah Abdelaty spoke of a similar impression. In an interview she asserted that, "As far as I am concerned women

have become bolder. They are more willing to stand up for their rights and hope in changing things." The notion of women claiming their natural and well-deserved rights is a popular one in discussions of women's activism. As the revered young activists Esraa Abdel Fattah claimed, "Women no longer see themselves as just housewives – they have rights for which they are going to fight."[120]

Rasha Kenaway reported a similar sentiment and connected it to the larger experience of being an Egyptian citizen. She described the dawn of "the feeling that as a woman you can take it to the street to express your presence. You feel, 'I have my rights, I am Egyptian.' We used to say that only guys will go out. Today we say, 'No, Egypt doesn't only belong to you. No, Egypt is ours as a whole, women and men, we women are also Egyptian.'"[121] This change in consciousness makes it clear that women will not soon be silenced as they continue to fight for their rights as citizens.

Women forge ahead in spite of the many barriers that arose after the uprising - either those from the change of regime or those rooted in Egyptian culture. Finally reclaiming the narratives and avenues of their empowerment, women continue to break down these barriers. During the protests, women's activism gained political legitimacy as they helped dismantle the greater illusions of the authoritarian environment. The uprising uniquely allowed women to position themselves to continually deconstruct the cultural stigmas of the political woman.

CONCLUSION

Writer Salwa Bakr succinctly captures the spirit of the uprisings with, "...we dreamed a lot, we dreamed to change this country, to bring social justice and this new revolution of 2011 let us dream again. We want to touch it and not let it escape from our hand."[122] Her touching sentiment speaks to the long suffering of the Egyptian citizenry and the hope that they maintain even in the face of disheartening political drama. The shifting power schemas that Egyptians must still contend with have extremely important implications for women's political participation. The intricate interplay of power and gender demands that the discussion of either include the other. This remains especially true within the greater context of globalized and universalizing discussions of women's rights as a facet of human rights. The question of how culture interacts with politics also underlies this work. A definitive answer may be impossible to ascertain, but I would like to suggest that civic participation and subsequent self-redefinition bridges the gap between the two arenas.

I have argued that the historical appropriation of discourses of women's liberation created a cultural bias against women's political participation. This bias resulted in the increasing discrimination against women in the post-uprising period, despite the great advances made by women in the public sphere during the protest movement. The differences in the phases of regime change must be reconciled, and women's experiences in the protests will enable them to continue their fight. The uprisings marked an important milestone in the evolution of women's political consciousness.

The uprising showed how dynamic social movements can be; its uniqueness signals that social movements are specific to historical situations. However, the movements and the experiences of their participants can have resounding consequences in societies for many years. Just as the Egyptian Uprising as a whole demonstrated that citizens will not continue to silently tolerate despotism, women's roles in these demonstrations serve as a harbinger of the evolution of women's struggle and hopefully the eventual improvement of their situations.

As scholar Suad Joseph writes, "Women often do not choose the moment and the context for the political involvement. Their political participation may be evoked by the state, by rulers, and by politicians or others in authority."[123] Joseph speaks broadly of women in the Middle East, but her words remind us of the historical exploitation of Egyptian women's political identities. In the case of the uprising, however, we see that women successfully took advantage of the unique political opportunity structures that were not created by authority figures.

The question remains of how women can continue to take advantage of shifting circumstances in Egyptian society to secure greater equality for themselves and future generations. Most importantly, women's participation in the uprisings and their fight afterward have shown that governments should not disregard the power of social groups traditionally not perceived as threatening to regime stability. Women's recent political participation evidences that they will continue to act as a force with which to be reckoned.

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