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Preface

This journal serves two purposes: to encourage scholarly research on the part of student contributors and to make public the results of these historical investigations.

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Huey Long Through History

by Michael P. R. Cahill

When historian T. Harry Williams contacted Senator Russell B. Long about the possibility of writing a biography of his father, Huey P. Long, the Senator's reply was instant and warm, for "he had long desired that a biography of his father be written and he hoped that it would be done by a scholar."¹ This illustrates the point that, though Huey Long was a potential American President and perhaps the second most powerful man in the United States during the Depression of the early 1930's, historians and scholars had virtually ignored the complex subject of Huey Long. Those few that did seriously consider Long seem to have misinterpreted the essence of the man, his motives, and his goals. How has Huey P. Long appeared to posterity through the annals of history?

Huey Long himself left behind three books. One, his autobiography *Every Man A King*, remains of interest to the historian. Though it only covers the years up until 1933 (i.e., before he made his full impact on the national arena), Long's book is unusually candid for one written by a politician about himself. Although it is not extremely detailed, the book does reveal a good deal about Long. He writes in the language of a lawyer, yet he gets his point across clearly and concisely, and he conveys to the reader a real sense of concern for the poor and underprivileged. This book, more so than most autobiographies of eminent people, is invaluable to the historian for gaining a full understanding of the subject.

During Long's life and shortly after his assassination in 1935, a number of books were written about Huey Long. These books, of course, are hampered by having been written too close in time to the subject, for distance in time is important in order to gain a truly historical perspective on any topic. However, the greatest fault of these biographies is an almost total lack of objectivity. A couple of these tomes are written with a pro-Long slant, but most of them are violently anti-Long polemics. Yet, these books are not without worth to the historian, for they can give some clue as to the spirit of the times or, at least, of Long's political enemies. One choice example of the invective employed in these biographies would be, "Louisiana knows Huey

Long as a martinet, an autocrat, a dictator, a despot, a ruthless destroyer of free government and independent thought.”² Another book, with the descriptively apt title *The Career Of A Tinpot Napoleon*, sums up its argument, “Again, if it has not appeared in its true enormity and grotesquerie in these pages, the author confesses that the fault is his own, and not the fault of that most extraordinary mountebank, that most mendacious liar, that eminent blackguard and distinguished sneak-thief, Huey P. Long.”³ Obviously, Huey Long aroused great passions.

First hand accounts on Long are few and far between. His own men were either unable or unwilling to write about their mentor, for the Long name was political dynamite in Louisiana for at least three decades following Huey’s death. We do get some evaluations of Long from such qualified and usually perceptive New Dealers as James A Farley and Raymond Moley. Both of these men knew Huey Long as a formidable adversary, and they went to great pains to get across the point that they in no way underestimated Huey Long. Yet, one gets the impression that they did. People such as these describe Long as at worst a country bumkin who had luckily come to lead a large constituency in the United States or as at best an erratic genius.

The first book even to attempt at being objective about Huey Long was Harnett T. Kane’s *Louisiana Hayride*, published in 1941. This is an entertaining and sprightly book that covers the career of Long and the years leading up to the Louisiana Scandals of 1939. Kane’s book is not a scholarly work but rather a journalistic exercise; yet, it produces an interesting thesis. Kane writes:

Dictatorship came to Louisiana because the democracy that the state knew appeared inadequate to the needs of large groups of its citizens. Huey Long’s richly potent materials were not original to him. They were the same as those with which many another has aspired to power. But he alone was personally equipped, and rose at the moment thus far — of maximum effectiveness, to reach close to his goal. The advantages held forth by the native totalitarianism were more inviting than the known services of the known regime.⁴

Kane takes us back in time to try to show that the people of Louisiana accepted the excesses of the Long regime so readily because the “democracy” of the Bourbon aristocrats that preceded him was at least as corrupt and yet the people received none of the benefits that Long offered to them when he was in power. Kane’s book is rather anti-Long, but he at least treats the paradox that was Huey Long with some objectivity and with a tone totally lacking the vehement hatred that was the hallmark of most anti-Long tomes.

During and after the Second World War, interest in the subject of Huey Long seems to have waned. It was during these years that Robert Penn Warren wrote his Pulitzer Prize winning novel *All The King’s Men*, which

was loosely based on the career of Long. It is quite good as a work of literature as it deals with the moral question of whether the end justifies the means. In the film adaption of the novel, the actor who portrayed the Long-based lead character Willie Stark, Broderick Crawford, won an Academy Award Oscar. Afterwards, Crawford was warned not to enter the state of Louisiana, once many deemed the film to be anti-Long. This shows that Huey Long was still a touchy topic in Louisiana long after his death and may help to explain why so many of Long’s associates were reluctant to discuss or write about him.

As the field of the social sciences grew, the intriguing political phenomena of Huey Long and Louisiana attracted a number of political scientists and sociologists. Such a volatile human being as Long would be extremely difficult to categorize scientifically, yet some tried and a few minor studies resulted. In *Huey Long’s Louisiana: State Politics, 1920-1952*, Allan Sindler pays lip-service to Long’s uniqueness by quoting Long’s apt self description: “Just say I’m Sui Generis and let it go at that.”⁵ However, from then on, Sindler makes a case that Long was merely a tool of social protest in the south: “Longite politics was an outgrowth of class tensions which Longism undoubtedly intensified but did not create.”⁶ This would seem to be a rather dry and mechanistic view of history that is too one dimensional to be fully accurate. A more balanced view can be found in a chapter on Louisiana (“The Seamy Side Of Democracy”) in *Southern Politics* by the respected V. O. Key, Jr. Professor Key writes:

Of Huey Long, most interpretations are too simple. They range from the theory that he and his crowd were ordinary boodlers to the notion that here was native fascism. Boodling there was, to be sure. Fascism? Huey was innocent of any ideology other than the sort of indigeous indignation against the abuses of wealth current in the epoch of William Jennings Bryan. The Long phenomom must be explained in terms of the pathological situation in which he arose, in terms of traditional anti-corporationism, plus the genius of the man himself in politican manipulation and organization.⁷

Key’s view is the most accurate, for in Huey Long we can find an interesting blend of the “great man” theory and the socio-economic view of history. Undoubtedly, Long was greatly assisted in his rise to power by the issue of the depressed economic and social conditions that prevailed for the majority of the people in Louisiana and the rest of the south. However, Huey Pierce Long was a man of such great intelligence, talents, and skills that it is almost certain that he would have made a name for himself in any age. Indeed, in the case of Long, it seems as though the “great man ” theory may have the greater weight. Long rode the wave of a great social protest; but upon his death his movement, the “Share the Wealth” program, swiftly withered away without its founder’s guiding influence.

In the 1950's some attention was focused on the Long family, for one of Huey's brothers, Earl K. Long, was serving his unprecedented third term as Louisiana's Governor and another brother, George S. Long, served in the United States House of Representatives. Huey's son, Russell B. Long, had been elected to take his father's seat in the Senate, and Long cousins, Gillis Long and Speedy O. Long, were also on their way to Congress. A couple of volumes were devoted to the Long Dynasty in Louisiana and national politics. One such book was *The Longs Of Louisiana* by Stan Opatowsky. Books such as this were informative but were also rather pedestrian and were certainly not first-rate historical exercises.

At about this same time (1960), Huey Long finally came to the attention of a well-qualified historian: Pulitzer Prize winner Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., who devoted a chapter to Long, "The Messiah Of The Rednecks", in his monumental *The Age Of Roosevelt: The Politics Of Upheaval*. Schlesinger seriously considers Long and emerges with what appears to have been the prevalent opinion of Long among those scholars with any knowledge of the Depression. He is not always entirely accurate, yet he presents a generally well-reasoned view, although his conclusions do still slightly under-estimate Long. Schlesinger says of Long:

He had no overriding social vision. According to Raymond Daniell, who covered him for the *New York Times*, he did believe in Share Our Wealth "with all his heart"; but it was as a technique of political self-aggrandizement, not as a gospel of social reconstruction. Part traveling salesman, part confidence man, part gang leader, he had at most a crude will toward personal power. He had no doubt about becoming President . . . At bottom, Huey Long resembled, not a Hitler or Mussolini, but a Latin American dictator, a Vargas or a Peron. Louisiana was in many respects a colonial region, an underdeveloped area; its Creole traditions gave it an almost Latin American character. Like Vargas and Peron, Long was in revolt against economic colonialism, against the oligarchy, against the smug and antiquated past; like them, he stood in a muddled way for the economic modernization and social justice; like them, he was most threatened by his own arrogance and cupidity, his weakness for soft living and his rage for personal power.⁶

This, then, appears to be the general conception of Long held by most historians: he was a talented demagogue who had some vague good notions but was a bad guy and an evil influence in American history. Among other debatable conclusions, they doubt his sincerity in wishing to help the common man and also fail to recognize fully that he was probably the shrewdest politician of his age (with the possible exception of Franklin D. Roosevelt himself).

For most of the rest of the 1960's, Huey Long was again ignored. In most history texts, if he was mentioned at all, he was almost always referred to in

the same way. Briefly, and in passing, it would be noted that the unholy trio of Fr. Charles E. Coughlin, Dr. Francis E. Townsend, and Sen. Huey P. "Kingfish" Long Jr., usually got in the way of President Roosevelt's New Deal and messed things up, but were generally unimportant. If any further space was devoted to the subject of Long, it was often to overinflate falsely influence of the Rev. Gerald L. K. Smith on Long and the Share Our Wealth movement and organization. In other books that happened to mention Long, he was also usually maltreated. When describing Russell Long's role in the Civil Rights Debates in *The Making Of The President 1964*, the usually astute Theodore H. White (yet another Pulitzer Prize winner) wrote: "Talmadge of Georgia (fifty) and Long of Louisiana (forty-five), bearers of two of the most famous racist names in the South, were young enough to see that even their world was changing and that, sooner or later, they too would have to seek Negro votes as well as white — or lose their seats."⁹ This is odd, since both Huey and Earl Long helped the Black people as much as they could in their times and refused to resort to the usual racist tactics that were part of the hallmark of the typical southern politician stereotype. This was borne out later when famous Black Panther Huey Pierce Newton explained in his autobiography and political testament that he had been named after Long because his father was grateful to him for his efforts to help the blacks when no one else would. Newton himself accepts this and admits his respect for Long. Obviously, Long was ahead of the time on this issue and must have been somewhat successful in his struggle for the common man if he could move a Black Panther to respect for a white Southern politician.

Most of the misconceptions about Long, however, were washed away in 1969 with the publication of T. Harry Williams' brilliant biography *Huey Long*. This, too, won a Pulitzer Prize and is an excellent historical biography which smoothly covers all aspects of Long's life, works, and era. Williams' book, which is a great example of the utility of oral history, is slightly pro-Long, but, considering the complexity and strong emotions surrounding the subject, is about as near to a totally objective account as one could hope. That it is an almost definitive work on Long can be seen when we realize that in the decade since the publication of *Huey Long*, no other major work, pro or con, on Long has been attempted. Williams points out Long's flaws which were, as with most great men, numerous, but he also takes note of all of Long's good qualities which were at least as numerous. The author had set out to explode as many of the myths that surrounded his subject as he could and he succeeds well. Most significantly, Williams seems to remove the widely held demagogue/fascist/dictator myth:

He [Long] developed a thesis that he was only an agent of the popular will in Louisiana. He had explained his program to the people, asked for a mandate,

and received it. "A man is not a dictator when his is given a commission from the people and carries it out," he protested. The people had given him his commission and could revoke it, and hence his power was only temporary. "I believe in democracy, and the people of Louisiana ain't never going to have anything but democracy," he told one correspondent. "You know and I know that if people want to throw me out they're going to do it. They like what I'm giving them and what they're getting."¹⁰

This was how the remarkably candid Long explained the source of his power. Confirming Long's sincerity, Williams theorizes:

It was to help the people that Huey had seized power and then more power. He was not a fascist and he did not want to be a dictator. But he had become obsessed with the conviction that he could not do what he had to do without reaching for more power.¹¹

Professor Williams did a marvelous job in *Huey Long*. It would be difficult enough to restore a historical figure to respectability in a later age, but, through this book, Williams gives Long a whole new respectability that he did not enjoy during his life. This biography retains its scholarly objectivity and yet is also a partial apologia for Long's actions and career: a career that was unusual and questionable but which was always motivated by real concern for the common man and a desire to alleviate the plight of the poor.

NOTES

¹T. Harry Williams, *Huey Long* (New York: Bantam Books, 1969), p.x.

²Thomas O. Harris, *The Kingfish: Huey P. Long, Dictator* (Baton Rouge: Claitor's Publishing Division, 1938), p. 283.

³John Kingston Fineran, *The Career of a Tinpot Napoleon: A Political Biography of Huey P. Long* (Baton Rouge, Claitor's Publishing Division, 1932), p. 172.

⁴Harnett T. Kane, *Louisiana Hayride: The American Rehearsal for Dictatorship, 1928-1940* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1940), p. 454.

⁵Allan P. Sindler, *Huey Long's Louisiana: State Politics, 1920-1952* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), p. 1.

⁶Ibid.

⁷V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics, In State and Nation* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1949), p. 164.

⁸Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *The Age of Roosevelt*. Vol. III (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1960), pp. 67-68.

⁹Theodore H. White, *The Making of the President, 1964* (New York: Signet Books, 1965), p. 214.

¹⁰Williams, p. 800.

¹¹Ibid.

A Changed Dream: America in the 1930's

by Patrice A. Gaudin

During the 1930's, Americans experienced an enormous change in social and political values. The effects of the Depression were deep, particularly on the American dream of success. Conditions under which most people existed helped to create new judgments and opinions about American society. They also helped to encourage political changes throughout the government.

In 1929, industry experienced mass production levels never before witnessed. There were endless opportunities for business entrepreneurs. They capitalized on the ideals of laissez-faire and individualism to fulfill what was considered to be the American dream, material success. By 1929, Americans seemed obsessed with this pursuit. They equated success with ambition and aggression, and they considered those who had already achieved success, such as many American businessmen, to be the most important in the country.¹ To the popular writers in the 1920's, the conventional rags-to-riches story was a most popular theme. Writers, along with the rest of the population, left the overwhelming impression that the real American dream was material success and that nothing else could come before that attainment.²

The conditions during the early years of the Depression seemed to negate the pursuit of success. However, there was a persistent attempt among many to perpetuate the dream of success, despite the contradictory realities.³ The Depression caused a conflict between this dream and reality, but there were continual efforts to prevent any erosion of faith in the standard American dream. What resulted was an ever-increasing gap between myth and reality. The impression left by most magazines was that optimism still ran high among the population. This endurance proves that Americans were not ready to let go of their dream. More than ever before, hard work and ambitiousness were emphasized. Books written on success insisted that despite conditions, Americans could succeed if they followed certain rules or laws.⁴ Patterns in these books accentuated the importance of individualism and personality.

Prevalent in other stories was little awareness that the Depression even

existed. Here dream and reality had become completely separated. The dream of success had become fantasy, pure illusionary means of escaping reality, which freed the individual from the increasing pressures of poverty.

The Joad family, in Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath*, seemed particularly confident in the American dream of success. However, their dreams of success pertained to a place, California, where they believed all of their economic problems would be solved. This illusion of prosperity had become a means for them to escape the realities of their actual situation, which was poverty. "Yes, that's a good way. But I like to think how nice it's gonna be, maybe, in California. Never cold. An' fruit ever' place, an' people just bein' in the nicest places, little white houses in among the orange trees. I wonder — that is, if we all get jobs an' all work — maybe we can get one of them little white houses. An' the little fellas go out an' pick oranges right off the trees."⁵

The change in American values began with these ideas. Many could not escape, they realized these dreams were out of harmony with the true reality in which they existed. Milton Meltzer and Studs Terkel both include excellent descriptions of what conditions were really like in their books *Brother, Can You Spare A Dime*, and *Hard Times*. In the early 1930's, many had felt personally responsible for their economic failures. The opportunity of success had been available, but they had not taken advantage of it. However, as Meltzer and Terkel point out, the longevity of the suffering meant for many a realization that they would probably never acquire material success. They began to treat the American dream as foolish, shallow, and an ultimately destructive force. This reflected a rejection of any person or event which promoted upward mobility; in reality it was a rejection of the American dream of individual success. This helped to start a phenomenon in the 1930's which saw an increased sympathy with outsiders and losers in society. These characters, prevalent in many literary works, clearly displaced the American businessman as the typical American hero.⁶

Here was a distinct effort to adjust to the dream of success with the reality of the Depression. Economic breakdown challenged this dream, and Americans began to search for new values. Stories of total failure appealed to most people; they admired a character who would never obtain material success. They could identify these stories with their own failures. Instead of admiring personal qualities of intelligence and ambition, people placed value in peace of mind, love and security. It was the good heart of the little man that mattered, not his ability to acquire material success.⁷

In an effort to adjust to realities, many tended to scale down their expectations. Caroline Bird in *The Invisible Scar* describes the adaptation of many to a limited life; they often seemed amiable, pliant, and uncritical. Many found happiness in their poverty. Their new values were not dependent on

material success, but on personal success.

During the 1930's, there was also a disillusionment with the standard of individualism in obtaining success. Americans had perviously considered the success of the American dream to be dependent on the success of the individual. New values minimized the American dream; therefore there was less emphasis on the individual. What became important was the creation of a strong class solidarity. If anyone was going to grasp his share, it must be done through cooperative effort. No where is this more apparent than at the end of *The Grapes of Wrath*. Steinbeck's characters are not interested in grasping their share, they are interested only in surviving. After wandering helplessly, they come to realize that any effective action will be done by a group effort. The individual was no longer able to survive against the conditions of the Depression.

Roosevelt's New Deal created major political changes in the 1930's. New Deal Legislation prompted changes in both the character and performance of the federal government. In his book, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*, Leuchtenburg describes the changes during Roosevelt's administration. During his first days in office, Roosevelt passed several major acts, all contributing to political change. There were several acts aimed at providing relief for the millions of unemployed. The T.V.A., N.R.A., and the P.W.A. had a variety of goals. Besides providing millions of jobs for the unemployed, the T.V.A. helped to bring electricity to areas around Tennessee.⁸ The P.W.A. helped to build many national parks, and the N.R.A. helped to set a code of fair practices in business.⁹ Other acts, such as A.A.A., attempted to subsidize farm staples to poverty stricken farmers.¹⁰ The New Deal also provided relief by creating smaller agencies such as the Federal Theatre, the Federal Writers' Project, and the National Youth Association.

Roosevelt's first act extended federal relief to bankers, thus helping to begin our federal banking system. Roosevelt also created the Securities Act, which placed federal regulations over Wall Street. The most obvious change in political policies was the establishment of the Social Security Act. It created a system of old-age insurance in which employees were encouraged to join. This system provided for retirement annuities, unemployment insurance, and national aid for different public health systems.¹¹

The result of Roosevelt's legislation was an enormous expansion of the federal government, particularly in the economic sectors of society. For the first time, the government became an institution which was experienced, it was directly related to the welfare of the state. There was a personification of the government as a protector; every American was guaranteed social rights. Not only were they given federal relief from unemployment, they were also provided with insurance for old age.

These major political changes had profound effects on the dream of success. New Deal legislation modified the ideas of individualism, self-help, and laissez-faire.¹³ The individual became caught up in the complexity of government and big business. A good example of this was the expansion of corporate ownership. There was an elimination of the individual capitalist from corporate power; major corporations became increasingly under the power of management systems. They provided staff specialists to make decisions previously held by corporate owners.¹³ Emphasis was now placed on the individual to adjust to the complexity of government and corporate institutions.

Federal relief programs contradicted the American ideals of self-help and laissez-faire. Although there was still an emphasis on work, the Social Security Act provided relief for those who were unable to find jobs. The act also gave workers an opportunity to retire and collect old age insurance.

As Charles Hearn and William Leuchtenburg point out, the Depression did bring many social and political changes during the 1930's. By reading about the conditions during the time, as described by Milton Meltzer, Studs Terkel, John Steinbeck and Caroline Bird, we can understand these changes and how they developed.

NOTES

¹Hearn, Charles R.: *The American Dream in the Great Depression*, Greenwood Press, Inc.: Westport, 1977, p. 25.

²Ibid, p. 28.

³Ibid, p. 56.

⁴Ibid, p. 69.

⁵Steinbeck, John: *The Grapes of Wrath*, Penguin Books: New York 1976, p. 98.

⁶Hearn, p. 109.

⁷Hearn, p. 114.

⁸Leuchtenburg, William E.: *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal*, Harper and Row Publishers: New York, 1963, p. 54.

⁹Ibid, p. 64.

¹⁰Ibid, p. 51.

¹¹Ibid, pps. 132-33.

¹²Hearn, p. 138.

¹³Bird Caroline: *The Invisible Scar*, David McKay Company, Inc.: New York, 1966, p. 242.

The Reception of German Jewish Refugees from 1933-1939

by Beatrice Michals

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The Jews who lived in Germany during the build-up of Nazi power from 1933 to 1939 were unprepared for the choices they had to make. Despite Germany's long history of anti-semitism, they had grown used to being a well treated and respected community of professionals. They greeted the Nazi movement of privations and discrimination toward non-Aryans with disbelief and inattention. Most found emigration difficult to contemplate. From 1932 to 1935, 60,000 Jews left Germany.¹ This was 10% of the German Jewish population. As time went on, the full implications of Nazi policy became more evident; and more tried to leave the country. Restrictions were placed on emigration by the Nazi officials. In 1934 Jews were required to pay 25% of their income before they were allowed to leave. In 1938, after young Grynszpan shot a Nazi diplomatic undersecretary at the embassy in Paris, the Reich required all emigrating Jews to pay their share in a one billion Reichsmark collective fine on Jews.² This had the effect of sending them out penniless. As the immigration regulations of receiving countries required prospective immigrants to be self-supporting, this was a grave handicap as Jews searched for a nation to accept them. Approximately 237,000 Jews left Germany and Austria between 1933 and 1939.³ This paper deals with the reception they received from the major western nations and Palestine.

Jews seeking entrance to the United States found that the immigration regulations had changed radically since 1880. The idea of immigrants being a welcome necessity to a developing nation had vanished. In 1882 Congress passed its first regulation on immigration, barring convicts, lunatics, and paupers from entering.⁴

After the First World War the citizens of the United States feared they would be lost in the hordes of war-torn Europeans if they allowed open and unrestricted immigration. It was at this time the quota system first came into use. In 1921 the immigration policy allowed a total of 3% of the number of

foreign born persons of each European nationality residing in the United States as of 1910. The total allowable immigration was 255,000 persons per year. Of this total 55% were to come from northwestern European nations and 45% from southeastern European nations.⁵ The United States no longer saw herself as an asylum for the persecuted Europeans.

In 1924 a permanent policy of immigration was established. Northwestern Europeans filled 80% of the total with southeastern Europeans filling the final 20%.⁶ This plan included provisions that decreased the total quota to 150,000 in 1927. The new total was divided among the European countries by considering their overall contribution of people to the United States. The total number of immigrants that had come from each country was compared to the population of the United States and the ratio was calculated. Each country of origin would be allotted a percentage of the 150,000 spaces on the basis of this ratio.⁷ This legislation again altered the composition of the immigrants. The permissible number of immigrants from Great Britain and Northern Ireland increased while those for the Republic of Ireland, Germany, and the Scandinavian countries were decreased.⁸

In 1930, by presidential order, officials in charge of awarding visas were told to require immigrants to have enough money to support themselves for an indefinite period of time. People likely to become public charges were kept from entering the country.⁹ The world-wide depression of the 1930's had made immigration into the United States even more difficult.⁹ With the increased emphasis on economic stability, the total number of admitted immigrants dropped dramatically: during fiscal year 1930, 140,497 were admitted, in 1933 only 8,220 qualified.¹⁰ While the United States did not refuse Jews as Jews, the immigration totals show that only a small number of immigrants were allowed to come into the United States at the time when it was still possible for Jews to leave Germany.

This policy did not go unchallenged. Representative Samuel Dickstein (D. New York) tried to introduce legislation to increase the number of acceptable immigrants. His attempts included measures to admit refugees outside of their national quotas and to make them free of independent support clause. Representative Emmanuel Cellers also offered a bill that would exempt from the public charge clause those who passage had been paid by an organized group and minors accompanying their parents. His proposal allowed the president to widen the quota.¹¹ Organizations formed to aid refugees feared that if these bills were debated in Congress, they would be used as an excuse by restrictionists to lower the quotas further. As a result they died in committee and were never considered before the House.¹² President Roosevelt, in 1934, advised the people in charge of granting visas abroad to give refugees "the most humane and favorable treatment possible

under the law."¹³ However, during that time of depression and unemployment, the AFL and patriotic societies continued their efforts to keep the United States free from the multitudes of hungry Europeans.¹⁴

After *Kristallnacht* (the night of broken glass) in November of 1938, new legislation was proposed to aid the persecuted people in Germany. Senator Robert Wagner (D. New York) and Representative Edith Rogers (R. Massachusetts) jointly proposed a bill in February, 1939, which would allow 20,000 German refugee children to enter the United States outside the established quotas. They were to be supported by responsible private agencies and individuals. They were definitely not to become public charges.¹⁵

Support for this measure came from a widely distributed cross section of the nation. By the end of April almost 5,000 unsolicited offers of homes were received.¹⁶ Organized labor left its usual restrictionist stance on February 8 when the Executive Council of the AFL and John L. Lewis of the CIO publicly accepted the possible legislation.¹⁷ In government circles the bill was supported by Herbert Hoover, governor Luren Dickenson of Michigan, Philip La Follette (former governor of Wisconsin), Mayor Fiorello La Guardia of New York, as well as the New York state Senate. The Federated Council of Churches supported the bill along with other religious organizations and individual denominations. A larger number of actors and movie people also supported the measure.¹⁸

Opposition mobilized almost as quickly. John B. Trevor, head of the American Coalition of Patriotic Societies, represented 115 organizations or about 2.5 million people who were consistently united in their opposition to increased immigration. Member organizations included the American Legion, Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic, the Junior Order of the United American Mechanics (and their Ladies' Auxillary), Daughters of the American Revolution, and the United Daughters of 1812.¹⁹ The main points of their attack on the measure centered on the idea that charity begins at home. They claimed it would be better to care for the thousands of destitute American children first. Besides, their argument continued, these foreign children will grow up and take jobs away from our American children.²⁰ Others protested the breaking up of families (this was not particularly applicable as almost all of the children involved had no idea where their parents were²¹). Although there was not much overt anti-semitism expressed, the care of the sponsors to emphasize the large number of Christian children involved show that this was an issue. The bill was defeated. As a result, from *Kristallnacht* to September 1939 the United States admitted only 240 children as part of the quota and in an arrangement with the Department of Labor. Great Britain, however, absorbed 6,000 children during the same time period and France sheltered 600.²²

An interesting analogy is sometimes drawn between the failure of the bill for the German refugee children and the general public support for the plans to take care of British children. After the fall of France, on June 20, 1940, the United States Committee for the Care of European Children was formed. It had two goals: to provide homes for British children who had no friends or relatives in the United States and to maintain high standards of care in these homes. Within two days they had received 2,000 offers of homes, and by three weeks the number had risen to 15,000 homes.²³ The State Department made a new provision that July which extended visitors's visas to children under 16 who were travelling to escape the dangers of the war and who had an inclination to return home at the end of the war. This included children covered by corporate affidavits.²⁴ This venture enjoyed large public support. Patriotic societies did not mobilize against it. Those who tried to propose the argument of charity begins at home and concern for the breaking up of families found that these arguments no longer could sway opinion. What prevented the children's arrival this time was a shipping problem and not immigration difficulties.²⁵

It is possible that many Americans experienced a moral conversion during the year interval between the two calls to allow children's immigration. However, this is not likely. Despite their name, the Committee for the Care of European Children, their orientation was almost entirely British. In both cases the children were fleeing violence promoted by the Reich. Although the plight of the British children may have been more graphically presented, the real difference in the situation was in the composition of the children themselves. Americans as a group showed themselves to be more willing to accept British Christians than German Jews. A New York Times tabulation of the letters offering to take refugee children, showed that the child most often requested was a blonde English girl, about six years old.²⁶ The actions taken in these two cases of special immigration legislation follow the spirit used in formulating the quotas.

Perhaps the most frightening aspect of the American response to the question of the Jewish refugees is the blatant racism expressed by patriotic restrictionists. A well-known radio speaker of the time, Rev. Charles Coughlin, was another one who spread an anti-Jewish atmosphere. In 1935 his charges against the Jews were so similar to those advanced by the German Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels that it appeared to contemporary journalists that he had copied them from Goebbels.²⁷

Strict interpretation of the "likely-to-become-a-public-charge" clause by unreasonable consulates helped to keep even the small quota underfilled. The American Consulate in Zurich refused to accept affidavits that guaranteed the emigrant financial support, even though these same affidavits had

been acceptable in Berlin and Vienna.²⁸ At the Consulate in Stockholm almost no affidavits were found sufficient to prove that the emigrant was not likely to become a public charge. This Consulate required a bank deposit in the United States or an undetermined amount of cash in hand as proof of self-sufficiency.²⁹ The Consulate in Antwerp was also not satisfied with affidavits of support. One group of fifty-two refugees had their request for visas approved in Austria and then travelled to Luxembourg to wait for the visas to come through. The Antwerp Consulate turned the Austrians down when their turn to emigrate arrived and suggested that each establish a trust fund of several thousand dollars in the United States and then apply again for visas.³⁰ This was an effective way to decrease the number of immigrants to the United States. Less than one-fourth of the possible Austrian-German quota was used from 1933 to 1937:

1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	
5.3%	13.7%	20.2%	24.3%	42.1%	percentage of the quota filled that year ³¹

The Roosevelt administration officially stopped using the "likely-to-become-a-public-charge" clause to screen immigrants in 1938.³² That year 85% of the Austrian-German quota was filled, in 1939 that quota was 99% filled.³³

Despite the Dreyfuss affair and other anti-semitic flare-ups that occurred close to the turn of the century, France not only continued to accept Jews on her frontiers,³⁴ but also actually encouraged immigration to increase her small labor force. France had an outstanding record of refugee acceptance.³⁵ The policy of leniency was continued under the Blum government which allowed 50,000 Jews to enter.³⁶ At the time of the invasion of France by Germany, there were 320,000 Jews in France in contrast to the 250,000 Jews in France in 1933.³⁷

However, several forces in France militated against increasing acceptance of Jewish refugees. The spirit of anti-semitism increased, especially after the added Jewish immigration following the First World War.³⁸ Socialist labor leaders protested against the increased immigration. They feared that wages would suffer as the number of people seeking employment increased.³⁹ The socialists were aided by men of business who were not anti-semitic by nature, but who saw the increasing power of Germany and wanted to placate her. They were the people involved in business on a large scale and believed, "Better Hitler than Stalin."⁴⁰ In France the right wing was clearly calling for a pro-Nazi orientation in the hope of appeasing the Germans.⁴¹ As was the case in the United States, the Jews found another possible

escape blocking by a combination of race hatred and fear with pressing economic concerns. France accepted very few Jewish refugees after the Munich agreement. During the subsequent German occupation, all the refugee Jews in France were sent east to camps.

Great Britain was also affected by the general outcry against immigration. She too feared inundation by waves of destitute aliens. In 1914 she passed the Alien Registration Act. This was amended in 1920 to become the Alien Order. According to these laws, permission to land was dependent on the immigrant's ability to prove that he could support himself and his dependents. Permits for employment were issued only after making sure that the position could not be filled by a British subject.⁴²

The British were not completely insensitive to the plight of the refugees, they established the British Council for German Jewry to help alleviate the refugee problem.⁴³ They preferred to consider settling Jews in former colonial areas instead of the United Kingdom proper. Despite this, a rather liberal policy existed in Great Britain from 1933 to 1938. The main opposition came from doctors and dentists who feared their professions would be invaded.⁴⁴ The press found little public outcry to report.

After 1938 the persecutions increased the flood of refugees who left eastern Europe and arrived in Britain and France and other European nations, both legally and illegally. By 1939 Great Britain was harboring 42,300 people that had escaped from Nazi controlled areas.⁴⁵ Britain tried to keep her humanitarian ideals and tradition of political asylum for refugees in spite of her large unemployment and the growing anti-refugee sentiment.⁴⁶ British historians are fond of pointing out that for several years, despite her small size, Great Britain admitted at least as many refugees as the United States.⁴⁷

Great Britain also took the lead in the children's rescue program, founding the World Movement for the Care of Children from Germany. This was based in London and authorized by the British Home Office.⁴⁸ By August of 1939, 9,354 children had been sent to Britain; and of these children, 7,482 were Jewish.⁴⁹ The plan of this operation was to provide a temporary refuge for people under eighteen and to have them emigrate by their eighteenth birthday.

Palestine grew in importance for the persecuted Jews in Europe. Symbolically it provided the hope of a home land where Jewish culture and religion could flourish free from interference. Palestine also became an actual haven for a large number of Jews fleeing persecution.

Palestine became a British Mandate in 1922. Under Article 6 of the Mandate the British were required to allow the immigration of Jews and to encourage their settlement on the land.⁵⁰ Immigration was allowed under the usual limitations. Persons desiring to enter had to be registered, had to have

the proper visas, be able to be self-supporting, pass a medical examination, and not be a fugitive from justice.⁵¹ From 1919 to 1931, 115,689 European Jews entered Palestine.⁵²

With the coming of the world depression, the British introduced immigration restrictions. These were vigorously protested by the leaders of the Zionist Conference, especially by Dr. Chaim Weizman. Premier Ramsay MacDonald answered Dr. Weizman's objections to the new immigration policy in a letter sent in February, 1931. MacDonald explained that the new policy was adopted to prevent hardship on the part of the Arabs. They could not be denied employment. He felt that the British government could not admit more Jews than there was work for.⁵³

In spite of the regulations many Jews continued to try to get into Palestine. From 1933 to 1939, Palestine received the most Jewish emigrants accepted into any one country: 235,032. Of this number 22.4% or 52,647 came from Germany.⁵⁴

In 1939, after the Arab uprisings of 1936 and 1937, the British adopted a new immigration policy towards Palestine. By the terms of the White Paper issued on May 17, Jewish immigration was restricted to 10,000 persons per year for the next five years, after which it was to stop entirely. An extra allowance of 25,000 persons was granted in view of the persecution. Further immigration was dependent on Arab acquiescence.⁵⁵

One peculiar aspect of German immigration to Palestine was the transfer agreement. This was started by a private citrus grower in conjunction with the German government as a way to move at least a small amount of Jewish capital out of Germany. By this plan two special accounts were opened in the Reichsbank. One was for investors and the other for those planning to emigrate. Emigrants could deposit up to 50,000 Reichsmarks for the purpose of buying tools in Germany to transfer to Palestine. They could also purchase 1,000 for a deposit with the British which allowed an immigrant to enter Palestine as a capitalist outside of the regular quota of immigration.⁵⁶ Jews who transferred money in this way lost two-thirds to three-fourths of it in the process.⁵⁷ Approximately 38% of the German Jewish immigrants to Palestine used this plan.⁵⁸

After the occupation of Austria in 1938, the refugee problem became even more crucial. The League of Nations had established a High Commission for Refugees with a special branch for German Refugees in 1933. This was headed by an American, James G. McDonald. He resigned in 1935 claiming that this was an ineffective organization because it had to operate outside the League support.⁵⁹ Dorothy Thompson, an American journalist, expressed the concern of many in 1938 when she wrote; "It is a fantastic commentary on the inhumanity of our times that for thousands and

thousands of people a piece of paper with a stamp on it is the difference between life and death."⁶⁰ In March, 1938, in the face of the lack of an effective international program to deal with the refugee problem, President Roosevelt invited twenty American republics and nine European nations to meet later that summer in Evian, France to consider the refugee problem.⁶¹

President Roosevelt stressed that the purpose of the conference was not to force more unwanted refugees on particular countries but to develop an international strategy for dealing with the refugee problem. In particular, he had five basic purposes in mind for the Conference. The first was to decide what strategies needed to be developed to get the German and Austrian political refugees settled in other countries. He included here those wishing to emigrate as well as those who already had emigrated. Roosevelt stressed that this was intended to supplement and not to supplant the work that the private agencies were doing. His second purpose involved finding which nations under their existing immigration laws could absorb the "most urgent cases."⁶² He also recommended that each nation send a confidential copy of its immigration procedures and the possible numbers and types of immigrants it would be willing to accept. The third purpose of the conference was to discuss a system of documentation for the refugees who were unable to obtain identification papers from their former governments.⁶³ The fourth purpose concerned the establishment of a committee formed from representatives of all governments to coordinate their efforts with those of the private agencies. The fifth purpose suggested by Roosevelt dealt with the formation and operation of the committee.⁶⁴

Myron C. Taylor opened the conference by outlining the objectives. He stated that while the final interest of the conference would be to deal with all persons who were forced to flee from governmental intolerance the most important thing at that time was to aid the present refugees from Germany and Austria.⁶⁵

The attitudes expressed by the nations attending the Evian Conference were typical of each nation's earlier actions. President Roosevelt was adamant about remaining within the legal limits of immigration allowed by the quotas. The position of the United States made it clear "no country would be expected or asked to receive a greater number of immigrants than is permitted by its existing legislation."⁶⁶

Great Britain refused to allow Palestine to be discussed at the Evian Conference as a possibility for immigration.⁶⁷ At Britain's request, the Intergovernmental Committee was headed by Earl Winterton who was reputed to be hostile towards the Palestinian Mandate and toward the Jews in general.⁶⁸ Winterton's statement at the conference explained the British policy on immigration into Britain proper:

It has been the traditional policy of successive British governments to offer asylum to persons who, for political, racial, or religious reasons, have had to leave their own countries. The United Kingdom has never had cause to regret this policy, and refugees have often enriched the life and contributed to the prosperity of the British people. But the United Kingdom is not a country of immigration. It is highly industrialized, fully populated and is still faced the problem of unemployment. For economic and social reasons the traditional policy of granting asylum can only be applied within narrow limits.⁶⁹

The French also gave their evaluation of their own capabilities to deal with the refugee problem. M. Berenger, the French delegate, reported that his government was in "fullest agreement, in principle, with that task of aiding refugees." He emphasized that his country's limits must be remembered and "the fact that she has already almost exhausted her own resources, which unfortunately are not so boundless as her zeal to serve the cause of humanity."⁷⁰

Smaller European nations who attended the conference agreed to accept refugees on a transitory basis while they were being trained to support themselves elsewhere.⁷¹ The main success of the Evian Conference remained the offer of the Dominican Republic to accept 100,000 refugees. This has been interpreted by historian Shmuel Ettinger as an attempt by the racist dictator, Trujillo, to appear more favorable in American eyes.⁷² A survey of the Dominican Republic done in 1941 by the Brookings Institute found that the country as a whole could only support about 5,000 refugees.⁷³

The formation of the Intergovernmental Committee was also counted as one of the successes of the Evian Conference. It met in London and tried to formulate plans to expedite the emigration of Jews from Germany and German controlled areas. However, the plans hinged on the German government's cooperation. Before the plans could be put into action, German aggression had increased. The European nations found themselves in a serious struggle for their own existence and the refugee problem moved to a place of less importance.

The German Jewish refugee movement is not outstanding in size when compared to the earlier Greek, Russian, and Armenian refugee movements. It involved a possible one-half million potential refugees. The circumstances surrounding this movement of people are what makes it a particular problem. It occurred in the midst of a world-wide depression that had slowed all other immigration. This was accompanied by widespread anti-semitism, making places of asylum even more difficult to find.⁷⁴

While the particular immigration policies varied from country to country, they are all characterized by a certain amount of reluctance. A review of the immigration statistics and legislations reveals that refugees from Ger-

many were allowed to enter western countries, although in restricted numbers. Of the nearly one million people who fled from the Reich from 1933 to 1939, 700,000 remained in areas that were later conquered by the Nazis.⁷⁵ Less than one-third of the refugees were able to leave the European continent for places of more permanent safety. This reflects the German government's restriction on emigration, especially their refusal to allow the departing Jews to take any substantial amount of their property with them. Because of the world wide depression and unemployment, receiving nations were very hesitant to admit penniless refugees. For the United States, this hesitation took the form of a very strict interpretation of the "likely-to-become-a-public-charge" clause.

The Evian Conference of 1938 failed in its primary objective of finding new places or enlarging old ones for German immigration. Its child, the Intergovernmental Committee, did not succeed in convincing the Reich to establish emigration procedures that allowed those departing to bring their property with them. The concern for the refugees evidenced by the calling of the Conference was not followed by any concrete action. The nations which attended agreed to maintain their immigration legislation as it was, except in the case of several South American countries which increased their restrictions.

As this event is evaluated, two things must be firmly kept in mind. First, the serious economic difficulties that accompany a world wide depression cannot be underestimated. For nations with large unemployment problems, the acceptance of even a small number of refugees is a humanitarian gesture. Also, many people were unaware or unable to believe the true nature of the German refugees' plight. British historian A.J. Sherman expresses it this way:

Few if any in responsible government positions could have predicted that would-be immigrants left behind in the Greater Reich faced not merely privation, but an organized and ultimately largely successful attempt at personal annihilation.⁷⁶

Britons writing on Great Britain and Americans on the United States are more sensitive to the humanitarian nature of their respective countries.⁷⁷

However, there is another body of thinkers and writers who view the problem from a different vantage point. A large number of Jews consider the difficulties involved in entering western countries experienced by the refugees to be an action typical of the nations' unfeeling indifference to Jews. If the West did not know the actual nature of the conditions within the Reich, it was because they did not care to know. Certainly in a time of economic troubles, it was easier to ignore the journalists and congressmen who spoke out than to face the truth of the Nazi persecution and the action that this realization required.

NOTES

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- ¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 77.
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- ¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 80.
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- ²²*Ibid.*
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- ²⁴Department of State Bulletin. III (July 20, 1940, 31-33), quoted in Wyman, p. 120.
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- ²⁸Wyman, p. 115.
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- ⁴⁴Wischnitzer, p. 19.
- ⁴⁵Sherman, p. 266.
- ⁴⁶*Ibid.*, p. 265.
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- ⁵⁸James G. McDonald, Letters of Resignation, Dec., 1935, C.

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⁶¹*Ibid.*, p. 136.

⁶²This is similar to the policy of the Nansen Office in dealing with Russian and Armenian refugees earlier under the League.

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⁶⁴*Ibid.*, p. 137.

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⁶⁶Wischnitzer, p. 201.

⁶⁷Ben-Sasson, p. 1022.

⁶⁸Estorick, p. 137.

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⁷⁰*Ibid.*

⁷¹*Ibid.*

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⁷³Estorick, p. 140.

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⁷⁵Franklin Scott, *World Migration in Modern Times* (Englewood Cliffs, 1968), p. 155.

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The Grimke Sisters: Abolitionists and Feminists

by Anne F. Gudaitis

The reform movements that sprang up in the early nineteenth century all seemed to be based on the principle of democracy. Dorothea Dix's reform for improved treatment of the mentally ill was based on the idea that all people deserved decent human treatment. The different religious sects that evolved in this period were based on the idea that God was anxious to save everyone. Even the utopian communities, which hoped to set up an ideal society, based their foundations on the equality and individualism of all. It is not surprising then, that out of this reformist era came a movement concerned with the greatest reform — the liberation of the black slaves. While the abolition movement and the concern for the rights of blacks dated back further than this period, it was not until the 1830's that the spirit of the movement was "struck with the fire of the Grimke's."¹ The Grimke sisters, Sarah and Angelina, through their many public speeches, gave the abolitionists a renewed sense of the importance of their mission. The involvement of two women on such a public level gave rise to the realization of another inequality in American society still existing today, 150 years later, the status of women.

The Grimke sisters were born into a prominent South Carolina family. Sarah, thirteen years older than Angelina, was born in 1792. Their father was an important judge in the South Carolina Supreme Court and sparked an interest in Sarah for legal studies. Although her father "had a higher opinion of feminine mentality than most men of his day,"² he still would not allow his daughter to study law. Finally, the "frustration Sarah experienced from her father's refusal to permit her to learn Latin and later to study law was probably partially compensated for by the emotional gratification and admiration she derived from the special role she played in her younger sister's life."³ Sarah was to play an important role throughout Angelina's life.

Bad childhood memories for both Sarah and Angelina concerning brutalization of slaves and the inability of the church to do anything about the situation led to their rejection of the Episcopalian church, the church in which the girls were raised. Angelina was later to write that the "clergy stand right in the way of reform, and I do not know but this stumbling block too must be

removed before Slavery can be abolished, for the system is supported by them."⁴ On a trip to Philadelphia after her father's death, Sarah was to find her divine inspiration in the Philadelphia Society of Friends. Sarah convinced her sister to join the Friends with her and they lived in a community in Philadelphia for many years teaching school and visiting the poor. Although Angelina was unhappy in the Society because of the lack of personal challenge, it was through the Quakers (the first abolitionists) that she read an anti-slavery pamphlet and "the thwarted Grimke sisters found release for their restless spirits."⁵

It was Angelina, however, who took the first active step in the movement by writing a letter to the famous abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison in support of his work. When Garrison published the letter in the *Liberator* (Sept. 19, 1835), "overnight Angelina created national turmoil."⁶ Anxious to continue in her new found cause, Angelina wrote an essay extremely important in its implications entitled, *Appeal to the Christian Women of the South*. Angelina's appeal was to the Southern women to do something about slavery either through reading, praying, speaking, or acting against it in order to influence their husbands, fathers, or brothers to take action against slavery.⁷ Sarah followed Angelina's lead when she appealed to the clergy in her, *Epistle to the Clergy of the Southern States*. Feeling the need to do more than write and since the "Quakers were the only well-established sect that encouraged women to speak in meeting,"⁸ Angelina and Sarah were prompted to enroll in Theodore Weld's training course at Lane Seminary. The oral training the two sisters received at the seminary was to influence greatly their future as well as the future of both slaves and women.

Both women were capable speakers and "under Weld's tutelage Angelina had become an orator of considerable power."⁹ Starting with parlor talks to small groups of women in Boston, the sisters grew in popularity. Soon men began to attend the talks too; and the "sisters were speaking before mixed audiences, a thing they had never planned to do."¹⁰ The word spread, and the sisters began a speaking tour around Massachusetts becoming the "first female abolitionist agents to press publicly for abolition."¹¹ The popularity of the Grimke sisters lay not only in their excellent training at Lane Seminary, but also "was particularly effective because their Southern background enabled them to speak from experience."¹² All the abolitionists before the sisters had been male Northerners. Angelina's ability to speak from experience was a great contribution to the movement for she "knew how to translate her own revulsion into a virtual orgy of pain and guilt," thereby immersing "each audience in her own neurotic suffering."¹³ The fact that the new abolitionist speakers were women, although a curiosity at first, later became a deterrent and finally a dividing factor in the movement.

It was not only that the Grimke sisters were females preaching in public that led to their promotion of women's rights, but that they called for women to take an active role in the movement themselves. This raised the question of whether women had the social sanction to take part in such issues. The involvement of women in the abolition movement had always been important since "their cause demanded women simply because it required more hands, minds, and creativity."¹⁴ Men were not sure, however, to what extent the involvement of women ought to be. Women, on the other hand, began to identify the campaign for their own rights. It was thought that through emancipation of slaves women could justify their stand on other political issues. Even the large size of the audiences led Sarah to believe that "the time was approaching when Christians would realize that there was neither male nor female but that all were one in Christ."¹⁵ Sarah always had hoped for equality between men and women since her early denial of legal studies because of her sex. It was through their lectures that both sisters now had a platform or their views on women's rights.

They felt that if women were to be effective in the abolitionist movement then they had to "free themselves from the social restraints that kept them humble and silent and learn to speak and act as fully responsible moral beings."¹⁶ The sisters were not alone in their desire for reform in the area of women's rights as well as those of the slaves. William Lloyd Garrison also felt that women had a moral right, equal to that of man, to promote abolitionism. Garrison, however, felt that the sisters were doing enough through their lecturing since "thousands hear you every week who have all their lives held that a woman must not speak in public."¹⁷

Garrison's viewpoint was not widely shared among men. Most felt that "raising the woman question simply muddled and diverted the whole anti-slavery argument."¹⁸ Some advocated that the women were being selfish by putting their demand for rights ahead of a more important one — the Negro's demand for rights.¹⁹ Even Theodore Weld, who by now had fallen in love with Angelina, cautioned, "Don't push your *women's* rights until human rights have gone ahead and broken the path."²⁰

Despite Weld's cautions, the sisters continued to advocate women's rights in their speeches. Events finally culminated in the resignation of eight orthodox clergymen over a dispute about women, which brought a close to the lectures. Angelina and Sarah were mentally and physically exhausted. Before completely retiring from public life, however, Angelina was invited to speak in the State House in Massachusetts on abolition. The invitation, in addition to indicating that the state government was interested in what the abolitionists had to say, was also the first time the Senate House had admitted a woman speaker.²¹ Angelina and Sarah had won a victory in the movement

for recognition of women's rights.

Angelina and Sarah Grimke left the political limelight when Angelina agreed to marry Theodore Weld. Although Weld continued to advocate emancipation on a national level, Angelina confined herself to their home with her sister. Their impact on the early stages of abolitionism had been great. The sisters accomplished the mission they had set forth. The Northerners had been told the truth about horrors of slavery by those who spoke from experience. The people now saw the need for the immediate abolition of slavery. But the Grimke sisters accomplished more than just the abolition cause. They had been the first women to speak in public as well as in a legislative assembly. They brought to the attention of the public the important role a woman can play in social reforms.

Through the Grimke sisters' advocacy of black rights, the first steps were taken for women's rights. Although women's equality was not the initial motive for their outspokenness, they realized that it was a necessary outcome of their actions. The Grimke sisters were a symbol of the concern for democracy in the reforms of the 1830's. They realized equality was needed among all people with no regards to race or sex. The Grimke sisters were perhaps the most complete reformers of their time as well as the present, because they foresaw the reforms still lacking in today's society.

NOTES

¹Lawrence Lader, *The Bold Brahmins* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1961), p. 69.

²Allen Johnson and Dumas Malone, eds., *Dictionary of American Biography* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1931), p. 631.

³Alice S. Rosse, ed., *The Feminist Papers: From Adams to de Beauvoir* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), p. 283.

⁴John L. Thomas, *The Liberator: William Lloyd Garrison* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1963), p. 242.

⁵Benjamin P. Thomas, *Theodore Weld* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1950), p. 136.

⁶Lader, p. 63.

⁷Rossi, p. 297.

⁸B. Thomas, p. 137.

⁹Gilbert Hobbs Barnes, *The Antislavery Impulse, 1830-1844* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1957), p. 155.

¹⁰B. Thomas, p. 137.

¹¹Carol L. Thompson, "Women and the Antislavery Movement," *Current History*, May 1976, p. 199.

¹²"Grimke sisters," *Colliers Encyclopedia*, 1979 ed.

¹³Lader, p. 65.

¹⁴Louis Filler, *The Crusade Against Slavery* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), p. 130.

¹⁵J. Thomas, p. 143.

¹⁶Rossi, p. 287.

¹⁷Barnes, p. 157.

¹⁸Russel B. Nye, *William Lloyd Garrison and the Humanitarian Reform* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1955), pp. 106-7.

¹⁹Barnes, p. 157.

²⁰B. Thomas, p. 149.

²¹Lader, p. 67.